National Single Window: Paving the way for paperless trade

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Morning, the Island, and Lanka Business Online

By Mithara Fonseka and Kavishka Indraratna

In 2016, Sri Lanka ratified its Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) with the WTO and in 2017 a Secretariat was established for the National Trade Facilitation Committee to drive much needed trade reforms in the country. Currently, the rate of Sri Lanka’s implementation commitments under TFA stands at 34.9% with a timeframe ranging from 2017-2030. Reforms include the Trade Information Portal, streamlining customs processes and revamping the systems for post-clearance audit. However, progress of one of the key reforms, the National Single Window (NSW), has been stalled. Deviating from the initial time frame of completing the Single Window in December 2022, the target date has been delayed to 2030. The NSW, a globally recognised trading portal, acts as a one-stop shop for exporters and importers where customs documents, permits, registrations and other information can be submitted online at once. The definition of a Single Window, as provided by the UN/CEFACT Recommendation No. 33, is as follows: “A Single Window is defined as a facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. If information is electronic, then individual data elements should only be submitted once”. Putting such a reform on the back-burner will only delay Sri Lanka’s transition to a system of streamlined, paperless trade processes and therefore acts as an impediment to local and foreign investment.

Why should Sri Lanka implement a NSW?
Sri Lanka has been underperforming in global trade rankings, where we sometimes rank in the bottom 50 countries. According to the Ease of Doing Business in 2020, in the trading across borders pillar, Sri Lanka ranks 96 out of 190 economies. While several of Sri Lanka’s indicators perform better than the South Asian average, there is significant room for improvement. When comparing with OECD standards, Sri Lanka takes 72 hours for border compliance regarding imports and 48 hours for export documentary compliance whereas the OECD average stands at 8.5 and 2.3 hours respectively. Lengthy customs procedures and multiple inspections impede efficiency. Meanwhile, we ranked 94 out of 160 countries under World’s Bank 2018 Logistics Performance index and 103 out of 136 for the World Economic Forum’s 2016 Enabling Trade index. Notably, one of the indicators from the Enabling Trade Index, the customs services index, which considers factors such as clearance of shipments via electronic data interchange and the separation of physical release of goods from fiscal control, we rank 116 out of 117 countries. A lack of transparency, inter-agency coordination and lengthy cumbersome processes contribute to Sri Lanka’s poor trade environment. An average trade transaction can involve over 30 different agencies and upto 200 data elements, a lot of which have to be repeated. There is thus an evident need to streamline trade processes through digitisation, creating a business friendly environment that supports small businesses as well as foreign investors.

A Background into the National Single Window

In 1989, the Government of Singapore introduced the world’s first NSW, known as Tradenet. It took two years for the model to become operational and has now become one of the most advanced models in the world. Since then, many countries have adopted similar models and a NSW has become a critical tool in facilitating efficient and paperless trade. The annual survey conducted by The United Nations on trade facilitation identified that almost 74% of countries surveyed in the Asia Pacific region have to some extent engaged in creating a NSW (this includes countries which are only in the pilot stage). While a NSW is universally known for promoting the transition from paper-based to electronic customs processing, each window developed by a country is unique and varies according to the context of the country. For example, in Chile and Malaysia, the NSW enables traders to submit their export and import declarations, manifests and their trade-related documents to customs authorities electronically. In Korea and Hong Kong, private sector participants including banks, customs brokers, insurance companies and freight forwarders are also connected through the portal.

Single entry, single submission, standardized documents and data, sharing of information (information dissemination), centralised risk management, coordination of agencies and stakeholders, analytical capability and electronic payment facilities are some of the key functions included in a Single Window. In Sri Lanka, the World Bank did several studies on the NSW, identifying different operational models, best practices and a final blueprint document was given to the government and Sri Lanka Customs (SLC) in July 2019. However, since then, there has been no news of progress. While many countries including Sri Lanka are keen to emulate Singapore’s pioneering model, a lack of clear targets and timelines deteriorate the chances of implementing such a system.

The Mutual Benefits of a NSW

Businesses in countries without an integrated trade system find it difficult to compete in the international arena given the time and money spent to simply get clearance. Streamlining the entire process from start to finish in a manner that’s comprehensive and transparent, sans bureaucracy has a number of positive effects for traders. It was estimated that Singapore’s TradeNet saved its traders around US$1 billion per year. Korea’s uTradeHub allowed its business community to save approximately US$ 818.9 million. These were savings from the use of e-documents, automated administrative work and information storage and retrieval with the use of ICT. A Single Window automatically simplifies the compliance requirements traders face. In Mozambique traders benefited from faster clearance times, where through the NSW, the time was reduced from 3 days to a few hours. Meanwhile, Thailand’s NSW transformed the customs clearance turnaround time (measured as per declaration) to 95% in 5 minutes. Using a single portal has enabled traders to avoid visiting multiple agencies and simply submit an application at their convenience from any location. NSW has supported businesses through the removal of unnecessary costs, time and red tape, factors which tend to act as key deterrents to small businesses as well as foreign enterprises. 

The NSW system has similarly provided noteworthy cost-savings for government entities involved in trade. Singapore Customs, has claimed that for every US$1 earned in customs revenue, it only spends 1 cent, implying a profit margin of 9,900%.  In Hong Kong, trade facilitation measures have provided them with HK$1.3 billion in annual savings. The NSW has also reduced revenue leakages which may arise through transit. For example, Mozambique is a transit country to Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. By expanding their NSW to include value added services such as GPS tracking of consignments in transit, automatic detection of breaches in consignment and deviation from assigned transit corridors the NSW prevents revenue leakages and the opportunity for corruption, maximising revenue collection. The NSW has further led to productivity and efficiency improvements. A Single Window has enabled authorities to handle a larger volume of applications with much more ease. Mozambique, which used to face infrastructural weaknesses, through the implementation of its single window, is able to handle roughly 1,500 custom declarations per day.  Shifting to paperless customs processes would reduce costs for inventory and assist in improved resource allocation as personnel would not be required for trivial and mundane tasks such as preparation and cross checking of numerous documents. In totality, a fully digitised system provides government agencies with the means to do away with inefficiencies that hold back the speed of document processing, approval, communication and inspection stages. Further contributing to efficency, a NSW has also facilitated the dissemination of data through multiple agencies ranging from border control authorities, freight forwarders, customs brokers, shipping agents, banks and so on. As a result, there is improved inter-agency coordination and increased transparency.

Apart from a substantial increase in government revenue, the NSW will contribute to an improved business environment in Sri Lanka. The domino effects include an upward movement in the country’s global rankings, incentives for FDI and local business as well as a global recognition. 

Driving forces for implementation

While the NSW on the surface seems like an IT-based innovation, it is rather a platform for inter-agency and private sector collaboration. As the NSW is a system which requires involvement from government, the private sector and the transport community, it is crucial to ensure inter-agency collaboration. Ensuring public-private sector participation, introducing mandates and a steering committee to oversee implementation is crucial in developing such a system. The system as a whole is one that constantly evolves with no end stage. It requires continuous maintenance, support, and enhancement. This should be supplemented by the appropriate legislation, disclosure and publishing, backed by training and airtight data security policies. Thus governance of the NSW needs to be executed appropriately so that new technologies, techniques and new modes of trade can be leveraged. In best performing nations, a Single Window is not considered a single system but rather “a combination of trade-related platforms that serve various trade communities and modalities”. This has enabled leading countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong to facilitate seamless trade by building an environment of interoperable trade systems.

1. WTO, Trade facilitation Agreement Database, https://tfadatabase.org/members/sri-lanka , Accessed January 6, 2022.

2. WTO, Trade facilitation Agreement Database,10.4-Single Window, https://tfadatabase.org/members/sri-lanka/technical-assistance-projects/article-10-4

3. United Nations, UN/CEFACT, ‘Recommendation and Guidelines on establishing a Single Window: to enhance the efficient exchange of information between trade and government, Recommendation No.33, (2005), https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/recommendations/rec33/rec33_trd352e.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

4. World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2020’, Economy Profile Sri Lanka, Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies,(2020), https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sri-lanka/LKA.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

5. World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2020’, Economy Profile Sri Lanka, Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies,(2020), https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/sri-lanka/LKA.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

6. World Bank Group, ‘Logistics Performance Index 2018’, (2018), https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/radar/254/C/LKA/2018#chartarea Accessed January 6, 2022.

7. World Economic Forum,’The Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, Enabling Trade Rankings’, (2016) https://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-report-2016/enabling-trade-rankings/#series=CUSTSERVIND

8. World Economic Forum, ‘Enabling Trade Index 2016’, (2016) https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GETR_2016_report.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

9. World Economic Forum, ‘The Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, Enabling Trade Rankings’, https://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-report-2016/enabling-trade-rankings/#series=CUSTSERVIND Accessed January 6, 2022.

10. Johns, M. “Trade facilitation reform in Sri Lanka can drive a change in culture”, World Bank Blogs, 2017

    https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/trade-facilitation-reform-sri-lanka-can-drive-change-culture Accessed January 6, 2022.

11. UN ESCAP,’Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation in Asia and the Pacific 2021’, (2021)
      https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/UNTF%20Report.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

12. UN ESCAP,’Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide’,

    https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/5%20-%201.%20Introduction_0.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

13. UN ESCAP, ’Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide’

     https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/5%20-%201.%20Introduction_0.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

14. UN ESCAP, ‘Single Window for Trade Facilitation: Regional Best Practices and Future Development’ https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf, Accessed January 6, 2022.

15.  UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide, Singapore case study’, https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/single_window/sw_cases/Download/Singapore.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

16. United Nations ESCAP, ‘Single Window Implementation: Benefits and Key Success Factors’, (2012), https://unnext.unescap.org/sites/default/files/switajik-sangwon.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

17. UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Guide, Single Window Implementation in Mozambique’,
    https://tfig.unece.org/cases/Mozambique.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

18. UNECE,Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide, Interagency Collaboration for Single Window    Implementation:Thailand’s Experience, https://tfig.unece.org/cases/Thailand.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

19. United Nations, Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide, (2012) https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/0%20-%20Full%20Report_5.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

20. United Nations, ESCAP, Single Window Implementation: Benefits and Key Success Factors

     https://unnext.unescap.org/sites/default/files/switajik-sangwon.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

21. UNECE, ‘Trade Facilitation Guide, Single Window Implementation in Mozambique’,   
        https://tfig.unece.org/cases/Mozambique.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.

22. United Nations, ESCAP, Single Window for Trade Facilitation:Regional Best Practices and Future  
    Development, (2018),  https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Regional%20Best%20Practices%20of%20Single%20Windows_updated.pdf Accessed January 6, 2022.
    

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

State-owned enterprises: A major crisis in the making

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Island, Ada Derana Biz, Ground Views and The Morning

By Migara Rodrigo

Sri Lankan State-Owned Enterprises: A Major Crisis in the Making

Sri Lanka has a whopping 527 state-owned enterprises (1) (SOEs). The 55 SOEs classified as “strategically important” alone employ 10% of the public sector workforce (2) or about 1.9% of all workers. Such a large number of SOEs are not the norm globally(3); many other countries (such as India) have been reducing their stakes in SOEs and, in some cases (e.g. Air India), have been privatizing them entirely. SOEs - particularly many in Sri Lanka - tend to be grossly inefficient, loss-making, and a burden on the taxpayer. The time is ripe for major SOE reforms. 

What is an SOE?

An SOE is traditionally defined as a commercial entity that has majority ownership/control by a nation’s government – in Sri Lanka, this can include statutory bodies, regulatory agencies, promotional institutions, educational institutions, public and limited companies. While Sri Lankan SOEs have traditionally been incorporated by an Act of Parliament, in recent years these entities have also been incorporated under the Companies Act instead. 

Sri Lankan SOEs can be divided into three categories: 55 Strategic SOEs, 287 SOEs with commercial interests, and 185 SOEs with non-commercial interests. Unlike nations such as India which mandate internal audits of their SOE’s business activities and publish an annual overview with a balance sheet of each individual business, the majority of Sri Lankan SOEs do not reveal this pertinent information to the public; financial information is available for just 10.4% of SOEs. 

Fundamental problems with Sri Lankan SOEs

Contrary to what some believe, low quality of talent is not the most significant issue with SOEs; many employees are eminently qualified and capable. Unfortunately, these organisations fall victim to government mismanagement and corruption. In addition to excessive employment to fulfil their political ambitions, there have been allegations that some SOEs have been formed purely to facilitate corruption – for example, the Lanka Coal Company engaged in fraudulent deals to purchase coal causing a loss of over Rs. 4 billion (allegedly with the knowledge of the minister in charge)(4). 

SOE financials are late and few obtain ‘clean’ audit reports. Investigations have revealed repeated instances of fraud, mismanagement, corruption and negligence. Furthermore, the internal control, monitoring and governance frameworks seem inadequate to deal with these problems – of over 500 SOEs, regular information is only available for 55. Even obtaining a complete list of entities proved to be a challenge. Public access to information is limited – the Department of Public Enterprises has not released an annual report since 2018, and right-to-information requests often go unanswered.

Figure 1 Source: Ginting, Edimon et al, 2020, Reforms, Opportunities, and Challenges for State-Owned Enterprises, Asian Development Bank

Moreover, SOEs have few budget constraints and shareholder (public) accountability and therefore have limited incentive to control costs. Unlike with private sector enterprises, which have a need to make a profit, many SOEs (particularly in Sri Lanka) can simply borrow from other state organisations/banks or the government when they require additional funds, which undermines the threat of bankruptcy as a source of discipline(5). Some recently established SOEs have found a new way of bypassing budgets and oversight: by incorporating as companies rather than through an act of Parliament, they are excluded from Parliamentary accountability and allowed to rack up unsustainable debts and surpass budgets more easily. This has led to SOEs burning through taxpayer rupees: the cumulative losses of the 55 strategic SOEs from 2006-20 amounts to Rs. 1.2 trillion.

Finally, while some SOEs do manage to make a profit this is, more often than not, due to the advantage that these companies have in an uneven playing field. In addition to lax budgetary requirements and the ability to rack up unsustainable debts, these companies are supported by the government through direct subsidies and state-backed guarantees; by regulators through exemptions from antitrust policies and preferential treatment; and by the justice system through an ability to sidestep parliament. This has led to private sector organisations being crowded out of the industries that SOEs operate in. Instead of having private firms in the marketplace with efficient and high-quality services, the Sri Lankan taxpayer is beset with SOEs with total liabilities of 4-5% of GDP(6).

Potential reforms 

Given that the nation has reached an economic tipping point, with serious questions about debt sustainability and government solvency, it is clear that immediate action must be taken. Advocata proposes a short-term policy solution consisting of privatisation, restructuring and disinvestment, and listing on the Colombo Stock Exchange. None of these solutions are particularly radical in the global or local context. According to Lankan Angel Network Director Anarkali Moonesinghe, the two main policies of both Western and Eastern governments when reforming SOEs are to reduce subsidies and increase efficiency, forcing SOEs to compete more equitably with private enterprises.

Alternatively, full or partial privatisation is a possible solution: SLT-Mobitel’s service has markedly improved following its 1997 privatisation and the entrance of competitors such as Dialog Axiata, all held accountable by the broadly competent Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. Listing on the CSE would allow these firms to have broad-based direct ownership, while also improving the growth of the CSE and capital markets. Importantly, these firms would have to be ‘corporatised’ before listing, an opportunity to improve productivity and eliminate bloat. 

There are, unfortunately, firms that will essentially have to be given away due to their huge debts and poor reputations. A prime example of this is SriLankan Airlines, which has racked up Rs. 316 billion in losses (7) since control was taken from Emirates in 2008. While some will regard this as a blow to our national pride, Sri Lanka would not be alone in taking such a pragmatic step to improve government finances and customer experience; Air India, the Indian national carrier, is currently in the process of being sold to the Tata Group for the relatively small sum of INR 18,000 crore. This would also inspire confidence in Sri Lanka amongst foreign investors as it would show the country’s commitment to meeting its upcoming debt servicing obligations.

Furthermore, long-term solutions include strengthening governance/limiting corruption and influence, improving efficiency, enacting cost-reflective pricing, and finally unbundling key sectors. This applies particularly to firms like the Ceylon Electricity Board which, as a natural monopoly, cannot be broken up and privatised without losing efficiency. A 2006 study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency recommended breaking up CEB into three parts: “making the generation, transmission, and distribution divisions…independent” (8). Despite the 15 years and multiple nationwide blackouts that have occurred since, GoSL continues to drag their feet on the issue, as it is politically unpopular. 

Cost-reflective pricing (also prevented due to political unpopularity) is another essential reform. The existing system of having electricity tariffs priced below cost is a public subsidy whose cost will be borne by future generations. It is also inequitable, as the Government could provide low-cost services to those who need it by giving them direct cash transfers, instead of subsidising the wealthy who can afford to pay. A similar situation is evident with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which currently makes a loss of Rs. 23-38 per litre of fuel (9); again, a public subsidy to those who can often afford to pay the market price. Finally, greater accountability, by means of annual internal audits and the availability of SOEs’ financial information to the public, is also important to ensure these firms stick to the targets they are given.

A successful and thriving market, in most industries, will only occur with the presence of three crucial factors: competition, a good framework, and competent regulation. By reforming Sri Lanka’s SOEs to meet these criteria, we will ensure a good customer experience, a reduction in the government deficit, and general prosperity for all key stakeholders. 

References:

1 Ratnsabapathy, Ravi et al, 2019, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka, Advocata Institute

2 Dissanayake, Imesha, 2021, SOE Reforms; the Impetus for Post Pandemic Economic Revival, Ceylon Chamber of Commerce

3 Büge, Max et al, State-owned enterprises in the global economy: Reason for concern? Last modified: May 2nd, 2013 

4 ColomboPage.com, President to take action against removal of head of Lanka Coal Company, Last modified: January 21st, 2017, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_17A/Jan21_1484983651CH.php

5 Ratnsabapathy, et al, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka

6 WorldBank.org, South Asia Must Reform Debt-Accumulating State-Owned Banks and Enterprises to Avert Next Financial Crisis, Last modified: June 29th, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/24/south-asia-must-reform-debt-accumulating-state-owned-banks-and-enterprises

7 PublicFinance.lk, Sri Lankan Airlines: Annual and Accumulated Loss to the Public, Last modified: 24th August 2021, https://publicfinance.lk/en/topics/Sri-Lankan-Airlines:-Annual-and-Accumulated-Loss-to-the-Public-1629789830

8 Saito, Yoshitaka et al, 2006, Master Plan Study on the Development of Power Generation and Transmission System in Sri Lanka, Japan International Cooperation Agency Economic Development Department

9 EconomyNext.com, Sri Lanka’s CPC says petrol, diesel losses rise as LIOC hikes prices, Last modified: 25th October 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lankas-cpc-says-petrol-diesel-losses-rise-as-lioc-hikes-prices-87276/#modal-one

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reform or Regress

Originally appeared on The Morning

By K D Vimanga

The Sri Lankan economy’s crossroads

The great South African Statesman Nelson Mandela once said: “It always seems impossible until it is done.” Well, in our case, the time to get things done is already here. If we keep calling the act of reforming our economy impossible, then this country for sure will continue on a very dangerous path. So the longer we postpone the possibility of reforms, the more painful the process is going to be. So, we all, both policy makers and citizens alike, need to realise that the only way we can get out of this crisis is by implementing immediate and hard reforms, which this column has over and over again expounded on. 

Implementing reforms remains impossible for the sole reason that there remains very little political will to do so. However, what history teaches us is that the only way for nations to emerge from a crisis is by implementing bold reforms, even if they are politically unpopular. Such bold policy decisions, taken for the greater good of the nation, have been instrumental in releasing millions out of poverty. The best example is the economic reforms in India, which commenced from the 1991 economic crisis. The bold decisions taken by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh were taken during compelling times. India was facing a similar situation, where the country was finding it hard to meet external debt obligations along with a serious balance of payment crisis. India was almost bankrupt as a result of the post-independence command and control-driven economy that brought the nation to the brink. However, amidst all odds, at the height of the crisis, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh opened its economy to be driven by market forces, while dismantling the license quota raj. This also involved the devaluation of the rupee at the height of the crisis. It were these hard reforms that laid the foundation of India emerging out from the depths of bankruptcy. As a result of these reforms from 1992 to 2005, foreign investment increased by 316.9%, and India’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from $266 billion in 1991 to $2.3 trillion in 2018 (1). 

Sri Lanka is facing a similar or far worse crisis. It is public knowledge that the economy has reached a boiling point, with the country’s reserves falling to $ 1.57 billion, while Sri Lanka has debt payment commitments of $ 4.5 billion (2) for 2022. Inflation has been rising to 9.9% (3). Advocata’s Bath Curry Indicator, which tracks the price of essential food items, records that since 2019, prices have increased by 44%. This means that an average family who spent Rs. 960 weekly on the BCI basket of food items in November 2019 now has to pay Rs. 1,390 for the same basket of goods just two years later. Continued printing of money, along with the implementation of policies without foresight – such as the overnight move to organic fertiliser – have all significantly added to this present rise in food prices. Therefore one cannot deny the existence of the crisis anymore. 

So what needs to be done? 

The answer is simply, implement a comprehensive programme of reforms now. For this week’s column, I would like to discuss the role of privatisation in the most immediate and short term. Implementing such a programme of privatisation which releases commercial activities carried out by the state can bring in significant cost savings for the Government while also bringing in short term liquidity. More importantly, such a programme can become a much needed productivity boost to the economy while opening up for private sector participation. Closing down non-viable state-owned entities is another key requirement of such a programme. 

The country is also currently in desperate need for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Finance Minister admitted in Parliament that Sri Lanka is not getting FDIs as fast as expected. Therefore privatisation can be the fastest route to capture foreign direct investment. FDIs jumped in the 1990s mainly due to their ambitious privatisation programme. Out of the total privatisation proceeds realised during 1989-2005, 59% was financed by foreign investors as illustrated by the Central Bank (4). Privatisation served as a significant channel for FDI entry. Privatisation-related FDI accounted for at least one-third of FDI in the 1990s. The largest 20 foreign investors in Sri Lanka all arrived in the 1990s and made significant contributions in telecommunications, power, ports, and other areas of services and manufacturing. However, to be effective, it is critical that privatisations are carried out through open and transparent processes.

One way to maintain this transparency is maintaining oversight. The Public Enterprises Reform Commission (PERC) was established under an Act of Parliament in 1996 to be solely responsible for ensuring that the privatisation process occurred in a transparent and structured manner. Although not entirely free of controversy, PERC increased transparency and public information about the privatisation process. The PERC was shut down, and it is now necessary to revive PERC and put in place measures to ensure transparent and competitive processes.

Successful privatisation, if done right, can reduce the drain of government resources, especially at a time when government expenditure and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises are a serious burden on the fast draining government coffers. A second benefit is the generation of new sources of government revenue through receipt of proceeds, at a time where the Government is in desperate need for government revenue. The improvement of infrastructure and delivery of public services by the involvement of private capital and expertise is another important benefit. Other merits of privatisation include the improvement of the efficiency of the economy by making it more responsive to market forces, the broadening of the base of ownership in the economy; and the enhancement of the capital markets. 

A programme of privatisation can be the center point of the reform programme. However, macro-economic stabilisation, which we have discussed over and over again, must be carried in tandem. What is crystal clear is that time to implement these is running out if we continue to be blindly critical of these painful reforms and be complacent of its merits. Unlike at any other point in time, policy makers also need to be ready to make bold reforms and this will be the ultimate test of the resilience of our economy. The tipping point has been reached, we have no choice but to get these reforms done. Bold policy making is the need of the hour!

References

• Dutta, M. K. and Sarma, Gopal Kumar, Foreign Direct Investment in India Since 1991: Trends, Challenges and Prospects (1 January 2008).

  Ministry of Finance Annual Report 2020

  https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/pr/press_20211130_inflation_in_november_2021_ccpi_e.pdf

  https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_docu-ments/publications/annual_report/archives/en/2007_17_Appendix.pdf

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.