Fuel deal without bidding sparks fears of economic instability

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

On Wednesday (16), a daily newspaper reported that the new Government was planning to strike a fuel supply deal between the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) for power generation.

Following this report, there was significant discussion on social media questioning why the Government would deviate from the competitive bidding process (a few Government representatives have personally informed us over the phone that the facts in the news story are incorrect and that the Government plans to clarify details through a press conference).

If the news is true, it would mean that the CEB would no longer engage in competitive bidding when purchasing fuel from the CPC. Fuel purchases, including hydrocarbons like naphtha and heavy fuel oil, are key input costs in electricity generation.

Regardless of the news story’s accuracy, the main concern for businesses is that bypassing the competitive bidding process in fuel procurement could lead to significant risks for CPC and CEB financial stability with corruption vulnerabilities. If the CPC and CEB start incurring losses or attempt to cover up losses by increasing tariffs, it could destabilise the economy.

To put this into perspective, the CPC’s revenue for 2023 was approximately Rs. 1,300 billion and the CEB’s about Rs. 679 billion. In comparison, Sri Lanka’s total tax revenue, including Value-Added Tax (VAT) for 2023, was around Rs. 3,000 billion.

Together, these two institutions manage a cash inflow that amounts to nearly two-thirds of the country’s total tax revenue. Even a minor financial misstep could result in a major crisis for the Government, leading to a complete economic collapse.

Avoiding the competitive bidding process creates a vulnerability to corruption. Competition is a crucial tool for preventing corruption, as it automatically introduces checks and balances through price signals on the supplier side. Without competitive bidding, any corruption within the CPC or CEB would likely manifest as significant financial losses in their balance sheets. Unlike other institutions, losses at the CPC and CEB have massive spillover effects, as has been seen under successive governments.

Typically, the CPC sells naphtha – a byproduct of its refinery – at a price higher than the market rate to the CEB. This is one way the CPC tries to offset its own inefficiencies or cover losses when the Government mandates fuel sales below production cost. However, when the CPC charges more for naphtha, electricity generation becomes more expensive, prompting the CEB to seek tariff increases.

On top of this, the CEB often delays payments to the CPC when it experiences losses, which forces the latter to borrow money from banks at high interest rates. These costs, in turn, are passed on to consumers, affecting industries across the board – from rice mills to poultry farms and even hotel operations, as energy costs are a major expense (CEB tariff hikes impact the water bill and many other industries, including through increasing inflation).

The CPC also sells jet fuel to SriLankan Airlines at inflated prices, similar to how it overcharges the CEB for naphtha. Jet fuel is a significant cost for the aviation industry and the high prices can push airlines into losses. When the CPC, CEB, and SriLankan Airlines all incur losses, they ultimately turn to the Treasury for bailouts.

It is no secret that the Treasury’s budget deficit has remained massive for years, compared to the country’s GDP. Consequently, the Government then turns to State-owned banks like the Bank of Ceylon (BOC) and People’s Bank (PB) to cover the losses. In many cases, the Government provides Treasury guarantees, sometimes even in US Dollars, for fuel purchases.

These banks, in turn, are forced to lend depositors’ money to these institutions, often at a high risk due to the prime lending rates. Ultimately, the financial mismanagement of the CPC and CEB trickles down to depositors’ hard-earned savings.

In the last Budget, the Government allocated Rs. 450 billion, equivalent to three years of Advance Personal Income Tax (APIT, previously the Pay-As-You-Earn [PAYE] tax), to recapitalise the banking sector, mainly with State banks. In addition, the Government absorbed $ 510 million into the Treasury to address losses at SriLankan Airlines, largely caused by the CPC’s inflated prices.

If the CPC indeed moves away from competitive bidding, it is a clear signal of poor governance and a warning of future economic hardship, potentially affecting depositors’ savings. When the CPC and CEB incur losses, the Government typically has to either increase the prices of electricity and fuel beyond what is set by price formulas or continue providing subsidies – both of which lead to higher taxes or interference with key economic indicators, thus creating political pressure.

This cycle has been ongoing for years, which is why the business community and others are deeply concerned about the CPC leaving the competitive bidding process. If the news is false, we can be relieved. But it is essential to understand the grave risks of abandoning competitive bidding, as it extends far beyond corruption; it threatens to bring about complete financial instability.

Why we won’t be able to find the thieves after the election

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

If you ask the average person the reason for our economic crisis, they would probably say one word: ‘corruption’. The idea of corruption was hyped so much that it became the main theme of the people’s movement – the ‘Aragalaya’. 

However, the truth is a little different. This doesn’t mean there hasn’t been corruption; it means corruption is more of a symptom than the root cause. Corruption is like a fever, while the real infection lies elsewhere. The problem is, we don’t fully understand how corruption occurred, and if we don’t know that, it’s unlikely that we can fix it either. 

Even when we look at the election manifestos of political parties, they talk about eliminating corruption, but corruption isn’t the main focus. Instead, they place more emphasis on proposals for exports, business environment reforms, social safety nets, and debt restructuring.

Why don’t we know?

The way many Sri Lankans calculate corruption is simple: they take the total value of loans we have taken over the years, compare it with the asset value of infrastructure projects, and conclude that the difference equals corruption. 

However, most of the money we borrowed was not for infrastructure. In fact, since 2010, about 47% of the loans were taken just to pay interest. Another 26% of the debt increase came from currency depreciation. This means that from 2010 to 2023, about 72% of the total loans was used for interest payments and dealing with currency depreciation. 

Therefore, comparing the value of infrastructure projects to the total debt doesn’t give a clear picture of corruption because we have been borrowing mostly in order to pay interest. As a result, the debt keeps growing and we remain stuck in the same place.

Does that mean there’s no corruption?

This doesn’t mean there has been no corruption. It simply means we don’t fully understand how it took place. As a result, the solutions proposed for corruption only address the symptoms, not the root cause. 

Corruption has taken place during procurement. Most of the projects we conducted have been priced far above their actual value. 

For example, a project that should have cost $ 1 million was priced at $ 3 million. We then borrowed money at high interest rates for that inflated amount. The project is completed, but we’re still paying interest on an inflated value and the interest keeps snowballing. Now, we’re borrowing more just to pay the interest, which only pushes the total debt higher.

How to fix it

This problem needs to be fixed at the beginning, not at the end. Most anti-corruption methods focus on the aftermath – finding thieves and recovering stolen money. Of course, we should recover stolen money and hold people accountable for misuse of public funds. But on a policy level, the real need is for transparency in procurement and competitive bidding. 

Digital procurement systems and a proper procurement law can take us to the next stage. Otherwise, it’s akin to closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. Without competitive bidding, we may never even know the true value of projects or how much was stolen. Recovering stolen money becomes incredibly difficult if we don’t know the amount or the method used to steal it.

The solution is upfront disclosure of the values of large infrastructure projects, as well as clear financing methods and guidelines.

The graph shows the impact of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) losses on debt. The contributions of Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and SriLankan Airlines to the debt are clear; in 2024, we will see more debt from SriLankan Airlines, the National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB), and other entities.

Simply put, we borrowed too much at high interest rates with short maturities for infrastructure projects that didn’t generate enough revenue to even cover the interest payments. As a result, the interest compounded and we have been continuously borrowing to pay off that growing interest, leaving the debt in place and forcing us to keep borrowing.

Albert Einstein put it wisely when he said: “Compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world. He who understands it, earns it; he who doesn’t, pays it.”

Prioritising SOE bill over OSA: A shift in economic direction

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

While the Government has prioritised the Online Safety Act (OSA), which is extremely negative for our economy, there are other bills in the line-up which are expected to get through. One such bill is on the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) holding company.

The SOE Restructuring Unit (SOERU) has outlined the principles of SOE reforms, which are in the right direction, but the Government’s prioritisation of bringing the OSA is definitely in the wrong direction.

Key principles

While the bill on the SOE holding company is yet to be released, the SOERU has outlined nine key principles on which they expect to base the SOE reforms. In the first principle it admits the Government has no role in commercial activities except for three instances.

(1) If there is a concern on national security, the Government can engage in business.

(2) If there will be no private participation in certain industries given the size of our market, the Government can engage in business. For instance, if we open the rural bus routes for the private sector, there may be a possibility that, given the nature of the low population density, no private bus operator will be interested in entering the market. While it can be to an extent addressed through allowing to charge a higher price and the Government providing a direct cash subsidy to the citizens in the rural area, there can be practical challenges. In that case the SOERU principals have left the space for the Government to enter business.

(3) If the service from the Government is essential in nature but if the regulatory mechanisms are weak for competition, where there is opportunity for market exploitation by the private sector, the Government can be in the business.

While the three areas are logically right, we have to wait for the final bill to see how exactly this has been worded. The danger is that governments are so powerful that even in the above three areas, it can leave a lot of room to keep a lot of existing SOEs under the government of the day if the political ideology is to keep SOEs, claiming it is under national security.

In the Right to Information (RTI) Act, there is provision that the authority can decline to disclose the requested information if it threatens national security. For most RTI requests, many Government institutions have been responding that the information cannot be disclosed due to national security reasons. Therefore, defining national security or the process of deciding how an organisation or industry comes under national security is important.

Unless the Government can always build a logical stand, even institutions like the Cashew Corporation will have to be under the Government as it can impact national security.

On the second condition, that in the absence of a private player due to limitation of the market size or another criterion for a service that is essential in nature, the guidelines have to be developed in the case of what could be a new player wanting to join the industry later.

For example, it could be an industry with high capital investment and low market penetration, making Sri Lanka unattractive at the beginning due to the market size. As a result the Government can be in that business as the service is in the nature of being essential.

But over the years as technology and other parameters develop, at one point there may be new players interested in joining the industry. At that point, a natural resistance may occur from the SOEs over a new entrant being in the market as they will lose their monopoly status. The same happened when Lanka IOC entered the market and still there is some resistance to the entrance of Sinopec and other players in the energy market.

Deciding what an essential service is also requires a framework. Otherwise, when a government wants to be in a business, it can easily announce that industry as an essential service and enter the business, bringing forth various reasons.

All of the above are beyond the scope of the SOE law, but we need to keep in mind that these are the loopholes governments always have when ideological stances are different. Even if the new bill passes, we should not underestimate the skills of policymakers in finding the loopholes.

Other principles

The fourth principle of the SOE holding company is to bring all SOEs under one registration format. At the moment, different SOEs have different structures with a very high degree of complexity. For instance, the railway is a commercial activity and runs as the ‘Railway Department,’ while the Ceylon Electric Board runs as a board under an act. Meanwhile, Lanka Hospitals is a hospital but operates as a private limited company. Therefore bringing them all under one registration is vital when we set up the SOE holding company.

The fifth principle mainly focuses on the governance of SOEs as the SOE reform process is a longhaul game. The SOE holding company and the subsidiaries are required to adhere to Colombo Stock Exchange guidelines. This includes releasing quarterly financial statements and the board of directors being required to conform to the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance.

The other principles in the list are on unbundling the regulator and the operator in certain industries. There are industries run by the Government where the Government is a player as well as a regulator at the same time.

Overall the SOERU’s principles to base the SOE holding company is in the right direction, although there is always room for politicians to exploit the principles.

It is sad to see the pushing back of such important SOE holding company legislation over the draconian Online Safety Act.

What next for Sri Lanka?

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

New predictions are emerging that debt restructuring and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Board-level agreement may take until the end of this year. Another ongoing discussion is about the Local Government Elections and postponement of elections. Electricity tariffs are to be increased and 10 banks have been downgraded by Fitch Ratings as a recalibration of Sri Lanka’s sovereign rating.

Overall, it appears that economic reforms are being sidelined faster than expected, without realising the consequences of each action. It is true these complicated problems have no easy, straightforward solutions. No solution will be perfect and the validity, impact, and effect of any solution will be weighed against time. To put it simply, a solution that appears valid and reasonable today may not sound reasonable in a few weeks or months.

Each action has its consequences and inaction will also have consequences. It will be a battle between the consequences of action and inaction and the continuation of this for the next few years.

Reforms and restructuring

Let’s take the case of reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). With the election cycle commencing with Local Government Elections, attempts at restructuring SOEs such as the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) may be delayed. This delay means that inefficiencies will continue and tariffs will be increased without any competitive basis. This will in turn impact all businesses as well as macroeconomic indicators given the monopoly and the size of the electricity business. It may also extend the duration of power cuts and pave the way for another wave of protests, worsening the business environment.

Reforms too will be painful. Trade unions and some employees will be affected and an electricity monopoly can interrupt the life of the common man in multiple ways, with political and capital implications.

The cost of not implementing reforms will be much higher politically and economically, as it would be a cyclical result. Therefore, the reasonable decision is to restructure loss-making SOEs. Unfortunately, there is no other way out and delaying this further may invite darker years in the future.

The delays in the debt restructuring process will have its own consequences, both economically and geopolitically. The debt restructuring delay is a repercussion of maintaining bad foreign relations.

Poor international relations

How we treated India over the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) and in discussions on the East Container Terminal was extremely unprofessional and irresponsible. There is a significant difference between disagreement, negotiation, and unprofessional treatment.

By suspending the Light Rail Transit (LRT) project, we lost the respect and trust of Japan. We even annoyed China with the fertiliser matter and continuous regulatory delays with the Port City project. Our relations with the Middle East deteriorated with the cremation of dead bodies of the Muslim community during Covid.

We are not even in the good books of the US over the way we dealt with the MCC grant. Simply put, we do not have a friend who will extend a helping hand during troubled times. It is said that countries have longer memories than people. As such, we have limited our options due to our own grave mistakes.

A stalemate in a crisis

Economics and politics often go hand in hand. During an economic crisis, instability in politics is unavoidable. Our President does not have a direct mandate and the composition of the Parliament may not really reflect the people’s voice with the dawn of the completely new sociopolitical environment.

This was one reason the discussion of a common minimum programme was floated by concerned individuals and professionals, but it appears that this too has been discarded, with everyone slowly turning their attention to the election cycle. The calibre of our politicians is too inferior for them to understand the dynamics involved and to come up with responsive and novel policies and political options.

We are now in a stalemate, with a lot of short-term distractions. In such situations, we become distracted and waste our time on non-value adding activities without realising the massive deterioration of the quality of life. A deeper analysis shows that while the absence of economic reforms is a major issue, the fragility of our institutions is a bigger concern, with the institutional capability for the functioning of a basic society being almost nonexistent.

Solutions

Appointing capable and credible human resources for debt negotiations with China is essential to avoid delays. Acceleration of debt restructuring will unblock many other barricades, enabling us to move forward. There is a huge vacuum of capable human resources needed to carry out reforms. Therefore, providing space for already appointed committees to recruit more capable people and working out a time-bound solution matrix is important. The solution now lies in setting up institutions that can execute reforms to get us the required results.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Who pays God’s electricity bill?

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Over the years, I have volunteered at a humanitarian organisation named CandleAid Lanka to help the poor. The organisation has a programme called ‘Gift a Meal,’ where we provide meals to selected vulnerable households. When these people receive meals or dry rations, they thank the organisation profusely. I have noticed that most families also thank whichever god they believe in, because poor people think it is their god who is giving them a meal through CandleAid. 

I shared this observation later during a dinner table conversation with CandleAid’s Founder, Captain Elmo Jayawardena, who, as usual, cracked a joke regarding my observation. He said: “God takes very good care of people who support CandleAid, because God is rational. God ultimately gets the credit for all the hard work we do, so he must be thinking that he will lose the people’s support on two fronts if he harms such people. Firstly, he will lose the credit he gets through CandleAid’s work, and secondly, people will lose trust in God, because if something happens to people who donate to these charities, others will wonder why generous people are not being taken care of by God. So any rational God would simply do everything to protect us.”

Captain Jayawardena of course did not mean any particular god or religion, but was simply sharing a light moment at a private dinner. 

Lower power tariffs for religious institutions 

There was a time when the high powers of the Ceylon Electricity Board requested the blessings of a rain god for uninterrupted power supply during the Yahapalana regime. Now, religious institutions have requested a lower tariff rate compared to the normal rate.

Let’s face the truth. Even if we provide low tariffs for religious institutions or ask them to pay high tariffs, it is the common people who will pay. If we provide a tariff concession, common people and businesses have to pay it as taxpayers. Someone has to bear the cost of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. If we cross-subsidise religious institutions, it is ultimately the taxpayers who have to pay. If we ask religious institutions to pay higher tariff rates, these same common people have to pay, as devotees of the god they believe in. 

However, there is a significant difference in behaviour and impact of usage, although the end payer is the same. 

If taxpayers are asked to pay the subsidy for religious institutions, religious institutions have no motivation to reduce their usage, because the buying price is far less than the market price. Therefore, there is no motivation to save electricity. 

At the same time, the difference in treatment of one set of customers will create market distortions. It will also set a bad example and many other customer categories will make the same request. 

Moreover, even those who don’t use electricity at the religious institution have to indirectly pay for it through taxes, instead of spending the money on something productive. This will incentivise the religious institutions to continue using electricity without moving to sustainable energy sources. Even if the particular line ministry pays the electricity bill, it is ultimately the taxpayer who has to foot the bill. 

If the higher electricity tariff is borne by the religious institutions, even then the same taxpayers have to pay the bill, as devotees of the institution. But in this case, devotees who use electricity at the institution will be the ones to bear the cost, so they have a motivation to reduce their consumption. This will also incentivise them to look for alternative energy sources. 

Market reform for better options

Considering the political dynamics surrounding the tariff hike, it appears that once again electricity tariffs are becoming a political weapon as usual. Most likely this will block some electricity sector reforms. 

If there was a market system, there could have been a concessionary rate for religious institutions. For instance, if we had a few companies that undertook electricity generation and distribution, one of these companies may have offered an option for religious institutions to receive electricity at a concessionary rate as charity. 

For example, supermarket chains run various charity projects geared towards sustainability through their outlets. Telco service providers offer different services to donate money on a range of issues at a corporate level. 

Therefore, I believe that religious institutions should request for market reforms rather than tariff concessions, because it is more likely that they will receive a better offer from a market system than from politicians. 

Energy sector reforms should not only be about simple tariff hikes. When we approach an election, these same politicians will simply use the electricity tariff as a political tool, resulting in a bigger mess. The same will happen for fuel as well. 

In Sri Lanka, the culture of entitlement across all sectors is a genuine issue. This culture is not only present in requesting tariff concessions for religious institutions but also in requesting tariff protections for selected industries. On both occasions, the burden is simply passed on to the common man. When the same thing happens repeatedly, there is only one thing left for the common man to say: “God save us.” 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

New electricity tariff structure leaves room for considerable improvement

Originally appeared on the Daily Mirror, Timesonline.lk

By the Resident Fellow of Advocata Institute

The recent revision of electricity tariffs is a step towards reducing the fiscal burden caused by the supply of electricity below its cost of production. While the new tariff structure is an improvement on the previous one, anomalies remain.

 In determining tariffs, there are three characteristics of electricity that must be noted:

I. Electricity is a commodity that is interchangeable, both in its generation and use. One megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity produced from coal or hydropower contains the same amount of energy. Different categories of users consume the same product.

II. It must be produced and used simultaneously. Electricity storage is still prohibitively expensive. Supply must meet demand exactly in the power grid.

III. The cost of supplying electricity fluctuates throughout the day, depending on the power generation mix, cost of fuels used, transmission costs and energy losses.

As electricity is a commodity, there should be no difference in the prices charged to different users. The tariff should also reflect the varying cost of supply, depending on the time of day and should as far as possible, balance the generation of electricity with its use. For sustainability, the tariff needs to be on a cost-recovery basis.

The new tariff addresses some of the shortcomings of the existing structure but there is still considerable room for improvement.

1. The proposed structure reduces the discrimination between different types of bulk supply customers.

For users below 42kVA, the different rates that were charged to hotels, government and general-purpose bulk supply, have been amalgamated into a single general-purpose tariff but a lower rate remains applicable to ‘industrial’ customers. However, it is positive that the differential between the general-purpose bulk supply and customers categorised as ‘industrial’ has decreased.

For larger bulk customers, it is welcome that the distinction between categories has been done away with and a single tariff, close to cost recovery and reflecting time of use, has been applied.

The Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) consultation document states that the average cost of generation is Rs.32.87 but the tariff charged to low-use industrial users (Rs.20) and low-use general-purpose customers (Rs.25 for those below 180kWh) is both below cost.

The only justification for a discriminatory tariff is for a lifeline tariff for the poor. While the domestic users below 90kWh do receive a subsidised tariff, the domestic consumers, who exceed this, pay the highest tariff (Rs.50 for usage between 90-180kWh, Rs.75 above 180kWh), which is almost double that of all bulk users. Thus, high-use domestic consumers are subsidising industrial and commercial users.

Moreover, instead of increasing the rate for each block of use, the moment domestic customers exceed 60 units, the tariff increases from an average of Rs.9 to Rs.16. A customer, who consumes 59 units, will pay Rs.9 but one who consumes 61 units will pay Rs.16 per unit. This is unfair and can promote corruption in meter reading. In general, such cross subsidies are undesirable, as they can lead to inefficient resource allocation or have unintended consequences.

For example, the higher domestic tariff may serve as a disincentive for remote work. Remote or flexible work arrangements can reduce transport costs, congestion, energy use and for some, enable a better work/life balance. The government should be facilitating flexible work but the higher rates applicable to some domestic consumers may be a disincentive.

The PUCSL has an unusual definition of industry. It includes, ‘agriculture’, ‘forestry and fishing’, ‘mining and quarrying’, ‘manufacturing’, ‘electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply’, ‘water supply, sewerage and waste management. As a matter of principle, the producer should not make judgment on how the product is used or attempt to encourage or discourage particular activities through prices. If the government does wish to encourage particular industries, it is more efficient to do this through a transparent system of grants, rather than distorting prices.

Economic activity is increasingly complex and a value chain can involve many different sectors. For example, the tea industry involves agriculture, processing in factories, transport, warehousing, blending, financing, marketing and exports. Moreover, products are now more knowledge intensive, so a greater part of the value addition arises in non-production-oriented components of the value chain. With differential tariffs, parts of the same value chain may pay different prices for use of the same commodity.

Religious and charitable bodies continue to enjoy preferential treatment under the domestic tariff category but there is a small decrease in the discount offered to these bodies. High-use customers in this category should also be subject to a time of use (TOU)-based tariff. Advocata reiterates that there should be no price discrimination between users; at most there should be two categories, households and businesses.

2. It is welcome to note that the new tariff structure extends the TOU tariff to the agriculture subsector but this should be extended to smaller bulk users and made compulsory for the high-use domestic category. For customers using solar power on a net metering basis, the export and import tariffs should be based on TOU. A TOU-based tariff reflects the changing cost of generation across the day. Generation during peak hours relies more heavily on thermal power, which is more costly. Tariffs charged to customers should reflect this, so that the consumers are incentivised to shift demand to off-peak hours.

3. The new tariff maintains a lower rate for low-use domestic customers and it is welcome that the new structure applies marginal tariffs based on different slabs of usage. The previous system was inherently unfair to the consumer; the new tariff removes this anomaly.

4. The decision to charge for street lighting, which should be paid for by the local authorities, is welcome. Previously, as the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) did not charge for street lighting, the local authorities, which have control over when the lights are switched on and off, had no particular incentive to switch off street lights during day time. A lower rate for street lighting is justified because the major part of the use falls into off-peak hours.

5. It is regrettable that the PUCSL permitted the CEB to compel selected clients to pay for electricity in US dollars. This is a step towards forced dollarisation of payments and is precluded under Section 4 of Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949. The proposal is meant to address the current shortage of US dollars for importation of fuel for the energy sector. However, this would only divert resources from other alternative users and may not be the most efficient way of allocating the scarce foreign exchange in the country. It would be preferable to allow US dollars to flow into the banking sector (by removing any restrictions and requirements such as forced conversions and surrendering requirements) and for those funds to be allocated based on price (exchange rate).

The increase in the electricity tariff is unavoidable but will impose an additional burden on consumers. Therefore, it is imperative that this must be accompanied by increased transparency and efficiency

within the utility.

Consumers may expect to pay for higher world prices but cannot be expected to pay higher costs, due to inefficiency, waste or corruption. State enterprises need to be open and transparent in their affairs, particularly in procurement and where possible should operate in competitive markets.

As a first step, the CEB should provide a detailed breakdown on the components of its tariff:

• Energy costs: (Own generation costs and that paid to the private generation companies). This must be broken down into the fuel cost and the costs of operating the power stations, such as the manpower and maintenance costs as well as the capital cost of the stations.

• Network costs: This reflects the cost of transporting electricity through the power grid.

• Overhead: This is to recover the costs of central administration, billing and meter reading, data management, retail market systems as well as market development initiatives.

The opinions expressed are the authors’ own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute.

Timescale confusions in solutions for the crisis

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

A few days after the tsunami, I was called to an expert meeting at Temple Trees by the then Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa. I was seated next to Arisen Ahubudu, the famous giver of names. He stated that we had lost too much territory, including Madagascar, and that we could not afford to lose more. He proposed building a wall around the country, using the traditional techniques used in protecting tank bunds, the ralepanawa. I was stunned that such a nice and well-meaning person could come out with such arrant nonsense. He had confused geological time with human time. 

Timescale confusions of a smaller magnitude are evident among many proposing solutions to our current multi-faceted crisis. 

Solutions to power cuts

We all experience the problem. Some of us understand the cause: no dollars to pay for fuel for the generators that make up for the shortfall from lower production from the hydro generators and Norochcholai. Even if we had the dollars, such fuel is priced in dollars and subject to price fluctuations that we cannot control. It is common sense that we should shift to electricity produced by renewable sources such as solar and wind. 

The problem is that under current market and technology conditions, both the distribution network (low voltage) and the transmission network (high voltage) are limited in how much solar- and wind-generated electricity they can accept. We can, and should, increase the use of electricity from renewable sources, but we need to upgrade the transmission network to be able to do so. Solar panels yield electricity when the sun is out (not at night and not when clouds pass over the panels); the wind will produce electricity even in evenings when our use is highest, but it is still intermittent. Batteries are not cost-effective yet.

Given the need to balance supply and demand of electricity in real-time caused by lack of cost-effective storage technologies, we need a large and modernised system in order to absorb more energy from these intermittent sources. We need to invest in upgrading the national grid and possibly connect to the large Indian grid. Feasibility studies must be done, and investment mobilised. It will take several years for the desired outcomes to be achieved. Increasing solar- and wind-based energy is not a viable solution for our immediate problems, though it is a solution in the long term. Within the applicable timescale, what we need are dollars for coal and diesel.

Promotion of manufacturing

Twin deficits, exacerbated by recent economic mismanagement, caused the crisis. More exports would have addressed the current-account deficit and may have helped with the fiscal deficit if the right tax policy was in place. Roughly $ 11 billion was earned from the export of goods such as apparel, tea, and value-added rubber products before the pandemic. Around $ 7 billion was claimed from service exports such as tourism, software and business process outsourcing. 

It is true that the East Asian Tigers and China took their people out of poverty through the production of goods for export. One has to ask why Sri Lanka (and to a significant extent, the rest of South Asia) failed to ramp up the production of goods for export, relying more heavily on service exports. One could even argue that the apparel industry is a service industry. A tailor who makes a suit out of material given to him is undoubtably a provider of services. The Sri Lankan apparel industry, which is the largest importer as well as the largest exporter, is doing what a tailor does, at scale. If it is manufacturing, it is manufacturing lite.

Until the market opening in 1978, the answer to the question of why we had no industries was that our private sector was weak and lacked capital. Therefore, the State went into manufacturing: steel, plywood, tyres, sugar, paper, shoes, cooking implements, etc. were all produced by fully State-owned enterprises under protection. They produced shoddy goods at high prices for the local market and lost enormous amounts of money. The plywood factory resulted in the clear-cutting of half of Sinharaja. After the market was opened to imports, they went out of business.

Since 1978, we have relied on private investors, with or without foreign partners, to manufacture for export (and for domestic use). They have tended to invest in sectors that did not rely too heavily on cheap energy (because our electricity prices were high, especially for industrial users). Except in the case of a few sectors such as apparel and rubber-based products, our producers failed to secure access to markets. Restrictive laws and para tariffs hindered local producers from getting integrated into global production networks, with very few exceptions. 

So, the industrialisation prescription as a solution to the crisis will take time and effort to implement. We would have to ensure reliable and low-cost energy (and other infrastructure services such as waste disposal), eliminate para-tariffs, and create the conditions for market access. The latter is the most challenging. 

Investors such as Michelin ensured market access for the solid tyres produced in Sri Lanka. The apparel industry also benefited in the early stages from foreign investors who facilitated market access. Attracting such investors and entering into trade agreements are needed for market access. But both take time. 

Industrialisation may be a good solution, but it is not for the Government to decide on manufacturing priorities. Because China has established itself as the factory to the world, countries such as ours must identify and exploit niches. Those best positioned for this are those with intimate knowledge of the markets, with skin in the game, namely private investors. The State must create the conditions and leave the actual investment decisions to such players. All this will occur on a timescale different from what is relevant to emerging from the present crisis.

Constitutional reforms

It has become evident that the hyper-presidential system created by the 1978 Constitution has failed to yield the promised benefits and has caused serious damage after the enactment of the 20th Amendment, which removed all the checks that were placed on the President by the 19th Amendment. For example, the Minister of Finance has stated that specific officials were responsible for the tax cuts that triggered the present crisis and the delay in debt restructuring. In the current system, the sole authority for those appointments was the President who must therefore be held accountable for the current crisis.

To address the demands of the protestors, the President must go. He must resign or be impeached. The former can take place immediately would allow the country to return to normal (if such a condition exists after the devastation wreaked by the President and his appointees). The time taken to impeach will be too long. 

The next best solution is to reduce the powers of the President. This would require a Constitutional amendment. An amendment that is approved by Cabinet can be completed within around six weeks. If it is moved as a private member’s motion, it could take more than six months, outside the timeframe needed to calm the country and get the debt restructuring done. The announcement that the Government is proposing the restoration of the 19th Amendment suggests a solution within the required timescale. Of course, it would be necessary to scrutinise the proposed amendment and ensure the President’s powers are meaningfully reduced immediately.

In innumerable discussions I have participated in, I hear proposals for Constitutional reform that pay no heed to the time factor. Some talk of a Constitution authored by the people, modelled on what is going on in Chile. The process began with an amendment to the Constitution and a referendum in 2020. This was followed by an election for a Constituent Assembly in April 2021. Its deliberations are ongoing. How realistic is this kind of process for the kinds of issues that have brought our people to the streets?

In these days of limited attention (and paper supplies), it would be useful if greater weight is given to the appropriateness of the proposed solutions for the time needed to solve the problems that beset us.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

How can affordable electricity be assured 24x7?

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

The best way to understand the value of something is to experience life without it. These days, the Government is giving us a crash course on the value of reliable electricity supply. An unpleasant lesson, but nonetheless a learning opportunity.

If we probe the causes of load shedding, the learning can be deeper. Load shedding can be eliminated but at a cost. When hydropower declines due to periodic drought, the difference can be made up with generators running on imported fuel, the dollar price of which is determined by world market conditions. We can have 24x7 electricity, but not at an affordable price.

The Government created the immediate conditions for unreliable electricity supply through mismanagement of the country’s external debt. Today’s problems are not caused by delays in building additional generating capacity; they are caused by the lack of dollars to provide fuel for the existing generating plants. But there were deeper weaknesses in the organically developed system that must be understood.

With benchmark crude oil prices going over $ 100 per barrel, we must rethink our dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Reducing dependence on fossil fuels

Examination of the composition of our imports (Figure 1) shows that refined petroleum and crude oil taken together is the largest or second largest category of what is imported. It follows then that reducing the import of petroleum products would be an action that would satisfy many: those concerned about global warming will be made happy; those who want self-sufficiency would also be pleased. 

Petroleum imports are not used solely for electricity generation. But the way to reduce the consumption of petroleum products for transportation also involves electricity generated by renewables: buses and trains that are powered by electricity; lorries, cars, three-wheelers, and two-wheelers that are powered by electricity. Promoting electric vehicles makes no sense unless electricity comes from renewable sources. 

The significant increase in expenditure for fossil fuels starting in 2011 (Figure 2) appears correlated with the massive increase in the vehicle stock after the end of the conflict, leading to a doubling by 2014. Luckily, the biggest increase was in two wheelers, which do not take up a lot of road space and consume less fuel. 

Generating electricity from renewables does require some imported elements such as low-cost, efficient turbines and photo-voltaic panels but the costs and dependence is nowhere near that which exists with imported oil and natural gas. In fact, it may be possible even to export electricity at certain times of the day or even for months on end. But this will require substantial investment in the transmission grid.

Preconditions for increasing use of renewables

An economics commentator whose work I follow had expressed puzzlement at “demand for electricity is higher than supply” being given as a reason for load shedding. Others had expressed outrage at some Facebook posts that I had shared, which stated that solar and wind could not provide a complete solution to our energy woes. These responses by well-meaning and intelligent commentators made me realise the need for a better understanding of how the electricity is generated, transmitted, and distributed.

For all practical purposes using currently affordable technology, electricity must be treated as something that cannot be stored (but see discussion of pumped storage below). That means that it must be generated at the same time as people consume electricity by activating lights or appliances. Peak consumption in Sri Lanka (in the evening hours starting from around 6:30 p.m.) is around 2 or 2.5 times that of lowest use which is around 1000 MW. 

That necessitates a cheap source of baseload electricity that can be drawn upon throughout the day. In addition, we must have other sources that can be mobilised as demand increases. One would think that the major hydroelectric plants that have been built on the main rivers which generate cheap electricity that is unaffected by world market prices and the value of the rupee could serve as the source of baseload power. But there are constraints, such as competing demands from agriculture. The weather affects hydropower, as we are experiencing now. 

Therefore, planners in the past argued for coal as the ideal baseload for Sri Lanka. If Norochcholai does not keep breaking down and operates optimally, it can give 900 MW continuously whether or not the rains come. But it does break down, and it appears there have been irregularities in coal purchases. Coal, even if procured on long-term contracts at the lowest possible price, still must be paid for in dollars.

There are those who argue that Sri Lanka has plenty of wind and sun, and we can solve all problems by shifting to wind and sun. But the simple fact is that these are intermittent sources. Solar does not produce electricity when the sun does not shine and produces less when clouds cover the sun. Wind can produce throughout the day and night, but there are times when the wind dies down. It requires complex system controls to blend these intermittent sources into a centralised system designed for large, stable and controllable generators. 

Countries have incorporated massive amounts of intermittent renewable sources. In 2019, 47% of Denmark’s electricity came from wind. But they have a very sophisticated grid that is capable of handling intermittent power sources, and they use interconnections with other national systems to help balance the system. So, for example, when excess power is generated by the Danish wind turbines, it is used to pump water back up into reservoirs in Norway and Sweden (a method of storing electricity in the form of water known as pumped storage), which can then be run through turbines again to produce more electricity when needed. Yet with all that, Danish consumers pay more for electricity than their neighbours.

Similarly, if Sri Lanka is to increase the use of intermittent power sources, we will have to upgrade the grid and the system control centre’s software. Given the difficulties of synchronising the frequencies to one big plant such as Victoria, it may even be necessary to gradually convert the grid to direct current. If the Sri Lankan grid is connected via a high voltage direct current cable to the Southern Indian grid, the much larger combined system can absorb a greater amount of wind and solar power. 

Interconnecting does not mean that a country gives up on generating its own electricity. It simply means that marginal amounts of electricity will flow in either direction when it is advantageous to two (or more) systems. The fact that the peaks are different in the two systems can also be used to reduce the high costs incurred at peak.

It may be necessary to directly link revenues derived from regulated prices to those who make the substantial investments needed for the grid. This will almost necessarily require a restructuring of the current ungainly, unresponsive, and money-losing CEB in a manner that allows the transmission unit to be run efficiently. 

All these options require careful study in terms of costs, benefits and energy security. The relations between Denmark and its neighbours are such that all the parties can be confident about the contracts being respected and any disputes that arise being settled in a fair manner. We must ensure that the interconnection agreements with India have all these safeguards. The precedent of India’s interconnections with Bhutan shows that mutual interdependence is achievable in South Asia. The experience in Europe where interconnection, including over long distances across water, is growing rapidly even after Brexit, will have to be studied. 

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

State-owned enterprises: A major crisis in the making

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Island, Ada Derana Biz, Ground Views and The Morning

By Migara Rodrigo

Sri Lankan State-Owned Enterprises: A Major Crisis in the Making

Sri Lanka has a whopping 527 state-owned enterprises (1) (SOEs). The 55 SOEs classified as “strategically important” alone employ 10% of the public sector workforce (2) or about 1.9% of all workers. Such a large number of SOEs are not the norm globally(3); many other countries (such as India) have been reducing their stakes in SOEs and, in some cases (e.g. Air India), have been privatizing them entirely. SOEs - particularly many in Sri Lanka - tend to be grossly inefficient, loss-making, and a burden on the taxpayer. The time is ripe for major SOE reforms. 

What is an SOE?

An SOE is traditionally defined as a commercial entity that has majority ownership/control by a nation’s government – in Sri Lanka, this can include statutory bodies, regulatory agencies, promotional institutions, educational institutions, public and limited companies. While Sri Lankan SOEs have traditionally been incorporated by an Act of Parliament, in recent years these entities have also been incorporated under the Companies Act instead. 

Sri Lankan SOEs can be divided into three categories: 55 Strategic SOEs, 287 SOEs with commercial interests, and 185 SOEs with non-commercial interests. Unlike nations such as India which mandate internal audits of their SOE’s business activities and publish an annual overview with a balance sheet of each individual business, the majority of Sri Lankan SOEs do not reveal this pertinent information to the public; financial information is available for just 10.4% of SOEs. 

Fundamental problems with Sri Lankan SOEs

Contrary to what some believe, low quality of talent is not the most significant issue with SOEs; many employees are eminently qualified and capable. Unfortunately, these organisations fall victim to government mismanagement and corruption. In addition to excessive employment to fulfil their political ambitions, there have been allegations that some SOEs have been formed purely to facilitate corruption – for example, the Lanka Coal Company engaged in fraudulent deals to purchase coal causing a loss of over Rs. 4 billion (allegedly with the knowledge of the minister in charge)(4). 

SOE financials are late and few obtain ‘clean’ audit reports. Investigations have revealed repeated instances of fraud, mismanagement, corruption and negligence. Furthermore, the internal control, monitoring and governance frameworks seem inadequate to deal with these problems – of over 500 SOEs, regular information is only available for 55. Even obtaining a complete list of entities proved to be a challenge. Public access to information is limited – the Department of Public Enterprises has not released an annual report since 2018, and right-to-information requests often go unanswered.

Figure 1 Source: Ginting, Edimon et al, 2020, Reforms, Opportunities, and Challenges for State-Owned Enterprises, Asian Development Bank

Moreover, SOEs have few budget constraints and shareholder (public) accountability and therefore have limited incentive to control costs. Unlike with private sector enterprises, which have a need to make a profit, many SOEs (particularly in Sri Lanka) can simply borrow from other state organisations/banks or the government when they require additional funds, which undermines the threat of bankruptcy as a source of discipline(5). Some recently established SOEs have found a new way of bypassing budgets and oversight: by incorporating as companies rather than through an act of Parliament, they are excluded from Parliamentary accountability and allowed to rack up unsustainable debts and surpass budgets more easily. This has led to SOEs burning through taxpayer rupees: the cumulative losses of the 55 strategic SOEs from 2006-20 amounts to Rs. 1.2 trillion.

Finally, while some SOEs do manage to make a profit this is, more often than not, due to the advantage that these companies have in an uneven playing field. In addition to lax budgetary requirements and the ability to rack up unsustainable debts, these companies are supported by the government through direct subsidies and state-backed guarantees; by regulators through exemptions from antitrust policies and preferential treatment; and by the justice system through an ability to sidestep parliament. This has led to private sector organisations being crowded out of the industries that SOEs operate in. Instead of having private firms in the marketplace with efficient and high-quality services, the Sri Lankan taxpayer is beset with SOEs with total liabilities of 4-5% of GDP(6).

Potential reforms 

Given that the nation has reached an economic tipping point, with serious questions about debt sustainability and government solvency, it is clear that immediate action must be taken. Advocata proposes a short-term policy solution consisting of privatisation, restructuring and disinvestment, and listing on the Colombo Stock Exchange. None of these solutions are particularly radical in the global or local context. According to Lankan Angel Network Director Anarkali Moonesinghe, the two main policies of both Western and Eastern governments when reforming SOEs are to reduce subsidies and increase efficiency, forcing SOEs to compete more equitably with private enterprises.

Alternatively, full or partial privatisation is a possible solution: SLT-Mobitel’s service has markedly improved following its 1997 privatisation and the entrance of competitors such as Dialog Axiata, all held accountable by the broadly competent Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. Listing on the CSE would allow these firms to have broad-based direct ownership, while also improving the growth of the CSE and capital markets. Importantly, these firms would have to be ‘corporatised’ before listing, an opportunity to improve productivity and eliminate bloat. 

There are, unfortunately, firms that will essentially have to be given away due to their huge debts and poor reputations. A prime example of this is SriLankan Airlines, which has racked up Rs. 316 billion in losses (7) since control was taken from Emirates in 2008. While some will regard this as a blow to our national pride, Sri Lanka would not be alone in taking such a pragmatic step to improve government finances and customer experience; Air India, the Indian national carrier, is currently in the process of being sold to the Tata Group for the relatively small sum of INR 18,000 crore. This would also inspire confidence in Sri Lanka amongst foreign investors as it would show the country’s commitment to meeting its upcoming debt servicing obligations.

Furthermore, long-term solutions include strengthening governance/limiting corruption and influence, improving efficiency, enacting cost-reflective pricing, and finally unbundling key sectors. This applies particularly to firms like the Ceylon Electricity Board which, as a natural monopoly, cannot be broken up and privatised without losing efficiency. A 2006 study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency recommended breaking up CEB into three parts: “making the generation, transmission, and distribution divisions…independent” (8). Despite the 15 years and multiple nationwide blackouts that have occurred since, GoSL continues to drag their feet on the issue, as it is politically unpopular. 

Cost-reflective pricing (also prevented due to political unpopularity) is another essential reform. The existing system of having electricity tariffs priced below cost is a public subsidy whose cost will be borne by future generations. It is also inequitable, as the Government could provide low-cost services to those who need it by giving them direct cash transfers, instead of subsidising the wealthy who can afford to pay. A similar situation is evident with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which currently makes a loss of Rs. 23-38 per litre of fuel (9); again, a public subsidy to those who can often afford to pay the market price. Finally, greater accountability, by means of annual internal audits and the availability of SOEs’ financial information to the public, is also important to ensure these firms stick to the targets they are given.

A successful and thriving market, in most industries, will only occur with the presence of three crucial factors: competition, a good framework, and competent regulation. By reforming Sri Lanka’s SOEs to meet these criteria, we will ensure a good customer experience, a reduction in the government deficit, and general prosperity for all key stakeholders. 

References:

1 Ratnsabapathy, Ravi et al, 2019, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka, Advocata Institute

2 Dissanayake, Imesha, 2021, SOE Reforms; the Impetus for Post Pandemic Economic Revival, Ceylon Chamber of Commerce

3 Büge, Max et al, State-owned enterprises in the global economy: Reason for concern? Last modified: May 2nd, 2013 

4 ColomboPage.com, President to take action against removal of head of Lanka Coal Company, Last modified: January 21st, 2017, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_17A/Jan21_1484983651CH.php

5 Ratnsabapathy, et al, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka

6 WorldBank.org, South Asia Must Reform Debt-Accumulating State-Owned Banks and Enterprises to Avert Next Financial Crisis, Last modified: June 29th, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/24/south-asia-must-reform-debt-accumulating-state-owned-banks-and-enterprises

7 PublicFinance.lk, Sri Lankan Airlines: Annual and Accumulated Loss to the Public, Last modified: 24th August 2021, https://publicfinance.lk/en/topics/Sri-Lankan-Airlines:-Annual-and-Accumulated-Loss-to-the-Public-1629789830

8 Saito, Yoshitaka et al, 2006, Master Plan Study on the Development of Power Generation and Transmission System in Sri Lanka, Japan International Cooperation Agency Economic Development Department

9 EconomyNext.com, Sri Lanka’s CPC says petrol, diesel losses rise as LIOC hikes prices, Last modified: 25th October 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lankas-cpc-says-petrol-diesel-losses-rise-as-lioc-hikes-prices-87276/#modal-one

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

The first test of the President’s ‘power’

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dhananath Fernando

Power cuts in Sri Lanka are not a recent phenomenon. However, this phenomenon is going to be repeated over and over if we fail to find a sustainable solution. The media reported that during the 2019 blackouts, senior officials in the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) had to beg the rain gods with a special “poojawa” to fill our reservoirs faster as they ran out of any other option. As reported by media, pressure mounted to a level that the then President was very disappointed with their performance and requested that the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) and CEB agree on a common plan.

It is clear that the energy problem in Sri Lanka is extremely complicated. This problem has no simple solution, as structural constraints, economic limitations, technological drawbacks, and many other complications continue to ravage Sri Lanka’s energy sector. The current President has received a mandate for a “system change”. How he solves this problem will be a litmus test on his administration. His approach and ability to solve this complicated public policy problem will determine whether such an ambitious “system change” is possible.

Understanding the context

The uniqueness of electricity is that we cannot store it on a grand scale – until the world comes up with a cost-effective battery storage solution. This places the CEB in a challenging position, as it has to walk a fine line between undersupplying and oversupplying power to the country, without an option to store electricity and manage shortfalls. In other words, all electricity that is produced has to be met by demand, and the CEB has to have a constant supply available, as it would be impossible to predict electricity demand down to the last unit. If the electricity demand is higher than what is generated, the grid becomes unstable. Producing more electricity than is demanded will make it difficult to manage the grid. It would also be very expensive as our electricity supply comes from multiple sources such as hydro, coal, thermal, and few renewable energy sources.

When demand increases, we can’t just activate a power station and supply electricity to the grid, as activating some power plants, setting up the temperature, and resetting the grid takes a few days. That is one reason as to why the CEB requires a few days to overcome this situation with the Norochcholai Plant becoming dysfunctional. Even with low power demand due to the contraction of economic activity such as tourism and some industrial plants, resetting the grid without Norochcholai and managing the capacity with other plants takes a few days. To put it simply, the CEB does not have an easy task at hand. The most economical form of generating electricity is hydropower where the cost per unit is about Rs. 6. We cannot match demand only through hydropower, however, and we have to activate our coal power plants during peak hours when demand rises. The unit cost of coal-generated electricity is approximately Rs. 17.50 per unit and Rs. 25-35 is the unit cost of thermal-generated electricity. According to energy specialist Dr. Tilak Siyambalapitiya, the overall cost of production of a unit of electricity is Rs. 23.32 and the approved selling price is Rs. 16.29. In other words, our selling price only covers about 70% of the generation cost. The important fact is that the cost for each unit we consume is not the same; the cost of the energy we consume during peak hours from 6 p.m.- 1 p.m. is more, as it is mainly generated from thermal and coal.

Sri Lanka’s cost per electricity unit is comparatively high compared to our neighbours like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, India, and Bangladesh. But one real reason for the cost to be lower in these countries is they have blackouts during peak hours without activating their thermal and coal plants, and households have adapted to face blackouts with some capital investments such as battery power and installing inverters. In Sri Lanka, the economic cost of a blackout would be significantly higher than supplying power through coal, thermal, and renewable energy sources. Hence, our cost is high for a multitude of reasons.

The composition of Sri Lanka’s grid is based on domestic consumption, making our peak demand hours in the evenings between 6 p.m.-10 p.m. In contrast, countries with greater industrial development have peak demand hours during daytime working hours. Additionally, in Sri Lanka, there is a tug of war between the regulator, the PUCSL, and electricity supplier, the CEB, on developing a long-term power generation plan and maintaining our power mix. As a result of this cold war, not a single power plant has been commissioned to be built during the last Government. It is rather unfortunate that Sri Lanka’s inability to come to a timely consensus on solutions for this chronic issue has continued to weigh down our national potential.

The CEB monopoly

The CEB has an absolute monopoly in power generation, distribution, development, and technology implementation. It’s a monopoly within a non-tradable sector. They have blocked everyone else and kept complete control.

Even though power generation and power stations have been contracted to suppliers of renewable energy in the private sector, they too fall under the CEB’s control. It was reported multiple times by the media that the CEB buys power from private energy suppliers at a high cost, causing colossal losses for the CEB.

It’s a mafia ecosystem between bureaucrats and the private sector. The more thermal power we buy, the more beneficial it is for the cartel members to make more money. The grid and cable network is also maintained (generation, transmission, and distribution) by the CEB with no competition, making it completely inefficient.

When questioning the CEB on its colossal losses, one common excuse provided by all governments is that the CEB sells units of power at a cheap rate so that all Sri Lankans have access to electricity. However, it is important to note that if the CEB makes a loss, it would be indirectly passed to the taxpayer anyway, as no CEB official or parliamentarian pays the losses from their private money. Our cost of power has a greater impact on Sri Lanka’s investments, and its ability to get faster connectivity to the grid is one main parameter in the “Ease of Doing Business Index” compiled by the World Bank (WB).

The CEB’s losses have also extended into the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC). In the past, the CPC stated that they would stop the supply of fuel if the CEB fails to settle its debts. This continues to be an ongoing battle. Both the CEB’s and CPC’s losses are passed onto taxpayers, even though their claim that our electricity is reasonably prices is a flawed argument and proves to be counterproductive, given that our energy prices are not reasonable when compared to the region. 

Over the years, it was reported that a grant from the Asian Development Bank provided $ 17 million in 2012 to modernise the System Control Centre (SCC), which is the main control centre for managing demand and supply of electricity.

Even though an SCC is the heart of managing electricity demand and supply and stabilising the grid, it took Sri Lanka more than a decade to execute this decision. The CEB, a state corporation with an asset base of Rs. 500 billion, being unable to finance crucial infrastructure development such as the SCC is indicative of a culture of inefficiency and ineffectiveness that is inherently ingrained within monopolies.

One of the main promises of H.E. the President is creating an e-government system and digitising government systems and processes. If the Government is serious about this, installing smart meters as soon as possible under the digitisation programme must be a key consideration. With the installation of smart meters, a significant cost for the CEB would be reduced. In an age where our bank card is connected to a mobile-based platform, where private buses are in discussion about a smart card, can we as a country still afford to have a system where an officer has to visit every household in Sri Lanka to check the electricity meter and provide a bill? Especially in an energy market where the cost of the unit changes based on the period of the year and as per the time of electricity usage? Introducing smart meters will not be a popular solution, but a system change cannot be achieved without making unpopular decisions!

Possible solutions

The problems at hand have many tiers. The main barriers for reforms are structural. While operational and human resource-related reforms can be undertaken, without structural reforms, the operational issues and human resource issues sustainably fixed will continue to be chronic weaknesses.

Structural changes

With the Imposing, a strict leadership style or rolling heads at the senior level of bureaucracy in the energy sector will not be productive given the structural problems that exist. In fact, it will most likely worsen the situation if dealt with in this manner.

As a first step, the monopoly held by the CEB must be un-entangled and straightened out. The ecosystem of corruption, inefficiency, and malpractices has to be exposed to competition, with players entering the market.

There are multiple options to do this, and we have to unbundle the monopoly of power generation, transmission, and distribution as the first step. This will be a major structural change. To ensure competition, in the long run, a competition law has to be established which will not only be beneficial to the power and energy sector but for all Sri Lankan monopolies.

Opening energy for trading

Since Sri Lanka is an island, we are not in a position to trade energy, as our grid is not connected to any other energy market. Even if we generate a surplus of energy, we cannot trade, and in an emergency, we do not have the capacity to manage a sudden shortage.

One suggestion by Prof. Rohan Samarajiva in a report compiled under the chairmanship former Central Bank Governor Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy and handed over to H.E. the President is to connect Sri Lanka’s grid to the South Indian grid through an HVDC (High Voltage DC) cable.

Energy trading is already in place between Bhutan and India, and Bhutan is a net energy exporter and their energy cost is very low as their generation is mainly from hydropower due to their unique mountains and geography. This has to be taken up at the highest level with negotiations bilaterally if we are aspiring to be part of a big energy market and if we are serious about being a hub for energy in the Indian Ocean.

In an era of uncertainty and supply chain diversification, it is not a bad idea to move ahead from a simple self-sufficiency mentality to a mentality of generating a surplus and aiming to become competitive within the energy industry.

While we work on these long-term solutions, we have to make sure to build the necessary power plants in the short run to manage our energy supply, while diversifying towards renewable energy sources.

The energy mafia is so large and sometimes they work by planting big ideas that are backed by self-interest of the key decision-makers, including H.E. the President.

If we continue to think in isolation and settle for mediocre options yet again, we will just be postponing the problem before us. Our President has the rare opportunity to fulfil his mandate of a “system change” and tangibly change the system by reforming the energy sector. Alternatively, he could take the easy road by postponing any serious tackling of the problem. I hope the Government will have the courage to change the system, instead of giving into pressure.

By implementing this reform, the Government will be working towards bringing the average Sri Lankan out of the figurative darkness of the nation’s long-running electricity crisis.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.