Government should walk the talk with transparency

Originally appeared on the The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

One day, I was enjoying a cup of coffee at a coffee shop in the greater Colombo area located on prime property. A gentleman joined me and we began a conversation. As we spoke, he mentioned he was actually the landlord of the building and had rented it out to someone else.

I asked: “Why are you renting this place? Isn’t it better for you to run this shop so you can earn a better return?” His response was: “Actually, I tried for two years and made a profit too.” I was surprised that renting it was more profitable than running a business.

I inquired about the reasons. He mentioned that he was making a profit of about Rs. 50,000 per month by running his own business and he could not exceed it. But by renting out the same building, he earns about Rs. 350,000 as the rent income.

The rest is not rocket science; when you have the capacity to earn Rs. 350,000, it doesn’t make any sense to settle for 50,000.

But in national economic issues, people often get carried away with just the profit without considering the asset value which generates that revenue.

Divesting of SOE shares

A recent case is the argument against divesting the majority shares of a State-owned telecom company and a hospital. Often, the argument is: “Why should the Government be selling the profit-making entities while the loss-making entities are the problem?”

Of course, the loss-making ones are the main problem, but the Government making a profit doesn’t really reflect whether that profit is worth it or not – as with the case of the landlord of the coffee shop. If the Government makes just Rs. 50,000 when the actual capacity is making Rs. 350,000 with a better purpose, it is in fact a loss of Rs. 300,000.

Many people are not aware of the fact that the Return on Assets (ROA) of the profit-making entities owned by the State is far less than the industry standard. Some are making profits simply by being a monopoly or getting preferential treatment from the Government. The value of the business has to be based on the value of assets it owns. In other words, what matters more is the profitability of the company in relation to its assets.

Motivation for profits

So when we compare the ROA of a Sri Lankan State-owned telecommunications company with the private sector telecommunications companies, it is evident that the State-owned telecom company has a lower ROA compared to private companies. It is not surprising because the motivation for profits comes with ownership.

When there is no owner and when it runs on taxpayer money spent by political appointees, there is no intention of maximising profits. In that structure, the incentive is for longer survival and absorption is reduced as much as possible.

It is a classic case similar to a farmer encroaching on forest land to yield more harvest without considering productivity in the long run. It is not the size of the harvest that matters but the harvest that can be obtained per unit of land. Similarly, it is not the profit gained but the profit in relation to a unit of assets.

On the other hand, we need to realise these losses have to be borne by taxpayers. That is one reason why the Government should not run any business. Even the ones which make profits can easily drift to loss making when governance structures are not in place. It has happened multiple times.

When we restructure SOEs, of course the first preference would be for profit-making ones. It’s not rocket science, since no one wants a loss-making entity. When someone takes a loss-making entity and if the entity has a high level of liabilities, those liabilities have to be absorbed by the Government – meaning, the people.

That is one reason why the Government should not engage with commercial operations because losses are borne by the citizens while the benefits of profits are not necessarily shared among the citizens.

Transparency and accountability key

In the process of reforming or divesting the assets of the State, it is of paramount importance to proceed the transactions on a competitive basis. One reason why people have suspicion over State asset divestments and privatisation is because the previous transactions had a lot of grey areas. Thus, the suspicion is obvious.

If the Government is committed to reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and attracting the right type of investors, the only tool it has is transparency. Any bad transaction will backfire on the rest of the reforms, extending to even debt restructuring and bilateral support. We can only advise and play the role of watchdog – the people who have power should walk the talk.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Salvaging the debt-ridden National Carrier

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Privatising SriLankan Airlines is a hot topic once more, although this discussion is decades old now. Founded as Air Lanka in 1979, the airline was described by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew as “a glamour project, not of great value for developing Sri Lanka”. 

In 1998 Air Lanka signed a 10-year management contract with Dubai-based Emirates Airline for 40% of shares and provided the Emirates management the ability to make most of the management decisions. Air Lanka was rebranded as SriLankan Airlines. However, after 10 years, Emirates realised that the Sri Lankan Government was not going to renew the contract. 

According to SriLankan Airlines Annual Reports from 2008, the final year in which Emirates operated the airline, it made a profit of Rs. 4.4 billion. It was mentioned in some reports that this profit included insurance claims after the terrorist attacks on the Bandaranaike International Airport. 

Fig 1: Losses and Profits of Sri Lankan Airlines

However, since then, SriLankan Airlines has not made a single cent of profit. Cumulatively it has lost Rs. 372 billion since 2008. The airline made a loss of Rs. 44 billion in 2019, Rs. 47 billion in 2020, and Rs. 45 billion in 2021. Losses in 2019 were equivalent to 93% of the Samurdhi scheme’s budget – Samurdhi being the main social safety net in place to protect the poor. The losses were also equivalent to 84% and 90% of the Samurdhi budget in 2020 and 2021, respectively. These losses are equivalent to 17% of 2019’s health sector allocation in the National Budget. 

The problem is both clear and dire. We maintain a national airline at a substantial loss and ask the common people, many of whom don’t even possess a passport or haven’t even stepped on an aeroplane, to foot the bill. In other words, we are maintaining a failing  airline at the expense of the education and healthcare of our people. 

There are multiple reasons why SriLankan Airlines incurs losses. It is too politicised and many politicians and their relatives are not charged for extra baggage when they travel. Board appointments and recruitments have all been politically driven. Simply put, it is bad management. The general remedy for bad management is to replace it with good management so we can make the enterprise profitable. This has been the popular suggestion each time that the privatisation of SriLankan Airlines has been proposed. That is the exact thing we have been trying to do since we ended the management contract with Emirates. 

We have to ask ourselves why the outcome hasn’t changed even after the same remedy has been proposed and implemented repeatedly. Simply put, when you don’t invest sufficient money, time, or reputation into a business, no one has the ability to make it profitable. All the business leaders who have been appointed to lead the firm already have their own businesses, so it is obvious that SriLankan Airlines will become a secondary priority. 

Airlines are a very competitive business. Even privately-owned airlines are finding it difficult to compete and maximise profits, so how can we expect a State-owned and managed airline to do the same? There is a difference between a private company making a loss versus a State-owned company making a loss. A private company’s losses are borne by the private investors, who knowingly and consensually made the choice to invest their money in a potentially risky endeavour. But when public companies make losses, taxpayers have to pay and their money will be spent without their consent. How can this be justified, especially in a country like Sri Lanka where people suffer from a lack of basic needs, and when our healthcare, education, and social safety nets need significant improvement?

So what can be done about SriLankan Airlines? SriLankan Airlines’ business has few strategic units: The airline operation, catering, and the ground handling operation. Each section has some assets as well as liabilities. Overall, the airline has a lot of liabilities and debt. Most of the debt is guaranteed by the Treasury (part of it dollar denominated), which is part of the debt that is to be restructured as per the announcement on 12 April 2022.

Table: Debt guaranteed by Sri Lanka treasury for Sri Lankan Airlines

Accordingly, one option is that we ask strategic investors to pitch in to buy SriLankan outright. The bidding process has to be made transparent and competitive. The airline as a group is making colossal losses, so it is unlikely that we will be able to realise significant proceeds from the sale. As has been said, beggars can’t be choosers. 

Another option is for divisions like catering to be sold at concessionary rates to a potential buyer, again through a competitive bidding process, so that we don’t have to shoulder the burden of managing an operation while also closing any future window for corruption.

There is also the option to explore the feasibility of a similar kind of management contract or a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) similar to that which existed with Emirates. However, our airline is now in such a poor shape financially that the feasibility of a management contract is questionable. 

There are suggestions to list the airline on the Colombo Stock Exchange and allow investors to buy shares. Generally listings are successful when the company is doing well. At the moment, given the present economic conditions of the country and the historical performance of the entity, this may be challenging.   

Finding a strategic investor through a competitive bidding process is still a possibility given our connectivity with the main South Indian airports. Some Indian and international airlines may have an interest in expanding their network and will see a potential win-win situation. 

We have to begin the process of privatisation as it is obvious that we can’t run a business on taxpayer money at a time when the people are struggling for their basic survival. The citizens of Sri Lanka gave the management experts of all political parties and their close associates multiple opportunities over 14 years to turn the airline around and bore significant losses in return. Let us hope that policymakers will understand the gravity of the situation and that they will not allow such a huge drain on our coffers to continue unimpeded. 

For explanation of SLA losses for 4 years.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Timescale confusions in solutions for the crisis

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

A few days after the tsunami, I was called to an expert meeting at Temple Trees by the then Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa. I was seated next to Arisen Ahubudu, the famous giver of names. He stated that we had lost too much territory, including Madagascar, and that we could not afford to lose more. He proposed building a wall around the country, using the traditional techniques used in protecting tank bunds, the ralepanawa. I was stunned that such a nice and well-meaning person could come out with such arrant nonsense. He had confused geological time with human time. 

Timescale confusions of a smaller magnitude are evident among many proposing solutions to our current multi-faceted crisis. 

Solutions to power cuts

We all experience the problem. Some of us understand the cause: no dollars to pay for fuel for the generators that make up for the shortfall from lower production from the hydro generators and Norochcholai. Even if we had the dollars, such fuel is priced in dollars and subject to price fluctuations that we cannot control. It is common sense that we should shift to electricity produced by renewable sources such as solar and wind. 

The problem is that under current market and technology conditions, both the distribution network (low voltage) and the transmission network (high voltage) are limited in how much solar- and wind-generated electricity they can accept. We can, and should, increase the use of electricity from renewable sources, but we need to upgrade the transmission network to be able to do so. Solar panels yield electricity when the sun is out (not at night and not when clouds pass over the panels); the wind will produce electricity even in evenings when our use is highest, but it is still intermittent. Batteries are not cost-effective yet.

Given the need to balance supply and demand of electricity in real-time caused by lack of cost-effective storage technologies, we need a large and modernised system in order to absorb more energy from these intermittent sources. We need to invest in upgrading the national grid and possibly connect to the large Indian grid. Feasibility studies must be done, and investment mobilised. It will take several years for the desired outcomes to be achieved. Increasing solar- and wind-based energy is not a viable solution for our immediate problems, though it is a solution in the long term. Within the applicable timescale, what we need are dollars for coal and diesel.

Promotion of manufacturing

Twin deficits, exacerbated by recent economic mismanagement, caused the crisis. More exports would have addressed the current-account deficit and may have helped with the fiscal deficit if the right tax policy was in place. Roughly $ 11 billion was earned from the export of goods such as apparel, tea, and value-added rubber products before the pandemic. Around $ 7 billion was claimed from service exports such as tourism, software and business process outsourcing. 

It is true that the East Asian Tigers and China took their people out of poverty through the production of goods for export. One has to ask why Sri Lanka (and to a significant extent, the rest of South Asia) failed to ramp up the production of goods for export, relying more heavily on service exports. One could even argue that the apparel industry is a service industry. A tailor who makes a suit out of material given to him is undoubtably a provider of services. The Sri Lankan apparel industry, which is the largest importer as well as the largest exporter, is doing what a tailor does, at scale. If it is manufacturing, it is manufacturing lite.

Until the market opening in 1978, the answer to the question of why we had no industries was that our private sector was weak and lacked capital. Therefore, the State went into manufacturing: steel, plywood, tyres, sugar, paper, shoes, cooking implements, etc. were all produced by fully State-owned enterprises under protection. They produced shoddy goods at high prices for the local market and lost enormous amounts of money. The plywood factory resulted in the clear-cutting of half of Sinharaja. After the market was opened to imports, they went out of business.

Since 1978, we have relied on private investors, with or without foreign partners, to manufacture for export (and for domestic use). They have tended to invest in sectors that did not rely too heavily on cheap energy (because our electricity prices were high, especially for industrial users). Except in the case of a few sectors such as apparel and rubber-based products, our producers failed to secure access to markets. Restrictive laws and para tariffs hindered local producers from getting integrated into global production networks, with very few exceptions. 

So, the industrialisation prescription as a solution to the crisis will take time and effort to implement. We would have to ensure reliable and low-cost energy (and other infrastructure services such as waste disposal), eliminate para-tariffs, and create the conditions for market access. The latter is the most challenging. 

Investors such as Michelin ensured market access for the solid tyres produced in Sri Lanka. The apparel industry also benefited in the early stages from foreign investors who facilitated market access. Attracting such investors and entering into trade agreements are needed for market access. But both take time. 

Industrialisation may be a good solution, but it is not for the Government to decide on manufacturing priorities. Because China has established itself as the factory to the world, countries such as ours must identify and exploit niches. Those best positioned for this are those with intimate knowledge of the markets, with skin in the game, namely private investors. The State must create the conditions and leave the actual investment decisions to such players. All this will occur on a timescale different from what is relevant to emerging from the present crisis.

Constitutional reforms

It has become evident that the hyper-presidential system created by the 1978 Constitution has failed to yield the promised benefits and has caused serious damage after the enactment of the 20th Amendment, which removed all the checks that were placed on the President by the 19th Amendment. For example, the Minister of Finance has stated that specific officials were responsible for the tax cuts that triggered the present crisis and the delay in debt restructuring. In the current system, the sole authority for those appointments was the President who must therefore be held accountable for the current crisis.

To address the demands of the protestors, the President must go. He must resign or be impeached. The former can take place immediately would allow the country to return to normal (if such a condition exists after the devastation wreaked by the President and his appointees). The time taken to impeach will be too long. 

The next best solution is to reduce the powers of the President. This would require a Constitutional amendment. An amendment that is approved by Cabinet can be completed within around six weeks. If it is moved as a private member’s motion, it could take more than six months, outside the timeframe needed to calm the country and get the debt restructuring done. The announcement that the Government is proposing the restoration of the 19th Amendment suggests a solution within the required timescale. Of course, it would be necessary to scrutinise the proposed amendment and ensure the President’s powers are meaningfully reduced immediately.

In innumerable discussions I have participated in, I hear proposals for Constitutional reform that pay no heed to the time factor. Some talk of a Constitution authored by the people, modelled on what is going on in Chile. The process began with an amendment to the Constitution and a referendum in 2020. This was followed by an election for a Constituent Assembly in April 2021. Its deliberations are ongoing. How realistic is this kind of process for the kinds of issues that have brought our people to the streets?

In these days of limited attention (and paper supplies), it would be useful if greater weight is given to the appropriateness of the proposed solutions for the time needed to solve the problems that beset us.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

How can affordable electricity be assured 24x7?

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

The best way to understand the value of something is to experience life without it. These days, the Government is giving us a crash course on the value of reliable electricity supply. An unpleasant lesson, but nonetheless a learning opportunity.

If we probe the causes of load shedding, the learning can be deeper. Load shedding can be eliminated but at a cost. When hydropower declines due to periodic drought, the difference can be made up with generators running on imported fuel, the dollar price of which is determined by world market conditions. We can have 24x7 electricity, but not at an affordable price.

The Government created the immediate conditions for unreliable electricity supply through mismanagement of the country’s external debt. Today’s problems are not caused by delays in building additional generating capacity; they are caused by the lack of dollars to provide fuel for the existing generating plants. But there were deeper weaknesses in the organically developed system that must be understood.

With benchmark crude oil prices going over $ 100 per barrel, we must rethink our dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Reducing dependence on fossil fuels

Examination of the composition of our imports (Figure 1) shows that refined petroleum and crude oil taken together is the largest or second largest category of what is imported. It follows then that reducing the import of petroleum products would be an action that would satisfy many: those concerned about global warming will be made happy; those who want self-sufficiency would also be pleased. 

Petroleum imports are not used solely for electricity generation. But the way to reduce the consumption of petroleum products for transportation also involves electricity generated by renewables: buses and trains that are powered by electricity; lorries, cars, three-wheelers, and two-wheelers that are powered by electricity. Promoting electric vehicles makes no sense unless electricity comes from renewable sources. 

The significant increase in expenditure for fossil fuels starting in 2011 (Figure 2) appears correlated with the massive increase in the vehicle stock after the end of the conflict, leading to a doubling by 2014. Luckily, the biggest increase was in two wheelers, which do not take up a lot of road space and consume less fuel. 

Generating electricity from renewables does require some imported elements such as low-cost, efficient turbines and photo-voltaic panels but the costs and dependence is nowhere near that which exists with imported oil and natural gas. In fact, it may be possible even to export electricity at certain times of the day or even for months on end. But this will require substantial investment in the transmission grid.

Preconditions for increasing use of renewables

An economics commentator whose work I follow had expressed puzzlement at “demand for electricity is higher than supply” being given as a reason for load shedding. Others had expressed outrage at some Facebook posts that I had shared, which stated that solar and wind could not provide a complete solution to our energy woes. These responses by well-meaning and intelligent commentators made me realise the need for a better understanding of how the electricity is generated, transmitted, and distributed.

For all practical purposes using currently affordable technology, electricity must be treated as something that cannot be stored (but see discussion of pumped storage below). That means that it must be generated at the same time as people consume electricity by activating lights or appliances. Peak consumption in Sri Lanka (in the evening hours starting from around 6:30 p.m.) is around 2 or 2.5 times that of lowest use which is around 1000 MW. 

That necessitates a cheap source of baseload electricity that can be drawn upon throughout the day. In addition, we must have other sources that can be mobilised as demand increases. One would think that the major hydroelectric plants that have been built on the main rivers which generate cheap electricity that is unaffected by world market prices and the value of the rupee could serve as the source of baseload power. But there are constraints, such as competing demands from agriculture. The weather affects hydropower, as we are experiencing now. 

Therefore, planners in the past argued for coal as the ideal baseload for Sri Lanka. If Norochcholai does not keep breaking down and operates optimally, it can give 900 MW continuously whether or not the rains come. But it does break down, and it appears there have been irregularities in coal purchases. Coal, even if procured on long-term contracts at the lowest possible price, still must be paid for in dollars.

There are those who argue that Sri Lanka has plenty of wind and sun, and we can solve all problems by shifting to wind and sun. But the simple fact is that these are intermittent sources. Solar does not produce electricity when the sun does not shine and produces less when clouds cover the sun. Wind can produce throughout the day and night, but there are times when the wind dies down. It requires complex system controls to blend these intermittent sources into a centralised system designed for large, stable and controllable generators. 

Countries have incorporated massive amounts of intermittent renewable sources. In 2019, 47% of Denmark’s electricity came from wind. But they have a very sophisticated grid that is capable of handling intermittent power sources, and they use interconnections with other national systems to help balance the system. So, for example, when excess power is generated by the Danish wind turbines, it is used to pump water back up into reservoirs in Norway and Sweden (a method of storing electricity in the form of water known as pumped storage), which can then be run through turbines again to produce more electricity when needed. Yet with all that, Danish consumers pay more for electricity than their neighbours.

Similarly, if Sri Lanka is to increase the use of intermittent power sources, we will have to upgrade the grid and the system control centre’s software. Given the difficulties of synchronising the frequencies to one big plant such as Victoria, it may even be necessary to gradually convert the grid to direct current. If the Sri Lankan grid is connected via a high voltage direct current cable to the Southern Indian grid, the much larger combined system can absorb a greater amount of wind and solar power. 

Interconnecting does not mean that a country gives up on generating its own electricity. It simply means that marginal amounts of electricity will flow in either direction when it is advantageous to two (or more) systems. The fact that the peaks are different in the two systems can also be used to reduce the high costs incurred at peak.

It may be necessary to directly link revenues derived from regulated prices to those who make the substantial investments needed for the grid. This will almost necessarily require a restructuring of the current ungainly, unresponsive, and money-losing CEB in a manner that allows the transmission unit to be run efficiently. 

All these options require careful study in terms of costs, benefits and energy security. The relations between Denmark and its neighbours are such that all the parties can be confident about the contracts being respected and any disputes that arise being settled in a fair manner. We must ensure that the interconnection agreements with India have all these safeguards. The precedent of India’s interconnections with Bhutan shows that mutual interdependence is achievable in South Asia. The experience in Europe where interconnection, including over long distances across water, is growing rapidly even after Brexit, will have to be studied. 

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

Government must resign itself to reforms – now

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

My school Advanced Level biology teacher used to tell me how to study for exams. Her main advice was that the first step was to ‘make a decision to study’. I would think to myself, ‘Haven’t we all decided that we need to study?’ 

But she would explain the power of decision making, which applied everytime we make a decision – be it consciously or unconsciously – and mention life every time we had to make a decision: “Not making a decision is a decision. Thinking to ourselves to study later is also a decision. Studying now is a decision. Not studying is also a decision.” 

I realised that it’s all about the thousands of decisions that we make everyday. All of our destinations will be determined by such small decisions. What we are today is based on the decisions that we made in the past; what we will be tomorrow is based on decisions we make today.

The same lesson applies to our economic policy as well. It appears that our policymakers have made a decision to not make any decisions on the public policy front. Since the initial stages of Covid-19, multiple reports have been submitted by experts and the Government has even called for multiple reports on the current economic situation. There was an initial report by the Pathfinder Foundation which focused solely on the pandemic. Then a ‘Road Map for Economic Recovery’ was launched by the Advocata Institute. 

In fact, the President called for a deregulation report, which was chaired by Krishan Balendran and Lalith Weeratunga. Suggestions were handed over by the Delegation of German Industry and Commerce (1) to the Deregulation Committee. There were many other suggestions and ideas by many other stakeholders, including the Chamber of Commerce, on the brewing economic crisis. It was recently reported that the Pathfinder Foundation submitted another report to the Minister of Finance based on the findings of a tripartite discussion between experts from Sri Lanka, Japan, and India. 

After all these suggestions, the decision to delay reforms may have multiple reasons, of which which we can only guess. But keeping assumptions aside, the more we delay, the closer we get pinned to the wall with limited choices to escape from the crisis.

Economic reforms must always be looked at in a political context. Whether the present political power balance supports the reforms is a key question. While many are of the view that with a two-thirds majority reforms can be done, it seems otherwise. Reforms are going to be quite painful so it seems that policymakers are reluctant to push hard reforms, as they are scared that the citizens’ frustration during the reform period may dilute the political capital they enjoy.  Further, this may even cause them to lose the super-majority. 

Even the Minister of Finance has admitted that the State sector and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are a massive burden to Government coffers; yet no State sector reform programme is even on the table. Politics is obviously the concern of the Government and State sector employees and their families are a massive voter bloc. Some of them would lose their jobs or would be pushed into mandatory retirement which would not help politics at the ground level. So reforms are put on the back burner and the Government continues to procrastinate. 

On the other front, the more that we delay reforms, the more the people get frustrated with disturbances to their regular day-to-day activities and businesses, including shortages of essentials such as LP gas, fuel, milk powder, cement, etc. The Government is stuck between a rock and a hard place – whether it carries out reforms or not, its popular support and political capital will be diluted either way. Therefore, my view is that it is better to bite the bullet and carry out reforms, as procrastination is just going to make things worse in the long run.

Another reason that reforms are delayed could be that the energy and focus of policymakers and politicians is spent mainly on fire-fighting day-to-day micro-problems. The situation is such that everyday has become a challenge for the Government to find US Dollars for importing basics and debt repayments.

Weather conditions impacting hydropower generation and global crude oil prices reaching nearly $ 100 a barrel are making our crisis worse. So far our policymakers’ strategy has been to completely depend on swaps. 

Over the last few weeks, India provided us with swaps and credit lines worth $ 1.5 billion and China with another Yuan 10 billion (approximately $ 1.5 b), of which basic information such as interest rates and payment conditionality has yet to be published. Interestingly, the total amount of swaps and credit lines are equivalent to six times the value of the MCC Grant, which created an extensive social discussion on the attached binding conditions which caused the President to appoint a committee to evaluate the grant agreement.

But our economic crisis is such that we are extremely desperate for foreign exchange. We had a presidential commission for a mere $ 480 million grant at a time when people had a deeper sensitivity to the potential conditions, whereas now we have decided to borrow six times more than that without any political party, media, or public figure having voiced their concerns. 

The decisions available at hand for all political parties are limited and difficult. It has come down to simply having the courage to implement reforms. Politics or party lines have become irrelevant as the prescription will not change regardless of the person in the driver’s seat.

Since 1977 and 1990 there has been no effort for any hard economic reforms, so many policymakers think that hard reforms will dilute their popularity. As a result, procrastination on reforms has become the norm. At the same time, the practice and knowhow of driving reforms have not been common. But the truth is that reforms will have less damage on political capital, while not undertaking reforms will have far more serious consequences. Stagnation won’t take us anywhere, but reforms will. 

References

1 https://srilanka.ahk.de/aktuelles/news-details/handover-of-report-on-the-simplification-of-existing-laws-and-regulations-in-sri-lanka

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

State-owned enterprises: A major crisis in the making

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Island, Ada Derana Biz, Ground Views and The Morning

By Migara Rodrigo

Sri Lankan State-Owned Enterprises: A Major Crisis in the Making

Sri Lanka has a whopping 527 state-owned enterprises (1) (SOEs). The 55 SOEs classified as “strategically important” alone employ 10% of the public sector workforce (2) or about 1.9% of all workers. Such a large number of SOEs are not the norm globally(3); many other countries (such as India) have been reducing their stakes in SOEs and, in some cases (e.g. Air India), have been privatizing them entirely. SOEs - particularly many in Sri Lanka - tend to be grossly inefficient, loss-making, and a burden on the taxpayer. The time is ripe for major SOE reforms. 

What is an SOE?

An SOE is traditionally defined as a commercial entity that has majority ownership/control by a nation’s government – in Sri Lanka, this can include statutory bodies, regulatory agencies, promotional institutions, educational institutions, public and limited companies. While Sri Lankan SOEs have traditionally been incorporated by an Act of Parliament, in recent years these entities have also been incorporated under the Companies Act instead. 

Sri Lankan SOEs can be divided into three categories: 55 Strategic SOEs, 287 SOEs with commercial interests, and 185 SOEs with non-commercial interests. Unlike nations such as India which mandate internal audits of their SOE’s business activities and publish an annual overview with a balance sheet of each individual business, the majority of Sri Lankan SOEs do not reveal this pertinent information to the public; financial information is available for just 10.4% of SOEs. 

Fundamental problems with Sri Lankan SOEs

Contrary to what some believe, low quality of talent is not the most significant issue with SOEs; many employees are eminently qualified and capable. Unfortunately, these organisations fall victim to government mismanagement and corruption. In addition to excessive employment to fulfil their political ambitions, there have been allegations that some SOEs have been formed purely to facilitate corruption – for example, the Lanka Coal Company engaged in fraudulent deals to purchase coal causing a loss of over Rs. 4 billion (allegedly with the knowledge of the minister in charge)(4). 

SOE financials are late and few obtain ‘clean’ audit reports. Investigations have revealed repeated instances of fraud, mismanagement, corruption and negligence. Furthermore, the internal control, monitoring and governance frameworks seem inadequate to deal with these problems – of over 500 SOEs, regular information is only available for 55. Even obtaining a complete list of entities proved to be a challenge. Public access to information is limited – the Department of Public Enterprises has not released an annual report since 2018, and right-to-information requests often go unanswered.

Figure 1 Source: Ginting, Edimon et al, 2020, Reforms, Opportunities, and Challenges for State-Owned Enterprises, Asian Development Bank

Moreover, SOEs have few budget constraints and shareholder (public) accountability and therefore have limited incentive to control costs. Unlike with private sector enterprises, which have a need to make a profit, many SOEs (particularly in Sri Lanka) can simply borrow from other state organisations/banks or the government when they require additional funds, which undermines the threat of bankruptcy as a source of discipline(5). Some recently established SOEs have found a new way of bypassing budgets and oversight: by incorporating as companies rather than through an act of Parliament, they are excluded from Parliamentary accountability and allowed to rack up unsustainable debts and surpass budgets more easily. This has led to SOEs burning through taxpayer rupees: the cumulative losses of the 55 strategic SOEs from 2006-20 amounts to Rs. 1.2 trillion.

Finally, while some SOEs do manage to make a profit this is, more often than not, due to the advantage that these companies have in an uneven playing field. In addition to lax budgetary requirements and the ability to rack up unsustainable debts, these companies are supported by the government through direct subsidies and state-backed guarantees; by regulators through exemptions from antitrust policies and preferential treatment; and by the justice system through an ability to sidestep parliament. This has led to private sector organisations being crowded out of the industries that SOEs operate in. Instead of having private firms in the marketplace with efficient and high-quality services, the Sri Lankan taxpayer is beset with SOEs with total liabilities of 4-5% of GDP(6).

Potential reforms 

Given that the nation has reached an economic tipping point, with serious questions about debt sustainability and government solvency, it is clear that immediate action must be taken. Advocata proposes a short-term policy solution consisting of privatisation, restructuring and disinvestment, and listing on the Colombo Stock Exchange. None of these solutions are particularly radical in the global or local context. According to Lankan Angel Network Director Anarkali Moonesinghe, the two main policies of both Western and Eastern governments when reforming SOEs are to reduce subsidies and increase efficiency, forcing SOEs to compete more equitably with private enterprises.

Alternatively, full or partial privatisation is a possible solution: SLT-Mobitel’s service has markedly improved following its 1997 privatisation and the entrance of competitors such as Dialog Axiata, all held accountable by the broadly competent Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. Listing on the CSE would allow these firms to have broad-based direct ownership, while also improving the growth of the CSE and capital markets. Importantly, these firms would have to be ‘corporatised’ before listing, an opportunity to improve productivity and eliminate bloat. 

There are, unfortunately, firms that will essentially have to be given away due to their huge debts and poor reputations. A prime example of this is SriLankan Airlines, which has racked up Rs. 316 billion in losses (7) since control was taken from Emirates in 2008. While some will regard this as a blow to our national pride, Sri Lanka would not be alone in taking such a pragmatic step to improve government finances and customer experience; Air India, the Indian national carrier, is currently in the process of being sold to the Tata Group for the relatively small sum of INR 18,000 crore. This would also inspire confidence in Sri Lanka amongst foreign investors as it would show the country’s commitment to meeting its upcoming debt servicing obligations.

Furthermore, long-term solutions include strengthening governance/limiting corruption and influence, improving efficiency, enacting cost-reflective pricing, and finally unbundling key sectors. This applies particularly to firms like the Ceylon Electricity Board which, as a natural monopoly, cannot be broken up and privatised without losing efficiency. A 2006 study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency recommended breaking up CEB into three parts: “making the generation, transmission, and distribution divisions…independent” (8). Despite the 15 years and multiple nationwide blackouts that have occurred since, GoSL continues to drag their feet on the issue, as it is politically unpopular. 

Cost-reflective pricing (also prevented due to political unpopularity) is another essential reform. The existing system of having electricity tariffs priced below cost is a public subsidy whose cost will be borne by future generations. It is also inequitable, as the Government could provide low-cost services to those who need it by giving them direct cash transfers, instead of subsidising the wealthy who can afford to pay. A similar situation is evident with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which currently makes a loss of Rs. 23-38 per litre of fuel (9); again, a public subsidy to those who can often afford to pay the market price. Finally, greater accountability, by means of annual internal audits and the availability of SOEs’ financial information to the public, is also important to ensure these firms stick to the targets they are given.

A successful and thriving market, in most industries, will only occur with the presence of three crucial factors: competition, a good framework, and competent regulation. By reforming Sri Lanka’s SOEs to meet these criteria, we will ensure a good customer experience, a reduction in the government deficit, and general prosperity for all key stakeholders. 

References:

1 Ratnsabapathy, Ravi et al, 2019, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka, Advocata Institute

2 Dissanayake, Imesha, 2021, SOE Reforms; the Impetus for Post Pandemic Economic Revival, Ceylon Chamber of Commerce

3 Büge, Max et al, State-owned enterprises in the global economy: Reason for concern? Last modified: May 2nd, 2013 

4 ColomboPage.com, President to take action against removal of head of Lanka Coal Company, Last modified: January 21st, 2017, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_17A/Jan21_1484983651CH.php

5 Ratnsabapathy, et al, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka

6 WorldBank.org, South Asia Must Reform Debt-Accumulating State-Owned Banks and Enterprises to Avert Next Financial Crisis, Last modified: June 29th, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/24/south-asia-must-reform-debt-accumulating-state-owned-banks-and-enterprises

7 PublicFinance.lk, Sri Lankan Airlines: Annual and Accumulated Loss to the Public, Last modified: 24th August 2021, https://publicfinance.lk/en/topics/Sri-Lankan-Airlines:-Annual-and-Accumulated-Loss-to-the-Public-1629789830

8 Saito, Yoshitaka et al, 2006, Master Plan Study on the Development of Power Generation and Transmission System in Sri Lanka, Japan International Cooperation Agency Economic Development Department

9 EconomyNext.com, Sri Lanka’s CPC says petrol, diesel losses rise as LIOC hikes prices, Last modified: 25th October 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lankas-cpc-says-petrol-diesel-losses-rise-as-lioc-hikes-prices-87276/#modal-one

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Sri Lanka’s unwieldy state sector: A growing burden?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Recently a minister proudly proclaimed that the Government, for the last two years, has recruited approximately 45,000 new civil servants who have failed their Ordinary Level (O/L) examinations (of those who have studied up to the O/Ls). Comparing this to government recruitment of about 22,145 workers during the 2015-2019 Yahapalanaya regime, he explained that the present Government has recruited about 60,000 new workers for the state sector. 

While most ministers and parliamentarians see the recruitment numbers for the Government as an achievement from a business and economic point of view, the tail-heavy government cadre is one of the key reasons for Sri Lanka’s poor economic performance. 

We have more than 1.5 million state sector employees – a figure which has doubled since 2005. Their burden on the taxpayer is not a one-off expense, but one that is long term, as their pensions accumulate throughout the state sector and sometimes are even transferable to their spouses. 

The reasoning for increasing the size of the government cadre is part of a popular yet vicious cycle. For most politicians and political parties, job offers in the state sector are one way of establishing their political brand image for the next election – a priority over effectively managing taxpayer money. On the flip-side, for most of the unqualified voters the carrot for supporting the uneducated politicians is a government job opportunity with low work/productivity requirements and a tidy pension. 

When looking at the structure of the cadre, it is mostly chauffeurs, clerks, office assistants, and other unskilled/menial workers who have been recruited. Skilled jobs are very limited in the Government. As a result of high expenditure on the bottom-heavy structure of the Government, skilled job openings at the top cannot offer competitive salaries compared to the private sector. The outcome of this is that top-level jobs in the state are occupied by poorly skilled officers with low intellectual capacity. Furthermore, as a result of poor pay, top-level public officers have a significant incentive to engage in corrupt practices to remunerate themselves. One of the main reasons for white collar corruption across all ministries is the twin problem of offering non-competitive salaries and their natural result: poor leaders in top positions. Many ministry secretaries earn a salary that amounts to less than Rs. 100,000 per month. By contrast, it is likely that a high-skilled junior executive with an undergraduate degree would earn a better salary and enjoy a better work-life balance in the private sector. 

The recent statement by one of the ministers of the Government proves that the view inside the Government on state sector employment is divided. The Minister of Finance has stated that the state sector is becoming a significant burden for the Government (particularly due to mounting debt repayment concerns), and went on to propose an increase of the retirement age in the state sector to 65. 

Over-staffing of state workers is not inherent to one government. A viral social media video released during the last regime drew great controversy for that government, as it showed the then Minister of Housing (now Leader of the Opposition) interviewing candidates and directing his subordinates to choose workers for security and labourer jobs based on height. The aforementioned statement by a present minister about the Government hiring 45,000 candidates who failed their O/L examinations is purely an indicator that all governments subscribe to the same, flawed ideology – that expanding the state sector is a pathway to development. 

The salary scale for unskilled staff in government offices are in the range of Rs. 30,000-45,000 per month; as a result many of them simply stay in their offices needlessly (burning electricity generated on imported fuel) to claim a very high overtime income. Once, a chairman of a state authority mentioned (during a personal conversation) that he has to approve overtime pay for many drivers that is higher than the entire take-home salary package of the Chairman himself.

The situation is similar in many government institutions. Executive level state workers – who are not entitled to overtime pay – simply block every file and proposal and try to extort money out of the applicants. Alternatively, they may try to claim bills which are not spent on their other perks (e.g. travel expenses, fuel, etc.) and earn some extra money. 

This has always been the vicious cycle of state jobs. Now, the situation has deteriorated to the point that the Government is finding it difficult to keep even extremely important employees such as the directors and chairman of the Board of Investments (BOI), due to the pressure mounting from unskilled workers and trade unions over the salary hikes of the board. When the employment structure is unbalanced and too bottom-heavy, the final outcome is that the tail end takes control – with trade union activities and strikes completely disrupting all activities of citizens and the government alike. 

Attracting billion dollar investments is a highly skilled job which requires a specific sales mindset, credibility, intellectual power, and a business network to perform. Throughout the world, the work of investment bankers and high-level sales executives is very well compensated. Hence, it is doubtless that for investment promotions, Sri Lanka will require very highly skilled individuals. However, investors will not be attracted to Sri Lanka by merit of our talent alone; a regulatory framework that is conducive to business activities is also necessary to attract foreign direct investment inflows. In a bottom-heavy organisational structure, when salary increments are taken by the senior level staff or when top executives are recruited, bottom-level employees get concerned that their salaries will be affected by higher resource absorption by the senior level. This is the case in many institutions and public enterprises in Sri Lanka.  

Sri Lanka’s state sector is, without a doubt, too large and expensive for us to maintain. It’s exploding to a level beyond our control. If we fail to implement reforms as fast as possible, the situation would be disastrous for both the state sector as well as the private sector. The best solution for our current problems is economic reforms. The idea that the state can maintain its public capital by simply hiring more workers is a myth. Without reform, we will soon lose both our solvent economy and our politicians’ credibility and political capital. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Air India sold; privatise SriLankan now

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

Privatisation should not take into account the nationality of the purchaser, but that a foreign acquisition would, on balance, yield a more sustainable solution

Air India, which was losing $ 3 million a day on average (over $ 1 billion per year) has been sold for what amounts to loose change for a conglomerate the size of Tata Sons: $ 400 million plus the assumption of $ 2 billion out of the massive debts in excess of $ 8 billion accumulated by the state-owned carrier over the years.

But this is a good deal for the people of India. It is one that we in Sri Lanka should study and emulate.

Air India, founded by the Tatas in 1932, was expropriated by the state a few years after independence. It, and Indian Airlines which was merged with it a few years back, had the backing of the state, unlimited financing, and monopoly rights in both the domestic and international segments. Yet, service was awful, and profits were rare. 

As the market was opened to competition, first in the domestic segment and then in the international, the two state-owned airlines failed to meet the challenge. Even today, Air India is smaller than IndiGo, an airline which commenced operations in 2005.

The greatest benefit to the public is the avoidance of subsidising the airline. The government will still have to deal with the remaining debts of the company but at least the liabilities will not keep growing. And if the Tatas manage to turn it around, the government will receive tax revenues.

100% sale

It took the Modi government four years to get to this point in the sale. But in fact, various Indian governments have been trying to do something about this bleeding sore for much longer. Earlier attempts failed because the government was trying to keep an ownership stake and the ability to interfere in management. 

In 1998, the Kumaratunge government sold only 40% of the money-losing and inefficient Air Lanka for $ 70 million. It bundled the sale with a 10-year management contract to Emirates. But given the crudity of how the letter and spirit of the management contract was violated by the government in a fit of pique, it was unlikely that any new investor/manager would trust the government of Sri Lanka to keep its word.

Back in the 1990s or even in the following decade, state-owned airlines were seen as having value. But over time, the environment has changed, and they are beginning to look less like marquee investments and more like collections of landing slots and aircraft. With the present transaction, more attention is being paid to Air India’s Heathrow landing slots than the value of its brand or the prestige of being a flag carrier. The airline business is a regulated activity vulnerable to state interference and coercion. Even having 100% ownership is not going to protect an airline with the major presence in a national market from the caprice of a head of state annoyed that his entourage did not all get seats in business class. But it is better than having thieves foisted on the airline as managers. The thievery engaged in by SriLankan management is now in the public record, thanks to the Airbus investigation. 

For how much?

Even when Emirates was remitting dividends to Treasury, the airline itself was not profitable (though it was not haemorrhaging money like after Emirates departed); the real money makers were catering and ground handling, which were monopolies. The considerable pressures that will be exerted to bundle these activities along with the airline to show a less cringeworthy sale price should be resisted. 

Once we get rid of the money-guzzling airline, action should be taken to provide the best possible services to all airlines without discrimination through optimal use of the tools of competition: competition for the market and competition in the market.

The Government can save face by manipulating the debt component of the sale, as has been demonstrated in India. Because the government of India is absorbing more of the debt than the stated sale price of $ 2.4 billion or the actual cash component of $ 400 million, an uncharitable observer could even claim that the Modi government is giving away an airline for nothing. But that disregards how much is saved by not having the white elephant in government hands: more than $ 1 billion a year.

With SriLankan, the avoided losses to Treasury would be Rs. 99 million a day, the average per day loss incurred by the airline in 2018, 2019 and 2020. The less abnormal years of 2018 and 2019 were included lest it be said that no general claims could be made from losses in a pandemic year. Rs. 99 million ($ 0.5 million a day) is quite a bit lower than Air India’s $ 3 million a day benchmark. But it must be remembered that most things in India are around 50 times the size of Sri Lanka, whereas the daily loss is only six times. 

But still, not losing Rs. 36 billion per year ($ 180 million) a year would be nice. That’s close to one fourth of what the Government spent on pensions in 2020. In times like this, every billion matters.

But it should be Sri Lankan

Once I was on a TV talk show with JVP leader, making headway with the argument that the taxes paid on potatoes and milk powder by a housewife in Siyambalanduwa should not be spent on subsidising SriLankan Airlines. He conceded that such subsidies were wrong and that the government appeared incapable of running an airline. But he said, why do we have to sell it to foreigners? Why cannot some good Sri Lankan capitalists take it over and run it professionally? 

So shocked was I by this ceding of ground that I was unable to properly respond, which I will do now. My first response would have been to say that from a Marxian perspective the nationality of the capitalist makes no difference. Exploitation is no less objectionable because the capitalist carries the same passport as the exploited. But then, perhaps Marxism is no longer relevant, this being three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and all that. 

As a consumer why would I care about anything other than the price-quality bundle offered by the airlines offering service to the destinations I wished to travel to? If one of the airlines happened to be a lossmaker like Air India or SriLankan, subsidised by other people’s tax dollars, that would be even better for me as a consumer. 

But then, it could be argued that this was a form of predatory pricing, whereby even efficient airlines were driven to rack and ruin because they have to match the artificially low prices of the state-subsidised carriers. As a consumer I would not care, but perhaps as a policy maker I may. The remedy for this would be some form of inter-state agreement not to offer subsidies, as there exists in the European Union.

But this would be a digression, because the whole point of privatising to a foreign or domestic investor would be to get away from subsidising the flying rich. If the investor believed he would not be bailed out, he would run the business in a responsible manner, offering reasonable prices and withdrawing from ruinous competition where such popped up. The only danger would be the state (or the Cardinal through the state) exerting pressure not to withdraw from unprofitable routes, something SriLankan is very familiar with.

Who would be able to better resist such pressures, a domestic or a foreign investor? The answer being the latter, I would conclude that privatisation should not take into account the nationality of the purchaser, but that a foreign acquisition would, on balance, yield a more sustainable solution.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

Reform or Perish. It’s not too late

Originally appeared on The Island, ColomboTelegraph and Groundviews

By K.D.D.B Vimanga and Naqiya Shiraz

The Sri Lankan economy faces a historical crisis.  The root causes are the twin deficits. First, the persistent fiscal deficit - the gap between government expenditure and income. Second, the external current account deficit - the gap between total exports and imports.  The problems have been festering for too long. Without urgent reforms, the crisis could easily morph into a full-blown debt crisis. 

Sovereign debt workouts are extremely painful for citizens. A mangled debt restructuring can perpetuate the sense of crisis for years or even decades. A return to normal economic activity may be delayed, credit market access frozen, trade finance unavailable.

With the global pandemic, these are unusual and difficult times. The next five years are going to be crucial for the country.  The problems can no longer be avoided and should be faced squarely. The journey ahead is going to be painful but the longer these are delayed the worse the problem becomes and the magnitude of the damage compounds. 

The State of the Economy 

The new government inherited a fragile economy, battered by the Easter attacks of 2019, the constitutional crisis of October 2018 and the worst drought in 40 years in 2017. With the pandemic in 2020 Sri Lanka’s economy shrank by 3.6% with all sectors of the economy contracting. 

Yet, the pandemic is not the sole cause - it only accelerated the decline of Sri Lanka’s economy that was weak to begin with.  The country has long been plagued by structural weaknesses, with growth rates in the last few years even below the average growth rate during the war. Mismanaged government expenditure coupled with a long term decline in revenue have characterised Sri Lanka’s fiscal policy. As of 2020 total tax as a percentage of GDP fell to just 8%, while recurrent expenditure increased. 

Borrowing to finance the persistent budget deficits is proving to be unsustainable. Total government debt rose to 101% of GDP in 2020 and has grown since. Sovereign downgrades have shut the country from international debt markets. The foreign reserves declined from US$ 7.6 bn in 2019 to US$ 5.7bn at the end of 2020 and to US$ 2.8 bn by July 2021. This level of reserves is equivalent to less than two months of imports. With future debt obligations also in need of financing, the situation is dire. 

The import restrictions placed to combat this foreign exchange crisis have failed to achieve their purpose and are doing more harm than good. imports rose 30% in the first half of  2021 compared to 2020 despite stringent restrictions.

The problem lies not in the trade policy but in loose fiscal and monetary policy that has increased demand pressures within the economy, drawing in imports and leading to the balance of payments crisis and consequently the depreciation of the currency.  

Measures by the Central Bank to address this by exchange rate controls and moral suasion have caused a shortage of foreign currency leading to a logjam in imports.

Fundamental and long-running macroeconomic problems were  intensified by the pandemic.Import restrictions, price and exchange controls do not address the real causes.

Treating symptoms instead of the underlying causes is a recipe for disaster.

The continuation of such policies will lead to the deterioration of the economy,  elevate scarcities, disadvantage the poor who are more vulnerable and in the long run lead to even higher prices and lower output due to lack of investment. 

Sri Lanka’s GDP growth over the last decade has been alternating between short periods of high growth and prolonged periods of low growth. This is a result of the state-led, inward-looking policies of the last decade.

A comprehensive reform agenda must be built around  five fundamental pillars:

i) fiscal consolidation - The need to manage government spending within available resources and to reduce debt are paramount. Revenue mobilization must improve but the control of expenditure cannot be ignored. Budgetary institutions must be strengthened and there must be reviews not only of the scale of spending but also the scope of Government.

 ii) Much of government expenditure is rigid - the bulk comprises salaries, pensions and interest so reducing these is a long term process. Reforming State Enterprises, especially in the energy sector and Sri Lankan Airlines is less difficult and could yield substantial savings. Continued operation of  inefficient and loss-making SOE’s is untenable under such tight fiscal conditions. Financing SOE’s from state bank borrowings and transfers from government reduces the funds available for vital and underfunded sectors such as healthcare and education. Excessive SOE debt also  weakens the financial sector and increases the contingent liabilities of the state. Therefore SOE reforms commencing with improving governance, transparency, establishing cost reflective pricing and privatisation are necessary. This can take a significant weight off the public finances and by fostering competition contribute to improvements in overall economic  productivity. 

iii) Tighten monetary policy and maintain exchange rate flexibility.  Immediate structural reforms include, Inflation targeting, ensuring the independence of the central bank by way of legislation and enabling the functioning of a flexible exchange rate regime. Further significant  attention has to be placed on the  financial sector stability with a cohesive financial sector consolidation plan, with special emphasis on restructuring of SOE debt. 

 iv) Supporting trade and investment. Sri Lanka cannot achieve economic growth without international trade which means linking to  global production sharing networks. Special focus has to be given to reducing Sri Lanka’s high rates of protection which creates a domestic market bias in the economy along with measures to improve trade facilitation and attract new export oriented FDI. 

Attempts to build local champions supported by high levels of protection have 

(a) diverted resources away from competitive businesses, 

(b) created a hostile environment for foreign investment, 

(c) been detrimental to consumer welfare,

(d) dragged down growth

v) Structural reforms to increase productivity and attract FDI - Productivity levels in Sri Lanka have not matched pace with the rest of the growing economies. The reforms mentioned above are extensively discussed in Advocata’s  latest publication “Framework for Economic Recovery”.

Sri Lanka  stumbled into the coronavirus crisis in bad shape,with weak finances; high debt and widening fiscal deficits. It no longer has the luxury to delay painful reforms. Failure to do so will not only jeopardize the economy; it could even spawn social and humanitarian crises.

Naqiya Shiraz is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at naqiya@advocata.org.K.D.D.B. Vimanga is a Policy Analyst at the Advocata Institute. He can be contacted at kdvimanga@advocata.org.

The Advocata Institute is an Independent Public Policy Think Tank. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute

Can we print our way out of this economic hole?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

I had a friend in school whose aspiration was to be the president of Sri Lanka. One day, our school teacher asked him: “So what are you going to do when you become the President?”

He had a simple answer. “I am going to end poverty in Sri Lanka and make all citizens wealthy by ensuring they all have enough money.” In response, the teacher further questioned: “How are you going to do it?” To which my friend answered: “It’s not difficult. I will print money and distribute one million per citizen among all citizens so they have money to buy all the goods and services they want.”

This sounded like a great idea to schoolboys who did not know anything about economics. “Why can’t governments print money and increase the income of people and allow them to buy goods and services as they wish?” were our initial thoughts.

The teacher then questioned: “What if the market doesn’t have enough goods and services to buy with the money you expect to give away. Do you think that having money in hand but no goods and services in the market will help people consume what they need?”

Through my teacher’s counter-questioning I realised that “money” or fiat currency is just a piece of paper. The amount of goods and services we can buy from that money is what matters instead of the quantitative or numerical amount of money in hand.

Take a Rs. 100 note and a $ 100 note for example. Both of them might represent a 100 but we can buy more goods and services from $ 100 than Rs. 100. Therefore, managing “money” or the currency must be done very carefully. 

The economy is a broader concept where the supply of money is just one tool within this system. This economic system performs the function of optimising limited and scarce resources to meet unlimited wants. Prices determine what could be bought or sold by the quantity of money.

If there is strong demand for one good over another, its price will go up and the supply of that good will go up, as producers try to make more money to get more profits.

Excessive creation of money without regard to the number of goods and services produced in a country leads to price inflation, which distorts relative prices. Sri Lanka’s economic problems are multifaceted. Therefore, we have to evaluate whether we can overcome our economic challenges by printing money as suggested by my school friend. This dilemma brings Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) into context.

Some advocates of MMT say money can be printed by governments without a problem. Other advocates say governments can borrow large amounts of money without a problem. At the end of the day, printing money is also a form of borrowing from the Central Bank. Still, other proponents say taxation can be used to stop the inflationary effect. 

While different proponents of MMT have proposed slightly different views, some of the key ideas are that governments can increase deficit spending without a problem and that they can also print money. Still, others argue that money can be printed to repay bonds, and therefore there will be no default on debt.

However, it is important to remember that the comparison of a government to a household only goes so far. This is because sovereign nations can print money which a household cannot. Some believers of MMT claim that in an environment where a country hasn’t reached full employment, printing money or quantitative easing doesn’t cause inflation. Some others argue that if inflation picks up, taxation can be used to take spending power and reduce inflation.  

When a country like Sri Lanka prints more money it can cause two problems. One is that it will

create a balance of payment problem when economic activities and credit picks up. Sri Lanka or any other country cannot live in complete isolation. We have to import some basics such as fossil fuel, pharmaceuticals, and inputs for our exports. Statistics by the Central Bank show that about 80% of our imports are capital and intermediate goods, required for consumption and for our exports. When we print excessive money, that will increase imports and create a balance of payment crisis. In addition, the fall in reserves and the fall in exchange rate will lead to a loss of confidence. Then, foreigners who had loaned money and other investors will take their money back. This is called capital flight. That is one reason the yields of sovereign bonds have increased to very high levels and we cannot issue more sovereign bonds.

But what about rupee debt, you may ask.

One question commonly asked is why Sri Lanka cannot print money if the US and Japan can print money in trillions. This is possible for the US and Japan to some extent because both the US dollar and the Japanese yen are pure floating exchange rates. The US dollar in particular is also used abroad. However, that did not prevent the collapse of the US dollar in 1971 when it was pegged to gold and money was printed in excess.

When the US dollar was a floating currency also it was not immune. After very low rates from 2001, a massive credit bubble was fired in the US and the dollar weakened. Inflation and oil and house prices went up and then collapsed.

Sri Lanka does not have a pure floating currency. Sri Lanka collects reserves through the purchase of dollars and then the sale of dollars to defend the value of the rupee against the US dollar at different rates. 

Such countries are much more at risk from printing money than those with a pure floating exchange rate. Consecutive governments of the past resorted to the practice of financing our budget deficit by money printing. One reason Sri Lanka has had to go to the International Monetary Fund many times over the last 70 years is mainly due to such balance of payment crises caused by the excessive printing of money.

Restricting imports reduces the amount of goods and services available in a country and leads to higher prices. When countries without floating exchange rates print money, not just inflation but hyperinflation also can happen.

Zimbabwe created excessive amounts of fiat money that led to inflation rates of more than 1,000% per year. As the currency crashed, notes of million-dollar Zimbabwe banknotes were printed. Eventually people shifted to US dollars. Inflation then stopped. But many were left destitute. Large numbers left as refugees. Creating money without regard to the availability of goods and services can ruin an economy. And worse. It devastates the poor.  

It is true that the economy of a country cannot be compared to the economy of a household because people trade in different currencies and trade between countries is a global phenomenon bringing in competitive synergies.

But when money is printed, the main objective of economic policy becomes “saving foreign exchange”.

The MMT advocates of the West did not say to control imports. Some people hold up Japan as an example due to its high debt levels and attempts at trying to ignite inflation there through money printing. But there is no import control in Japan.

So we should not forget that the main objective of an economy and economic policy is not to just have money in every citizen’s hand or saving US dollars to pay our debt. The prime objective of a well-functioning economy is to improve the quality of life of the people and reduce poverty. We can only achieve these objectives by utilising our scarce resources optimally. Hence my teacher’s question, “what if we all have money but not enough goods and services for our consumption?” must be analysed in depth.

Therefore, improving the quality of life, eradication of poverty, and using our resources optimally have to be the broader objectives of the economic policies we implement. This does not mean that we divert from our focus of facing the ever-growing economic challenges before us. However, our solutions to meet short-term economic challenges should not dilute our aspirations or our long-term economic goals of improving quality of life and eradicating poverty.

Monetary history has shown over and over again that the oversupply of money causes inflation and currency depreciation and balance of payments problems. When money printing is continued, it will end in hyperinflation like in Zimbabwe. The poorest sections of the society will be most affected by hyperinflation.

Countries like Venezuela and Zimbabwe are prime examples of the various consequences that can occur as a result of governments running their money printing machines overtime. It results in a situation where they have money, but not the adequate amount to afford their necessities.

What is the solution?

It is understandable that in a global pandemic and a credit collapse some countries printed money, especially when there was no economic activity to make use of the money. But expecting to use it as a permanent solution may cause long-term damage to our economy. 

To optimise the use of our resources, we have to remove the structural impediments that stop the people from doing growth-creating economic activity. 

We must restructure our state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and open public sector resources to the private sector, in order to attract money, for example, rather than print money. Ultimately, it is the production of goods and services and getting all Sri Lankans to contribute to economic growth that will help meet our long and short-term economic objectives. Expecting that production will kickstart when excess money is supplied through money printing is surely a not solution. Instead, we should examine the barriers that have to be removed in order to ramp up production. These barriers keep dragging our economy behind.

We should not forget the scenario where everyone was given money through money printing but there were insufficient goods and services to purchase. This lesson taught by my school teacher to my aspirational friend who wanted to lead the country, is a lesson for the whole country. A lesson as to why such thinking is fundamentally flawed.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Daniel Alphonsus : A Crises Manifesto: Exorcising Hunger, Unemployment and Debt

Originally appeared on Echelon

By Daniel Alphonsus

An unprecedented crisis can only be met with comprehensive and deep reform. Bandages and tinctures will not do.

There are crises and there are crises. But the truly momentous calamities, those that set the stage for the decades that follow are few and far between. Surveying 20th century Sri Lankan history, two such events stand out – the Great Depression and the rice-queues of the 1970s. Those traumatic experiences dictated economy policy for the decades that followed. In the case of the Great Depression, rapid reductions in commodity prices, combined with a global credit crunch, ravaged Sri Lanka’s undiversified plantation economy. A consensus emerged for reducing Sri Lanka’s dependence on international markets.

The Ceylon Banking Commission report of 1934, in many ways the premier pre-independence analysis of Sri Lanka’s economy, observed, “Never before was the vulnerability of the economic structure of Ceylon more forcibly revealed than during this period. The three major products, namely, tea, rubber, and coconut, which between them account for over 90% of the wealth of the country, suffered seriously during the depression. The creed of economic self-sufficiency which became an article of faith in the economic policies of other countries spread to Ceylon as well.” Inspired by war-time planning and the Soviet command economy’s success in industrializing Russia, there was also widespread agreement that in the newly independent third world, governments, not firms, would be the motor of this historic transformation from global dependence to national independence.

Exhilaration soon gave way to enervation. The failure of import-substitution and appalling government record of running enterprises – including the critical plantation sector – paved the way for the open market reforms of 1977. The desperation was palpable. On election platforms, Sirima Bandaranaike accused J.R. Jayawardene of being in bed with the Americans, thinking that would dissuade voters from supporting him. But the ploy boomeranged. Voters, who just two or three decades ago were Asia’s second richest but now had to wait in queues for rice, voted with their stomachs. Their reasoning was simple, if J.R. is in bed with the Americans, then he will be able to secure relief from them.

Despite a quarter-century of the open market model coming to a sudden and unexpected halt in 2004, economically speaking, we are still the children of the 1977 revolution. This year may mark the twilight of that epoch, or at the very least a new chapter.

For Sri Lanka is facing an unprecedented economic crisis. It is a crisis of four tempests, whose sum is a raging storm that threatens to engulf the entire island in its dark thunderous deluge. They are:

1. Coronavirus: the global and domestic combined supply and demand shocks caused by the Coronavirus.

2. Original Sin: borrowing liberally from international capital markets in foreign currency, at high-interest rates and with low maturities for low-productivity construction and import consumption.

3. Negative Growth Shocks: the economic slowdown caused by floods, droughts, the constitutional coup and Easter Bombings.

4. Stalled Reform: with the exception of the new Inland Revenue Act, the failure to carry through any serious structural reform since 2004 has seen real growth fall.

As a result, we may be on the verge of Sri Lanka’s first sovereign default since Independence. Prior to the pandemic, though the trajectory was grim, there was still hope of avoiding that catastrophe. That hope is now waning fast. The origins of this crisis lie in the early years of this millennium. In 2004, the quarter-century long bipartisan consensus for reform stalled. In many cases – such as tariffs and privatizations – reform reversed. Due to time-lags the reforms of the late 90s and early 2000s continued to bear fruit for some years. But by the turn of the millennium, high-interest dollar debt increasingly became growth’s chief hand-maiden.

Post-2007 commercial borrowings from international capital markets rose rapidly from almost zero. This fueled a construction and consumption boom soon after the war’s end in 2009. Project loans were spent on empty airports and useless towers. Sovereign Bonds were issued to bridge the government’s ballooning budget deficit; caused by an unprecedently massive and swift expansion of the public sector.

Over the last few years, supported by an IMF programme, the government worked hard to reduce Sri Lanka’s debt-burden and dependence on international capital markets. Sri Lanka ran a non-trivial primary surplus for the first time in 2017, repeating that success in 2018 and upto November 2019 despite the coup and the Easter Bombing. But this alone was not enough.

In reality, the value of public debt rarely declines. What matters is reducing public debt relative to the size of public repayment capacity. In its simplest form, it’s about reducing the value of this equation:

This can be done in two ways. Reducing the value of the numerator, “Public Debt”. Or by increasing the value of the denominator, “Annual GDP”. In the last few years, Sri Lanka adopted a ‘fiscal consolidation’ approach which rightly attacked the numerator. But coalition dynamics and time-lags thwarted progress on the denominator, growth, which is more important. The new government reversed course significantly loosening fiscal policy. It implemented a sweeping range of tax cuts which drastically reduced government revenue. In the language of our equation, these tax-cuts increased the numerator. The wager – to describe the strategy charitably – was that rising public debt would be off-set by an even faster surge in GDP growth, thus reducing the relative value of public debt. That plan has clearly failed. Today, public debt is touching 95% of GDP. The true value, when one calculates all liabilities such as Treasury guarantees for invoices, is likely much higher.

As a result, markets seem to think Sri Lanka is at risk of defaulting for the first time in its history. Bond yields are in the double digits. Among emerging markets, only Argentina, Zambia and Lebanon have higher risk premiums on their debt. A default will be a further blow to an economy that has been ravaged by floods, coups, the Easter Bombings and COVID. The country will be shut off from international capital markets. It will not be able to finance the budget deficit. Inflation unless government spending is cut. Taken together, they could well lead us into an Argentine, Lebanese or Greek-style vicious cycle of default and political instability. An unprecedented crisis can only be met with comprehensive and deep reform. Bandages and tinctures will not do. As Italy has shown neither will attacking the numerator alone: decades of focusing on primary surpluses without structural reforms have only resulted in stagnation. Rather we need the second-round of 1977 type reforms that served Sri Lanka so well. There are many ways of thinking about such a reform programme. However, as the catalyst this time is likely to be a sovereign default, it is easier to label reforms as either an “attack on the numerator” or an “attack on the denominator”.

Attacking the Numerator: Reducing Debt

Reducing public debt – ‘attacking the numerator’ – can be done in three ways. First, increasing taxes. Second, reducing expenditure. Third, selling assets. Sri Lanka will probably have to do all three.

Increasing Taxes: Property Taxes and Tax Loopholes

 It is well known that Sri Lanka has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world and has a regressive tax system. This year Sri Lanka’s tax-to-GDP ratio could rank among the lowest 15 countries in the world. However, in the midst of economic contraction raising taxes that reduce consumption and investment could catalyze growth shocks. One solution would be to tax savings, especially those savings that are not productive. The biggest example of such savings is land ownership. A Western Province property tax could raise substantial revenue and encourage efficient use of idle property. In the last decade property prices in Colombo rose by 300%, much of this windfall is the direct result of public infrastructure spending. Our tax system also has many loopholes. Consider the case of excise taxes on cigarettes. Estimates suggest the government could prevent over two hundred billion rupees of revenue leakage over the next decade by introducing a formula for cigarette prices. Similarly, the duty on beedi clearly points to political rather than economic considerations in excise taxation.

Reducing Expenditure: Too Many Men

Sri Lanka has a bloated public sector. From a revenue, productivity and ultimately security viewpoint the large size of the military is a challenge. Around 40% of government salary expenditure is spent on the military. The military, nearing 280 thousand men (compared to the British Army’s approximately 100,000), is holding back our most able men from productive employment. Transferring most of these men to reserves and offering subsidized labour to the export industry through an apprenticeship scheme would substantially improve public finance and propel growth. A similar story of job growth can be found in the public sector.

Selling Assets: Sell Enterprises

The government is poor at managing businesses. State-owned enterprises are renowned for their mismanagement, waste and corruption. The direct cost is colossal. But the indirect costs are even greater. Despite competition from Ports Authority run terminals, SAGT and China Merchant Holdings have played a key role in making Colombo one of the world’s great ports. Imagine if airports and air-services had been similarly open to competition and private enterprise; Sri Lanka could have become an aviation and air-sea hub, as well as a shipping-hub. There are countless other examples throughout our economy.

At this stage of economic development, there is little reason for the state to run enterprises. In fact, the state can increase the value of the assets it owns by selling enterprises without selling land per se. For example, state-owned hotels, container terminals and air terminals could be privatized without selling the land on which they operate. In other words, privatize the enterprises, not their land-holdings. The tax-payer would be significantly better off as the privatization proceeds can be used to settle debt. In addition lease values, for the land, will rise and the land-value will appreciate faster too.

From a productivity point of view, key targets for privatization could be Sri Lankan Airlines, Ratmalana Airport, Jaya Container Terminal and Unity Container Terminal. One simple method of doing this would be to place all SOEs operating in competitive industries in a holding company that has an explicit mandate to sell them within a set time-frame, failing which they are automatically listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange.

Attacking the Denominator: Productivity Growth

There is only one tried and tested way of going from third world to first in the space of a few decades: manufacturing exports. Sri Lanka successfully completed the first step of this process by the 1980s when it established apparel exports industry, which remains Sri Lanka’s only manufacturing export. In 1983, Sri Lanka was about to move up the value chain to semi-conductors, which would have led to South-East Asian and East Asian style growth. But Black July was engineered, and the semiconductor plants being built in Katunayake by Motorola and Harris Corporation were shipped-off to Penang. Similarly, we missed the wave of Japanese investment that was about to begin at that time.

Since then Sri Lanka hasn’t developed a major manufactured export. The challenge for Sri Lanka is to create new higher-productivity export industries. This is a complex task requiring government effort. But Sri Lanka has done it before. The tested strategy of the 1977 revolution is as follows. First, create investment zones where the usual constraints affecting investment can be managed. That is the genius of the Free Trade Zones. Second, make Sri Lanka’s exports competitive: reduce tariffs (a tax on imports is a tax on exports) and sign Free-Trade Agreements. Third, enable efficient factor allocation: remove regulatory constraints on agricultural production and update labour laws. Fourth, unleash the power of the developmental state by fast-tracking the MCC grant, designing clever export subsidies and most importantly completing land reform.

Investment Oases

The engines of Sri Lanka’s manufacturing exports are the Free Trade Zones. It is here that the apparel industry started. It is also the zones that were the cradle for the island’s solid-tyre export industry and they remain the primary site of all other manufactured exports. The reason for this is that zones make it much easier for an investor to open a factory. Land, electricity and water are available; regulatory permissions are already secured; customs officers and other government agencies are on hand. Over time an eco-system of trained labour and ancillary suppliers also develops. Despite being near capacity, Sri Lanka failed to build any new free trade zones between 2002 and 2017. So its no surprise to hear investors complain that access to land is the primary constraint for investment.

Almost all of Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zones are managed by the BOI. One exception is the DFCC Bank run Linden Industrial Zone. The BOI run model worked well and was competitive in the 1980s. Today the world has moved on. In order to attract new investors in sectors outside apparel, Sri Lanka needs to allow international zone operators. For example, Sri Lanka should court a Chinese free trade zone operator, a Japanese free trade zone operator and a Singaporean one to establish facilities in Sri Lanka. These zone operators will then leverage the relationships they have with manufacturers in their countries and regions, doing the job successive governments have failed to do since the late 1980s.

The energies of Sri Lanka’s own private sector could also be unleashed in zone-management. MAS and Brandix run successful textile parks in Sri Lanka and India. There is no reason they couldn’t successfully run a zone in Sri Lanka. The failure is not the central government’s alone. As far as I know, no other province has done what the Wayamba Provincial Council did within a couple of years of the formation of a provincial government: establish not one but two province run industrial zones, at Heraliyawala and Dangaspitiya respectively. The Northern Province with its devolutionary fervour, combined with access to the KKS Port and Palaly Airport, should be particularly ashamed.

A pilot project could deploy under-utilized state land around Ratmalana to create an electronics free-trade zone. There is no better place in Sri Lanka due to proximity to a port, railway and airport, universities and technical schools and trained labour.

Export Competitiveness

But no one will build factories in Sri Lanka if input costs are high. In this era of global supply chains, one country rarely adds more than 20% to 30% of a product’s final value. Therefore, being able to import components and raw materials at the same prices as in competitor countries is vital. However, Sri Lanka has some of the highest effective tariff rates in the world. To make matters worse they are highly complex, creating ample room for discretion and thus delays and corruption. If Sri Lanka is to become the trading and manufacturing hub of the Indian Ocean, it will have to benchmark its tariffs against Dubai and Singapore. This is not new to Sri Lanka. In 1994 it has a simple three-band tariff structure. It is only after 2004 that Sri Lanka’s effective tariff rate sky-rocketed, primarily due to the cascading effects of CESS and PAL. Their abolition would be a very good start.

Similarly, during the 1977-2004 Sri Lanka’s real effective exchange rate was kept more or less constant. A weaker currency makes foreign goods dearer domestically and makes Sri Lankan goods cheaper on global markets. This helped ensure the competitiveness of exports and acted as an automatic, non-discretionary import substitution incentive. However, from 2004 onward the real effective exchange rate started creeping upwards, discouraging exports and encouraging imports. By 2017 Sri Lanka’s real effective exchange rate was 31% higher than in 2004.

Finally, Sri Lanka’s competitiveness is eroding because all its competitors are signing free trade agreements (FTAs). Sri Lanka must fast-track deeper goods and service trade integration with India, China and ASEAN. Most importantly, we need to become part of the two-major trade agreements the CPP11 and the RCEP. The constraints of space and time, robbed of the opportunity to discuss the importance of a new Customs Act, the implementation of the National Export Strategy or other reforms to facilitate cross-border trade. Suffice to say they too are essential.

Efficient Factor Allocation

Land, labour, capital; it is the development and allocation of these factors that determines the wealth of nations. Sri Lanka’s capital allocation is relatively efficient. Our challenge today is to ensure the efficient allocation of land and labour.

Land

Many cite East Asia’s successful land reform as the key to their economic prosperity. Studwell’s How Asia Works is perhaps the most persuasive and readable account. There is much to commend in this analysis. Granting freehold land to families already farming it will increase agricultural productivity. This is true of Sri Lanka too. One critical land reform, that can be implemented quickly, will be to make small-holders of the existing tea-estate workers. This will improve productivity, as the principal-agent problem will be solved. In addition, with freehold rights, they will have every incentive to replant and improve the land. Access to credit will not be an issue; the land itself will act as collateral.

As for the RPCs, the factories and land equal to the value of their remaining leaseterm can be transferred to them freehold. They can then offer extension services and an out-grower model to the new small-holders. In a similar vein, there is absolutely no good reason for the continuation of the Paddy Lands Act, especially in the wet-zone. In fact, some of the land in the wet-zone restricted by the Paddy Lands Act was never paddy land in the first place. This law is a major barrier to more productive use of land for high-value export crops, such as spices.

Having got land out of the way, we can move on to labour. Sri Lanka’s labour laws have created a de facto caste system of a few highly protected insiders and a sea of completely unprotected informal workers. In fact, the failure to make labour law more flexible is an important reason why over a million Sri Lankans work in the hazardous conditions of the Gulf. It is better to have some protection for many, than a great deal of protection for a few. Especially as labour law is a major constraint to growth. The downsides of more flexible labour laws can be effectively managed through a targeted social security net, such as in the Danish Flexisecurity model, which combines high levels of labour market flexibility with generous social safety nets, such as solid unemployment insurance.

The Developmental State

Finally, Sri Lanka needs to restructure its state to facilitate rather than hamper development. The first is a question of a simply accepting reality. What credibility does a country have when it refuses the largest grant in its history (MCC), while going-cap in hand asking for debt moratoria from its creditors?

Second, the state-owned enterprises in natural monopoly sectors, such as railways and power-lines need to be depoliticized and forced to be efficient. Depoliticization can be significantly achieved by simply passing a new law. The law can require that the appointment of directors of all State-Owned Enterprises be subject to the approval of a Constitutional Council appointed nominating board, with clear ‘fit-and-proper’ criteria. A similar mechanism is already in place for banks.

Furthermore, efficiency can be improved by introducing competition, resolving conflicts-of-interest and raising transparency. Sri Lanka’s competition law does not cover state-owned-enterprises: this allows public sector monopolies to enjoy rents at the expense of citizens. That needs to go. It is also absurd, for example, that the Sri Lanka Ports Authority is owner, operator and regulator of port terminals. The public sector is rife with such conflicts-of-interest which appear designed to breed corruption and mismanagement.

These are the key changes, but information matters too. As they are owned by the tax-payer, SOEs should have greater disclosure requirements than firms listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange. But a start would be to simply require SOEs to follow all CSE disclosure requirements, this can be done by law or by requiring SOEs to list their debt on the CSE. Or both.

There are also government departments that need to be made into SOEs. The railways are the most important example. If the railways were able to borrow money, which they could if they were an SOE, they could then finance the electrification and double-tracking through the development of land the CGR owns around railway stations.

Way Forward

The real economic policy statements in Sri Lanka are not budgets but IMF programmes. Budgets are often nothing more than promises of bread and the certainty of circuses. They bear little reality to actual revenue and expenditure, much the less actual economic management. As such the crescendo of this crisis, and thus opportunity, will be the inevitable IMF programme. It is almost certain that Sri Lanka will enter into its 17th IMF programme later this year or early in 2021. Sri Lanka has been in IMF devil-dances for much of its post-independence history. We have failed to undertake the reforms needed to grow and to protect our sovereignty. The IMF kapuralas have also failed to require front-loading reforms: allowing Sri Lanka to get away with cosmetic compliance rather than really restructuring the economy.

With COVID, the IMF is also overextended; perversely this improves its bargaining position. As a result, this programme can be a water-shed that combines both fiscal consolidation and export-driven productivity growth. It must be a landmark programme with a single objective: to be the last programme the IMF has with Sri Lanka. Then, as in 1977, Sri Lanka may just pull-off a Phoenix-like rise from the ashes. If not, then the demons of hunger, unemployment and debt-collectors will follow.

(Daniel Alphonsus was an advisor at Sri Lanka’s Finance Ministry. He also worked at Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry and at Verite Research. Daniel read philosophy, politics and economics at Balliol College, Oxford and public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School where he was a Fulbright Scholar.)

Sri Lanka’s Auditor General and Steve Jobs’ Garden Fence

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dhananath Fernando

A few days ago, I read up on an interesting anecdote from the life of Steve Jobs. When Steve was a child, his father had asked him to paint the fence around his house. Steve took the task up and painted the outside of the fence. When he proudly presented his hard work to his father, the father questioned why only the outside of the fence was painted. Steve replied: “Dad, no one sees the other side of the fence!”

To that, his dad responded: “Steve, but we will see it.” Many years later, when Steve briefed his engineering team on the deliverables of the Macintosh computer, he said to them: “I want the outside of the computer’s aesthetics and design to be outstanding. But I also want the inside of the computer to be more outstanding than the outside.” To that, his team responded: “Why do we need to spend so much time, effort, and money on the inside of the computer? No one really sees the inside!”

Steve replied: “But we will see it.”

The ongoing debate on the dilution of the Auditor General’s powers has reminded us of the need to paint both sides of our fence if we want to see a developed and prosperous Sri Lanka.

The development, prosperity, and progress we see in any society or institution are a result of structural changes, self-discipline, and systematic advances of working on an in-depth value system. That is why self-control is always better than state control.

Audits and checks and balances are unseen on the inside. What we see on the outside is a reflection of our society on the inside. Therefore, Sri Lankans not reaching our full potential is interconnected to the absence of many systems of accountability and transparency. Audits and checks and balances should come from within. What we see outside is merely a reflection of who we truly are on the inside. Sri Lankan society lags behind for this very reason, as we lack the many systems of accountability and transparency necessary for growth.

Systematic misgovernance

If you ask any Sri Lankan why their country is still developing, they will give you three reasons: corruption, waste, and misgovernance. What we see on the outside as low productivity, inefficiency, and delays are a result of a lack of accountability, transparency, audits, and checks and balances. This is not only valid for our public sector but also for our private sector.

In the context of the 20th Amendment, the proposed Clause 31 repeals article 153 (1) of the Constitution which mandated that the Auditor General be a qualified auditor subject to the approval of the Constitutional Council (CC), following which, s/he would be appointed by the President. The removal of this by the 20th Amendment opens the risk of appointing an Auditor General who wouldn’t possess the qualifications required for the position.

The risk of providing constitutional leeway in appointing an unqualified Auditor General is multidimensional. A greater degree of Sri Lanka’s corruption and crime is white-collar crime, and given the legal structure of Sri Lanka, even qualified auditors are finding it difficult to audit.

The VAT (value-added tax) scandal reported many years ago and the more recent Central Bank bond fiasco all indicate the enormous cost of ignoring simple processes, which when multiplied can cripple our entire economy. Unfortunately, the need for such processes only come into the limelight when things go wrong, while the positive results of having due process usually don’t make it to newspaper headlines.

Accountability is key

Even under the 19th Amendment, the Auditor General’s powers did not include the ability to audit state-owned enterprises (SOEs) incorporated through the Companies Act in which the government has a stake of less than 50%. Maintaining accountability in most of our gigantic SOEs that the Treasury has supported with taxpayer money has failed! Most SOEs have failed to produce even a basic annual report over the years for the benefit of the public, even though the revenue of some public enterprises is nearly half a trillion.

There are more than 500 SOEs of different scales which waste a colossal amount of taxpayer money, and there is no excuse that can be provided for not producing annual accounts when earning half a trillion rupees in revenue.

The space created by the 20th Amendment for SOEs to not get audited by the Auditor General will set a bad example for all businesses. The collective losses of only 16 strategic SOEs in 2018 amounted to Rs. 156.73 billion, which is equivalent to more than thrice (Rs. 47 billion in 2017) the expenditure of the Samurdhi Programme.

One may ask why corruption levels were still high with the Auditor General having the power to audit under the 19th Amendment, and when there were additional checks such as having an Opposition member heading the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) and opening COPE meetings to the media; it is true that neither the Auditor General nor opening COPE meetings to the media will solve all corruption problems within SOEs.

If the level of corruption and misgovernance was high even with the Auditor General’s powers under the 19th Amendment, imagine how the situation would be without such supervision. We sincerely hope that at the committee stage, matters pertaining to the transparency and accountability of SOEs will be taken seriously.

Improving systems and doing things better than we did in the past must be the way forward if we are serious about a “system change”. In order to strengthen governance, we should at least list strategic SOEs at the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) so that these institutions will have no choice but to adhere to the governance structure of the CSE. One other measure is to provide the Auditor General with more power to investigate SOEs incorporated through the Companies Act in which the government has less than 50% stake, as most SOEs have the practice of incorporating subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries under the main SOE with different stakeholder arrangements.

In public policy, dismantling an existing accountability measure without an alternative could be highly problematic, given the level of corruption rooted in Sri Lankan society. Sri Lanka has dropped from 89th to 93rd in the Corruption Perception Index for 2019 by Transparency International.

If you observe any successful private company or society, there are systems and procedures that have been refined over the years with the advancement of technology to reach where they are today. Our attitude towards accountability measures has to change as a way of painting the fence on the inside even though no one sees it. Ultimately, what we see on the outside is what we build inside.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

What good is a handbook that’s not followed?

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Aneetha Warusavitarana

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are infamous for their losses. According to the 2018 Ministry of Finance Annual Report, the main 54 SOEs made a net loss last year, amounting to Rs. 26,070 million. With the Committee on Public Enterprises being opened up to the media, coverage of both losses and mismanagement of SOEs has flooded newspapers.

It is abundantly clear that the plethora of SOEs in the Government are unable to function without a constant stream of funds from the Treasury. In 2018, budgetary support for recurrent expenditure of the main 54 SOEs came to a total of Rs. 58,519 million.

The chart below lists the five state-owned enterprises which receive the greatest quantity of Treasury Guarantees, just one example of the money that flows out of the Treasury to sustain these entities. When it is Sri Lankan taxpayers’ money that keeps these entities above board, the question of the hour is why isn’t there better management?

What is the Government’s approach to governing SOEs?

Extensive work has been done on international and regional case studies of good governance for SOEs. Restructuring and partial privatisation of inefficient SOEs have been proposed, while some SOEs could be lined up for complete privatisation. While organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank have provided clear guidelines for governance and improved management of SOEs, so has the Sri Lankan Government.

The Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) is a well-known government mechanism established to hold SOEs to account. The committee is empowered to publish reports which evaluate selected SOEs – investigating hiring irregularities and issues in procurement, and auditing their finances. The reports are usually a hair-raising read, speaking of special employment grades created with high-wage allocations of money that simply cannot be accounted for, and situations that can only be described as odd – for instance, why was the Sri Lanka Ports Authority building a cricket stadium in Sooriyawewa?

In 2018, the National Human Resources Development Council (NHRDC), with the Institute of Chartered Accountants (CA) launched a “Handbook on Good Governance for Chairmen and Directors of Public Enterprises”. This handbook was meant to act as a guide for Sri Lankan SOEs, placing emphasis on the fact that as SOEs run on the money and resources of the Sri Lankan people, and as such, it is important that there is proper management. The handbook is comprehensive – detailing the frequency of board meetings, responsibilities of key officials, and emphasising the need for regular financial reporting.

The handbook places responsibility for financial discipline in the public sector, including public enterprises, with the Minister of Finance, and the General Treasury is able to act on the Minister’s behalf. The duties of the boards of these SOEs are also detailed on, and ensuring proper accountability by maintaining records and books of accounts are one of the many responsibilities which fall on the board. The chief financial officers are responsible for accounting and budgetary control systems.

On the point of monitoring and evaluation, the handbook is clear. It calls for monthly reporting in the form of performance statements, operating statements, cash flow statements, liquidity position and borrowing, procurement of material value, statement on human resources, as well as a separate performance review if the entity is a commercial corporation or a government-owned company.

The reality: Turning a blind eye to good governance

While the COPE and the handbook on good governance are two mechanisms put in place by the Government to ensure good governance of SOEs, the reality of how our SOEs are run is vastly different. The Ministry of Finance has identified 54 “Strategic State-Owned Enterprises” – the profits and losses of these entities are monitored by the Ministry of Finance, and are published in its Annual Report. However, this is where any structured financial reporting from SOEs ends. In 2017, only 28 of the 54 strategic SOEs have submitted annual reports to the Ministry of Finance. Advocata’s report on the “State of State-Owned Enterprises: Systemic Misgovernance” identifies a total of 527 SOEs, including the plethora of subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries that exist. On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance Annual Report 2018 only mentions a total of 422 enterprises, and does not publish their financial statements. In this context of minimal oversight, there is no wonder that the losses incurred by these entities are this high.

The next step: Dissolution

A key recommendation that has been presented in response to the losses incurred by SOEs is privatisation, or at least partial privatisation. It could be implemented on a case-by-case basis, evaluating entities on both their performance and the type of service that is provided, which would be one way for the Government to stem the losses that pour out of the Treasury. While calls for privatisation have often elicited an unfavourable response, it is interesting that the handbook published jointly by the NHRDC and CA has a section on criteria for dissolution of SOEs. To quote from the handbook: “Dissolution of a public enterprise would arise under the following circumstances:

(a) When objectives for which the enterprise was created have been achieved and continuation is no longer required

(b) On the basis of policy directions of the Treasury/Government

(c) When the enterprise is faced with losses and liquidity problems or is not viable due to other reasons

(d) Merger or amalgamation with other enterprises.”

The question that remains is why is the Government continuing to run these enterprises, despite the losses that they incur? The losses, corruption, and clear practices of political patronage make it clear that by not taking action, the Government is actively choosing to mismanage the funds and resources of the people, for personal gain. It’s high time some of these recommendations, guidelines, and committee reports were actioned.

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Limited government – Ideal State

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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Limited Government; Ideal State – Part IV

By Dhananath Fernando

This article completes Advocata’s four-piece series on “limited government”. Over the past three weeks, we have presented three arguments in favour of a limited government. We began the series by delving into the mounting costs associated with a government of this size. The article questioned the rationale behind expenditure on this scale, given that the services provided by the Government are characteristically inefficient. Erratic power cuts and railway strikes seen in the recent past are testament to this. From here, the series explored the question of how a government can best serve its citizens.

The main argument presented was that when the powers and responsibilities of the State are decentralised, voters are given a stronger voice and are better able to hold elected officials accountable. The result is that public finances are better managed and service delivery improves. The last topic tackled in this series was that of corruption, expanding on how the window of opportunity for corruption widens when a government grows in scope as well as physical size, without the necessary governance and accountability measures in place. All three articles concluded on the same point – the size and role of the Government needs to be re-visited.

At a fundamental level, a government exists to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens. This is the first and foremost responsibility of a government and it is vital that this is given priority. The danger of governments expanding into other sectors is that these foundational responsibilities are pushed to the sidelines. When a government provides subsidies, creates price ceilings, and gives ad hoc handouts, it loses incentive to focus on its priorities. Giving a subsidy has an immediate impact on its voters and a cycle of instant gratification begins. Parallel to election cycles, governments now have an easier, quicker method to win over voters. Ensuring the rule of law and enshrining the negative freedoms of a population does not have the shiny appeal of a handout – the positive, virtuous cycles these freedoms and protections create are strong, they can permeate institutions and change cultures of work. However, they can take years to come into effect and are difficult concepts to convey through the flashy advertisements of an election campaign.

Of course, this means that governments respond to the attractive incentive of a quick win and an extended term in office, and prioritises the handout over the fundamentals of freedom. As much as these freedoms can create virtuous cycles of growth and development, the neglect and deterioration of these freedoms can create dangerous cycles of corruption, misuse, and violence.

The best way to illustrate these dangerous cycles is through the justice system. Unfortunately, we witnessed first-hand the aftermath of the Easter attacks where virulent rhetoric against the Muslim community resulted in riots, with 500 Muslim-owned shops being attacked and set on fire. In the face of this outbreak of violence, the rule of law was flagrantly abused, and peace was not upheld.

Eammon Butler, in his book “Foundations of a Free Society”, expounds on this in some detail. According to him, the rules of justice are a cornerstone of any free society. While rules of justice would mean there are penalties for harming other people, in a free society, emphasis is also given to ensuring the role and power of a government is strictly limited. This will mean that the monopoly over violence a government has will not be used arbitrarily or in the self-interest of those who wield it. To quote: “The main problem of political organisation is not how to choose our leaders – that is easy – but how to restrain them.”

This seems reasonable and rational. No one wants an army-running rampant – you want to ensure the people with the guns and ammunition have clear rules on when and why they can use it. Most governments recognise this and have mechanisms such as constitutions and the separation of the executive, legislature, and judiciary to restrain those in positions of power. But the foundation of this is to ensure that citizens are all treated equally under the law – that all laws apply equally to all citizens and there is equal treatment and due process of justice. For freedom to have meaning, it has to apply equally to the whole population. When this does not take place and there is essentially a break down in the rule of law, the immediate impacts might seem inconsequential. It might mean that someone gets out on bail when maybe they shouldn’t. It might mean that tariffs are raised to protect politically important local business interests. Taken alone, these are singular events, which, while problematic, don’t cause much consternation. However, this is a slippery slope which often ends in widespread corruption in the best case, and a complete breakdown of law and order in other instances.

Once again, recent events illustrate that all citizens are not treated equally under the law, and that instances where law and order break down are increasing in frequency. The Wennappuwa Pradeshiya Sabha (PS) Chairman issuing a letter prohibiting Muslim traders from conducting business at the Dankotuwa Market is a case in point. It is of utmost importance that steps are taken to ensure the rule of law is maintained, and the Government prioritises its core functions putting the safety and freedom of all its citizens at the forefront.

Less spending, less corruption

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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Why should we have a limited government? – Part III

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The World Bank quite simply defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain”. Accordingly, public office can be abused when private agents actively offer or accept bribes, institute practices of patronage and nepotism, and engage in the theft of state assets or misuse public funds. In Sri Lanka, corruption has become institutionalised and can range from the traffic policeman who accepts a bribe to a high-ranking bureaucrat siphoning public money for personal expenses.

In 2018, Sri Lanka ranked 89th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. As a country, we score 38 out of 100, with 100 representing a clean, corruption-free country. The magnitude of this problem is clear.

What’s the big deal about corruption?

Is corruption really bad? You can’t deny that when your garbage is piling up, it’s easier to bribe the garbage collectors to take your garbage than visit your municipal council and file a complaint. Sometimes, it can just be easier to pay a bribe to the traffic police than go to court and settle a traffic violation, or to pay a little extra and get your driving license renewed faster. These are all very mundane, commonplace occurrences that have become normalised to the point one does not think of it as “corruption”. It’s just a small payment to make your life a little easier – a small payment to ensure an application is processed smoothly. So, if corruption can make things simpler, what’s the issue?

While corruption on this scale can appear to be insignificant, in reality, it is one component of a much larger, systemic problem which has far-reaching consequences. Corruption in government is institutional, and given the outsized role the Sri Lankan Government plays in markets and business, the impact is far-reaching. The difficulty in holding government officials accountable and the considerable discretion they can wield creates an environment in which corruption can flourish.

The far-reaching impacts of corruption

Large corruption scandals often focus on the amount of money that has been misused, placing emphasis on face value loss that is created by corruption. However, the impact of one act of bribery or corruption goes far beyond the initial monetary loss. Corruption raises the transaction costs of conducting business and creates uncertainty in the market. In an environment where corruption flourishes, a business will not win a contract based on merit and skill alone. Procurement-related issues (read: corruption) associated with the Kerawalapitiya Power Plant meant that it took three years to award the tender. This lowers profitability within firms and creates an overall environment of uncertainty which discourages foreign investment. The result is that the positive spillover effects from investments, like increased competition and technology transfers, will not take place. Corruption also reduces the attractiveness of entrepreneurship, resulting in higher prices and lower quality. The problem does not end there. The culture of corruption is one of impunity and complete disregard for the rule of law. When this culture permeates the government, it affects the independence and credibility of the legislature and the judiciary – the very institutions which should be ensuring that the rule of law is upheld.

State-Owned Enterprises and corruption

Sri Lanka’s state-owned enterprises are a prime example of institutionalised corruption. In Advocata’s flagship report, the State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka – 2019, the problem of corruption is a key issue tackled. In this report, corruption is explained through the perverse incentives that exist in the Sri Lankan bureaucracy. In the case of state-owned enterprises, as the money invested in state-owned enterprises is not of the politicians, there are no incentives for politicians to work towards making these enterprises efficient or productive. However, given the deep-rooted culture of patronage that exists in Sri Lanka, there is a strong incentive for politicians to use state-owned enterprises for their own gain. The lack of oversight or accountability means politicians can hire almost indiscriminately, giving out jobs for political gain. The reports from the Committee on Public Enterprise (COPE) make this abundantly clear, highlighting the numerous instances where recruitment had taken place without the appropriate approval from the Department of Management Services.

This problem is exacerbated by weak systems of accountability and governance. While the COPE and the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) do play a role in the governance of state-owned enterprises, they have access to limited resources and equipment and are in need of specialised skills such as legal aid.

What is the solution?

If corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain, then in order to stop corruption, we should focus our attention on how and where this abuse happens. When the government moves outside its core mandate to protect life, liberty, and property, it grows in size and in scope, making the government difficult to monitor and hold accountable. Additionally, as a government grows in size, so does its spending. Changing a culture of corruption will take a great deal of political will and leadership, as well as buy-in from the bureaucracy. While accountability and transparency play an important role in countering corruption, the effects of this are seen in the long term. In the short term, focus should be on limiting the scope of the government and thereby drastically reducing government spending. A 10% cut of Rs. 3 million is significantly lower than a 10% cut of Rs. 300 million; reducing government spending is the fastest way to reduce corruption in quantitative terms. A reduction in government spending will also make transparency within the government easier to enforce, helping create a culture of accountability.

If we are to seriously tackle the problem of corruption in government, the role and scope of the government needs to be revisited and limited.

Decentralisation: Taking governance to the ground level

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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Why should we have a limited government? – Part II

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

When speaking of a limited government, the first thing that comes to mind is the fact that governments tend to be so expansive. A plethora of ministries and an innumerable amount of departments and agencies spring to mind. However, it is important to keep in mind that when speaking of a limited government, the rationale goes far beyond arguing for fewer ministries and reducing the duplication of work and responsibilities within the government system. A limited government is one that is limited in scope – it identifies its key functions and expends all resources to achieve them. When speaking of the role of the government, its primary functions can be described as the protection of life, liberty, and property. When a government’s main role expands beyond this, there is a strong likelihood that the government will prove to be ineffective and even harmful.

How can a limited government run a country?

It’s all well and good to say that the role of the State should be limited to the protection of life, liberty, and property, but governments also provide a myriad of public goods. Doing all this requires resources, people, and departments. Given that this requires a significant amount of administration, how do you ensure the government does this effectively, while staying within its key mandate and with minimal corruption or abuse of power?

Can decentralisation be the answer?

Why should Sri Lanka move away from a centralised system of governance and increase the levels of decentralisation in the country? While there are some very theoretical explanations for decentralisation (which are important in their own right), we will use a simpler approach. In a population of approximately 21 million diverse people with different interests, preferences, and disposable incomes, how do markets allocate resources efficiently? Any A/L economics student will reply with the brief answer of the “invisible hand”. In reality, of course, there is no puppet master moving fruits and vegetables from one place to another. Each individual business acts in their own self-interest, resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources. Prices signal to these businesses – and the profits or losses these businesses make guide decisions to produce or sell – and thus, without the convening of committees or the presentation of any findings, an entire country is provided with goods and services it requires. William Easterly sums up this phenomenon as such: “The wonder of markets is that they reconcile the choices of myriad individuals”.

Price signalling works well in allocating resources because at any given point of time, it is impossible for one bureaucrat, or even a host of committees of bureaucrats, to have all the information necessary to dictate the production and distribution of a single good in an economy, much less all goods in an economy. This is because information and knowledge are localised, time sensitive, and tacit. In other words, information and knowledge cannot be transferred effectively in their entirety or in time. The fall of the Soviet Union is a testament to this.

What do markets have to do with decentralisation?

The same principle applies. The decision-making in a market economy is never centralised. While decentralisation will, of course, function differently – the spontaneous order created by price signalling in markets will not be making administrative decisions – the principle that centralised decisions are not effective stands. The reason behind this is that the information problems, which plague centralised decision-making of economics, also plague centralised decision-making for administration and governance. As much as a bureaucrat will find it impossible to distribute exactly the number of potatoes required to each province of this country, it is equally difficult for a bureaucrat to be located in a central government and to take decisions on local infrastructure. Any decision taken at a central level will not be ideal. There will always be information and local contexts that a bureaucrat is not privy to, and as a result, the decision will not be as effective.

Decentralisation brings governance and administration down to the ground level – it means decisions are taken by local government authorities who are best placed to make that decision. They are aware of local contexts and have been elected into office by the people in the locality, which would mean they have an understanding of what is needed. Of course, where the rule of law is weak, decentralisation can mean that local government authorities succumb to crony capitalism, as a system it is not without its faults. However, when comparing central governance and decentralised governance, in the case of decentralisation, there is greater opportunity for electorates to hold their representatives accountable, make their demands heard, and push for the reform that they want. In other words, it puts more power with the people and makes elected individuals more accountable to their voters – an admirable objective not only in principle, but also because of its effectiveness.

The burden of unprecedented costs

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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Why should we have a limited government? – Part I

By Dilshani Ranawaka

“The government that governs best, governs least” – Thomas Jefferson

A state has three core tasks within a society: Protecting the life, liberty, and property of the people. As societies evolved, these core tasks were overlooked when more emphasis was given to managing economies. Should the state intervene in economic affairs? Would that be more beneficial to the economy and society?

For the following four weeks, “The coordination problem” will discuss why large governments cause more harm than good when they engage in tasks beyond ensuring freedom and security of the citizens and the rule of law.

The series titled “Why should we have a limited government?” will justify why large governments are a bane to the economy through arguments on costs, problems of coordination, and corruption. The series will then conclude with a fourth piece on what an ideal state looks like.

It is intuitive that larger governments incur larger costs. This takes place through two avenues: recurrent expenditures and management expenditures. The present Government has lost count of the number of enterprises the State owns, as revealed by the Advocata Institute’s recently published report “The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka – 2019”.

As of 2017, 1,389,767 of the labour force in Sri Lanka are employed in the public service. This is around 14.5% of the labour force. The enormity of these numbers is clear when compared with developed countries. For instance, Canada, which has a population of 37.6 million, has a public sector of 262,696, according to the official Government of Canada website, making it clear that a government does not need to be expansive even in the instance of a large population.

To make things even worse, the Government introduces salary increments either at the onset of an election or during a new budget proposal, instead of having increments dependent on performance.

With the recently proposed increment of Rs. 10,000 for the public sector, the expenditure for wages adds up to Rs. 768 billion for the year. This is around 25% of the government’s expenditure, as per the Budget in 2019. This exceeds the amount allocated for public investment (Rs. 756 billion) for the year 2019, which is around 24% of the budgeted expenditure for this year.

These complicated numbers bring questions to mind: Is providing jobs a role of a government? What is the opportunity cost? What are the indirect consequences? What is the concealed political gain from this process?

A state’s role goes beyond providing job opportunities. Some of the crucial elements a state should look into are national defence and maintaining law and order. The Easter attacks and ensuing events highlighted that the Government should be focusing more on its core functions before moving beyond.

Furthermore, when looking retrospectively at political campaigns, politicians target the votes of government officers mainly through the introduction of wage increments. While increments are positive incentives for productivity, politicians use them for popularity. In such cases, two factors increase the costs for the government. Since larger governments require more state officers for administration purposes, the costs incurred just for administration purposes increase. When politicians promising higher increments become popular, the cost burden for the government piles up.

Every decision made in the economy has an opportunity cost. A state could allocate resources either for consumption or for investments. Investments generate direct income in the long run while consumption creates effective demand which indirectly generates income. Given this backdrop, it is important to answer why unregulated and irresponsible expenditure by a state is catastrophic.

Let us explain through a simple example. If a household spends on consumption which does not generate income, the household has to resort to loans. A similar argument can be transposed towards a state. If a state spends on consumption (in this case the cost for expansion of the government), they have to utilise other methods such as loans or taxes which are reflected back on the taxpayers of the country. These wage expenditures incurred by the government are utilised for consumption most of the time. Alternatively, if politicians stop promising salary increments and reduce the size of the government, these wages could be utilised for public investments – a critical requirement for economic growth and long-term income generation.

Leaving vital services aside, what do state officers incur to the government? Losses or revenues? Would an additional state officer cover the cost of their wages and generate revenue through their productivity? Would it increase the efficiency of the department? These questions should be standard criteria before unnecessarily expanding particular state departments. The experience one has at most government institutions speaks for the inefficiency that plagues these institutions.

What is the underlying cause of incompetence of the State in Sri Lanka? If the government is supposed to facilitate services, why do they operate their entities in a manner they generate losses? Why do we constantly see power cuts through the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) if larger governments are meant to provide better services? Could we keep our trust on the State, given the way they function with our money?

Do larger governments function better? The evidence seems to indicate otherwise.

How many committees does it take to fix an airline?

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dilshani Ranawaka

On 1 March, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved $ 164.1 million under the Extended Fund Facility after successfully completing the fifth review for the country. According to the IMF, restructuring and enhancing the governance of SriLankan Airlines and other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the implementation of price formula are key issues that should be addressed.

SriLankan Airlines has a new CCO and CFO as a result of the numerous numbers of commissions formed to assess and come up with a restructuring process. Presently, the losses alone had accumulated up to Rs. 40 billion in a time frame of 2016-2018.

The solution is pretty straightforward – find the root cause and then come up with recommendations. However, restructuring in the case of SriLankan Airlines appears to be a rather daunting process for the Government, with endless committees and subcommittees working on a strategy. The Government started off by appointing Cabinet members and state officials in the first commission. It took them three years to realise that it is crucial to appoint experts to look into this matter. Even after appointing four committees plus consulting the best in the aviation industry, Nyras, what they have achieved so far is the appointment of a new board and a new management along with the CCO and CFO. Given the climbing amount of debt from operating the airline and also knowing the intensity of the losses, why have they taken such a long time to plan a way out of this?

The first such committee was formed back in May 2017, focusing on privatising the airline. The council was headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and consisted of officials from the Cabinet and other state officials. Following up on the process, it was reported that the Prime Minister was to take the decision on restructuring the airline in July 2017.

“By 31 July, we have to give an internal restructuring plan to the Prime Minister, basically looking at what we have to do internally with SriLankan – irrespective of whether we are getting a partner or not, we need to move forward,” a statement given by then Minister of Public Enterprise Development Kabir Hashim.

However, implementation did not materialise, and on 8 December 2017, the President appointed another special ministerial committee and a committee of officials to assist them to decide the fate of SriLankan Airlines with a deadline of two weeks, with a report due to be submitted on 20 December 2017. The actions regarding the airline were to be implemented on or before 31 July 2018. Why does the Government take such a long time – almost half a year – to implement these recommendations? The role of any government in an economy is to adjust market failures, not to cause more.

By 2018, Nyras, one of the leading aviation consultancy firms, was hired after the initial round of recommendations, and it presented a comprehensive report. However, the consultancy group has now filed a lawsuit against the Government because of delayed consultancy payments. While these measures were taken and international consultants were hired, SriLankan Airlines was still piling up losses at an exponential rate.

By 7 January 2019, the President formed yet another commission to conduct a comprehensive study – review the present vision and mission objectives, strategies, corporate plan, and action plan of the airline – and come up with recommendations for restructuring, which does not consist of any member of the previous committees formed by the President. Does this mean that the previous four committees appointed (two committees in 2017, one in 2018, and another in 2019) are redundant?

Exercising our rights as citizens, we need to push for fast reforms as this is a black hole sucking out tax-payer money. It has taken five committees, including consultancy from Nyras, to address various issues of SriLankan Airlines for the past three and a half years. With these five committees, what the Government has achieved so far is inducting the board of the airlines.

What we can take from this is:

1. The commissions have submitted recommendations that wouldn’t work

   or

2. The Government is incapable of implementing these recommendations

   or

3. The Government is being willfully negligent by not taking action and implementing recommendations.

Given past experiences, these failures indicate a combination of the second and third conclusions.
SriLankan Airlines, which was then operated under Emirates – a renowned carrier of United Arab of Emirates, enjoyed a profit of Rs. 4.4 billion for the year 2008. The next 10 years, once the airline was taken over by the Government, suffered heavy losses due to the decline in performance and poor governance. The national airline had been climbing down in terms of performance as well as losses.

How many committees would it take for the Government to really execute any of these plans? When the good governance regime started their office in mid-2015, the losses of SriLankan Airlines were Rs. 16.4 billion. The losses of the airline had more than doubled up to a cumulative loss of Rs. 40 billion for the time period between 2016 and 2018. It took losses of Rs. 40 billion, and three years’ worth of planning to appoint two vital roles, the Chief Commercial Officer and the Chief Financial Officer, to the airline. How enormous should the losses be for the government to implement restructuring procedures? What would be at stake by then? This is indefinitely an answer Sri Lankans would not like to find out.

Keeping track of our state enterprises

Originally appeared on the Daily News

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The Sri Lankan government is currently in a rather confused state of having lost track of the number of state enterprises it runs.

While the Ministry of Finance tracks the financials of 55 key SOEs, the government does not have an official number for the enterprises it runs. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance states that there are 400 and this is true to a certain extent. In the Advocata Institute’s 2019 report on the state of state enterprises, it has identified 424 principal SOEs, 84 subsidiary SOEs and 19 sub-subsidiary SOEs; bringing the total to a shocking 527 entities.

While it is bewildering that the government runs a minimum of 527 entities, the losses sustained by these enterprises are a greater cause for concern. When looking at the financials of the 55 strategic SOEs (which account for only 10.4% of the 527), the cumulative losses for the period of 2006 – 2017 amount to a massive Rs. 795 billion.

Reform promises

Apparently, the government has taken note of this. Reform has been promised by a variety of politicians at pivotal political moments. The election manifesto of President Maithripala Sirisena stated,

“I will implement a plan corresponding to Singapore’s Thamasek model to regularise the Management of State owned strategic institutions and sectors such as state banks, the harbour, energy, water supply, airports and transport.”

This is essentially a good starting point. Under the Singaporean Temasek model, one holding company is responsible for countries’ public enterprises. This is a model that has worked, with variations being adopted in other countries.

The Indonesian variation of the model has one holding company for each sector – given that Sri Lanka is a much smaller country it is possible that we could manage with one holding company.

The benefits of adopting this model lie in the accountability it creates. Having a holding company creates distance from the government and its SOEs, reducing chances for political intervention. It’s important to note that the Prime Minister has also expressed his support for this model, which meant the policy had buy-in from both sides of then unity government. While the Temasek model is a step in the right direction, if we want our SOEs to be efficient, privatisation is where the final solution lies.

On that note, the ‘privatisation of state-owned enterprises’ was mentioned early in the 2016 budget speech. The speech highlighted the loss-making nature of SOEs and the negative impact this it had on the budget. The solution mentioned was the use of ‘corrective measures’ to transform SOEs into commercially viable enterprises.

The methods recommended were selective, market-based pricing mechanisms for public utilities, rationalising of recruitment and exploring public-private-partnership opportunities.

The budget speech of 2017 also stated that steps would be taken to make SOEs viable business entities through cost reflective pricing structures and operational autonomy.

It went further, committing to the listing of non-strategic enterprises such as the Hyatt, Grand Oriental Hotel, Waters Edge, West Coast, Manthai Salt, Hambantota Salt and Hilton. The rationale was that the money raised could be used for debt repayment. Notably, both the budget speech of 2018 and 2019 were silent on the topic of SOE reform.

Working under the assumption that these promises were made in good faith, there is the question of why reform never materialises. It is possible that we have been trying to run before we can walk. While SOE losses have to stemmed, it may be better to have smaller, digestible phases of reform than a large reform agenda which will never move beyond a statement or speech.

Reform is vital, but should realistic

A key point highlighted in the recent IMF staff report was the losses sustained by state owned enterprises. Three main SOEs; the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) and SriLankan Airlines have recorded a combined loss of 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2018, compared to 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2017. The report also puts the financial obligations of non-financial SOEs at 11.8% of GDP.

Given rising losses and the urgent requirement for some level of action to be taken, it may be that the government should focus on smaller, more achievable reform that lies within the realm of political possibility. In Advocata’s 2019 report on the state of state enterprises, a few key reforms were identified.

These reforms were chosen because they are politically feasible and because they will have a targeted impact on the root causes behind SOE losses. Two of the main reforms are detailed below.

1. Conduct a survey of all state-owned enterprises: it is impossible for the government to regulate or monitor these entities, when the government is uncertain of the scope of its responsibility. Once the survey is completed, the government can institute basic reporting procedures.

2. Strengthen COPE, COPA and the Auditor General’s Department: these institutions are the main source of accountability for state-owned enterprises and as such should be given a mandate which allows them to take sufficient action.

Once these steps are taken, the government could expand its reform agenda to encompass the OECD principles of corporate governance, which include clearly defining the state’s role as an owner, establishing an effective legal and regulatory framework for SOEs, ensuring transparency and disclosure, while emphasizing the state’s responsibility to stakeholders. In short, the OECD guidelines will nudge SOEs towards a path of transparency and efficiency.

However, in the short term, the first two reforms mentioned above remain crucial.

The COPE reports

Originally appeared on Echelon

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

The Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts (COPE) reports on state enterprises

The COPE, a key oversight committee, is by its own admission under-resourced. It lacks staff, particularly for audit and legal support. They also lack IT systems and, apparently, even a proper office. Despite these limitations and the fact that the reports are not comprehensive, they have examined a limited number of issues in a few institutions. These reports are a devastating critique of the state of governance, underlining the need for a re-think in the role of the government.

Excerpts from the reports are as follows:

SRI LANKA PORTS AUTHORITY: RS 5.8 BILLION TO CONSTRUCT SURIYAWEWA CRICKET STADIUM

As per the Auditor General’s report on the SLPA (2016):
“The Authority had conducted the architectural and construction activities of the international cricket stadium in Suriyawewa on behalf of the institute of Sri Lanka Cricket. According to the contract agreement entered into between the contractor and the Authority on the said construction, a sum totalling Rs5,838 million, inclusive of the interest amounting to Rs2,881 million, had remained payable to the contractor by the Authority up to 31 December 2016 in respect of the said constructions made under the variation order (emphasis added) of the contract for construction of the Hambanthota Harbour.”

Note: A variation order is an alteration to the scope of works in a construction contract in the form of an addition, substitution or omission from the original scope of works. While these are not unusual in large projects, it is bizarre to treat work on an entirely new and unrelated project as a variation in a port construction contract.

“Despite the non-availability of any verification that the said sum would be borne either by the Treasury or the institute of Sri Lanka Cricket, the sum had been accounted in the financial statements of the Authority as being receivable from a Government institution, but the receipt of that sum remained doubtful”(ibid).

Separately, the third COPE report observes that Sri Lanka Cricket owes the State Engineering Corporationan amount of Rs818 million on 7 projects as at 31.12.2015.

PEOPLE’S BANK DUD LOAN

1. NON-PERFORMING LOANS AT RS395 MILLION – KANDY CITY CENTRE
An overdraft facility of Rs245 million and a long-term loan facility of Rs150 million were granted to a customer for a construction named Kandy City Centre on 30 January 2009 and 27 January 2009, respectively. However, these loans were classified as non-performing loans after 3 months. Though the customer agreed to pay the loan in installments of Rs1 million per month, it was decided to offset the loan against the monthly rent to be paid on behalf of the People’s Bank branch housed at Kandy City Center.

However, even if the customer repaid the loan in monthly installments of Rs1 million each, the bank would have to wait for 62 years to recover the outstanding amount. The chairman stated that several such unsystematic transactions had been done.

Note: As per CBSL guidelines, ‘Credit facilities repayable in monthly installments: when 3 consecutive installments, principal and/or interest, have not been paid’ are to be classified as non-performing loans.

The loan granted in January 2009 was classified as non-performing within three months of disbursement, which indicates that there was no attempt at repayment. Subsequent to COPE recommendations, Rs20 million had been recovered. Legal action had been instituted, but the defendants did not appear in courts when the case was called on 1 December 2016.

Credit approval in a bank should go through multiple levels of authority – the branch manager, credit officer, credit committees, board committees and risk management committees – depending on the size of the loan. A loan in excess of Rs100 million would typically require approval at the highest levels. The chairman’s comment of ‘unsystematic transactions’ seems to indicate serious control weaknesses, further examples follow.

2. NON-PERFORMING LOANS GRANTED BY JA-ELA BRANCH AT RS619 MILLION
The Ja-ela Bank branch had granted three loan facilities and three overdraft facilities to a customer, his spouse and an enterprise; and subsequently, these loans were categorized as non-performing.

I. At the date of 12.11.2013, the outstanding balance of Rs619,867,345 of the three overdraft facilities and one loan facility could not be recovered.

II. The chairman stated that legal action has been taken to recover more than 60% of the loans that had been granted in an unsystematic manner and discussions are being held with regard to the remaining portion of the loans.

Note: Subsequent follow-up by COPE indicates that the husband and wife were directors in a company engaged in property development. Loans had been obtained in the names of the individual directors and the company. The unsettled balance of these loans was Rs197 million and the interest to be collected was Rs503 million, making the sum total due to the bank Rs700 million by September 2016.

AIRPORT AND AVIATION SERVICES

1. Rs. 7 MILLION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF KATARAGAMA HOLIDAY RESORT
Rs7 million had been paid to a private party in 2002 to purchase land to construct this holiday resort. Thereafter, the Kataragama Divisional Secretariat informed that the land belongs to the government and that it had been obtained on a 30-year lease from January 2008 for an annual lease of Rs460,000. However, the sum of Rs7 million paid to a private party had not been recovered.

Note: Following the COPE report, legal action had been instituted in the Gampaha District court for recovery of the Rs7 million. The question as to why the title was not properly checked prior to purchase remains unanswered.

2. AIRPORT AND AVIATION SERVICES LIMITED: RS248 MILLION PAID ON A CONTRACT SIGNED FOR RS27 MILLION TO DEVELOP AN ERP SYSTEM. THE PROJECT WAS NOT COMPLETED.
The contract had been awarded to a private company for Rs27,464,632 (without VAT) in June 2012 for the implementation of the project within 8 months. The company had paid a sum of Rs248,600,000 (without VAT) to the contractor and the period of the contract had been extended on four occasions. Though over four years have lapsed since the awarding of the contract, the contractor had failed to carry out the contract properly. The work of this institution has currently been suspended and it has submitted an appeal.

SRI LANKA TOURISM DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

1. SPENT A TOTAL OF RS113 MILLION ON FOUR OCCASIONS FOR WORK THAT WAS NOT CARRIED OUT
A sum of Rs11 million out of Rs29 million had been received for renovating 30 rooms of a holiday bungalow belonging to the Authority had been for work not done and overpaid taxes. According to the report obtained by the Authority from ICTAD, a loss of nearly Rs5 million has been incurred. Steps had not been taken to recover that amount from the contractor or the officer who approved the payment.

A sum of Rs3.2 million had been paid to suppliers based on three letters, which the suppliers had produced stating that they had provided dozers to construct the Kalpitiya Mohottuwasama Jetty. This payment had been made without a certificate of fixing work hours according to the daily meter reading by an officer of the authority.

Even though the Kalpitiya integrated Tourism project commenced in 2008 on an estimated cost of Rs5.5 billion in order to construct holiday resorts with 4,000 rooms and infrastructures facilities to be completed within 5 years, not a single room had been constructed despite an expenditure of Rs88.7 million at December 2014.

2. PAID RS7.3 MILLION AS PART OF THE INTEREST OF A LOAN OBTAINED BY A PRIVATE HOTEL
Four hotels had been selected close to the Hambantota International Cricket Stadium (which was selected to host cricket matches for the 2011 Cricket World Cup), to develop accommodation facilities.

It was revealed that this sum of Rs7.3 million, a portion of the 4% interest of a loan obtained by the Peacock Beach Hotel from the Bank of Ceylon, had been paid out of the Tourism Development Fund on a number of occasions. According to the documents furnished to this committee, the approval of the minister in charge had not been obtained to make the payments.

Note: A letter appended to the COPE report provides some explanation of the circumstances of this payment. It indicates that the four hotels had to be upgraded to four-star status in order to host the 2011 World Cup matches. The hotels had apparently informed the SLTDA that there was no commercial viability to the exercise and requested that the government subsidise the interest cost on the loans required to finance the upgrade.

The cost of upgrade for three hotels is indicated as being “Rs414 million”. The upgrade cost of the fourth hotel was apparently not available. The letter was written by the Director General of the SLTDA and addressed to the Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism had been copied to the Bank of Ceylon, People’s Bank and Hatton National Bank. The interest rates on the loans were supposed to be 12% and the SLTDA was supposed to pay 4% as a subsidy. Based on these figures, the subsidy for the three hotels would amount to Rs16.5 million annually, assuming loans to the values indicated were granted. It is not known if this was the case and if further liabilities exist.

NATIONAL WATER SUPPLY AND DRAINAGE BOARD

There was a cost escalation of 338% in 11 water supply projects that were funded by a bank loan of Rs54 billion. The board has received an unsolicited foreign-funded project, and work has commenced without a contract. Strangely, the NWSDB has been appointed as a sub-contractor on the project by the main contractor, to the value of $64 million (it appears that the unsolicited proposal was accepted by the NWSDB and the work has later been sub-contracted to the NWSDB itself).

Lanka Mineral Sands Ltd. spends money on tasks that are contrary to the objectives of the company – Beach Park The company’s welfare funds have been utilized for the construction of roads and buildings in various other areas in contravention to the objectives of the institution. Information pertaining to spending Rs40 million for the construction of the Hambantota Beach Park and spending money for making improvements to the Devinuwara Maha Devale have come to light.