Privatisation! the need of the hour

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

I travel mainly by a common staff transport from Moratuwa to Colombo to work. I travel by train as well as on normal public transport for other travel purposes. Undoubtedly, my staff transport is the most efficient and affordable, providing the most value for money. It not only provides value for the money I pay, but it also provides a great example of why the Government should not do business and why the private sector should be allowed to. Even in the toughest conditions, private enterprises can bring solutions.   

The operator of my private staff transport is Amal, an executive at an office in Colombo. While a normal bus typically has three main stakeholders, Amal has made it so that there’s just one main stakeholder. That’s efficiency. A normal bus on the road generally has an owner, a driver, and a conductor. Amal just has one. He is the driver who drives us all safely and on time. He does not have a conductor because he has an automated door which the driver can operate easily with just a switch in the dashboard.

He charges about Rs. 12,600 for an air-conditioned bus ride for the entire month. That is approximately Rs. 286 per one-way journey from where I live, which is around 20 km. If I were to calculate my cost per kilometre for a peaceful air-conditioned bus ride where I can sleep comfortably or work on my computer, it costs just Rs. 14. 

Even if I travel by a normal non-air-conditioned bus, the incremental value I pay for Amal is negligible. If I use an air-conditioned bus, my costs are higher than what Amal charges. In the first place, there are no air-conditioned buses where I live and with Amal, my travel time is almost one-third of the total time taken on the normal route. I believe that travelling with Amal not only saves time but also reduces carbon emissions as well. 

A win-win situation 

Amal is just one man in the private sector who adds value to my life while making a profit and a living out of it. He recently bought another bus and now he has two rosters both ways with a time gap of about 30 minutes, meaning I can choose either the first bus or the second according to my convenience. He shares the live location on WhatsApp before every ride, so I can track where the bus is and be prepared. 

Amal is not the only such person. If you observe Colombo between 7-9 a.m. you will notice that there are many buses operating on the same model as Amal’s. There is no regulatory authority on staff transports in Colombo and yet it operates efficiently, with both Amal and I being beneficiaries of the system. It’s a complete win-win. I hope that after reading this article, there won’t be any Government regulations set up regarding staff transport to ruin the market. 

Amal is a one-man private operator who solves a burning issue for me or at least provides me with a reasonable solution which my Government has been unable to provide for more than three decades, even with billions worth of funds.    

Amal can improve efficiency because he has an incentive for improving efficiency. His incentive has a ripple effect leading up to minimising carbon emissions. 

Privatisation to solve problems

Given the discussion on privatisation, there is no better example than Amal of how private enterprises help people. Economics and businesses are all about solving people’s problems. Our life is all about solving each other’s problems and depending on each other. Amal solves my transport problem and by paying him, I may be contributing money for his child’s education. 

Our entire economy is a complicated yet interconnected web. Efficiency and getting the maximum out of our resources are needed, which can only be done when the markets are in operation. Markets are operated by private individuals like you and me who read this article. 

While the process of privatisation is complicated, privatisation is just a normal process for market operations. Sri Lanka’s economic problem is that we don’t solve anybody’s problems. When we do not solve problems, how can we earn money? How can others solve our problems? 

Problem-solving is nothing but improving efficiency. Efficiency can only be improved when people have incentives. It is a universal truth, like the earth revolving around the sun. Even if you look at the Return on Equity (ROE) or Return on Assets (ROA), which are indications of a company’s efficiency, it is very clear that under normal circumstances and on level playing fields, the private sector’s efficiency and impact is much higher than when the Government runs businesses. 

Just take a look at Figure 1, which is a comparison between Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT), which has some private sector engagement and Dialog, which is a private sector player.

Figure 1: ROE analysis of SLT vs. Dialog

Source: Annual Reports of SLT and Dialog (2018-2021)

In some cases, the State sector ROE is simply higher because of the absence of a level playing field. The banking sector is a good example. Most State banks get preferential treatment so their returns are high due to the non-competitive nature of getting businesses. Given the size of the Government, most Government banking is done through the State-owned People’s Bank and Bank of Ceylon. Anyone visiting a State bank and a private bank will experience the difference in service levels. This doesn’t mean the private sector is perfect; markets are always imperfect, but it is obviously many miles ahead of businesses run by the State.

Figure 2: ROE comparison of the banking sector

Source: State of the State-Owned Enterprises, Advocata Institute (2022)

The private sector is not anyone else, it is us. We should be given the opportunity to solve our problems instead of making the Government solve them. When the Government tries to solve the problem, it will not only block the private sector but it will also waste our tax money. Just think of Amal; he is providing me with a reasonable solution to a problem that the Government has been unable to solve for over three decades.  

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

One-size-fits-all reform strategy will not work

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

It is said that there are three kinds of people: those who watch things happen, those who make things happen, and those who wonder what happened. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis and its story of reforms is undeniably a case of the latter.

Unfortunately, our key institutions and the Government authorities who are currently in the driving seat fall into a new category called ‘those who wonder what happened, but frankly just don’t care’. 

A good example is the recent discussion on the validity of the debt servicing suspension announcement. Since Parliament has the power to approve all public finance decisions, questions have been raised as to how such an important decision, which was made for the first time in the history of Sri Lanka, was not tabled before Parliament for approval.  

Of course, if we had enough money and if our State coffers held a reasonable amount of foreign reserves, we wouldn’t have needed to skip debt servicing or suspend debt repayments, and this would not have been an issue. However, it is no secret that the country did not even have enough funds to clear a shipment of LP Gas worth $ 20-30 million. The phrase ‘scraping the bottom of the barrel’ is not appropriate in this instance, because there is simply nothing at the bottom. 

Warnings fell on deaf ears

There were multiple alerts on Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability issued by local intellectuals as well as by common men and women. Global banks such as Citibank even issued a report titled ‘Denial is not a strategy’. But their warnings fell on deaf ears as our Parliament and Central Bank did next to nothing to remedy the situation. 

Months after suspending debt payments, Parliament is now questioning whether the debt suspension decision had been approved by them. Instead, they should be asking themselves what they were doing for so long when it was obvious that we did not have money to pay our debt. 

When the country was heading straight towards bankruptcy, many policymakers did not bother to question what was happening. This does not justify the failure to follow parliamentary protocol, of course, but two wrongs will not make a right. 

In desperate need of reforms

The current system is a clear indication that our institutions are in desperate need of a complete reform programme, one that includes political reforms. However, expecting reforms to be implemented by a set of policymakers who, up until very recently, did not even bother to question what was happening may be too high an expectation. 

The execution of a solid reform programme requires building upon an understanding of what these reforms should be as well as understanding the importance of laying the foundations for strong, independent institutions. Along with specialist skills, a commitment to seeing these reforms through is required. Political reforms should support economic reforms and vice versa.

SOEs as a starting point

A good starting point is reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). It is quite surprising to me that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) press release on the Staff-Level Agreement (SLA) gives little significance to SOE reforms. 

One of the seven main points highlighted by the IMF and the Government is the need for cost reflective pricing for energy and petroleum products. This is a welcome move, but it will lead to the same problems we have been facing so far. 

Given the state of our institutions, our politicians will adopt the cost reflective pricing strategy for as long as is needed and then simply revert back to their old habits – changing the pricing formula, bringing  prices down, and ignoring the cost factor. For this reason, our reforms have to be of a much more permanent nature this time around and that is why we need a strong combination of specialist skills and a commitment to implementing these reforms. 

The role of the Government

The Government’s role is not to conduct business, and a private sector business leader recently said as much: “The Government’s only business is to not to do business.” Simply looking at which enterprises make profits or incur losses is definitely the wrong way to look at it.  

Government businesses that make profits at present can incur losses in future. The Government has the ability to destroy any notion of a level playing field and can support Government businesses through loans, subsidies, and special permits. The vast majority of profit-making SOEs are not profitable solely due to their own efforts, and in reality, they aren’t competitive businesses.

For instance, it is widely known that the Development Lotteries Board is a profit-making Government institution. What may be a lesser known fact is that there is only one other competitor – the National Lotteries Board, and the directors of both these companies are appointed by the Minister of Finance. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be a surprise that the Development Lotteries Board is profitable. 

Therefore, looking solely at profitability won’t address prevailing issues. We have to first look at what the role of the Government should be. 

It is true that all SOE reforms cannot adopt a one-size-fits-all strategy. Different SOEs have to be treated differently. This treatment has to be based on the principle of the government having no role in business.  

In cricket and football, it is a commonly held view that the umpire or referee has no role in playing the game. It is the umpire’s responsibility to overlook the game and ensure that it is being played fairly. The umpire’s decision is final and if the umpire acts more favourably towards one side, there is another set of regulation mechanisms to manage this. The umpire facilitates the competitive nature of the game. The same holds true for the role of the government. 

Many options have been discussed for reforming SOEs, including privatisation and SOE consolidation that follows models like the Temasek in Singapore and Khazanah in Malaysia. Regardless of which option is chosen and which model is followed, we expect the Government to implement SOE reforms on a case-by-case basis, with special attention being paid to the role of the State.  

If we fail to understand the role of the State and implement solutions for SOEs based on this, Sri Lanka’s reform programme will probably fall into the category of things that make people ‘wonder what happened’. People will certainly question the reform programme and its credibility, while our next generation will wonder how they inherited such a poorly-managed nation that was once so full of potential.  

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Timescale confusions in solutions for the crisis

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

A few days after the tsunami, I was called to an expert meeting at Temple Trees by the then Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa. I was seated next to Arisen Ahubudu, the famous giver of names. He stated that we had lost too much territory, including Madagascar, and that we could not afford to lose more. He proposed building a wall around the country, using the traditional techniques used in protecting tank bunds, the ralepanawa. I was stunned that such a nice and well-meaning person could come out with such arrant nonsense. He had confused geological time with human time. 

Timescale confusions of a smaller magnitude are evident among many proposing solutions to our current multi-faceted crisis. 

Solutions to power cuts

We all experience the problem. Some of us understand the cause: no dollars to pay for fuel for the generators that make up for the shortfall from lower production from the hydro generators and Norochcholai. Even if we had the dollars, such fuel is priced in dollars and subject to price fluctuations that we cannot control. It is common sense that we should shift to electricity produced by renewable sources such as solar and wind. 

The problem is that under current market and technology conditions, both the distribution network (low voltage) and the transmission network (high voltage) are limited in how much solar- and wind-generated electricity they can accept. We can, and should, increase the use of electricity from renewable sources, but we need to upgrade the transmission network to be able to do so. Solar panels yield electricity when the sun is out (not at night and not when clouds pass over the panels); the wind will produce electricity even in evenings when our use is highest, but it is still intermittent. Batteries are not cost-effective yet.

Given the need to balance supply and demand of electricity in real-time caused by lack of cost-effective storage technologies, we need a large and modernised system in order to absorb more energy from these intermittent sources. We need to invest in upgrading the national grid and possibly connect to the large Indian grid. Feasibility studies must be done, and investment mobilised. It will take several years for the desired outcomes to be achieved. Increasing solar- and wind-based energy is not a viable solution for our immediate problems, though it is a solution in the long term. Within the applicable timescale, what we need are dollars for coal and diesel.

Promotion of manufacturing

Twin deficits, exacerbated by recent economic mismanagement, caused the crisis. More exports would have addressed the current-account deficit and may have helped with the fiscal deficit if the right tax policy was in place. Roughly $ 11 billion was earned from the export of goods such as apparel, tea, and value-added rubber products before the pandemic. Around $ 7 billion was claimed from service exports such as tourism, software and business process outsourcing. 

It is true that the East Asian Tigers and China took their people out of poverty through the production of goods for export. One has to ask why Sri Lanka (and to a significant extent, the rest of South Asia) failed to ramp up the production of goods for export, relying more heavily on service exports. One could even argue that the apparel industry is a service industry. A tailor who makes a suit out of material given to him is undoubtably a provider of services. The Sri Lankan apparel industry, which is the largest importer as well as the largest exporter, is doing what a tailor does, at scale. If it is manufacturing, it is manufacturing lite.

Until the market opening in 1978, the answer to the question of why we had no industries was that our private sector was weak and lacked capital. Therefore, the State went into manufacturing: steel, plywood, tyres, sugar, paper, shoes, cooking implements, etc. were all produced by fully State-owned enterprises under protection. They produced shoddy goods at high prices for the local market and lost enormous amounts of money. The plywood factory resulted in the clear-cutting of half of Sinharaja. After the market was opened to imports, they went out of business.

Since 1978, we have relied on private investors, with or without foreign partners, to manufacture for export (and for domestic use). They have tended to invest in sectors that did not rely too heavily on cheap energy (because our electricity prices were high, especially for industrial users). Except in the case of a few sectors such as apparel and rubber-based products, our producers failed to secure access to markets. Restrictive laws and para tariffs hindered local producers from getting integrated into global production networks, with very few exceptions. 

So, the industrialisation prescription as a solution to the crisis will take time and effort to implement. We would have to ensure reliable and low-cost energy (and other infrastructure services such as waste disposal), eliminate para-tariffs, and create the conditions for market access. The latter is the most challenging. 

Investors such as Michelin ensured market access for the solid tyres produced in Sri Lanka. The apparel industry also benefited in the early stages from foreign investors who facilitated market access. Attracting such investors and entering into trade agreements are needed for market access. But both take time. 

Industrialisation may be a good solution, but it is not for the Government to decide on manufacturing priorities. Because China has established itself as the factory to the world, countries such as ours must identify and exploit niches. Those best positioned for this are those with intimate knowledge of the markets, with skin in the game, namely private investors. The State must create the conditions and leave the actual investment decisions to such players. All this will occur on a timescale different from what is relevant to emerging from the present crisis.

Constitutional reforms

It has become evident that the hyper-presidential system created by the 1978 Constitution has failed to yield the promised benefits and has caused serious damage after the enactment of the 20th Amendment, which removed all the checks that were placed on the President by the 19th Amendment. For example, the Minister of Finance has stated that specific officials were responsible for the tax cuts that triggered the present crisis and the delay in debt restructuring. In the current system, the sole authority for those appointments was the President who must therefore be held accountable for the current crisis.

To address the demands of the protestors, the President must go. He must resign or be impeached. The former can take place immediately would allow the country to return to normal (if such a condition exists after the devastation wreaked by the President and his appointees). The time taken to impeach will be too long. 

The next best solution is to reduce the powers of the President. This would require a Constitutional amendment. An amendment that is approved by Cabinet can be completed within around six weeks. If it is moved as a private member’s motion, it could take more than six months, outside the timeframe needed to calm the country and get the debt restructuring done. The announcement that the Government is proposing the restoration of the 19th Amendment suggests a solution within the required timescale. Of course, it would be necessary to scrutinise the proposed amendment and ensure the President’s powers are meaningfully reduced immediately.

In innumerable discussions I have participated in, I hear proposals for Constitutional reform that pay no heed to the time factor. Some talk of a Constitution authored by the people, modelled on what is going on in Chile. The process began with an amendment to the Constitution and a referendum in 2020. This was followed by an election for a Constituent Assembly in April 2021. Its deliberations are ongoing. How realistic is this kind of process for the kinds of issues that have brought our people to the streets?

In these days of limited attention (and paper supplies), it would be useful if greater weight is given to the appropriateness of the proposed solutions for the time needed to solve the problems that beset us.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

How can affordable electricity be assured 24x7?

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

The best way to understand the value of something is to experience life without it. These days, the Government is giving us a crash course on the value of reliable electricity supply. An unpleasant lesson, but nonetheless a learning opportunity.

If we probe the causes of load shedding, the learning can be deeper. Load shedding can be eliminated but at a cost. When hydropower declines due to periodic drought, the difference can be made up with generators running on imported fuel, the dollar price of which is determined by world market conditions. We can have 24x7 electricity, but not at an affordable price.

The Government created the immediate conditions for unreliable electricity supply through mismanagement of the country’s external debt. Today’s problems are not caused by delays in building additional generating capacity; they are caused by the lack of dollars to provide fuel for the existing generating plants. But there were deeper weaknesses in the organically developed system that must be understood.

With benchmark crude oil prices going over $ 100 per barrel, we must rethink our dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Reducing dependence on fossil fuels

Examination of the composition of our imports (Figure 1) shows that refined petroleum and crude oil taken together is the largest or second largest category of what is imported. It follows then that reducing the import of petroleum products would be an action that would satisfy many: those concerned about global warming will be made happy; those who want self-sufficiency would also be pleased. 

Petroleum imports are not used solely for electricity generation. But the way to reduce the consumption of petroleum products for transportation also involves electricity generated by renewables: buses and trains that are powered by electricity; lorries, cars, three-wheelers, and two-wheelers that are powered by electricity. Promoting electric vehicles makes no sense unless electricity comes from renewable sources. 

The significant increase in expenditure for fossil fuels starting in 2011 (Figure 2) appears correlated with the massive increase in the vehicle stock after the end of the conflict, leading to a doubling by 2014. Luckily, the biggest increase was in two wheelers, which do not take up a lot of road space and consume less fuel. 

Generating electricity from renewables does require some imported elements such as low-cost, efficient turbines and photo-voltaic panels but the costs and dependence is nowhere near that which exists with imported oil and natural gas. In fact, it may be possible even to export electricity at certain times of the day or even for months on end. But this will require substantial investment in the transmission grid.

Preconditions for increasing use of renewables

An economics commentator whose work I follow had expressed puzzlement at “demand for electricity is higher than supply” being given as a reason for load shedding. Others had expressed outrage at some Facebook posts that I had shared, which stated that solar and wind could not provide a complete solution to our energy woes. These responses by well-meaning and intelligent commentators made me realise the need for a better understanding of how the electricity is generated, transmitted, and distributed.

For all practical purposes using currently affordable technology, electricity must be treated as something that cannot be stored (but see discussion of pumped storage below). That means that it must be generated at the same time as people consume electricity by activating lights or appliances. Peak consumption in Sri Lanka (in the evening hours starting from around 6:30 p.m.) is around 2 or 2.5 times that of lowest use which is around 1000 MW. 

That necessitates a cheap source of baseload electricity that can be drawn upon throughout the day. In addition, we must have other sources that can be mobilised as demand increases. One would think that the major hydroelectric plants that have been built on the main rivers which generate cheap electricity that is unaffected by world market prices and the value of the rupee could serve as the source of baseload power. But there are constraints, such as competing demands from agriculture. The weather affects hydropower, as we are experiencing now. 

Therefore, planners in the past argued for coal as the ideal baseload for Sri Lanka. If Norochcholai does not keep breaking down and operates optimally, it can give 900 MW continuously whether or not the rains come. But it does break down, and it appears there have been irregularities in coal purchases. Coal, even if procured on long-term contracts at the lowest possible price, still must be paid for in dollars.

There are those who argue that Sri Lanka has plenty of wind and sun, and we can solve all problems by shifting to wind and sun. But the simple fact is that these are intermittent sources. Solar does not produce electricity when the sun does not shine and produces less when clouds cover the sun. Wind can produce throughout the day and night, but there are times when the wind dies down. It requires complex system controls to blend these intermittent sources into a centralised system designed for large, stable and controllable generators. 

Countries have incorporated massive amounts of intermittent renewable sources. In 2019, 47% of Denmark’s electricity came from wind. But they have a very sophisticated grid that is capable of handling intermittent power sources, and they use interconnections with other national systems to help balance the system. So, for example, when excess power is generated by the Danish wind turbines, it is used to pump water back up into reservoirs in Norway and Sweden (a method of storing electricity in the form of water known as pumped storage), which can then be run through turbines again to produce more electricity when needed. Yet with all that, Danish consumers pay more for electricity than their neighbours.

Similarly, if Sri Lanka is to increase the use of intermittent power sources, we will have to upgrade the grid and the system control centre’s software. Given the difficulties of synchronising the frequencies to one big plant such as Victoria, it may even be necessary to gradually convert the grid to direct current. If the Sri Lankan grid is connected via a high voltage direct current cable to the Southern Indian grid, the much larger combined system can absorb a greater amount of wind and solar power. 

Interconnecting does not mean that a country gives up on generating its own electricity. It simply means that marginal amounts of electricity will flow in either direction when it is advantageous to two (or more) systems. The fact that the peaks are different in the two systems can also be used to reduce the high costs incurred at peak.

It may be necessary to directly link revenues derived from regulated prices to those who make the substantial investments needed for the grid. This will almost necessarily require a restructuring of the current ungainly, unresponsive, and money-losing CEB in a manner that allows the transmission unit to be run efficiently. 

All these options require careful study in terms of costs, benefits and energy security. The relations between Denmark and its neighbours are such that all the parties can be confident about the contracts being respected and any disputes that arise being settled in a fair manner. We must ensure that the interconnection agreements with India have all these safeguards. The precedent of India’s interconnections with Bhutan shows that mutual interdependence is achievable in South Asia. The experience in Europe where interconnection, including over long distances across water, is growing rapidly even after Brexit, will have to be studied. 

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

Air India sold; privatise SriLankan now

Originally appeared on the Daily FT

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

Privatisation should not take into account the nationality of the purchaser, but that a foreign acquisition would, on balance, yield a more sustainable solution

Air India, which was losing $ 3 million a day on average (over $ 1 billion per year) has been sold for what amounts to loose change for a conglomerate the size of Tata Sons: $ 400 million plus the assumption of $ 2 billion out of the massive debts in excess of $ 8 billion accumulated by the state-owned carrier over the years.

But this is a good deal for the people of India. It is one that we in Sri Lanka should study and emulate.

Air India, founded by the Tatas in 1932, was expropriated by the state a few years after independence. It, and Indian Airlines which was merged with it a few years back, had the backing of the state, unlimited financing, and monopoly rights in both the domestic and international segments. Yet, service was awful, and profits were rare. 

As the market was opened to competition, first in the domestic segment and then in the international, the two state-owned airlines failed to meet the challenge. Even today, Air India is smaller than IndiGo, an airline which commenced operations in 2005.

The greatest benefit to the public is the avoidance of subsidising the airline. The government will still have to deal with the remaining debts of the company but at least the liabilities will not keep growing. And if the Tatas manage to turn it around, the government will receive tax revenues.

100% sale

It took the Modi government four years to get to this point in the sale. But in fact, various Indian governments have been trying to do something about this bleeding sore for much longer. Earlier attempts failed because the government was trying to keep an ownership stake and the ability to interfere in management. 

In 1998, the Kumaratunge government sold only 40% of the money-losing and inefficient Air Lanka for $ 70 million. It bundled the sale with a 10-year management contract to Emirates. But given the crudity of how the letter and spirit of the management contract was violated by the government in a fit of pique, it was unlikely that any new investor/manager would trust the government of Sri Lanka to keep its word.

Back in the 1990s or even in the following decade, state-owned airlines were seen as having value. But over time, the environment has changed, and they are beginning to look less like marquee investments and more like collections of landing slots and aircraft. With the present transaction, more attention is being paid to Air India’s Heathrow landing slots than the value of its brand or the prestige of being a flag carrier. The airline business is a regulated activity vulnerable to state interference and coercion. Even having 100% ownership is not going to protect an airline with the major presence in a national market from the caprice of a head of state annoyed that his entourage did not all get seats in business class. But it is better than having thieves foisted on the airline as managers. The thievery engaged in by SriLankan management is now in the public record, thanks to the Airbus investigation. 

For how much?

Even when Emirates was remitting dividends to Treasury, the airline itself was not profitable (though it was not haemorrhaging money like after Emirates departed); the real money makers were catering and ground handling, which were monopolies. The considerable pressures that will be exerted to bundle these activities along with the airline to show a less cringeworthy sale price should be resisted. 

Once we get rid of the money-guzzling airline, action should be taken to provide the best possible services to all airlines without discrimination through optimal use of the tools of competition: competition for the market and competition in the market.

The Government can save face by manipulating the debt component of the sale, as has been demonstrated in India. Because the government of India is absorbing more of the debt than the stated sale price of $ 2.4 billion or the actual cash component of $ 400 million, an uncharitable observer could even claim that the Modi government is giving away an airline for nothing. But that disregards how much is saved by not having the white elephant in government hands: more than $ 1 billion a year.

With SriLankan, the avoided losses to Treasury would be Rs. 99 million a day, the average per day loss incurred by the airline in 2018, 2019 and 2020. The less abnormal years of 2018 and 2019 were included lest it be said that no general claims could be made from losses in a pandemic year. Rs. 99 million ($ 0.5 million a day) is quite a bit lower than Air India’s $ 3 million a day benchmark. But it must be remembered that most things in India are around 50 times the size of Sri Lanka, whereas the daily loss is only six times. 

But still, not losing Rs. 36 billion per year ($ 180 million) a year would be nice. That’s close to one fourth of what the Government spent on pensions in 2020. In times like this, every billion matters.

But it should be Sri Lankan

Once I was on a TV talk show with JVP leader, making headway with the argument that the taxes paid on potatoes and milk powder by a housewife in Siyambalanduwa should not be spent on subsidising SriLankan Airlines. He conceded that such subsidies were wrong and that the government appeared incapable of running an airline. But he said, why do we have to sell it to foreigners? Why cannot some good Sri Lankan capitalists take it over and run it professionally? 

So shocked was I by this ceding of ground that I was unable to properly respond, which I will do now. My first response would have been to say that from a Marxian perspective the nationality of the capitalist makes no difference. Exploitation is no less objectionable because the capitalist carries the same passport as the exploited. But then, perhaps Marxism is no longer relevant, this being three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and all that. 

As a consumer why would I care about anything other than the price-quality bundle offered by the airlines offering service to the destinations I wished to travel to? If one of the airlines happened to be a lossmaker like Air India or SriLankan, subsidised by other people’s tax dollars, that would be even better for me as a consumer. 

But then, it could be argued that this was a form of predatory pricing, whereby even efficient airlines were driven to rack and ruin because they have to match the artificially low prices of the state-subsidised carriers. As a consumer I would not care, but perhaps as a policy maker I may. The remedy for this would be some form of inter-state agreement not to offer subsidies, as there exists in the European Union.

But this would be a digression, because the whole point of privatising to a foreign or domestic investor would be to get away from subsidising the flying rich. If the investor believed he would not be bailed out, he would run the business in a responsible manner, offering reasonable prices and withdrawing from ruinous competition where such popped up. The only danger would be the state (or the Cardinal through the state) exerting pressure not to withdraw from unprofitable routes, something SriLankan is very familiar with.

Who would be able to better resist such pressures, a domestic or a foreign investor? The answer being the latter, I would conclude that privatisation should not take into account the nationality of the purchaser, but that a foreign acquisition would, on balance, yield a more sustainable solution.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

SriLankan Airlines and the Case for Privatisation

Originally appeared on Sunday Times

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The government’s policy document ‘Vision 2025: A Country Enriched’ positions Sri Lanka as a knowledge based, highly competitive, social market economy; and much of the content of the document is in line with increasing competition, productivity and efficiency.

The state of SriLankan Airlines, however, is in the antithesis of efficiency and productivity. The airline has been raking in losses for years now, and on Monday the 7th of January, the president appointed a committee to once again work on its restructuring. The new committee will assess the previous reports and restructuring plans and have now completed their recommendations.

It is evident that state ownership of this airline is not working, so what are the solutions?

Back when SriLankan Airlines was still Air Lanka, it was privatised. The government sold a 40% shareholding to Emirates Airlines in 1998, and contracted Emirates to manage the company for ten years with the government of Sri Lanka retaining majority shareholding. In 2008, the government took back complete ownership of the airline, and from then on, the losses began [1].

Source: Sri Lankan Treasury Annual Report (2008, 2018)

Privatisation has worked in the past, and the argument for privatisation of a state-owned airline is strong. To begin with, the aviation industry is an investment heavy industry, which requires expertise and foresight. Beyond procuring airplanes and terminal space, there is a web of domestic and international regulations to navigate, not to mention standards to adhere to. From then on, once you have the planes and are ready to start, the airline needs to be competitive in order to survive. It requires strong management and effective marketing, with a team that can adapt to external shocks in fuel prices, domestic and international politics, and changes in foreign exchange rates. Even if it has the money, a government is ill-equipped for this task, evidenced by the track record of the airline in state hands. During the period of 2009-2017, when the airline was under state management, it has accumulated losses of Rs. 148,707 Mn [2]. Repeated promises of restructuring or turnaround have remained unfulfilled.

While privatisation of SOEs, and specifically the privatisation of state-owned airlines is theoretically sound, appropriate implementation is necessary. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has done extensive research on privatisation of state-owned enterprises and has identified some key features that successful privatisations have had in common. Detailed below are some features that are relevant to Sri Lanka [3].

• Strong political commitment to privatisation at the highest level in order to overcome bureaucratic inertia and to resolve inter-institution rivalries in order to move the process forward.

• Clearly identified and prioritised objectives in order to provide the policy with focus and a sense of trade-offs that may be required.

• A transparent process to enhance the integrity of the privatisation process, gain credibility with potential investors and political support from the public.

• An effective communication campaign to explain the policy objectives of privatisation and the means by which they are to be achieved in order to respond to public concerns and to gain support for the policy.

• Allocation of adequate resources in order to meet the demands of the shift to privatization.

Partial privatisation of SriLankan as a more viable solution?

Privatisation does not always have to be full divestiture of the asset; the option of partial privatisation is open. In this scenario, governments sell a minority stake and retain a degree of control, while the enterprise reaps the benefits that accompany privatisation. The process of privatisation will bring with it a much needed infusion of private equity, new management, clearly defined guidelines and a more flexible financial structure. The focus of the airline will shift towards increasing profitability and efficiency, with the aim of increasing shareholder value. Given Sri Lanka’s past success story with the partial privatisation of Air Lanka, it is possible that this solution will be pursued or at least considered.

The pitfall of partial privatisation

Drawing from the experience of privatisation in other countries when governments remain the majority shareholder, the space for political interference continues to exist [4]. This is the biggest potential pitfall, and the SriLankan experience can attest to the damage this can cause. As of now the government is struggling to create interest in the purchase of the airlines, and the fear that the government will once again step in and interfere with the management is the most probable reason behind this.

If the government is considering partial privatisation, steps should be taken to ensure that the government’s interests remain those of a shareholder and not those of a political entity. Given past track records, assurances of non-interference are unlikely to inspire confidence.

In 2015 the Hon. Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe mentioned that the government was considering the Singaporean Temasek model of a holding company as a solution to the problems of SOEs in Sri Lanka [5]. Establishing a holding company for SOEs would help bolster investor confidence and improve the functioning of the airline. It would professionalize the management and create distance from local politics [6]. It is a shame that even though this idea was brought out in 2015, it was never implemented. The question that remains is whether the government will take this into consideration and take decisive action on this problem four years later.

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[1] Ratnasabapathy, R. (2016). The renationalisation of SriLankan airlines and the follies of state enterprise. In: The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka. Colombo: The Advocata Institute.

[2] Ten Year Review: SriLankan Airlines Annual Report 2016/17. Colombo.

[3] Privatising State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of Policies and Practices in OECD Countries. (2003). Paris: OECD Publishing.

[4] Ibid

[5] Wettasinghe, C. (2015). Temasek model to make public enterprises viable. Daily Mirror. (Online - Accessed 16 Jan. 2019)

[6] Kim, K. (2018). Matchmaking: Establishment of state-owned holding companies in Indonesia. Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 5(2), pp.313-330.

SOEs in Sri Lanka : Beyond "Profit & Losses"

The state has a long history of involvement in the economy in Sri Lanka; state ownership of utilities dates back to the colonial era. Post-independence experiments with socialism saw the expansion of the state into many new areas of business. Despite some reforms in the 1977-2005 era, state enterprises still account for a significant share of the economy.

The 2005-2015 period saw a halt to the privatisation process and a renewed wave of expansion in state businesses. Between 2009 and 2014 the number of SOEs grew from 107 to 245 while the number employed grew from 140,500 to a staggering 261,683.

Although the Department of Public Enterprises is supposed to improve governance in Public Enterprises (Commercial Corporations, Government Owned Companies and Statutory Boards), by its own admission only 55 SOEs come under its purview. The last available performance report (2014) indicates the 55 SOEs that were considered strategically important obtained budgetary support of Rs.126bn and treasury guarantees of Rs.47.6bn that year. Bank borrowings by these SOEs stood at Rs.471.2bn as at end 2014.

The size of the SOEs and the breadth of their activity make it an important determinant of the overall productivity of the economy. Consequently, the governance of SOEs will be critical to ensure their positive contribution to a country’s overall economic efficiency and competitiveness.

Ensuring that whether held nationally, regionally or locally – the state’s investments to actually deliver the societal outcomes desired is extremely difficult due to certain inherent problems.

1) Governments are run by politicians, not businessmen. Politicians can only make political decisions, not economic ones and these decisions will tend to be focused on short term publicity and benefits, ignoring long term consequences. An example is the launch of a company called Polipto Lanka to convert rubber and polythene waste to diesel. It was launched in 2009 amidst much fanfare but despite regular grants from the treasury it is yet to show any commercial results or even demonstrate that the process is economically feasible. Coincidentally, the launch took place a week before a general election. Polipto Lanka receives regular budget support from the Treasury; support for the last three years amounting to Rs.120m.

2) Governments use other people’s money; businesses must risk their own money. If a business does not earn a profit, the owner will need to keep infusing funds and this provides a powerful incentive to improve efficiency. The general public, whose money is effectively at risk in a state venture do not have the wherewithal or knowledge to hold managers or politicians to account. Politicians would prefer to postpone hard decisions than risk personal unpopularity, which is why state enterprises can keep running losses year after year.

The Janatha Estates Development Board (JEDB) and Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation (SLSPC) have not reported a profit in the last five years, Mihin Lanka has barely made a profit since its inception, yet they continue to operate, the losses being paid by taxpayers because politicians will not risk bad publicity that may follow any attempts to reform them.

The Director General of Public Enterprises admitted as much in his report of 2009:

"We have found some boards take affairs of the enterprise very lightly regardless of their strategic importance even in a situation where PE [Public Enterprise] faces very difficult time. Since there is

no formal procedure to hold the chairman and the board of directors accountable, for their weak performance or unacceptable practices, some boards act with sheer indifference in discharging their responsibility."

3) State enterprises tend to be monopolies or restrict competition from the private sector. A business that faces no competition will find it easier to report profits. Where state businesses face competition the Government may grant SOEs preferential tax or other benefits that hinder the ability of the private sector to compete, causing deterioration in service or increasing costs to consumers. A few years ago VAT was imposed on large supermarkets but LakSathosa was exempted from this. The previously unprofitable LakSathosa started to make profits, while the efficient local supermarkets were penalised.

SOEs which operate as monopolies may not deliver an adequate level of service or charge excessive prices, which may lower the productivity/efficiency of the wider economy.

When Telecom was in state hands, obtaining a telephone connection, essential for business was a luxury that required a wait of several years. Thanks to liberalisation of phone connections, now they are available over the counter but businesses still struggle to obtain power connections and may have to invest in standby generators due to unreliability.

Energy costs (fuel and electricity) do not reflect the decline in global oil prices partly due to inefficiencies within the CPC/CEB (Ceylon Petroleum Corporation/ Ceylon Electricity Board), impacting on the competitiveness of business.

Inefficiencies in the state managed port terminals are a drag on trade but fortunately throughput at the privately managed SAGT (South Asia Gateway Terminal) Queen Elizabeth Quay is far greater and a boon to business.

The SAGT terminal has been ranked number one for terminal productivity in South Asia by the Journal of Commerce in the USA and ranked number four in the world. Because of the faster turnaround time ships prefer to dock at Queen Elizabeth Quay where it operates.

SOEs, especially those that lose money, are partly funded by banks. When a large chunk of bank lending is directed towards SOEs, the private sector will find it harder to obtain funds and higher interest rates could lead to a phenomenon referred to as "crowding out".

4) Governments cannot boost overall employment by hiring workers to the state sector. Giving people state-sector jobs may appear to create employment but this causes a problem because each new position brings with it a tax obligation that imposes a burden on the private sector, where wealth is generated and taxes paid. Effectively, since the salary of a public-sector employee reduces the amount of funds available to private employers, a job created in the public sector causes an offsetting loss in the private sector.

5) State-owned enterprises may enjoy hidden subsidies in a variety of forms including preferential borrowing costs, lower rents or taxes. Thus the actual costs will be higher than reported in the accounts and very difficult to quantify without detailed analysis. For example, imagine if ministries or SOEs had to pay market rents for the space in Government buildings that they utilise. Few would occupy the highly-valued areas they do now and would probably occupy less office space.

Indeed there is a massive opportunity cost of state- owned property in that they do not generate a net tax income for the state. If these properties were utilised by the private sector they would generate taxes as well as rents. Secondly, government office buildings in city centres create additional congestion. Given the current state of information technology, most government offices could and should be moved far from city centres. Hence, it is clear that the problems with SOEs are not limited to losses; their inefficiencies also can be a serious drag on the wider economy.

A more worrying issue is that the public is unaware of the full extent of the problem. The Treasury and other bodies that are supposed to monitor SOEs do so only partially and by all accounts ineffectively. Hence the question is - how much of public resources are being drained away in this financial black hole? The tax payers and citizens surely deserve better.

At a minimum, the Government needs to publish regular, comprehensive performance report giving the investments, outstanding debts and profits/losses of all SOEs. The question of reform needs to be urgently addressed and privatisation should remain an option.

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A version of this article originally appeared in “The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka” Report as well as The Island.

What we could have done with the losses of state-owned enterprises

By Dhananath Fernando

The article originally appeared on the Daily Mirror on May 15, 2016

Would you believe the Sri Lankan government could have declared a Rs. 5000 bonus for each and every citizen in 2016 April New Year if Sri Lankan Airlines even if they had broken even for last 10 years.

The subject is State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and strangely most of them do not have proper financial data (Data is publicly available for 55 out of 255 SOE’s). I am adding my two cents worth to write about the mega losers of public money and some ‘why’ factors for the reader’s consumption.

The total losses of the 55 SOE’s from 2006-2015 amounts to a gigantic Rs. 636 billion. Interestingly 5 key institutes are responsible for 95 percent of the losses which adds up to Rs. 605 billion losses. Namely Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, Sri Lankan Air Lines, Mihin Lanka and Sri Lanka Transportation Board are the money eating machines of poor taxpayers. 

Surprisingly significant discrepancies were identified even in the figures disclosed to public through the COPE report, the Treasury Annual Report and Fiscal Management Report for the same institute.

Obviously all 3 the figures cannot be true and we can come to a reasonable conclusion that either two figures or all 3 figures are false. The simple reason we cannot ignore the discrepancy is because it exceeds Rs. 5 billion of tax payer’s money. If I take examples of other institutes this column will run out of space

Naturally, with such drastic discrepancies the following appalling questions cross our minds: nAre accepted accounting standards followed when profit calculations are made?  nIs the data fabricated to misguide the 20 million population?

Has COPE done their job well and does the money spent on the COPE committee justify taxpayer’s money.

If these government workers cannot manage these institutes and cannot even calculate profit and loss accurately, are they worth the money they are paid from tax payers’money.  The ‘Profits and losses’ analysis shows that in 2011 and 2012 there is a sharp increase in losses and the reasons for the increase in losses should be investigated to avoid reoccurrence of such situations in the future. 

Although it is a fact that the global economic conditions took a beating in 2012, but Sri Lanka had just emerged from a war situation in 2009, and this was a huge advantage to the Sri Lankan economy. SLTB and Mihin Air has failed to make any profit for last 10 long years and if a company cannot be turned around in 10 years, the ability of the management should be questioned. How many years must one wait to see a progress being made? 

Sometimes we the ordinary citizens of Sri Lanka cannot comprehend the value of Rs. 605 billion. Most of us, including the ministers and parliamentarians confuse millions and billions. In order to illustrate the potential of Rs. 605 billion, a list of things which could be done, if the 5 key institutes were well managed and were able to break even is given below:

1. Ten more highways

The cost of southern high way was 60 Billion rupees and we could have easily built 10 southern highways connecting all corners of the island with this money because the cost of the southern highway was way above the average cost. The Ministry of Highways attributes the high cost to the high prices paid for land acquisitions and land diversity. Even if this is true, 10 highways with similar capacity could have been constructed for the same price.  

2. Eleven harbours

The Hambantota port cost US$ 361 million and we could have built 11 ports and even saved another 600 million for the grand opening ceremony  

3. Cover 81% of the current budget deficit

The current budget deficit is estimated to be LKR 740 billion rupees and if the 5 institutes mentioned herein could have performed at breakeven level, we could easily cover 81% of the current budget deficit  

4. Twenty more airports

The current government is planning to make Sri Lanka an aviation hub and if they think they need airports like Mattala, even if it is only to store paddy during the harvest season, 20 similar airports could be built. The San Francisco Air Port in the USA, which incidentally is one of the top airports in the world, with the size of the runway being 3600 meters long and 45 meters wide is smaller than the Mattala airport runway which has a 3500 long and 60 meters wide runway. So I am talking about an investment of 20 airports having a capacity equal to the San Francisco Airport, not small domestic airports carrying light aircrafts  

5. Nine power plants as Norochchole

Making a Sri Lanka a hub of energy is another popular topic in town. The first phase of Norchchole cost US$ 455 million and losses made by the 5 key SOE’s in 10 years is 9 times  this cost.  

6. 10% of the Megapolis project 2030

The initial mega project in 2016 targeting to make Sri Lanka a middle income country by 2030, requires an investment of US$ 44 billion. The Government could easily cover 10 percent of the total investment with the losses made by these key 5 institutes.  

7. Relief of 22% of total tax revenue in 2016 on tax payers

The total estimated tax revenue of the government for 2016 is Rs. 1,584 billion. Even if Sri Lankan Airlines and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation could operate at breakeven level it could still cover 22 percent of the total estimated tax revenue from 2016 budget. I reiterate the values are just face values and the net present value (NPV) will show a worse situation  

8. Rs. 30,000 bonus by the first citizen with his annual greeting SMS

Leaving alone all of the above, the President instead of sending a SMS message to all Sri Lankan citizens who own a phone, wishing them a happy Sinhala and Tamil New Year, could give a cash gift of Rs.30,000 to every citizen of this country, including newly born infants, if these 5 key loss making institutes performed better by breaking even. (Rs. 120,000 for a 4 member house family) With the losses incurred by Sri Lankan Airlines alone, the President could gift Rs. 5000 to each citizen. 

What would be the solution?

It is a globally accepted theory that when you run a business, focussing on your strengths is a must and establishing monitoring and evaluation procedures is essential. If you do not possess the required skills or expertise within your organizations, you have to either hire the right people or outsource the job.I t is sad that the words like “Privatization” are injected as terrorist words into the blood of the nation but the reality is just leaving these 5 institutes in the hands of honest politicians had lost the country 605 billion which no one can justify. Those who promote concepts like state ownerships and big government has absolutely no idea on financial management.

If they had any sense on fiscal management a decade is a too long period even for a below average management.  The fear of privatization is same as fear of failure and the success is always lies beyond our comfortable zone. It is Albert Einstein, the brain of the 21stcentury, who said “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results”. 

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Dhananath Fernando is the Chief Operating Officer of AdvocataInstitute; an independent Sri Lankan think tank works for economic freedom. He could be reached via dhananath@advovata.org

The re-nationalisation of SriLankan Airlines and the follies of State enterprise

A couple of weeks ago, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe announced that the debts of SriLankan Airlines, amounting to a mammoth US$ 3.2 billion, will have to borne by the taxpayer. He said the government is taking this action to defuse an economic ‘landmine’ and that his government is actively looking for an international partner to manage the airline.

When a three billion dollar bill is passed on to ordinary Sri Lankans, many of whom have never flown the airline, it’s worth examining what let do this disastrous situation. In examining the data, it’s clear that Srilankan Airlines provides an excellent example of the problems that arise from state-owned enterprises.

Air Lanka, the state-owned airline was privatised in April 1998. The government of Sri Lanka sold a 40% shareholding to Emirates Airlines, which was also contracted to manage the company for a period of 10 years. The government of Sri Lanka continued to retain the majority shareholding but management was relinquished to Emirates.

Emirates re-branded the airline as ‘SriLankan’, overhauled the airline’s infrastructure and adopted a new approach to its operations. Cost-effective strategies were introduced; new pro-active management teams were put in place; Information technology became the basis of everyday activities. The airline’s network was constantly reappraised and product enhancement became a part of the airline’s philosophy. The airline was completely re-fleeted with an all-Airbus fleet of A340, A330 and A320 aircraft replacing the ageing Lockheed Tristars.

Although the privatisation and restructuring attracted a lot of criticism at the time, the exercise was eventually deemed a success; indeed in many quarters it was hailed as model for other airlines.

At an international seminar on airline restructuring and privatisation, held a couple of years after the divestment; the President of the employees union of Srilankan spoke on how union rights were protected and the improvement of working conditions.

At the time of the privatisation all employees were gifted shares by the government based on the number of years of service. Although a voluntary retirement scheme was also implemented the President of the union stated that employees were given an excellent deal if they wanted to leave and no-one was made redundant. Collective Agreements signed by the airline with employee unions guaranteed increments to employees. New human resource development programmes were instituted after privatisation to upgrade employees’ skills and a new grade and pay structure put in place.

Union representatives from other state-owned airlines were also impressed by the manner in which the airline disclosed information to employees; “they had never seen such transparency from an airline’s management,” said K J L Perera president of the employees union. SriLankan published its quarterly financial results in its staff newsletter.

Following a spat in December 2007 the Chief Executive Peter Hill, had his work permit revoked.The dispute began when Hill refused to bump 35 passengers from a full London-Colombo flight to make way for Sri Lanka’s president and his entourage. The Government cancelled the work permit of the CEO of the airline and in March 2008, Emirates did not renew the management contract. The airline, which had been consistently profitable under the management of Emirates last reported a profit in 2008; a bumper Rs.4.4bn. Since then the airline has racked up enormous losses; according to the latest published accounts for the year ended March 2015 losses stood 123.26bn rupees.

The airline reported an operating loss of Rs.16bn in the year 2015, an improvement from the loss of Rs.31.3bn in 2014. To put these figures into context, the Government bought out Emirates for only US$53m (or Rs.7bn at today’s exchange rate). Last year alone the airline lostfour times its original purchase price, a truly remarkable feat.  The airline’s accumulated losses amount to almost a billion dollars; the entire Southern highway was built for around 700 million dollars, cost overruns included.

The management of the airline has claimed that the recession in Europe and high oil prices caused the losses. The public was urged to look beyond the “mere profitability aspect” and understand the “catalyst role played” by the airline in tourism; in the words of the former CEO.

Airlines are global businesses and the same factors affect all airlines. Singapore Airlines cited by many who try to justify state ownership of airlines reported a marginal operating loss in only a single year during the last ten years; a loss of US$38m in 2009/10.

Singapore airlines is no less affected by the recession and oil prices, but it did not report losses. Singapore Airlines is a well-run state airline that is something of an exception. Many cite it’s example but few have been able to emulate its success, so we should not try to justify our Government’s ownership by looking to Singapore. Srilankan Airlines own track record is what we need to examine.

What changed when the Government took it over? They inherited a profitable business with the same staff, systems and infrastructure; the principal difference was in the management. The truth is that the airline suffered from gross mismanagement and corruption, some of which has recently been uncovered.

These problems seem to plague state owned enterprises (SOE’s), but why do they occur?

There are two elements to explanation: the principal-agent problem and the free-rider problem, both based on the assumption of self-seeking individuals.

An SOE is run by managers who do not own the firm. In a firm under state control managers know that their salaries will be paid regardless of how the business performs, therefore there is no incentive to maximise efficiency.

Frequently in Sri Lanka the Government will be under pressure to appoint various loyalists to key positions. In some, (although not all) instances, those who seek political patronage to be ‘fixed up in a job’ are people who lack the skills or abilities to find a job on their own merits. Thus the enterprise may become stuffed with incompetents; good staff will find it very difficult to work with these people so they either leave or give up trying to do any work and concentrate on keeping in the good books of the bosses.

The maxim of “more work, more trouble, less work, less trouble and no work, no trouble” is applied. In any case pay and benefits are not dependent on performance, so why bother to stick ones neck out? Soon, this attitude poisons the enterprise and staff work on surviving in their jobs rather than trying to manage the business.

This problem would not exist if the citizens, who are the owners (principals) of SOEs, can perfectly monitor the SOE managers (their agents) but individual citizens do not have the incentive, and means, to monitor the SOE managers.

This leads to the second element of the problem, even if they did try to hold the SOE to account, the costs that an individual citizen incurs in monitoring SOE managers (obtaining and analysing financial information, seeking explanations through public channels etc.) are solely his or hers, while the benefits of improved management accrue to all owners. Time and effort will be expended in the exercise by the citizen who receives no immediate benefit. Thus, individually, the citizens have little incentive to monitor the SOE managers, which means that in the end, no one monitors them. This is the so-called free-rider problem.

This is the fundamental structural flaw with SOE’s which explains why many operating in truly competitive markets are doomed to failure. There are apparently profitable SOE’s but In some instances they operate as a monopoly, like the Sri Lanka Port Aunthority.  In other instances such as LakSathosa, Governments  may  create an  uneven-playing  field  in  markets  where  an  SOE  competes  with private  firms,  as  they  have  a  vested  interest  in  ensuring  that  state-owned  firms  succeed. LakSathosa is exempt from the VAT and NBT charged on other supermarkets giving them a significant competitive advantage.

Accordingly, despite its role as regulator the government may, in fact, restrict competition through granting SOEs various benefits not offered to private firms. In such instances SOE’s may appear to be profitable but this is due to hidden subsidies and distortions which are ultimately borne by taxpayers.  

Airlines used to be regarded as a key part of transport infrastructure, like roads or bridges, which should be owned by the Government. Until the mid-1980s, most governments did own airlines and protected flag-carriers by restricting new entrants. This thinking has changed.

Privatisation made air travel more competitive and liberalisation brought competition from low-cost carriers. Most airlines in state control have failed to adapt and are losing money. There is little strategic interest in owning an airline; Switzerland and Belgium have done without a flag carrier for years.

The airline is currently a huge drain on the treasury and the previous experience with Emirates demonstrates the clear benefit of privatisation.

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A version of this article originally appeared in “The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka” Report as well as Ground Views