Aneetha Warusavitarana

Taxes on Essential Products: Bringing The Debate Back to Where It Matters

Originally appeared on Colombo Telegraph, Citizen.lk, The Morning, Lanka Business Online and Daily Mirror

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Sri Lanka’s exorbitant taxes on sanitary napkins had the media spotlight over the last few weeks - this is not a new issue. In 2018 the total tariffs on sanitary napkins was over 101.2%.  Since then we have seen some progress, with the tax being reduced from 101.2% to its current rate of 52%; a result of several tax revisions.

The 2020 budget revised down general duties for sanitary napkins to 15% and introduced a CESS tax of 15%, causing an uproar in social media and in parliament leading to fresh calls for the abolition of these taxes.  

Menstrual hygiene products are essential for girls and women, and this issue has put the interests of these consumers who want more variety and cheaper products against the interests of the local producers who want larger margins. Since the initial uproar last week, there have been claims that the local brands account for 95% of the local market and therefore import taxes do not have a bearing on the market price.  

Bringing the debate back to where it matters: impact on women

It is clear that for this issue, policy decisions have to be taken with the best interests of the consumer at heart - in this case, the millions of menstruating women. 

At the most basic level of analysis, when protectionist tariffs are placed on a good, it is the consumer who loses out. The tariffs will achieve two things: they will limit the range of products that enter the domestic market, and they will raise the prices of both imported products and locally manufactured products. How so? The inputs into the local production process are also taxed, which raises production costs, and therefore raises the final price of the locally manufactured product. Additionally, the tariff raises the price of the imported product, which allows local producers to raise their prices and keep substantial margins. In other words - tariffs cause both the locally produced goods and the imported goods to be sold at a higher price. 

These tariffs are also keeping more affordable options out of the market. At the time of writing, locally manufactured products can range in price (per pad) from LKR 11 to LKR 19. However, cheap imported alternatives are not available. For example, Indian supermarkets have products at the equivalent of LKR 5. The tariffs may not be deterring higher-priced imports from entering the market, but it could be possible that this is happening with more affordable imported options - it makes little sense to bring in a cheaper product if the tariff raises your costs to the point where you have to price the final good at the same price point as your more expensive product.

Will removing the tax only affect high-income earners?

An argument leveled against the removal of the tax has been that imported products are often out of reach of the average Sri Lankan woman, and as such has little relevance as a policy decision. This argument has also been coupled with the statement that as locally manufactured products exist, and women do purchase them - why should we care about bringing in imports? 

The example provided above makes it clear that removing the tax would actually bring more affordable products into the market. This is also where the importance of choice comes to play. Each woman will have different requirements at different points in their life. This is compounded by the fact that menstruation is often accompanied by pain and discomfort, which can range from mildly annoying to debilitating. In short, one size does not fit all when it comes to menstrual hygiene products. In response to this fact, the global industry has innovated - period cups, period underwear, reusable pads and more. These tariffs should be removed, and Sri Lankan women should also be given access to these choices. 

Economic Rents

By now it should be clear that there is only one winner, and it is not the millions of menstruating women. The basic explanation of the impact protectionist tariffs have is that they serve to benefit local producers, that are few in number. They shield them from the competition and allow them to price well above marginal costs. A classic case of ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour, where a company lobbies to secure itself protection in order to charge a higher price. The result is that the local consumer loses out. 

There is one area where the producer's complaints do have merits - that is the tariffs placed on their inputs.  Much of the input that goes into the production of sanitary napkins are also taxed.  The government should look into reducing these costs to help the local manufacturers stay price competitive.  

Given this, there is a clear call to reform - prioritise the requirements of women, and remove the taxes imposed on the final good and on the inputs into the production of these goods.

Aneetha Warusavitarana is the Research Manager at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at aneetha@advocata.org or @AneethaW on Twitter. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author's own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reform for our micro and small businesses

Covered in the Daily FT and Daily Mirror

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Last Saturday was the UN World Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Day, and in light of that, focus should be given to Sri Lanka’s small businesses and the challenges they face. 

Sri Lankan micro and small enterprises form a substantial part of our economy. Sole proprietorships account for 63.1% of all businesses in the country, and account for 27.1% of national employment (Department of Census and Statistics). However, they face a myriad of challenges and this focus on improving their business environment is welcome. As highlighted in a study conducted by the Advocata Institute on the regulatory barriers faced by micro and small enterprises, the three main challenges faced are access to finance, labour, and rent.

In addition, 45% of micro-enterprises and 10% of small enterprises remain unregistered, exacerbating these problems. Unregistered businesses are excluded from formal sources of finance, business networks, and do not qualify for Government assistance. 

In early March this year, the Cabinet approved the establishment of ‘one-stop shops’ for micro and small businesses in Sri Lanka. This project is now moving forward, with the Government working with the EU to set up these ‘one-stop shops’ in each district; with the aim of streamlining the registration process and providing assistance on issues of access to technology, quality control and access to markets. However, what else is there to be done? 

The problem of registration

Registering a business in Sri Lanka has always been a long, tedious process; one that discouraged businesses and negatively impacted our ease of doing business ranking. However, in 2018, Sri Lanka was witness to some welcome reform with the launch of ‘E-RoC portal’, which streamlined registration, and brought the process completely online. This success in reform was reflected in the country’s ranking on the ease of doing business ranking and was hailed as a reform success. 

However, the E-RoC portal is only applicable to the registration of private companies. 

In Sri Lanka, the registration of private companies is governed by the Companies Act No 07 of 2007, while the registration of sole proprietorships and partnerships are governed by Business Names Ordinance No 06 of 1918. As a result, the E-RoC could not be broadened to include the sole proprietors and partnerships. 

97% of micro-businesses in Sri Lanka and 85% of small businesses have registered their business as sole proprietorships, with only 3% of the businesses surveyed having registered themselves as a partnership, and 2% registering themselves as a Private Limited Company.4 In other words, for the vast majority of micro and small businesses in Sri Lanka, their registration process is long, tedious and unnecessarily convoluted.

How does business registration work for sole proprietors and partnerships?

The process of registration is implemented by the Divisional Secretariats. At best, the country currently has nine different regulatory processes for the registration of sole proprietors and partnerships. The process of registering a sole proprietorship or a partnership in Sri Lanka is a time consuming, complicated task, with the main steps detailed below: 

  1. Visit the Divisional Secretariat and collect form and instructions

  2. Fill out the application

  3. Provide documentation

    • Proof of ownership of business premises

    • Original Deed and notarised copy or

    • Original Rent agreement and notarised copy, or

    • No Objection letter from the owner of the premises

    • NIC copy

    • Tax assessment notification for the premises

    • Copy of the partnership business agreement

    4. Visit the Grama Niladhari and get the application and attached documents approved

    5. Receive additional approvals depending on the business type e.g.: PHI approval

    6. Hand over completed application to the Divisional Secretariat.

A majority of provinces do not have the application for business registration or the instructions sheet available for download from the Divisional Secretariat or Provincial Council website, and the instruction form is not always available in all three languages. 

This is in comparison to much simpler processes that have become standard internationally, and have also been replicated in Sri Lanka, as was seen with the E-RoC reform for private companies. 

Address the problem at hand

According to the island-wide survey conducted by the Advocata Institute, over 80% of respondents found the Grama Niladhari and the Divisional Secretariat to be an effective touch point. This would indicate that improving service at this point may not be an immediate requirement. Instead, focus should be placed on reforming the registration process for micro and small enterprises. 

Sri Lanka’s micro and small enterprises will have faced significant economic fallout during the curfew period. The Government has recognised this and responded with policy action like the debt moratorium to help ease some financial pressure. However, this is unlikely to be sufficient. These policies would only apply to entities that have registered their business and would leave the segment of unregistered businesses without support. It is vital that the registration process is streamlined, making it easier for these businesses to enter the formal sector and reap the benefits for formal sources of finance, and better access to markets that come with formalisation. There is a window for reform that exists, and we hope that the Government takes advantage of this to bring about some much-needed change. 

Lock-downs need not be curfews

Originally appeared in Daily FT, Daily Mirror, Lanka Business Online and Economy Next

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

On March 12, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the new coronavirus, COVID-19, to be a pandemic. With cases in Sri Lanka reaching over a 100, the government of Sri Lanka has taken several measures to prevent the spread of this disease. One such measure was enforcing an islandwide curfew.  


The risks posed by COVID-19 to the health and safety of our population are considerable and the measures to prevent the congregation of people and spread of the disease are commendable. A lockdown may certainly be warranted, yet a highly restrictive and prolonged curfew may prove to be counterproductive. As witnessed on Tuesday, March 24,  the short window given for basic necessities such as groceries,  medicine and other supplies, proved to be not only inadequate but also counterproductive to the objective of imposing a curfew in the first place. 


The government lifted curfew from 6:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, allowing people to purchase their essentials. This temporary lifting of curfew highlighted the flaws in the solution. With limited information as to when the next curfew would be lifted, people panicked and shops were inundated. It was not unusual to hear of someone who stood in line for six hours, practising social distancing, only to enter a supermarket that was crowded with people and filled with empty shelves. Crowds were so great that the fear is that the number of infections in the country will now rise in the weeks to come. 

Planning the shopping of an entire country or even one province is not an easy task and right now, people do not know when the curfew will be lifted next. As of Wednesday (March 25), curfew in Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara and Jaffna has been imposed indefinitely – there is no wonder that there was panic buying


Limited information exacerbating problem
Limited information on the government’s next steps is making the problem worse. The inherent problem with a curfew is that it cannot be imposed indefinitely. People need to have access to essentials – their food and their medicine. The curfew itself was imposed with almost no prior warning, which meant that the population panicked, hitting the shops and buying groceries that far exceeded their immediate requirement.


While this hoarding of goods has been publicly criticised, one can understand the fear that drives this behaviour. Planning the shopping of an entire country or even one province is not an easy task and right now, people do not know when the curfew will be lifted next. As of Wednesday (March 25), curfew in Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara and Jaffna has been imposed indefinitely – there is no wonder that there was panic buying. 


The government’s solution to this issue is to allow delivery services to run, while also organising a government-led distribution system of essentials to all families in these areas. The Presidential Task Force will coordinate this effort, mobilising the ‘grama niladari’, divisional secretariat, agricultural officers and ‘samurdhi’ officers.  The motivation behind this is commendable. The question that remains is whether this will be feasible and whether this is where the government should be dedicating limited resources.


Is there a more effective alternative?
The government has reassured the public, stating that there are no food shortages in the country. Empty shelves in the supermarkets are simply a result of panic buying and this appears to be true. A model that has been deployed in other countries with some success is the implementation of a lockdown and not a curfew. 


Under a lockdown, essential services such as banks, grocery stores, supermarkets, convenience stores, pharmacies and food delivery services, remain open. People are allowed out of their homes to purchase groceries, etc. with strict guidelines on social distancing being enforced.  


The government has already taken steps in this direction, with pharmacies and commercial banks remaining open and delivery services allowed to run. The next step would be to include grocery stores and supermarkets under the category of essential services. 


Looking at the example of South Korea, a success story in the handling of COVID-19, the South Korean government did not enter a complete lockdown. The government instead allowed limited movement of people but rapidly expanded their testing capacity, which helped drop the rates of infection.  


There is the concern that as Sri Lanka’s testing capabilities are not comparable to that of South Korea, we may not be able to replicate their model with an equal degree of success. 
There are other models that we can be considered in this case. In America, stores have allocated separate hours for the elderly to shop during, in order to limit exposure for this vulnerable group of the population. In New Zealand, where a little over 200 cases have been reported, the country has entered lockdown, allowing only essential services to run. 
Given the issues we have seen with curfew in Sri Lanka, the government could consider a variation on a traditional lockdown, where people are allowed to access essential services – with limitations on the number of people who can enter a shop at a time or allocating time slots for people to purchase goods. This could free up government resources currently being allocated to mass food delivery and allow these resources to instead be utilised in our healthcare sector. 

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Back to the Basics: Achieving our FDI targets?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

As we enter the middle of February, Sri Lanka does not appear to have a clear plan in place for foreign direct investment (FDI) for 2020. Last year, the Government set a target to attract Rs. 3 billion in FDI by the end of the year; this however did not come to pass. After the Easter Sunday attacks, the Government downgraded the target to Rs. 1.5 billion, reflecting the drop in investor confidence following the terror attacks.

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Attracting FDI should be a priority for Sri Lanka right now. As a region, growth in South Asia has slowed down, and we are no longer the fastest growing region in the world. In Sri Lanka, we will have to face challenging economic realities; the tax cuts introduced as a stimulus for the economy may or may not pan out as expected, and it is likely that government expenditure will continue to rise in the lead-up to parliamentary elections.

Our recent graduation to upper middle-income status has also shed light on the living standards of many in the country. The poverty line for upper middle-income countries is far higher than the official poverty line used in Sri Lanka. When the country’s poverty numbers are recalculated for the new poverty line of $ 5.5 per day, our poverty rate skyrockets from a respectable 4% to a horrifying 40%. Of course, this number should not be taken at face value; a little under half of our population did not suddenly plunge into poverty at the point of our transition to upper middle-income, and living standards are similar to what they were last year. However, it is a good indicator of how far we have to go as a country for Sri Lankans to have economic realities associated with upper middle-income countries.

Economic growth

The solution to our woes is of course economic growth; the catch is that growth appears to be quite elusive at this point, with GDP growth for 2020 estimated to be 3.7%. The country is also a little strapped for cash with debt repayments and uncertainty as to what our tax revenue will look like. What Sri Lanka needs at this point is FDI.

Attracting FDI into Sri Lanka should be a priority for the Sri Lankan Government, not simply because it is a source of foreign exchange for the country, but because the benefits of FDI go far beyond that of increasing inward capital flows. FDI is a link to international markets that Sri Lanka would otherwise have limited access to, and with that link comes the transfer of knowledge, skills, and knowhow. Entry into global value chains through FDI forces firms to improve productivity and increase competitiveness. The World Bank succinctly captures the benefits of FDI for high-growth firms in developing countries by identifying two main channels: (a) Contractual linkages between foreign and local firms that promote the formal transmission of knowledge and practices that may help domestic suppliers upgrade their technical and quality standards, and (b) the demonstration effect, where domestic firms imitate foreign technologies or managerial practices.

The investors’ side

Sri Lanka has to go far beyond setting targets for FDI if we are to attract it in the numbers that we need. We need to understand what investors are looking for, and then ensure that Sri Lanka has met that criteria. The World Bank’s Global Investment Competitiveness Survey is a tool that can help governments design policy and prioritise reform that investors will recognise and value. The survey captures 754 interviews with executives of multinational corporations (MNCs) that have invested in developing countries, and identifies the determinants to attracting FDI.

When speaking about FDI in Sri Lanka, focus is often solely on attracting FDI, with great effort being expended to answer the question of how to get investors to see Sri Lanka as a lucrative destination for investment. This is of course important, but we need to go beyond this if we are to retain FDI, and see the investment grow. One of the top five findings from the survey was that more than a third of investors reinvest all of their profits into the host country. This means that investors will be looking for policies in the host country that will help them grow their business, and not just policies to facilitate their initial setup.

Another key finding from the survey was the importance of having economic stability and a transparent, predictable policy regime. Three-quarters of investors have experienced disruptions in their operations as a result of political turmoil. A quarter of these investors then either cancelled or withdrew their investment.

Next steps

Achieving long-term policy stability is not an easy task; it will require considerable political will and commitment to long-term growth over a quick short-term win. Focus has to move beyond quick-fix investment incentives. The report highlights that incentives are not the most important determinant for a potential investor, according to the survey. They rank fourth in importance, below transparent governance, investment protection guarantees, and ease of establishing a business. Of course, this is not to say that incentives should be removed wholesale. They are a criterion, but possibly not the most important one.



Presidential promises and business registrations

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

On Independence Day, the presidential address touched on several topics, ranging from public administration and corruption to eradicating poverty in the country. Reforming the current system in order to promote an environment where Sri Lankans could thrive and prosper was a promise made – a large part of which was economic freedom. While the President veered clear of more controversial topics, this focus on reform was promising.

“Outdated laws, regulations, taxes, and charges that prevent people from freely undertaking self-employment, traditional industries, or businesses need to be revised swiftly. We will work towards removing unnecessary restrictions imposed on the public to better ensure their right to live freely.”

If the Government follows through on this commitment, it would require a considerable amount of work. While significant changes were introduced to the tax system of the country with relative ease, legal and regulatory change will be more difficult to come by. We have a host of outdated laws, and one industry is often governed by several acts – creating considerable confusion.

For instance, the coconut industry is governed by the Coconut Products Ordinance, the Coconut Fibre Act, and the Coconut Development Act. Each of these Acts address different aspects of the coconut industry, from the export of products to land use. Legal reform is notoriously time and labour intensive, and we are unlikely to see legal reform, unless it is driven by clear political will. Regulatory change is easier to bring about, and is a good starting point for the improvement of Sri Lanka’s business environment.

Small businesses

Last October, the Advocata Institute commissioned an islandwide survey of micro and small entrepreneurs, covering 1,500 respondents. The aim was to better understand the legal and regulatory barriers that these enterprises face. Sri Lanka has seen successful reform in the area of business registration, with the country moving up on the Ease of Doing Business index. The impact these reforms have had on small businesses was reflected in the survey findings, with 67% of respondents stating that they had registered their businesses. When this number was broken down further, we found that rates of registration did not fluctuate drastically between micro and small enterprises, with 66% of micro and 76% of small enterprises having registered their business.

While these numbers are promising, there is still room for improvement. Bringing businesses into the formal sector gives them opportunity and access to finance, knowledge, and markets that they are excluded from when they exist in the informal sector.

However, businesses have good reasons for being hesitant to formalise. In cases where the cost and time associated with registration are too high, it may make more sense for businesses to postpone registration until they are more established. Excessive regulation is also a key factor; when numerous documents and approvals are required, the costs associated with registration rise and act as a deterrent to formalisation.

Barriers

Among the unregistered businesses, only around one-third had tried to register their business at any point. The survey results indicate that this group of individuals may not necessarily have prohibitive barriers that prevent them from registering their businesses, as they have rarely gone beyond getting information from a municipal council or divisional secretariat, have prepared documents halfway, or have simply asked friends about the process or checked the website. This could indicate that there needs to be better information provided at divisional secretariats or municipal councils, or assistance provided to help these individuals register their businesses. It could also simply be a lack of interest in pursuing registration at this point in time.

One reason provided as to why they have not registered their businesses, which appears to be a more concrete barrier, is the issue of space and the requirement for a rent agreement. When these unregistered enterprises were asked if they were aware of the documents required for registration, 65% of respondents were aware that a name registration certificate was required and 61% were aware that grama niladari approval was required. Only 48% were aware that a rent agreement was required for the premises.

Requirements

The need for a rent agreement or copy of a deed at the point of registering the name of the business, while appropriate for a larger business, is less so in the case of these small and micro enterprises. A majority of the micro and small enterprises interviewed in the survey do not have a designated office space. 42% of small enterprises and 48% of micro enterprises operate from residential premises. If they are the owners of the premises, then the process is slightly simpler – the original deed and a notarised copy are required. If not, the original rent agreement and a notarised copy are required. At face value, this requirement may seem inconsequential. However, it does appear to be unnecessary and poses another hurdle for entrepreneurs.

A rent agreement or a deed is not necessarily a requirement for registering a business across the world. Looking at the case of New Zealand, it is only required that a company director enters in a valid address which will be cross checked against the New Zealand Post Database to ensure that the address is accurate. In the case of Hong Kong, registering a business only requires an incorporation form, a copy of the articles of association, and a notice to the business registration office. New Zealand and Hong Kong are in the top three most economically free countries in the world, and set a precedent that we could all follow.

Way forward

97% of micro businesses and 85% of small businesses surveyed register their business as sole proprietorships, with only 3% of the businesses surveyed registering themselves as partnerships, and 2% registering themselves as private limited companies.

Given this, removing the requirement of a rent agreement or deed for this type of registration could be a viable solution. The process of registration of private limited companies has been eased through the Government’s e-RoC portal, and reform should now focus on easing the process for our smaller businesses.



Achieving export target through National Export Strategy

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

After a series of tax cuts and promises of expenditure tightening, the Government has now turned its focus onto export growth. It is perhaps about time this area was given some attention, especially as it presents the Government with an avenue from which much-needed foreign exchange can enter the economy.

Minister of Industrial Export and Investment Promotion, and Tourism and Civil Aviation Prasanna Ranatunga has emphasised on the Government’s target of $ 18.5 billion in export revenue. In a welcome move, and breaking precedence, the Government has decided to continue with the National Export Strategy (NES) created during the tenure of the previous Government, a step that bodes well for policy consistency in the country.

The export narrative presented in the Government’s manifesto was one that focused on boosting domestic production for exports and carrying out import substitution. It identified that high tariffs on the imported inputs to stifle domestic production and economic growth, and committed to reduce tariffs on raw materials and intermediate goods.

Achievable targets?

Even though the policy consistency is promising, we still need to meet this target of $ 18.5 billion in export revenue. The question that remains is whether the Government has taken the steps to make this target a reality. The NES has a clearly laid out plan of action for the six key focus areas identified. However, we cannot think of creating export growth without a holistic look at the country’s trade position. Our location is often the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of international trade, but we have done little to reap any benefits from being the “Pearl of the Indian Ocean”. The recently released (human) Freedom in the World report tracks countries’ freedom to trade, among several other indicators. While Sri Lanka is still fairly low in overall rankings for human freedom, placing at 110/162, we perform poorly on the indicator “Freedom to Trade Internationally”, especially on the sub-indicators on tariffs and regulatory trade barriers, where we score 6.3 and 5.2 out of 10, respectively .

Some of the recent tax reforms have reduced taxes at the border as well, but Sri Lanka’s tariff system remains convoluted and opaque; even once this hurdle is cleared, the bureaucracy has to be contended with. Speaking of export growth is all well and good, but exports are simply one component of a strong international trade regime. If Sri Lanka does not have a foundation that supports and incentivises international trade, we are unlikely to witness export growth of this nature. Implementing some reforms mentioned in the Government’s manifesto, especially those on the lowering of tariffs, would be a strong first step.

A quick-fix solution?

While the NES has identified six focus areas for innovation and export diversification, it also places emphasis on easing regulations and improving Sri Lankan exporters’ ability to diversify, innovate, and comply with international standards. The Government would have to commit to creating a predictable and transparent environment for exporters, bringing down the costs of conducting business in Sri Lanka, improving the export competitiveness of domestic firms, and reforming some of our more archaic laws. Reform in the Customs Department is at the heart of this. There have been some preliminary steps in this direction, notably the launch of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), but there is much more to be done. Reforming the Customs Ordinance is vital; the NES states that a new Customs Act, which is in line with international standards for trade facilitation, has been drafted. However, it has not progressed beyond this stage.

These are not easy reforms to implement, and they are far from a quick-fix solution. They do, however, promise to create meaningful change that can translate into the export growth the Government is targeting.

Sri Lanka, left out of South Asia?

Apart from addressing these ground-level barriers to export growth, another avenue that can be explored is free trade agreements, and the Sri Lanka Export Development Board (SLEDB) has brought its attention here. Under the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (FTA), we have seen the country reaping the benefits of international trade. Sri Lanka’s exports to India have grown faster than India’s exports to Sri Lanka, and Sri Lanka has experienced diversification in the goods it exports to India, with a shift from agricultural products like cloves and areca nuts to boats and ships.

The case is the same when considering the impact GSP+ (Generalised Scheme of Preferences) has created on the economy. Trade agreements are far from a “quick fix”, with trade negotiations being notoriously drawn out, and a source of strong opposition in Sri Lanka. The last agreement we signed was the first one in a decade, and the Government should take care to ensure a lapse of that length does not repeat itself.

Even though South Asia has been replaced by East Asia and the Pacific as the fastest-growing region in the world, the potential in this region is significant and should be leveraged for our benefit. While the world watches on as Brexit takes place, the Asian region is heading in a more promising direction. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has 15 participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region and includes almost one-third of the world’s population and global domestic product. This is an ambitious target, but we should at the very least explore bilateral trade agreements with our neighbours, and give our export industries easier access to these markets.



Reducing govt. spending with 100,000 new jobs?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

From unannounced inspections of government offices to broader commitments to bring the public service to its former glory, the catchphrase for our new Government is efficiency. In the case of some policy measures, the Government has stood by their statements,and has taken steps to curtail the excesses and inefficiencies of the State. The most recent step towards achieving this was highlighted by a presidential circular which limited the allowances and official vehicles of chairpersons, while also directing state entities to reduce unnecessary expenditure, and create a 25% saving from their approved budgets. While it remains to be seen if these cuts in state expenditure will materialise, the sentiment can be applauded.

Efficiency in the public sector combined with a reduction of government spending plays a bigger role for the Government, and goes beyond the objective of providing quality services to the public. It is common knowledge that while we are now upper middle-income, the country has to face some challenging economic realities. There are significant debt repayments that have to be made, and the projected growth rate for the economy is not promising at 3.5%.

Recent tax cuts have raised concerns that the drop in government revenue will exacerbate the problem rather than improve it. Sri Lanka has been downgraded by two major credit rating agencies; Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch Ratings, both of which have stated the tax cuts and an expectation that fiscal consolidation will be left on the wayside as one of their rationales behind the downgrading.

Countering these claims, the Government has argued that the tax cuts will provide a much-needed stimulus to the economy, and will trigger economic growth. It also argues that the loss in revenue will be offset by a reduction in public expenditure as excesses of the State are curtailed and spending is prioritised. Efficiency is a key component in the Government’s argument that the country’s macroeconomic status will be a promising one in the coming years.

100,000 jobs we can’t afford

With parliamentary elections around the corner, the pressure to secure a majority is mounting, and the Government has announced that it will provide 100,000 jobs in the government sector – a surefire way to secure votes. This increase in government jobs is in contradiction to its aim to reduce government expenditure; these new entrants into the government service have been promised a salary of Rs. 35,000, creating an increase in government expenditure that we can ill afford. Salaries already constitute the second largest source of government expenditure, and this has long-term implications as pension commitments grow.

The provision of these jobs is part of the work carried out by the Multi-Purpose Development Task Force. The objective of this task force is to empower families that are eligible for Samurdhi benefits, but do not receive it. The programme will absorb unskilled individuals who have either low levels of formal education or no formal education at all. These individuals will be recruited to fill vacancies that do not require specific qualifications at schools, hospitals, and other state institutions. Candidates will also be absorbed into sectors of masonry, carpentry, agriculture, fisheries, and forest conservation, with training provided.

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Confusingly, the Government expects to reduce annual expenditure on agri-product imports by Rs. 2 billion through this employment scheme. Even if this increase in employment will boost agricultural productivity to a level in which the country saves on imports, this saving will not entirely offset the increase in expenditure on salaries.

Even though the objective of economic empowerment is commendable, there are once again questions that need to be raised. Targeting of families for Samurdhi benefits is notoriously poor, and there is no guarantee that the Government will be able to target individuals for this scheme any better. There are better and more effective ways to create meaningful economic empowerment – investing in vocational training programmes tailored to labour market gaps in the private sector would, for instance, be a workable alternative to handing out jobs.

Bloated government service and corruption

While this increase in government jobs is not in line with promises to continue fiscal consolidation, there are also more worrying consequences to this decision. The Government has promised to crackdown on the corruption that runs rampant in the government sector, but beyond that by increasing the size of the state sector, the Government is increasing opportunity for corruption. In instances where a country’s institutions are weak, self-interested individuals have greater opportunities to engage in rent-seeking behaviour.

Additionally, at this point in time, the Government should be focused on placing limits on the government service – greater numbers most rarely result in increased efficiency, and leaving efficiency aside, this is a step that the Treasury can ill afford.

Given that efficiency in the public sector and limited government expenditure are part of the Government’s plan to turn around the economy, as well as ensure economic stability if not growth, these hires are not only short-sighted, but are also economically damaging.



An island of potential?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)are constantly a part of policy discussions. They are described as the backbone of the economy, an important source of employment, and drivers of innovation and change. Successive governments have identified these enterprises as a focus for government help and have acted on this. We have seen a variety of loan schemes especially targeted at these enterprises under a variety of different names. More recently, we have witnessed the Government introducing a credit support scheme for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in an attempt to assist struggling businesses.

But what do we know about our micro and small enterprises?

When one thinks of a micro or small entrepreneur, what comes to mind is the grocery at the corner of your road the vadai cart at Galle Face or the small tailoring business you run to for a last-minute adjustment. While Sri Lanka’s “start-up” ecosystem is growing, and we are witnessing an increase in tech start-ups and other innovative microenterprises, this is a fairly accurate description of what Sri Lanka’s micro and small entrepreneurs look like.

In October 2019, as part of a larger research project, the Advocata Institute commissioned an islandwide survey of 1,500 micro and small entrepreneurs across the sectors of industry, services, and trade. The purpose of the study was to understand and identify the barriers that these enterprises face during the course of setting up and running their businesses. Apart from the focus on barriers and obstacles, the survey also looked into the motivations and expectations of these entrepreneurs to understand why they decided to strike out on their own and where they see their business in the future.

Why do Sri Lankans start their own businesses?

A majority of these entrepreneurs were motivated by a desire to run their own business and try out a new idea, a need to support their family, or a belief that they could make more money working for themselves than for someone else. When asked, 43% of women cited a need to support their family as a driving factor behind their decision, compared with 28% of men. Among men, a desire to run their own business was the most common reason provided, with 40% stating so. Only 12% of the respondents started their own business because they couldn’t find employment elsewhere and only 11% because they had no other means of survival.

While this paints a picture of people driven by a desire to strike out on their own and take risks, those in lower socioeconomic classes were more likely to start a business for reasons of survival – because they lost a previous job, couldn’t find work elsewhere, or simply needed to support their family.

Across the island, entrepreneurs were overwhelmingly positive about the future of their business, with 91% certain that they can make their business a success. Interestingly, when asked if offered a salaried position as an alternative, only 15% said they would close their business and take up the position, while 67% stated that they would not take up the position and the remaining 18% were uncertain. Given the opportunity, only 15% would leave Sri Lanka to work abroad, with 60% disagreeing with that statement. It is clear that our entrepreneurs have a rosier outlook on the business climate than most economic pundits, and have a determination to make their business a success.

What stands in their way?

Sri Lankan Entrepreneurs

When asked how their business has performed over the last two years, although their outlook was positive, 40% of entrepreneurs said performance has been alright, but could do better. 32% ranked their performance as either poor or very poor, while only 28% perceived their business performance to be good or very good.

The reasons they provided ranged from high competition, unsupportive government policies, and the Easter Sunday terror attacks to a lack of market access and business networks and an excess of regulations and restrictions. The question of what is holding our small and micro entrepreneurs back is one we tried to explore in greater depth through the survey. Sourcing finance, low sales, and difficulties in finding space were the most common problems cited.

How do we help these businesses?

Finance is often where governments intervene, with an aim to help or assist these enterprises. Under the credit support scheme introduced by the Government, performing and non-performing loans of up to Rs. 300 million are eligible for a capital moratorium, but interest payments will continue to be charged.

While this scheme provides relief for small and medium entrepreneurs, it does address the issue that these entities struggle to find access to finance. Focusing on how this problem could be eased, and how information could be better disseminated on options available, may be a better angle to take.


New year, same Sri Lanka?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

We entered 2019 on the back of a constitutional crisis, with the anticipation and uncertainty that accompanies any year which entails a presidential election. It is safe to say that a lot has happened in the year 2019. The country was devastated by the Easter Sunday bombings and had to slowly piece itself back together. The presidential election came and went and the country has a new President and Prime Minister. In a few short months, the general election will be held and the new Parliament will be voted in. It is a difficult year to take stock of and summarise, but looking forward, what can we expect for 2020? More importantly, what should we be expecting and how do we hold our Government to account?

Are we going to see an economic turnaround?

Will Sri Lanka play its cards right in 2020?

The country has witnessed quite a drastic turnaround with the introduction of a slew of tax cuts by the President within days of being appointed. The intention of these tax cuts is to ease tax burdens and provide a stimulus to the economy. However, the resulting drop in revenue has been estimated to be 2% of GDP. The Government has taken a few steps to counter this by raising excise duties and the Ports and Airports Development Levy. It has also committed to tightening government spending in the upcoming months, as it aims to maintain the budget deficit below 4%. Regardless, the Government appears quite ambitious in its goals for 2020, with economic growth targeted to double this year. The outlook presented by the Government is one that is fiercely positive.

Others are more sceptical. Sri Lanka’s sovereign credit rating has been downgraded to “negative” by Fitch Ratings, with the tax cuts cited as one reason for this drop. They also expect to see government debt increase in the medium term and argue that the tax increases will not be sufficient to counter the cuts that have been made. The increase in excise duty, for instance, will only cover 10% of the revenue lost by the VAT reduction. They do acknowledge that future policy steps could mitigate these concerns and while they expect the budget deficit to widen by 1.5% of GDP, they expect to see an increase in GDP growth by 3.5% in 2020 as well.

What does all of this mean to the individual?

Projections and policy statements are all well and good, but these numbers and percentages take time to translate into anything meaningful to an individual. The recent increase in the prices of vegetables has a greater impact to the voter than what is outlined in the paragraphs above. Sri Lanka’s graduation to upper middle-income status has not necessarily been felt by all Sri Lankans. According to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), the mean household income per month is Rs. 52,979. An individual’s mean income per month is Rs. 33,894. An increase in these numbers would be something meaningful. The opportunity to work in decent employment and see an increase in wages is probably what would improve the living standards in this country.

The Government has however tried a different tack with this problem. Following in the steps of innumerous governments before them, they have promised to increase hires into the government service. In a novel twist, the Government has promised to employ 100,000 individuals, selected from families that are recipients of the Samurdhi benefit. The rationale appears to be to give jobs to those most vulnerable. While this is a worthy sentiment, the implications of this policy should be seriously considered. Despite the change in Samurdhi allowance from Rs. 3,500 to a salary worth Rs. 35,000 for each individual, this policy measure further expands the state which already accounts for roughly 14% of the labour force in the country. Salary payments are a substantial component of government expenditure, only coming second to interest payments on our loans.

As the Government appears to embed itself deeper into our economy and takes on such significant policies, it is important to remember that the brunt of their oversight increases the burden on taxpayers. Although it may not feel like it, macroeconomics do shape our everyday lives and if the Government is unable to continue on a path of fiscal consolidation with careful expenditure management, the impact will be borne by us.

New Year’s resolutions

At this point, it is difficult to predict where the country is headed. Given that the parliamentary elections are around the corner, it is possible that some ambitious policies like the moratorium on small and medium enterprise loans and the increase in government hires are simply to garner public favour. Policy direction may change towards the middle of the year. Regardless, there are a few things to consider and a few facts that are unlikely to change: We have debt repayments to make, and unless the Government wishes to default, there should be careful fiscal management to ensure that we are able to meet these commitments. The country is in dire need of economic growth. We need to attract investment and kickstart the economy. Sri Lanka needs to plan beyond four years if we are to escape the dreaded economic boogeyman: The middle-income trap.

A big part of achieving this is holding the Government accountable. In present times more than ever, this is vital. Sri Lankans, like all people, are not fond of paying taxes – a fact reflected in our low rates of collection. We do however pay them, in various forms and in varying degrees. This money that we hand over to the Government is what partly funds policy decisions, giving us the right to demand accountability and transparency. As we close off an action-packed decade and open this new chapter, it is crucial that we stay committed to ensuring that we get the future we were promised, and the future we deserve.


What do we know about the MCC agreement?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Late last month, in a major breakthrough, Sri Lanka’s Cabinet of Ministers approved the implementation of the $ 480 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant and released the final draft of the grant agreement to the public for review.

The agreement has indeed been at the heart of heated debate and political scuffle in recent months, with the President refusing to approve the agreement before the end of his term, a fundamental rights (FR) petition against the signing of the agreement being filed in the Supreme Court, and even a protest fast being staged earlier in the week.

But with the agreement out in the public with continued avenues for negotiation, Cabinet appraisal, and the Attorney General’s (AG) stamp of approval, what does Sri Lanka have left to be concerned about?

Who is the MCC and what do they do?

The MCC was created by US Congress in 2004 and is an independent US foreign aid agency. Since its inception, the MCC has signed 37 compacts with 29 countries, with an expected benefit to approximately 175 million people. These countries have to meet stringent eligibility criteria in order to qualify for an MCC grant, as funding is dependent on governments demonstrating that they are committed to democracy, investing in their citizens, and economic freedom.

The MCC describes its selection process as “competitive”, with a clear selection process through which recipient countries are chosen. Using the World Bank’s classification of countries based on per capita income, candidate countries are selected. From here, country selection criteria and methodology are published, and performance on these indicators is assessed and published in a scorecard.

It is based on these country scorecards, the opportunity to reduce poverty and generate growth in a country, and the availability of funds that a final decision is taken.

Additionally, the MCC places emphasis on the work being country-led, meaning that the Government of Sri Lanka identifies its growth priorities and develops MCC proposals accordingly. Sri Lanka began negotiations with the MCC in 2004 and was selected by the organisation as eligible to develop a compact in 2016. Sri Lanka’s project proposals for the compact were submitted to the MCC Board in November 2017 and the Sri Lanka compact was approved by the MCC Board in April 2019.

However, the agreement has been on hold ever since. As the organisation traditionally only funds low and lower middle-income countries, Sri Lanka’s recent graduation to upper middle-income status has now put its eligibility for the MCC grant into jeopardy, unless the agreement is signed prior to 2020 as the country does not feature on the organisation’s 2020 scorecard.

What does the grant fund?

The main points of contention centre on the question: Where is the money going and what does this funding mean? According to the publicly available draft agreement, the MCC is providing this grant to address two of Sri Lanka’s “binding constraints” to economic growth: (a) inadequate transport logistics infrastructure and planning and (b) lack of access to land for agriculture, the services sector, and industrial investors.

These are constraints identified through a comprehensive constraints analysis conducted by the Government of Sri Lanka and the MCC, in partnership with Harvard University’s Centre for International Development.

To address these constraints, the MCC will be funding two main projects – the transport project focuses on improving traffic management, improving the road network along the Central Ring Road for better connectivity between the Western Province and peripheral provinces, and the modernisation of the public bus system.

The land project focuses on creating a parcel fabric map and inventory of state lands, digitising the deeds registry, facilitating the ongoing work to move Sri Lanka from a deed registration system to a title registration system, digitising key valuation information for properties in targeted districts, and establishing land policy councils to support the Government’s work on land policy and legislation.

The agreement states the projects are expected to benefit approximately 11 million individuals over a 20-year period – around half of Sri Lanka’s total population.

Why are people against the MCC agreement?

There have been two main arguments levelled against this agreement. The first is that the land project will mean that land owned by the Sri Lankan Government will be available for purchase to the American Government.

The second argument is that the MCC agreement is an attempt to undermine Sri Lanka’s national security. While both of these claims have been denied by MCC Resident Country Director Jenner Edelman, an air of suspicion still remains.

Indeed, Sri Lanka is commonly cited as a case study of debt-trap diplomacy in the region and there is merit to the argument that the Government should be vigilant in reviewing the terms and conditions of future development agreements.

However, upon review of the publicly available resources of information, the MCC grant does not involve the lease or transfer of ownership of any Sri Lankan land and does not require Sri Lanka to pay back any of the grant amount, as long as the agreement is not explicitly violated.

This is a standard safeguard that is characteristic of international aid agreements used to ensure that the grant money is used exclusively to achieve the goals of the compact and does not fall into the wrong hands.

Other concerns pertaining to the construction of a physical economic corridor, connections to SOFA and ACSA agreements, acquisition of Sri Lankan land by the US Government, undervalued land transactions, establishment of US colonies and/or army bases, construction of electric fences, and destruction of the local environment have also been confirmed as baseless upon review of the agreement.

The document clearly stipulates that the Sri Lankan Government has “principal responsibility for overseeing and managing the implementation” of the projects, and a signed legal opinion from the AG of Sri Lanka must be acquired before the agreement is entered into force.

Even after the agreement has been signed, Sri Lanka still has the option to modify the agreement, provided that these modifications do not exceed the allocated funding allowance or extend the grant term of five years.

The agreement will also not come into force until it has been submitted to and enacted by the Parliament of Sri Lanka, providing ample safeguards to ensure all relevant stakeholders are involved in the approval process. Concerns around the failure to submit the agreement to Parliament prior to its signing have been deemed unreasonable by Minister of Finance Mangala Samaraweera, who stated that Parliament cannot debate an unsigned document.

Signing the MCC Agreement

The argument of the Opposition that the agreement should be put on hold until after the election also presents serious risks of losing the grant altogether, due to Sri Lanka’s recent graduation into upper middle-income status.

While it is important for Sri Lanka to consider all of the implications associated with enforcing the MCC compact, it is equally important to consider the benefits that could be lost if the Government continues putting off approving the agreement any longer.

At no cost to Sri Lanka’s Treasury, the compact presents a rare opportunity for Sri Lanka to address some of its most prominent infrastructure issues and binding impediments to growth. With a current public debt-to-GDP ratio of 82.9%, the Treasury cannot afford to address these issues on its own, and grants like the MCC are only going to become harder to come by with Sri Lanka’s new income status. Regardless of which government comes into power over the next year, Sri Lanka should not let this opportunity slip away.


What good is a handbook that’s not followed?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are infamous for their losses. According to the 2018 Ministry of Finance Annual Report, the main 54 SOEs made a net loss last year, amounting to Rs. 26,070 million. With the Committee on Public Enterprises being opened up to the media, coverage of both losses and mismanagement of SOEs has flooded newspapers.

It is abundantly clear that the plethora of SOEs in the Government are unable to function without a constant stream of funds from the Treasury. In 2018, budgetary support for recurrent expenditure of the main 54 SOEs came to a total of Rs. 58,519 million.

The chart below lists the five state-owned enterprises which receive the greatest quantity of Treasury Guarantees, just one example of the money that flows out of the Treasury to sustain these entities. When it is Sri Lankan taxpayers’ money that keeps these entities above board, the question of the hour is why isn’t there better management?

What is the Government’s approach to governing SOEs?

Extensive work has been done on international and regional case studies of good governance for SOEs. Restructuring and partial privatisation of inefficient SOEs have been proposed, while some SOEs could be lined up for complete privatisation. While organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank have provided clear guidelines for governance and improved management of SOEs, so has the Sri Lankan Government.

The Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) is a well-known government mechanism established to hold SOEs to account. The committee is empowered to publish reports which evaluate selected SOEs – investigating hiring irregularities and issues in procurement, and auditing their finances. The reports are usually a hair-raising read, speaking of special employment grades created with high-wage allocations of money that simply cannot be accounted for, and situations that can only be described as odd – for instance, why was the Sri Lanka Ports Authority building a cricket stadium in Sooriyawewa?

Top 5 recipients of Treasury Guarantees

In 2018, the National Human Resources Development Council (NHRDC), with the Institute of Chartered Accountants (CA) launched a “Handbook on Good Governance for Chairmen and Directors of Public Enterprises”. This handbook was meant to act as a guide for Sri Lankan SOEs, placing emphasis on the fact that as SOEs run on the money and resources of the Sri Lankan people, and as such, it is important that there is proper management. The handbook is comprehensive – detailing the frequency of board meetings, responsibilities of key officials, and emphasising the need for regular financial reporting.

The handbook places responsibility for financial discipline in the public sector, including public enterprises, with the Minister of Finance, and the General Treasury is able to act on the Minister’s behalf. The duties of the boards of these SOEs are also detailed on, and ensuring proper accountability by maintaining records and books of accounts are one of the many responsibilities which fall on the board. The chief financial officers are responsible for accounting and budgetary control systems.

On the point of monitoring and evaluation, the handbook is clear. It calls for monthly reporting in the form of performance statements, operating statements, cash flow statements, liquidity position and borrowing, procurement of material value, statement on human resources, as well as a separate performance review if the entity is a commercial corporation or a government-owned company.

The reality: Turning a blind eye to good governance

While the COPE and the handbook on good governance are two mechanisms put in place by the Government to ensure good governance of SOEs, the reality of how our SOEs are run is vastly different. The Ministry of Finance has identified 54 “Strategic State-Owned Enterprises” – the profits and losses of these entities are monitored by the Ministry of Finance, and are published in its Annual Report. However, this is where any structured financial reporting from SOEs ends. In 2017, only 28 of the 54 strategic SOEs have submitted annual reports to the Ministry of Finance. Advocata’s report on the “State of State-Owned Enterprises: Systemic Misgovernance” identifies a total of 527 SOEs, including the plethora of subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries that exist. On the other hand, the Ministry of Finance Annual Report 2018 only mentions a total of 422 enterprises, and does not publish their financial statements. In this context of minimal oversight, there is no wonder that the losses incurred by these entities are this high.

The next step: Dissolution

A key recommendation that has been presented in response to the losses incurred by SOEs is privatisation, or at least partial privatisation. It could be implemented on a case-by-case basis, evaluating entities on both their performance and the type of service that is provided, which would be one way for the Government to stem the losses that pour out of the Treasury. While calls for privatisation have often elicited an unfavourable response, it is interesting that the handbook published jointly by the NHRDC and CA has a section on criteria for dissolution of SOEs. To quote from the handbook: “Dissolution of a public enterprise would arise under the following circumstances:

(a) When objectives for which the enterprise was created have been achieved and continuation is no longer required

(b) On the basis of policy directions of the Treasury/Government

(c) When the enterprise is faced with losses and liquidity problems or is not viable due to other reasons

(d) Merger or amalgamation with other enterprises.”

The question that remains is why is the Government continuing to run these enterprises, despite the losses that they incur? The losses, corruption, and clear practices of political patronage make it clear that by not taking action, the Government is actively choosing to mismanage the funds and resources of the people, for personal gain. It’s high time some of these recommendations, guidelines, and committee reports were actioned.


Where is the money behind our politicians from?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Thiloka Yapa and Aneetha Warusavitarana

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Election campaigns tend to be one of the driving forces behind corrupt practices even after candidates are elected.

Therefore, with a monumentally significant presidential election just over a month away, conversations around the issue of campaign finance and corruption in public office should be gathering steam.

Running a campaign in Sri Lanka is a costly affair; an aspiring candidate needs to connect with people on a grassroots level as well as a policy level. This exercise requires a great deal of manpower, posters, social media engagement, travel, and lots of “buth packets” – none of which come cheap. As a result, adequate campaign finance is a prerequisite for a successful election bid.

The problem lies in the issue of who is providing this finance and whether there are strings attached. If money is being funnelled into an election campaign on the understanding that once the candidate is in power, the financier will be afforded special privileges and benefits, this is when citizens need to be concerned.

Of course, campaign finance is not the root of all evil in the world of corruption. Regulating campaign financing would not address blatant theft within the government, nepotism, irregular procurement procedures, and the handing out of government jobs to political supporters. However, it is a step in the right direction and, interestingly, is something that Sri Lankan law has addressed in the past.

Regulating campaign finance

The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order in Council of 1946 specifies that a candidate would have to appoint an agent known as the “election agent”. This agent is responsible for the accounting and reporting of all expenses spent on elections, along with a declaration by the candidate. These financial reports have to be submitted within 31 days of the result of the election being published in the gazette. If it is not conveyed within the stipulated time period, the candidate would not be given the chance to sit or vote as a member in the House of Representatives, until such a conveyance is made.

However, this was repealed by the Parliamentary Elections Act No. 1 of 1981. Under this law, the sources of campaign financing would have to be tracked and reported. The fact that non-compliance would prohibit an individual from taking their seat in Parliament provides a strong and effective incentive for candidates to ensure that reporting is completed in the stipulated time period. While this law did not provide caps on spending during campaigns, making these declarations open to the public would provide another avenue through which elected officials could be held accountable.

However, this accountability mechanism is no longer in place. Under the Parliamentary Elections Act No. 1 of 1981, the entire section on reporting campaign finance was repealed, thus removing this avenue of accountability.

Bringing regulations back

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) has detailed the National Action Plan 2019-2023, aimed at tackling corruption in its various forms. The section on policy suggestions for proposed legislative amendments is all the more relevant in the context of elections. While the amendments proposed to the Bribery and Corruption Act aim to strengthen the powers of CIABOC and increase their ability to tackle corruption across the board, the proposals on campaign finance and asset declarations aim to curb opportunities for corruption in public office.

The proposed legislative framework for campaign finance puts in restrictions and accountability mechanisms on the finances of candidates. This ensures that when an individual comes into office, they do not bring with them the strings and influence of external parties, and are free to prioritise the needs and requirements of their electorate.

While the suggestions do include a cap on campaign financing, the amendments which prevent conflicts of interest and introduce accountability mechanisms may be more practical to enforce.

Restrictions on donations extend to donations made by government departments, companies registered under the Companies Act in which the government owns shares, donations from foreign governments, and organisations registered outside Sri Lanka. The proposed reform also includes a section on accounting and auditing of campaign finances, making this a prerequisite for an individual to come into power and acting as an accountability mechanism.

Beyond campaign financing

Through the proposed amendments to the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law, the checks on financing of elected officials continue once they enter office, expanding the scope of the law to encompass the President, private staff of elected officials, provincial council members, and members of local government authorities, to mention a few. The amendments specify that officials would have to submit asset declarations at the point of their initial appointment on a yearly basis while they hold office, at the point of retirement, and for two years post-retirement.

Additionally, asset declarations of the elected official’s spouse, dependent children, and other persons who live with the elected official or have similar ties are also required.

Tackling corruption is a mammoth task, but these reforms could form the backbone of a culture where citizens hold their representatives responsible and demand increased transparency and accountability.


Lotus Tower and the failure of governance

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The President’s announcement at the opening of the iconic Colombo Lotus Tower, stating that approximately Rs. 2 billion is missing, caused a great deal of consternation. From its inception, the Lotus Tower has been a point of debate, with critics of the tower arguing that it is essentially an expensive political vanity project, which should not have been a priority given the ever-growing debt burden that the country has to bear. However, leaving the politics aside, a better question is why is everyone talking about missing money after the project was completed?

What are the checks and balances on the Govt. and enterprises it runs?

Apart from the accountability that can be exerted by citizens, the Auditor General’s (AG) Department, Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), and Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) are three key entities that provide some measure of accountability to the Government, especially in cases where the Government is running an enterprise.

COPA focuses on the managerial efficiency and financial discipline of the Government, its ministries, departments, provincial councils, and local authorities by examining the sums voted by Parliament. On the other hand, COPE ensures financial discipline in public corporations and other semi-governmental bodies in which the Government has a financial stake. The accounts of these organisations are audited by the AG’s Department, and are often the backbone of COPE investigations. The AG’s reports provide an independent review of public sector institutions and reports to Parliament, with emphasis on both compliance with statutory and other regulatory requirements as well as an evaluation of the economy, and efficiency and effectiveness of Government operations.

It is clear that there is a fairly robust accountability mechanism in place, although there is still room for reform. The question that remains is was this mechanism in play during the construction of the Lotus Tower?

We need to start listening to the AG’s Department

As early as 2015, the AG’s Department had identified that there were irregularities in the construction of the Lotus Tower. The 2015 Annual Report of the AG highlighted three main points of concern. The first is that the construction contract was awarded to two Chinese companies whose business areas did not include the construction of multi-transmission towers or even large-scale construction. Secondly, even though the work should have been completed by 12 May 2015, the contract period was extended by two years to October 2017, without Cabinet approval. Finally, the borrowing and insurance cost of the project was grossly understated by Rs. 265 million and Rs. 682 million, respectively.

The 2017 Annual Report reiterated these concerns [5]. There was an additional delay of over 200 days as work was not completed even at 31 May 2018. With the tower being declared open only in September 2019, we are all aware that the delay was even greater. The demurrage of $ 10.43 million for this said delay had not been recovered at the point of publication of the Annual Report. Additionally, Cabinet approval had not been obtained to lease the Lotus Tower to a property management company or to construct a vehicle car park with an investment of Rs. 4 billion.

The Special Audit Report

In addition to the accounts included in their annual reports, the AG’s Department completed a special audit of Colombo Lotus Tower.

To give you a few of the key highlights; the issues brought up in the annual reports were expounded on in hair-raising detail, but there were also other major points of concern. For the sake of brevity, some of the key conclusions drawn in the Special Audit Report are listed below.

  • There was no feasibility study done for this project, and a project proposal was unavailable

  • The non-transferral of land from the Urban Development Authority and delays in construction has cost the Government an estimated Rs. 5.4 billion in revenue

  • A 200-day contractual limit on the recovery of liquidated damages from the contractor means that it is unlikely that costs incurred due to delays will ever be recovered

How do we action these reports?

It is clear that the accountability mechanisms in government are able to adequately assess and evaluate government spending in its various forms. The issue lies in that there does not seem to be any follow-up action. For instance, in 2016, COPE raised issue with the lack of an internal audit of the Lotus Tower, and a directive was given for the Chief Accounting Officer to present a report on this, which never materialised.

Opening COPE and COPA to the media brought with it greater public scrutiny and accountability. Increased publicity to the reports published by the AG’s Department could be a starting point. Should there be a stronger link between the AG, COPE, COPA, and entities which can hold the Government to account, possibly the Bribery Commission and the AG’s Office?

Lotus Tower

Economic freedom in free fall

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Sri Lanka’s sharp drop in 2019 index should worry us all

This year’s report on the Economic Freedom of the World is out, and Sri Lanka is ranked 104th out of 162 countries.

This index of economic freedom is compiled on a yearly basis by the Fraser Institute, measuring the degree to which the policies and institutions in a country facilitate and support economic freedom.

The report quantifies economic freedom by looking at five key components which uphold personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and compete, and the security of the person and private property. The five key components measured are the size of the government, legal systems and property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and levels of regulation.

Economic freedom, as measured in this index, is rooted in the concept of self-ownership, or whether individuals have the right to choose. In other words, the index can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which scarce resources are allocated by individual choices and free markets, as opposed to central government planning.

Does this index matter?

The value of this index lies in the impact economic freedom has on the lived experiences of people. Greater economic freedom has been linked to improved performance on indicators of human wellbeing, with freer countries reporting higher levels of income, happiness, and life expectancy. When looking at the dataset for the time period of 1995 to 2017, the report indicates that countries which rank highly on the Economic Freedom Index also rank highly on key indicators of human progress.

For instance, countries categorised as “most free” had an average per capita GDP of $ 36,770 in 2017, compared to $ 6,140 for those ranked as “least free”. Interestingly, the average income of the poorest 10% in the most economically free nations is two-thirds higher than the average per capita income in the least free nations. Countries that are highly ranked on economic freedom also have lower infant mortality and higher life expectancy. They also perform better on civil and political freedoms and enjoy greater gender equality.

These may appear to be rather sweeping statements – a concern echoed in the report. While the authors are hesitant to imply a direct causal relationship between economic freedom and these variables, they do acknowledge that it is possible that the factors that contribute to higher economic freedom also contribute to increased political and civil freedoms. Higher incomes could also result in greater investment in citizens, which is reflected in lower rates of infant mortality and higher life expectancy.

How has Sri Lanka performed?

Sri Lanka ranks 104th out of 162 countries for 2017 data. This is a drop from our previous position where we were ranked 90th in 2015. On the size of government, a component that focuses on lower levels of government spending, lower marginal tax rates, and limited state ownership of assets, we have barely improved with a rating of 7.63 (out of 10), compared to our rating of 7.62 in 2015. Given Sri Lanka’s expansive public sector and innumerous state-owned enterprises, perhaps this is to be expected. On legal systems, emphasis is placed on the protection of persons and their property and whether the rule of law, security of property rights, and an independent judiciary are present.

Here, Sri Lanka’s rating is a low 4.91, and looking at sub-indicators, we have performed poorly on impartiality of courts and legal enforcement of contracts.

On sound money, we fare comparatively better, with a rating of 7.58 and strong performance on sub-indicators of money growth and inflation. Unsurprisingly, our rating for freedom to trade internationally is 5.83, with low ratings on the sub-indicators for movement of capital and people, capital controls, and freedom of foreigners to visit. In comparison, we have a rather average rating on regulation, with 6.91 being a slight increase from 2015. While we perform well on most sub-indicators, hiring and firing regulations, administrative requirements, and bribes are low performers.

Looking forward

Sri Lanka’s drop in this index should be a cause for concern. Strong institutions form the foundation of meaningful economic growth; they are less vulnerable to political capture and ensure long-term protection of basic rights and freedoms. Presidential hopefuls have been quite vocal on the topic of economic growth and prosperity. However, if the kind of growth that is being envisioned is to become a reality, the country needs to shift trajectory. We need to put in place structural reform that will strengthen the independence of our judiciary, address the corruption that plagues our public sector, and rationalise the Government’s approach to economic policy.

Map of economic freedom

Officially ‘upper-middle income’ - Now what?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Sri Lanka is now an upper-middle-income country, with a per capita gross national income (GNI) that surpasses that of regional competitors like Indonesia and Vietnam. The threshold for eligibility as an upper-middle-income country is a per capita GNI of $ 3,996, and as at July 2019, Sri Lanka crossed that threshold with a per capita GNI of $ 4,060. While this appears to be a positive development, it should be taken in context. The eligibility criteria to be classed as an upper-middle-income country begin at $ 3,996 per capita GNI; however, all countries within the range of $ 3,996-$ 12,375 per capita GNI are categorised as upper-middle income. It’s glaringly obvious that we just about made the cut, and if we are to see the kind of growth and economic prosperity associated with upper-middle-income countries, we have a long way to go.

Middle-income trap

The fear is that the growth required to push our per capita GNI up by roughly another $ 8,000 will be elusive – the notorious “middle-income trap” could possibly impede upward mobility and economic prosperity. As a country leaves its demographic dividend, economic growth tends to slow. The growth that is seen in most developing countries is created by the shifting of labour from low-productive employment like agriculture to more productive sectors such as manufacturing. However, this is not a source of long-term growth. As labour flows into manufacturing, real wages will rise and productivity gains will reduce. As a result, a developing country will be unable to compete internationally with labour-intensive manufacturing. Low-productivity also means that competing with higher value-added goods will also be challenging.

The World Bank’s case study of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and the challenges they face have some parallels with the Sri Lankan situation. The World Bank highlights the damage caused to the economy by a social contract where the state is expected to provide jobs in government and hand out universal subsidies, in exchange for a lack of accountability. The result is that entrepreneurship and innovation are stifled, public service delivery is poor, and there is widespread mistrust of the government. In addition, considerable debt burdens are forcing governments to cut public spending, which has long been the main driver of growth in the region.

The situation in Sri Lanka is quite similar. While we are now an upper-middle-income country, the description of the public service in MENA regions is apt, and could very easily describe the government service in Sri Lanka. As each election cycle begins, the incumbent government doles out an additional few thousand jobs, while the opposition promises to give more jobs and better wages in the government sector if they are voted in. A rigid labour market, where innovation is not encouraged, and productivity is not rewarded is just one factor that is likely to hold us back.

Maneuvering the minefield

The general solution presented is that middle-income countries need to shift gears – policy decisions now need to be taken with the objective of moving into a high-income country classification. Focusing on innovation, a strong export base, and creating decent jobs are just a few policy solutions that are presented on the topic. While this is challenging, our newfound title is also an indicator of the potential in the country. With the right policies in place, there is a lot that can be achieved, and with presidential elections coming up, now is the ideal time to bring up this topic of policy reform.

While the middle-income trap is a pervasive problem in the region, there are success stories of countries that have “escaped” the trap. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has identified some common economic factors that these success-story countries have in common. The four key factors identified are as follows: (i) the country had a rapid transition from agriculture to industry, (ii) higher export shares, (iii) lower inflation, and (iv) decreases in inequality and dependency ratios. The ADB has also found that when looking at the drivers of growth for upper-middle-income countries, total factor productivity should not be underestimated – in other words, education, research and innovation, and structural reforms are vital.

Realising potential

Transforming the Sri Lankan economy will require a drastic shift in mentality. As a small island nation of only 21 million people, we need to open our borders for free movement of labour, technology, and investment. Sri Lankans require a shift in mindset, where the gains of free trade and integration into global value chains are not summarily dismissed. The risks of these actions are often over-exaggerated, or given sole focus, feeding into a larger protectionist mindset.

The positive is that Sri Lanka now has an idea of the challenges that lie ahead, and key policy reforms which would set the stage for the kind of economic growth that we aspire for. The hurdle lies in implementation. With presidential elections coming up, there is scope and policy room for new reforms to be brought in, and ideally, these reforms should be tailored to achieve the four success-story characteristics – a shift away from agriculture, a focus on exports, low inflation, and decreases in inequality and dependency ratios.

Why nationalisation signals ‘The End’ of the film industry

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Now that film distribution has been nationalised, Sri Lankan consumers may have to bid farewell to their beloved Marvel, DC, and Disney movies. All rights to film distribution are now vested solely with the government-owned National Film Corporation (NFC). The reality will be that consumers and cinema hall owners will suffer. While we consumers will now have to wait until the latest Marvel movie passes through this new bureaucracy to watch it, cinema hall owners will lose almost all decision-making power regarding which film they wish to screen, when they wish to screen, and for how long they wish to screen.

Looking at the “Methodology for Distribution and Screening of Films” of the NFC, the system for importing films is now as follows: “Registered importers should obtain the written approval of the Chairman of the Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘Chairman’), fulfilling all conditions as per the importation policy issued by the Corporation to be followed before (the) importation of films.”

Once the registered importer obtains the written approval of the Chairman of the NFC and imports the film, the film has to be handed over to the NFC. The NFC will then submit the film for approval to the Public Performance Board and if the Board issues the certificate, the NFC will distribute the film. In other words, written permission from the Government is required before a film is imported into the country, and once the film is imported, it is handed over entirely to the Government for approval until the point of screening.

It is no wonder there are fears that these businesses will not be able to remain profitable under such restrictions. Now that a second wave of nationalisation has hit film distribution in the country, it would be wise to take a step back and look at what happened the last time distribution was in the hands of the government.

Back to the 70s

In 1971, the then government stepped in and centralised all film distribution under the NFC. The result was the performance of the industry declining, as highlighted in the 1997 Senaka Bandaranayake committee report. To extract a few key points from the report, with the NFC having a complete monopoly over the distribution of films, the quality of films that were screened dropped. Even though cinema halls were empty – a reflection of movie quality – cinema halls had to continue screening. The drop in attendance and poor return on investment meant that there was a resultant deterioration in the quality of cinema halls and overall viewing experience. Inefficiencies in the NFC created a substantial distribution backlog of nearly 100 nationally produced films that were waiting to be screened. The report also notes that major foreign studios were not interested in working with a country where the government had a monopoly over film distribution, and as such, the NFC was unable to import high-quality films which would attract audiences and bring in revenue.

Prior to the nationalisation of distribution, the government was already a player in the industry – and when looking at the most basic mandate of the government, this should not be the case. Given that film distribution is a part of the entertainment industry, and is not an essential service, the role of the government is clearer – it should step out and limit its influence to that of a regulator. An argument that drives this second wave of nationalisation is that we need to promote locally produced films. While fostering local talent is not in itself a questionable objective, it will not be achieved through the nationalisation of film distribution. When the NFC last had sole distribution rights, it is difficult to say that there was a positive impact on the local film production industry. The backlog of locally produced films to be screened and empty cinema halls are not indicators of a thriving local production industry.

If the government is truly interested in local film production, then investment should be directed there – centralising the distribution of films removes competition, lowers standards, and does not create an environment where local film production will thrive.

Growth under private distribution

The takeaways from the report are clear – in the past, having the NFC as the sole distributor of films was detrimental to the industry. The growth that the industry has seen since then further exemplifies this point. When distribution was opened up in 2001 and four private film distribution circuits entered the market in addition to the NFC, there were approximately 137 screens running. Based on conversations with the industry, this number has now risen to over 200 under private film distribution. The increase in the number of screens is indicative of the investment that poured in once private distribution was allowed. Private investment will not pour into an ineffective business model – once private distribution was allowed, these circuits re-established good relationships with international production houses, and were able to import films that would draw audiences and generate revenue.

What are the consequences?

Film Infographic.png

Given that these conversations have been taking place since last year, it is unfortunate that the result was the nationalisation of distribution. The industry is likely to be hit hard. Nationalising film distribution means that cinema halls will be able to screen a movie only once it has navigated the minefield of regulations, corruption, and general confusion that is the government – in other words, long after the movie premieres internationally. They will then only be able to screen this movie on dates dictated by the NFC, and for a time period also dictated by the NFC. The issues that crippled the industry post 1971 are likely to resurface.

In a context where the cinema industry has to face competition from movie piracy and online streaming services, releasing movies as they premier internationally and re-inventing the experience of watching a movie in a cinema is vital. The chances are that local cinema businesses will suffer as a result of this decision.

As consumers, we will not be better off – no one wants to wait a few months, run the risk of seeing multiple spoilers online, and miss fandom conversations just for the experience of watching it at the cinema. If the movie were to premier at the same time it premiers internationally, there would be no question about it. It’s also important to reiterate that the country faced a growth in cinema halls once distribution opened up – private distribution led to a clear increase in investment and growth, and it is regrettable that we have taken a step backwards.

A rare window of opportunity for pension reform

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The inconvenient truth about pensions is that they are costly. Governments across the world struggle with striking a balance between the dual objectives of pension adequacy and financial sustainability. Looking at Sri Lanka’s government sector pension, it is glaringly obvious that the costs associated with this scheme are exorbitant. According to the 2018 Central Bank report, the Government has incurred Rs. 194.5 billion as pension payments. This was a little over 9% of recurrent expenditure for the year, for a group of around 623,000 pensioners. Let that sink in – 9% of recurrent expenditure for less than 3% of the population. In comparison, the Samurdhi allocation for 2018 is only 2% of recurrent expenditure, and goes to around 1.4 million households.

The costs associated with pensions will only grow, as has been highlighted by the Central Bank. The Census of Public and Semi Government Sector Employees shows that 77% of our government sector employees are between 30-55 years. This means that over the next 30 years, the Government will see an additional 800,000-odd individuals moving into retirement, and in a nutshell, this is a problem which will only snowball into something larger.

Quick fixes?

The government sector pension is non-contributory – the entire burden of payment is shouldered by the Government – and given our fiscal position, this is an area where reform should be seriously considered. Reforming pensions is tricky – it is a highly sensitive topic, and if executed badly, could mean that the Government still spends a similar amount on the same group of people, but through social transfers for the impoverished elderly as opposed to through a government-funded pension. There are however, some soft reforms which would be easy to implement, and which would have a positive impact on our pension system for both pensioners and the Government.

A quick fix would be to increase retirement ages…Sri Lanka’s demographics are such that we have a rapidly ageing population, with rising levels of life expectancy. In and of itself, this isn’t a bad thing, but it means the Government and policymakers need to think about how people will spend their old age. Future generations will be able to work for longer periods of time, and it is vital that this ability is reflected in our legal systems. Increasing retirement ages has been widely adopted across OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries which also have similar demographics to Sri Lanka. From the perspective of pension payments, this will slightly ease the burden placed on the system right now. To ensure that this reform doesn’t place undue shock on employees in older age brackets, who have planned to retire in the next few years, this is a reform that can typically be introduced to younger cohorts of employees.

It is impossible to introduce sustainable reform for the elderly without looking at reforms needed throughout an individual’s life cycle. Your quality of life as an aged person is determined by the life you led in your youth. Employment, health, disposable income, financial literacy, marriage status, and a myriad of other factors affect how an individual experiences their retirement.

Opportunity for greater reform

Right now, there exists a window of opportunity for the Government to holistically address old age security. This window exists for three reasons. The first is that all government employees hired after 1 January 2015 do not fall into the current non-contributory pension scheme. They are in a kind of no man’s land where they have been promised a pension, but the details of what this pension benefit will be like has not been made clear. It is not an enviable position to be in, but in making this adjustment, the Government has created a window for pension reform. As it is clear that these employees do not fall into the current non-contributory pension, the Government can bring in a new contributory pension scheme for the government system, where both the Government and the government sector employee contributes.

It will take decades to move out of the current commitment the Government has to those in the non-contributory scheme, but at least we can be certain that decades from now, the pressure that the non-contributory scheme exerts on the national budget will be reduced.

The second reason there is a window of opportunity is because the Government has promised to introduce a national pension scheme. The name implies that this would be a scheme that goes beyond the government sector, encompassing the private sector and the informal sector. As the private sector has coverage through EPF and ETF schemes, the widely uncovered informal sector will pose a challenge to those designing this pension scheme. However, the positive of this is that the Government has made a very public commitment to wide pension reform, under which reform of the government sector will be included.

The third reason for this window of opportunity is the recently discussed labour law reforms. Sri Lanka has a multitude of labour laws, and the reform proposed is to unify these laws under one common labour law. During this process, there will also be room for amendments to be made to the more archaic aspects of our labour laws – hopefully to ensure that our laws reflect a drastically different working experience than was there a hundred years ago. There is scope for reforms such as increasing the age of retirement and making flexible/part-time work more attractive – which would be a step towards attracting more women into the workforce. With female life expectancy, more women in work means more women with agency and greater financial stability in their old age.

What does all of this mean?

Labour reform and pension reform are inextricably linked to each other. The fact that discussions for reform in both labour law and pensions are ongoing is serendipitous – now the focus of work should be to ensure that reform has financial sustainability as well as adequacy at the forefront.

Will the sugar tax leave a bad taste in your mouth?

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Rising rates of obesity and incidence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) have long been a point of concern for the Sri Lankan health sector. As a country, we have made significant strides in addressing the challenge of communicable diseases, and now policymakers are shifting focus onto NCDs. The imposition of a tax on sweetened drinks in 2018 was a point of serious debate. It was both lauded as an admirable step in tackling the issue of NCDs, while simultaneously facing serious protest from the soft drink industry.

In 2018, the 51-day Government reduced this tax, and now the present Government stated that it will re-impose the tax, citing health concerns as the motivation behind it. While a final decision is yet to be taken on this, given that this is the same Government that imposed the tax, it seems likely that we will be seeing a tax increase.

Political packaging

Sugar tax

Imposing this tax is an easy way to gain some political mileage. The narrative presented is simple – obesity and non-communicable diseases are a serious health concern for the Sri Lankan population. Sugar consumption is a contributor to this problem and as a responsible Government, they need to take steps to discourage consumption – this will be done through a tax per gram of sugar in carbonated drinks. In essence, the tax is packaged as a health-positive policy measure. Indeed, at face value, the tax does present as such. However, there are a few questions which can be raised.

Is this tax fair?

There are two things in life that are certain – death and taxes. While it may be that we will have to continue paying taxes, these taxes should be sensible, effective, and should not be prohibitively burdensome. This idea has been espoused in basic principles of taxation to ensure the tax is effective and equitable. One of the principles the OECD expounds is that of neutrality: “Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of business activities.” Neutrality also means that the tax system will raise revenue while minimising discrimination in favour of or against an economic choice.

In the case of the sugar tax being imposed by the Sri Lankan Government, it is clear that the principle of neutrality is not adhered to. At a fundamental level, it is a “sin tax” or a “fat tax” – a tax being imposed to change the economic choices of the population – the aim of the tax is not to raise revenue, but to shift consumer behaviour away to more healthy options. Given that the sugar tax is applicable only to carbonated drinks, and excludes other sweetened drinks like fruit juice or milk packets, it is clear that the principle of neutrality has been ignored here.

Does unfair equal ineffective?

The principle of neutrality in taxation is all well and good, but does this affect people? The answer is yes. When the principle of neutrality is violated and a tax is imposed in a manner that is inequitable to business activities, it loses its effectiveness. The objective of this tax is to discourage the consumption of carbonated drinks with a high sugar content, to achieve a higher goal of good health. When the tax is imposed unfairly only on carbonated drinks, it means the consumers which simply substitute a carbonated drink with an alternative – and there is no guarantee that the alternative will be a sugar-free, healthy one. In fact, the likelihood is that people will switch to a different product with a similar calorie/sugar count – if a bottle of fruit juice is cheaper than a bottle of Sprite in the supermarket, you don’t want to pay more for the bottle of Sprite and you are likely to buy the juice instead. The health concerns will not end up being addressed because consumers will simply substitute one drink which is high in sugar with another drink that is also high in sugar.

Unfortunately, in the case of taxing food and beverages, the issue is that consumers can simply choose to continue to consume a similar level of sugar, just from a different source. Given that this tax only applies to one category of sweetened beverages, consumers can easily substitute it with another, cheaper beverage. There is also the question of whether sales of carbonated beverages drop; international evidence has mixed results. While the WHO (World Health Organisation) applauds these taxes, other studies question whether the tax affects sales of carbonated drinks to an extent that it would have an effect on overall health, or whether consumers are simply shifting preference to an alternative which is an equally sugary substitute.

The final word on this is that there is, at best, uncertainty about whether this tax creates a positive health externality; and at worst, consumers switch to unhealthy alternatives while businesses lose out on revenue.

Less spending, less corruption

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


Why should we have a limited government? – Part III

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The World Bank quite simply defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain”. Accordingly, public office can be abused when private agents actively offer or accept bribes, institute practices of patronage and nepotism, and engage in the theft of state assets or misuse public funds. In Sri Lanka, corruption has become institutionalised and can range from the traffic policeman who accepts a bribe to a high-ranking bureaucrat siphoning public money for personal expenses.

In 2018, Sri Lanka ranked 89th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. As a country, we score 38 out of 100, with 100 representing a clean, corruption-free country. The magnitude of this problem is clear.

What’s the big deal about corruption?

Bribery

Is corruption really bad? You can’t deny that when your garbage is piling up, it’s easier to bribe the garbage collectors to take your garbage than visit your municipal council and file a complaint. Sometimes, it can just be easier to pay a bribe to the traffic police than go to court and settle a traffic violation, or to pay a little extra and get your driving license renewed faster. These are all very mundane, commonplace occurrences that have become normalised to the point one does not think of it as “corruption”. It’s just a small payment to make your life a little easier – a small payment to ensure an application is processed smoothly. So, if corruption can make things simpler, what’s the issue?

While corruption on this scale can appear to be insignificant, in reality, it is one component of a much larger, systemic problem which has far-reaching consequences. Corruption in government is institutional, and given the outsized role the Sri Lankan Government plays in markets and business, the impact is far-reaching. The difficulty in holding government officials accountable and the considerable discretion they can wield creates an environment in which corruption can flourish.

The far-reaching impacts of corruption

Large corruption scandals often focus on the amount of money that has been misused, placing emphasis on face value loss that is created by corruption. However, the impact of one act of bribery or corruption goes far beyond the initial monetary loss. Corruption raises the transaction costs of conducting business and creates uncertainty in the market. In an environment where corruption flourishes, a business will not win a contract based on merit and skill alone. Procurement-related issues (read: corruption) associated with the Kerawalapitiya Power Plant meant that it took three years to award the tender. This lowers profitability within firms and creates an overall environment of uncertainty which discourages foreign investment. The result is that the positive spillover effects from investments, like increased competition and technology transfers, will not take place. Corruption also reduces the attractiveness of entrepreneurship, resulting in higher prices and lower quality. The problem does not end there. The culture of corruption is one of impunity and complete disregard for the rule of law. When this culture permeates the government, it affects the independence and credibility of the legislature and the judiciary – the very institutions which should be ensuring that the rule of law is upheld.

State-Owned Enterprises and corruption

Sri Lanka’s state-owned enterprises are a prime example of institutionalised corruption. In Advocata’s flagship report, the State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka – 2019, the problem of corruption is a key issue tackled. In this report, corruption is explained through the perverse incentives that exist in the Sri Lankan bureaucracy. In the case of state-owned enterprises, as the money invested in state-owned enterprises is not of the politicians, there are no incentives for politicians to work towards making these enterprises efficient or productive. However, given the deep-rooted culture of patronage that exists in Sri Lanka, there is a strong incentive for politicians to use state-owned enterprises for their own gain. The lack of oversight or accountability means politicians can hire almost indiscriminately, giving out jobs for political gain. The reports from the Committee on Public Enterprise (COPE) make this abundantly clear, highlighting the numerous instances where recruitment had taken place without the appropriate approval from the Department of Management Services.

This problem is exacerbated by weak systems of accountability and governance. While the COPE and the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) do play a role in the governance of state-owned enterprises, they have access to limited resources and equipment and are in need of specialised skills such as legal aid.

What is the solution?

If corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain, then in order to stop corruption, we should focus our attention on how and where this abuse happens. When the government moves outside its core mandate to protect life, liberty, and property, it grows in size and in scope, making the government difficult to monitor and hold accountable. Additionally, as a government grows in size, so does its spending. Changing a culture of corruption will take a great deal of political will and leadership, as well as buy-in from the bureaucracy. While accountability and transparency play an important role in countering corruption, the effects of this are seen in the long term. In the short term, focus should be on limiting the scope of the government and thereby drastically reducing government spending. A 10% cut of Rs. 3 million is significantly lower than a 10% cut of Rs. 300 million; reducing government spending is the fastest way to reduce corruption in quantitative terms. A reduction in government spending will also make transparency within the government easier to enforce, helping create a culture of accountability.

If we are to seriously tackle the problem of corruption in government, the role and scope of the government needs to be revisited and limited.

Decentralisation: Taking governance to the ground level

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In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning


Why should we have a limited government? – Part II

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

When speaking of a limited government, the first thing that comes to mind is the fact that governments tend to be so expansive. A plethora of ministries and an innumerable amount of departments and agencies spring to mind. However, it is important to keep in mind that when speaking of a limited government, the rationale goes far beyond arguing for fewer ministries and reducing the duplication of work and responsibilities within the government system. A limited government is one that is limited in scope – it identifies its key functions and expends all resources to achieve them. When speaking of the role of the government, its primary functions can be described as the protection of life, liberty, and property. When a government’s main role expands beyond this, there is a strong likelihood that the government will prove to be ineffective and even harmful.

How can a limited government run a country?

It’s all well and good to say that the role of the State should be limited to the protection of life, liberty, and property, but governments also provide a myriad of public goods. Doing all this requires resources, people, and departments. Given that this requires a significant amount of administration, how do you ensure the government does this effectively, while staying within its key mandate and with minimal corruption or abuse of power?

Can decentralisation be the answer?

Decentralisation

Why should Sri Lanka move away from a centralised system of governance and increase the levels of decentralisation in the country? While there are some very theoretical explanations for decentralisation (which are important in their own right), we will use a simpler approach. In a population of approximately 21 million diverse people with different interests, preferences, and disposable incomes, how do markets allocate resources efficiently? Any A/L economics student will reply with the brief answer of the “invisible hand”. In reality, of course, there is no puppet master moving fruits and vegetables from one place to another. Each individual business acts in their own self-interest, resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources. Prices signal to these businesses – and the profits or losses these businesses make guide decisions to produce or sell – and thus, without the convening of committees or the presentation of any findings, an entire country is provided with goods and services it requires. William Easterly sums up this phenomenon as such: “The wonder of markets is that they reconcile the choices of myriad individuals”.

Price signalling works well in allocating resources because at any given point of time, it is impossible for one bureaucrat, or even a host of committees of bureaucrats, to have all the information necessary to dictate the production and distribution of a single good in an economy, much less all goods in an economy. This is because information and knowledge are localised, time sensitive, and tacit. In other words, information and knowledge cannot be transferred effectively in their entirety or in time. The fall of the Soviet Union is a testament to this.

What do markets have to do with decentralisation?

The same principle applies. The decision-making in a market economy is never centralised. While decentralisation will, of course, function differently – the spontaneous order created by price signalling in markets will not be making administrative decisions – the principle that centralised decisions are not effective stands. The reason behind this is that the information problems, which plague centralised decision-making of economics, also plague centralised decision-making for administration and governance. As much as a bureaucrat will find it impossible to distribute exactly the number of potatoes required to each province of this country, it is equally difficult for a bureaucrat to be located in a central government and to take decisions on local infrastructure. Any decision taken at a central level will not be ideal. There will always be information and local contexts that a bureaucrat is not privy to, and as a result, the decision will not be as effective.

Decentralisation brings governance and administration down to the ground level – it means decisions are taken by local government authorities who are best placed to make that decision. They are aware of local contexts and have been elected into office by the people in the locality, which would mean they have an understanding of what is needed. Of course, where the rule of law is weak, decentralisation can mean that local government authorities succumb to crony capitalism, as a system it is not without its faults. However, when comparing central governance and decentralised governance, in the case of decentralisation, there is greater opportunity for electorates to hold their representatives accountable, make their demands heard, and push for the reform that they want. In other words, it puts more power with the people and makes elected individuals more accountable to their voters – an admirable objective not only in principle, but also because of its effectiveness.