Walking the talk on reforms: First step to Lankan recovery

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Often we all see the world the way we want to see it, and not as it is. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis is also seen by many people through their own perception of reality. 

In previous years, we believed that self-sufficiency, State-led industrialisation, State-centred economic planning, and more recently, Modern Monetary Theory, were the way forward for our economy. The current crisis has shown that none of that has really helped us; by contrast, it has exacerbated a poor situation to where we are today.  

Next comes the question of overcoming the crisis. This has to be analysed with context; the most significant piece of context is that we are facing the worst situation we’ve been in since independence in 1948 – and it is only getting worse. 

There are some suggestions to increase industrialisation, improve exports and the trade balance, and incentivise Foriegn Direct Investments (FDIs). However, it is of no use to have lofty goals of industrialisation when we can hardly provide an uninterrupted electricity supply. 

Foreign investors are planning to leave. Investors are by no means considering entering the country. Thus, potential solutions have to be evaluated based on this context. Simply having a wishlist of suggestions with minimal viability will add very little value at this juncture. We need rational solutions to solve the crisis immediately, rather than policies that can only be enacted in times of relative normalcy. 

The Government needs to bring its finances into a sustainable state. Revenue must increase and expenditure should be reduced. Reducing the losses of State enterprises is a way to reduce the deficit without touching social expenditure.

With that in mind, here are a few suggestions for reform:

1. Privatise SriLankan Airlines

At a time when people are struggling to feed their families and when our official usable reserves are less than $ 200 million, there are very few upsides to running a fully State-owned airline making losses equivalent to the value of our entire Samurdhi scheme, which, despite its flaws, is the main social safety net in Sri Lanka. Privatisation will provide strong signals that we are serious about reforms. 

For the last 15 years, we have not made any profits on SriLankan Airlines. We can disclose all finances and ask for interested companies to buy it outright with assets and liabilities. Having a higher liability than assets is the main problem in this instance. With the suspension of debt repayment of State enterprises, Treasury guarantees for the State are on hold at the moment. 

Even if we need to pay a certain amount to the buyer to take it off our hands and sell it off with staff, it is much better than keeping the enterprise in-house and incurring colossal losses repeatedly. The new buyer can be given the responsibility of staff restructuring. We can follow the playbook through which Air India was sold outright by the Modi Government. Our airline is unfortunately no longer an asset but a liability to our national coffers. 

However, it is not only the National Airline that makes losses. There are many institutes that add little value to the public, make massive losses, and are a very high burden on the Treasury. Some of these public enterprises are classified as ‘strategic’ and others as ‘non-strategic,’ but two things they have in common is that, more often than not, they make substantial losses and have very limited transparency. 

There were some discussions to revive Sri Lankan Airlines by appointing business leaders with a profit motive, converting it to a budget airline, and appointing committees to reform and restructure. We have run out of time to even attempt these options. Unfortunately, hard times require hard decisions and we do not have the time, money, or options to avoid them. 

With interest rates and Treasury bill interest rates reaching above 20%, running loss-making enterprises on borrowed money will make our local debt increasingly unstable the more we delay reforms. Most importantly, we don’t need to wait for pressure from creditors or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to kickstart reforms; we can begin them now.

2. Better utilisation of idle assets

Improving service efficiency and increasing revenue of railways through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have to be the way forward for better utilisation of idle assets. 

Sri Lanka Railways is categorised as a department of the Government, even though it is actually a State-Owned Enterprise. Sri Lanka Railways holds a considerable amount of State land which is used very unproductively. 

Fort Railway Station, Maradana Railway Station, and the surrounding land along the track between these two stations are prime examples. Major railway stations such as Kollupitiya, Wellawatte, and Bambalapitiya are all prime beachfront properties which are very poorly maintained and completely underutilised. Land prices in Colombo are extremely high. There are plenty of such examples under the Railways Department with zero or negative value addition to our economy. Sri Lanka Railways first has to be made a State-Owned Enterprise, and then the sector needs to be opened for private sector investment. 

In the past, some train compartments were operated by private players and it was a very successful and lucrative business model. If we eliminate the State railway monopoly and open up the time table, tracks, and properties to the private sector, we can cut down on our fuel consumption significantly, provide a convenient service to passengers, and even turn a loss-making liability into a revenue-generating asset.

Given the very high energy prices at present – which are only set to increase – many people need the option of efficient and robust public transit infrastructure. In any case, the majority of people in Sri Lanka cannot afford to purchase and operate personal vehicles, and trains have been the main source of transportation in areas where they are available.

It is also of paramount importance that the most vulnerable segments of the population benefit from a rehauled cash transfer system, which should cover the energy price component in public transport. Everyone, regardless of their socio-economic stratification, should be given a fair chance to compete in life. 

However, it should be emphasised that these two steps alone will not help overcome the crisis. However, it is a good start to get the wheels rolling on reforms. These reforms will provide an unambiguous signal to investors and the world that we are no longer a NATO (No Action, Talk Only) nation, but a nation that walks the talk.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

State-owned enterprises: A major crisis in the making

Originally appeared on Daily FT, The Island, Ada Derana Biz, Ground Views and The Morning

By Migara Rodrigo

Sri Lankan State-Owned Enterprises: A Major Crisis in the Making

Sri Lanka has a whopping 527 state-owned enterprises (1) (SOEs). The 55 SOEs classified as “strategically important” alone employ 10% of the public sector workforce (2) or about 1.9% of all workers. Such a large number of SOEs are not the norm globally(3); many other countries (such as India) have been reducing their stakes in SOEs and, in some cases (e.g. Air India), have been privatizing them entirely. SOEs - particularly many in Sri Lanka - tend to be grossly inefficient, loss-making, and a burden on the taxpayer. The time is ripe for major SOE reforms. 

What is an SOE?

An SOE is traditionally defined as a commercial entity that has majority ownership/control by a nation’s government – in Sri Lanka, this can include statutory bodies, regulatory agencies, promotional institutions, educational institutions, public and limited companies. While Sri Lankan SOEs have traditionally been incorporated by an Act of Parliament, in recent years these entities have also been incorporated under the Companies Act instead. 

Sri Lankan SOEs can be divided into three categories: 55 Strategic SOEs, 287 SOEs with commercial interests, and 185 SOEs with non-commercial interests. Unlike nations such as India which mandate internal audits of their SOE’s business activities and publish an annual overview with a balance sheet of each individual business, the majority of Sri Lankan SOEs do not reveal this pertinent information to the public; financial information is available for just 10.4% of SOEs. 

Fundamental problems with Sri Lankan SOEs

Contrary to what some believe, low quality of talent is not the most significant issue with SOEs; many employees are eminently qualified and capable. Unfortunately, these organisations fall victim to government mismanagement and corruption. In addition to excessive employment to fulfil their political ambitions, there have been allegations that some SOEs have been formed purely to facilitate corruption – for example, the Lanka Coal Company engaged in fraudulent deals to purchase coal causing a loss of over Rs. 4 billion (allegedly with the knowledge of the minister in charge)(4). 

SOE financials are late and few obtain ‘clean’ audit reports. Investigations have revealed repeated instances of fraud, mismanagement, corruption and negligence. Furthermore, the internal control, monitoring and governance frameworks seem inadequate to deal with these problems – of over 500 SOEs, regular information is only available for 55. Even obtaining a complete list of entities proved to be a challenge. Public access to information is limited – the Department of Public Enterprises has not released an annual report since 2018, and right-to-information requests often go unanswered.

Figure 1 Source: Ginting, Edimon et al, 2020, Reforms, Opportunities, and Challenges for State-Owned Enterprises, Asian Development Bank

Moreover, SOEs have few budget constraints and shareholder (public) accountability and therefore have limited incentive to control costs. Unlike with private sector enterprises, which have a need to make a profit, many SOEs (particularly in Sri Lanka) can simply borrow from other state organisations/banks or the government when they require additional funds, which undermines the threat of bankruptcy as a source of discipline(5). Some recently established SOEs have found a new way of bypassing budgets and oversight: by incorporating as companies rather than through an act of Parliament, they are excluded from Parliamentary accountability and allowed to rack up unsustainable debts and surpass budgets more easily. This has led to SOEs burning through taxpayer rupees: the cumulative losses of the 55 strategic SOEs from 2006-20 amounts to Rs. 1.2 trillion.

Finally, while some SOEs do manage to make a profit this is, more often than not, due to the advantage that these companies have in an uneven playing field. In addition to lax budgetary requirements and the ability to rack up unsustainable debts, these companies are supported by the government through direct subsidies and state-backed guarantees; by regulators through exemptions from antitrust policies and preferential treatment; and by the justice system through an ability to sidestep parliament. This has led to private sector organisations being crowded out of the industries that SOEs operate in. Instead of having private firms in the marketplace with efficient and high-quality services, the Sri Lankan taxpayer is beset with SOEs with total liabilities of 4-5% of GDP(6).

Potential reforms 

Given that the nation has reached an economic tipping point, with serious questions about debt sustainability and government solvency, it is clear that immediate action must be taken. Advocata proposes a short-term policy solution consisting of privatisation, restructuring and disinvestment, and listing on the Colombo Stock Exchange. None of these solutions are particularly radical in the global or local context. According to Lankan Angel Network Director Anarkali Moonesinghe, the two main policies of both Western and Eastern governments when reforming SOEs are to reduce subsidies and increase efficiency, forcing SOEs to compete more equitably with private enterprises.

Alternatively, full or partial privatisation is a possible solution: SLT-Mobitel’s service has markedly improved following its 1997 privatisation and the entrance of competitors such as Dialog Axiata, all held accountable by the broadly competent Telecommunications Regulatory Commission. Listing on the CSE would allow these firms to have broad-based direct ownership, while also improving the growth of the CSE and capital markets. Importantly, these firms would have to be ‘corporatised’ before listing, an opportunity to improve productivity and eliminate bloat. 

There are, unfortunately, firms that will essentially have to be given away due to their huge debts and poor reputations. A prime example of this is SriLankan Airlines, which has racked up Rs. 316 billion in losses (7) since control was taken from Emirates in 2008. While some will regard this as a blow to our national pride, Sri Lanka would not be alone in taking such a pragmatic step to improve government finances and customer experience; Air India, the Indian national carrier, is currently in the process of being sold to the Tata Group for the relatively small sum of INR 18,000 crore. This would also inspire confidence in Sri Lanka amongst foreign investors as it would show the country’s commitment to meeting its upcoming debt servicing obligations.

Furthermore, long-term solutions include strengthening governance/limiting corruption and influence, improving efficiency, enacting cost-reflective pricing, and finally unbundling key sectors. This applies particularly to firms like the Ceylon Electricity Board which, as a natural monopoly, cannot be broken up and privatised without losing efficiency. A 2006 study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency recommended breaking up CEB into three parts: “making the generation, transmission, and distribution divisions…independent” (8). Despite the 15 years and multiple nationwide blackouts that have occurred since, GoSL continues to drag their feet on the issue, as it is politically unpopular. 

Cost-reflective pricing (also prevented due to political unpopularity) is another essential reform. The existing system of having electricity tariffs priced below cost is a public subsidy whose cost will be borne by future generations. It is also inequitable, as the Government could provide low-cost services to those who need it by giving them direct cash transfers, instead of subsidising the wealthy who can afford to pay. A similar situation is evident with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which currently makes a loss of Rs. 23-38 per litre of fuel (9); again, a public subsidy to those who can often afford to pay the market price. Finally, greater accountability, by means of annual internal audits and the availability of SOEs’ financial information to the public, is also important to ensure these firms stick to the targets they are given.

A successful and thriving market, in most industries, will only occur with the presence of three crucial factors: competition, a good framework, and competent regulation. By reforming Sri Lanka’s SOEs to meet these criteria, we will ensure a good customer experience, a reduction in the government deficit, and general prosperity for all key stakeholders. 

References:

1 Ratnsabapathy, Ravi et al, 2019, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka, Advocata Institute

2 Dissanayake, Imesha, 2021, SOE Reforms; the Impetus for Post Pandemic Economic Revival, Ceylon Chamber of Commerce

3 Büge, Max et al, State-owned enterprises in the global economy: Reason for concern? Last modified: May 2nd, 2013 

4 ColomboPage.com, President to take action against removal of head of Lanka Coal Company, Last modified: January 21st, 2017, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_17A/Jan21_1484983651CH.php

5 Ratnsabapathy, et al, The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka

6 WorldBank.org, South Asia Must Reform Debt-Accumulating State-Owned Banks and Enterprises to Avert Next Financial Crisis, Last modified: June 29th, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/24/south-asia-must-reform-debt-accumulating-state-owned-banks-and-enterprises

7 PublicFinance.lk, Sri Lankan Airlines: Annual and Accumulated Loss to the Public, Last modified: 24th August 2021, https://publicfinance.lk/en/topics/Sri-Lankan-Airlines:-Annual-and-Accumulated-Loss-to-the-Public-1629789830

8 Saito, Yoshitaka et al, 2006, Master Plan Study on the Development of Power Generation and Transmission System in Sri Lanka, Japan International Cooperation Agency Economic Development Department

9 EconomyNext.com, Sri Lanka’s CPC says petrol, diesel losses rise as LIOC hikes prices, Last modified: 25th October 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lankas-cpc-says-petrol-diesel-losses-rise-as-lioc-hikes-prices-87276/#modal-one

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reform or Regress

Originally appeared on The Morning

By K D Vimanga

The Sri Lankan economy’s crossroads

The great South African Statesman Nelson Mandela once said: “It always seems impossible until it is done.” Well, in our case, the time to get things done is already here. If we keep calling the act of reforming our economy impossible, then this country for sure will continue on a very dangerous path. So the longer we postpone the possibility of reforms, the more painful the process is going to be. So, we all, both policy makers and citizens alike, need to realise that the only way we can get out of this crisis is by implementing immediate and hard reforms, which this column has over and over again expounded on. 

Implementing reforms remains impossible for the sole reason that there remains very little political will to do so. However, what history teaches us is that the only way for nations to emerge from a crisis is by implementing bold reforms, even if they are politically unpopular. Such bold policy decisions, taken for the greater good of the nation, have been instrumental in releasing millions out of poverty. The best example is the economic reforms in India, which commenced from the 1991 economic crisis. The bold decisions taken by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh were taken during compelling times. India was facing a similar situation, where the country was finding it hard to meet external debt obligations along with a serious balance of payment crisis. India was almost bankrupt as a result of the post-independence command and control-driven economy that brought the nation to the brink. However, amidst all odds, at the height of the crisis, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh opened its economy to be driven by market forces, while dismantling the license quota raj. This also involved the devaluation of the rupee at the height of the crisis. It were these hard reforms that laid the foundation of India emerging out from the depths of bankruptcy. As a result of these reforms from 1992 to 2005, foreign investment increased by 316.9%, and India’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from $266 billion in 1991 to $2.3 trillion in 2018 (1). 

Sri Lanka is facing a similar or far worse crisis. It is public knowledge that the economy has reached a boiling point, with the country’s reserves falling to $ 1.57 billion, while Sri Lanka has debt payment commitments of $ 4.5 billion (2) for 2022. Inflation has been rising to 9.9% (3). Advocata’s Bath Curry Indicator, which tracks the price of essential food items, records that since 2019, prices have increased by 44%. This means that an average family who spent Rs. 960 weekly on the BCI basket of food items in November 2019 now has to pay Rs. 1,390 for the same basket of goods just two years later. Continued printing of money, along with the implementation of policies without foresight – such as the overnight move to organic fertiliser – have all significantly added to this present rise in food prices. Therefore one cannot deny the existence of the crisis anymore. 

So what needs to be done? 

The answer is simply, implement a comprehensive programme of reforms now. For this week’s column, I would like to discuss the role of privatisation in the most immediate and short term. Implementing such a programme of privatisation which releases commercial activities carried out by the state can bring in significant cost savings for the Government while also bringing in short term liquidity. More importantly, such a programme can become a much needed productivity boost to the economy while opening up for private sector participation. Closing down non-viable state-owned entities is another key requirement of such a programme. 

The country is also currently in desperate need for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Finance Minister admitted in Parliament that Sri Lanka is not getting FDIs as fast as expected. Therefore privatisation can be the fastest route to capture foreign direct investment. FDIs jumped in the 1990s mainly due to their ambitious privatisation programme. Out of the total privatisation proceeds realised during 1989-2005, 59% was financed by foreign investors as illustrated by the Central Bank (4). Privatisation served as a significant channel for FDI entry. Privatisation-related FDI accounted for at least one-third of FDI in the 1990s. The largest 20 foreign investors in Sri Lanka all arrived in the 1990s and made significant contributions in telecommunications, power, ports, and other areas of services and manufacturing. However, to be effective, it is critical that privatisations are carried out through open and transparent processes.

One way to maintain this transparency is maintaining oversight. The Public Enterprises Reform Commission (PERC) was established under an Act of Parliament in 1996 to be solely responsible for ensuring that the privatisation process occurred in a transparent and structured manner. Although not entirely free of controversy, PERC increased transparency and public information about the privatisation process. The PERC was shut down, and it is now necessary to revive PERC and put in place measures to ensure transparent and competitive processes.

Successful privatisation, if done right, can reduce the drain of government resources, especially at a time when government expenditure and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises are a serious burden on the fast draining government coffers. A second benefit is the generation of new sources of government revenue through receipt of proceeds, at a time where the Government is in desperate need for government revenue. The improvement of infrastructure and delivery of public services by the involvement of private capital and expertise is another important benefit. Other merits of privatisation include the improvement of the efficiency of the economy by making it more responsive to market forces, the broadening of the base of ownership in the economy; and the enhancement of the capital markets. 

A programme of privatisation can be the center point of the reform programme. However, macro-economic stabilisation, which we have discussed over and over again, must be carried in tandem. What is crystal clear is that time to implement these is running out if we continue to be blindly critical of these painful reforms and be complacent of its merits. Unlike at any other point in time, policy makers also need to be ready to make bold reforms and this will be the ultimate test of the resilience of our economy. The tipping point has been reached, we have no choice but to get these reforms done. Bold policy making is the need of the hour!

References

• Dutta, M. K. and Sarma, Gopal Kumar, Foreign Direct Investment in India Since 1991: Trends, Challenges and Prospects (1 January 2008).

  Ministry of Finance Annual Report 2020

  https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/press/pr/press_20211130_inflation_in_november_2021_ccpi_e.pdf

  https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_docu-ments/publications/annual_report/archives/en/2007_17_Appendix.pdf

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Celebrating all the wrong things

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

There can be no independence without economic freedom

The lockdowns amidst the pandemic left all of us with ample time to explore new avenues in life. A friend of mine, excited to learn, enrolled himself in a bunch of online lessons with the motive of productively utilising this time. However, as time progressed, he got too lazy to keep up with the lessons and succumbed to the comforts of his home. He watched television, read novels, and baked way too many cupcakes. He did everything except follow through with his lessons, all the while feeling immensely guilty for failing to do so.

Every independence day, I can’t help but draw parallels between my friend and my motherland. We, Sri Lankans, are quick to celebrate independence with much excitement, just like my friend was to learn, but we fail to actually do the hard work to follow through with the initial commitment. We are quick to identify that learning is vital and even advocate for education. However, we lack initiative. Similarly, we proudly celebrate the British leaving us but have failed to do the work to achieve freedom in real terms.

As a result, over the years, Sri Lanka has only achieved certain elements of independence and democracy. Economic freedom remains an enigma up to date. Whether our fellow Sri Lankans have the ability to engage in business and trade with each other voluntarily has become a serious question. 80% of our land is owned by the Government. People have to wait in long lines and oil the palms of bureaucrats with discretionary powers to obtain a licence to cultivate a crop they think is best to earn a living.

Whether our fellow Sri Lankans can make economic decisions for the betterment of themselves and their children is a question which still remains unanswered. Yet, we opt to proudly celebrate “independence” with minimal comprehension of the true essence of freedom. I fail to see a big difference between my friend and this popular uninformed “patriotism”. 

Over the years, we have been excessively reactive rather than being proactive. Similar to my friend who celebrated the opportunity he had to learn but failed to follow through with it, we too continue to celebrate independence in its literal terms. To put things into perspective, let’s take a look at Sri Lanka’s economic incidents in the recent past.

We signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Singapore and went against our own terms and celebrated the “victory”. Since then, we have done very little to enhance Sri Lanka’s involvement in global trade. Instead, we continue to hamper the island’s economic growth and development through consistent import and export restrictions as highlighted by this column on numerous occasions.

We spent way too much time debating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact for more than two years and eventually celebrated not signing the agreement. The agreement could have helped Sri Lanka enhance her land use and improve transport and traffic. It is clear the issue was politicised. However, we could have informed the donors as to why we opted not to sign the agreement before they directed the funds elsewhere. Even without the MCC Compact, we have done very little to reform the island’s myriad transport, traffic, and land use issues.

Recently, we celebrated withdrawing from signing a Memorandum of Understanding  (MoU), foregoing much-needed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for the development of the East Container Terminal (ECT). The development here had already been delayed by more than five years. Do we have a plan for the ECT’s development? Have we thought of competitive bidding? Do we have a better cost structure to implement investments on strategic assets? Sadly, the answer is “no”, yet again. It is clear that we Sri Lankans celebrate poor policy measures as victories and fail to embark on proactive actions that cause real change.

What causes real change?

Instead of celebrating policy measures that stunt Sri Lanka’s growth, we have to work towards establishing economic freedom and initiate important but hard reforms. What we should celebrate, however, is the implementation and impact of progressive policies.

The Economic Freedom of the World Index by the Fraser Institute states that countries with high economic freedom are more likely to prosper. The quality of life in these countries is evidently much better than countries with low economic freedom. If we wish to be free and independent, we have to prioritise economic freedom.

Sri Lanka has to implement reforms that ensure people’s ability to do business with ease, voluntarily without any barriers. We have to strive towards attaining a small government. The legal system and property rights have to be strong. People should be able to resolve their court cases faster and with improved efficiency. Sri Lankans should be given the right of ownership to their land and property especially on what they wish to do and grow on these lands.

Sri Lanka’s monetary system has to be stronger. We should have sound money where people do not lose the value of money in hand, due to the use of a bad monetary policy. When the value of money depreciates (from inflation), it is the poor who lose their freedom to buy what they want. Vulnerable sections of Sri Lanka are definitely the most affected.  Inflation is the unkindest tax of all as the poor have no defence against it.

Our businesses should have the freedom to trade internationally and barriers to trade have to be removed. Sri Lankans should not pay about 80% on their tiny bathroom tiles or 300% for the vehicles they use as taxes. They should be given access to trade internationally without any barriers. A minimum and appropriate regulatory environment is fundamental if we Sri Lankans wish to enjoy real freedom. Currently, to register a sole proprietorship or a partnership, a library of documents have to be submitted to authorities. It takes weeks for these documents to process when it should be a matter of a few minutes. The Government should not hinder the growth and development of our own people and their businesses.

On last year’s Independence Day, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa stated that he wants to remove regulatory barriers at all levels. A few weeks ago, he appointed a committee to evaluate unnecessary regulation for businesses.

The Economic Freedom of the World Index compiled by the Fraser Institute is a good indication of whether a country is moving in the right direction in terms of economic freedom. I wish and pray that we celebrate actions and reforms taken to improve economic freedom instead of celebrating the wrong forms of independence. If we fail to initiate hard reform and establish economic freedom, we will continue to celebrate independence for the wrong reasons. Then Sri Lanka’s prospects would be the same as my friend who makes no progress.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Trade, deglobalization and the new mercantilism

Originally appeared on the Hinrich Foundation

By Prof. Razeen Sally

The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating shifts underway since the last global financial crisis (GFC). It ushers in a new era of deglobalisation and protectionism, indeed a new mercantilist world order.

Three global shifts will shape international trade. They will probably last beyond the immediate crisis to the “post-vaccine” future. The first is an accelerated shift from Market to State: more government interventions will further restrict markets. The second is to national unilateralism – governments acting on their own, often against each other – at the expense of global cooperation. The third is to more contested and unstable geopolitics, centred on US-China rivalry. Taken together, they herald a new mercantilism, whose main precedents are Europe and its colonial expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the period between the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century.

Mercantilism – the exercise of state power to control markets domestically and internationally – existed after 1945, but was constrained by the expansion of markets: it was relatively benign. But malign mercantilism governed the preceding decades, shattering domestic economies, shrinking individual freedom, destroying the world economy, and so poisoning international politics as to culminate in global war. Today’s emerging mercantilism is still far from that reality, but it risks heading in that direction.

Another set of historical precedents is also relevant. Increasingly, the US-China conflict today echoes that of the US and the Soviet Union in the “old” cold war. But China today, unlike the former Soviet Union, is an authoritarian (not totalitarian) power with a state-directed and partly globalised market economy (not a sealed-off command economy). China better resembles Germany and Japan as rising powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And US-China rivalry today better resembles that of the UK and Germany before the first world war: a contest between the established power, with a liberal-democratic political system and a free-market economy, and a rising power, with an authoritarian political system and a state-guided market economy.

Three eras of international trade preceded the present pandemic. The first – the quarter-century until the GFC – was an era of unprecedented liberalisation and globalisation. The second – the near-decade after the GFC – saw globalisation stall, though not reverse, and trade growth stagnate alongside “creeping” protectionism. The third, starting in early 2017, was triggered by President Trump, partly to retaliate against increasing Chinese protectionism. It centred on a US-China trade war but rippled out into copycatting protectionism by other countries. Protectionism went from creeping to galloping.

This pandemic has triggered the worst deglobalisation since 1945. International trade may shrink by up to a third, foreign direct investment by up to 40 per cent, and international remittances by 20 per cent, this year. The trade outlook is worse than it was during the GFC in two ways. Now economic contraction is synchronised around the world; during and after the GFC, fast growth in emerging markets, led by China, cushioned the fall in trade and enabled a recovery. Now services trade is suffering even more than goods trade; travel and tourism have collapsed. The GFC, in contrast, hit goods trade hard but services trade was more resilient, especially fast-growing travel and tourism. Now there are signs of a protectionist upsurge, starting with export bans on medical equipment, with new restrictions on foreign ownership in the pipeline.

What is the medium-term – post-vaccine – trade outlook?

First, protectionism is likely to increase as a spillover of domestic state – particularly industrial-policy – interventions that last beyond the present crisis. Crisis-induced subsidies will be difficult to reverse wholesale and will have trade-discriminating effects. New screening requirements might have a chilling effect on foreign investment. These and other interventions to protect domestic sectors and national champions have a home-production bias. The list of “strategic” sectors to protect on “national security” grounds against foreign competition will likely expand. There will probably be more restrictions on migration and the cross-border movement of workers.

Two precedents are relevant: the “new protectionism” of the 1970s and ‘80s, which partly resulted from bigger, more interventionist government in domestic markets; and, more perniciously, the expansion of government after the first world war, which empowered interest groups to lobby effectively for restricted imports, foreign investment and immigration.

Second, national unilateralism – this time “illiberal unilateralism” – will likely expand and make effective regional and global policy cooperation more difficult. It bodes ill for the WTO, APEC and the G20, also for regional organisations such as ASEAN, and will cramp the liberalising effects of stronger preferential trade agreements. This only increases the prospect of tit-for-tat retaliation, starting with the Big Three (the US, EU and China), and copycatting protectionism that will spread around the world.

Third, the reorientation of global value chains will accelerate. Western multinationals will relocate parts of their production from China to other countries on cost grounds, as they have been doing, but increasingly on political-risk and security grounds as well. There will be a combination of onshoring, near-shoring and regionalisation of value chains, which will vary widely by sector. But the overall effect will be to raise costs for producers and consumers.

Fourth, international trade will be hit harder by a more fractured and conflictual geopolitical environment, especially US-China rivalry, but not helped either by an inward-looking and divided EU. It will be squeezed between more unstable geopolitics and the recalibration of states and markets – more “state” and less “market” – domestically.

All the above points to a new mercantilist trade order that might be more malign than benign, echoing the “new protectionism” of the 1970s and early ‘80s, or, even more worryingly, the 1920s and ‘30s.

My ideal world is a classical-liberal one: limited government, free markets and free trade, underpinned by appropriate domestic and international rules. I would add political liberalism and legally protected individual freedoms. The post-1945 global order was some distance from this classical-liberal ideal, but it was liberal enough to deliver unprecedented freedom and prosperity. From this vantage point, the new mercantilist order, with emerging malign characteristics, is alarming – bad economics, politics and international relations; bad for individual freedoms and global prosperity. As a realist, however, I must take the world “as it is” rather than indulge in wishful thinking. To improve the world, principled liberalism must be combined with practical realism.

I believe the two biggest threats to global order are rising illiberal populism in the West, endangering the West’s adherence to its own liberal values, and the increasingly aggressive illiberalism of the Chinese party-state. Both have mercantilist features that spill over the border into protectionism and restricted globalisation. Both feed off each other in a global negative-sum game. Hence both must be resisted: naivety and complacency should apply to neither.

China under Xi Jinping, with its mix of authoritarianism, a state-directed market economy and external assertiveness, is becoming a classic mercantilist power, like Germany and Japan in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Its external power projection, especially in the last decade, looks quite different to that of the US in the Pax Americana. Of course, at times, here and there, the US threw its weight about unilaterally and arbitrarily. But the essence of US leadership was to provide public goods for a stable, open and prosperous world order. It did so by organising concerts of international and regional cooperation. In international trade, that took the form of the GATT, later the WTO, and the multilateral rules it administers.

China, in contrast, prioritises a combination of unilateral and bilateral action to expand and entrench its power. That subsumes the expansion of the PLA Navy in the East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean; and tight, asymmetric bilateral relations with smaller, weaker states in a twenty-first-century recreation of the ancient tributary system. The Belt and Road Initiative should be seen in this frame: a network of hub-and-spoke bilateral relationships in which China wields power over-dependent states. This is classic mercantilism. It privileges discretionary power, exercised unilaterally and bilaterally, over plurilateral and multilateral rules that constrain such power.

China – meaning the Chinese Communist party-state – presents a pressing challenge to the liberal world order. Dealing with this challenge will require some trade, technological and investment restrictions, and limited supply-chain decoupling. But that could easily descend into an all-round mercantilist and deglobalisation spiral. Hence China must be engaged at the same time, not least to preserve existing links that are mutually beneficial. Engagement and strategic decoupling need not be mutually exclusive. Still, this will prove an incredibly difficult, perhaps elusive, balancing act.

Liberal or semi-liberal small states and middle powers in Asia, the West and elsewhere have a crucial role to combat malign mercantilism. In Asia, this group includes Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. They need to keep their economies and societies open; demonstrate best policy and institutional practice (as they have done in this pandemic crisis); build coalitions of the willing on trade and other issues; strengthen alliances with the US and EU to nudge them to be more outward-looking and globally constructive, and finesse a mix of strategic decoupling and engagement on China. But doing all that in a global mercantilist environment will be an uphill struggle.

Prof. Razeen Sally is a visiting associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is also the author of "Return to Sri Lanka: Travels in a Paradoxical Island."

Sri Lanka's Rajapaksa restoration is complete. What comes next?

Originally appeared on Nikkei Asia

By Prof. Razeen Sally

Government may have to rely on new Chinese loans to avert a macroeconomic crisis

Sri Lanka's parliamentary election on August 5 delivered a thumping victory for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his older brother Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa's Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, or SLPP, party. Following Gotabaya Rajapaksa's decisive victory in the presidential election last November, what does the Rajapaksa family's unlimited rule portend for Sri Lanka and its external relations?

Illiberal democracy, a state-led economy, Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy -- Sinhala Buddhists are about 70% of the population, and a China-centric foreign policy were the hallmarks of Mahinda Rajapaksa's rule when he served as president until 2015. His surprise election defeat opened a window for liberal democracy, a more internationally open, private sector-led economy, reconciliation with ethno-religious minorities, and a more balanced foreign policy to reengage with the West and India.

But the coalition government that followed was a total disaster, crippled by no reform strategy, venomous internal warfare, corruption scandals and rank incompetence. The Rajapaksa restoration last November revived the core features of the previous Rajapaksa rule. But now Gotabaya Rajapaksa is in the driving seat, and Sri Lanka faces a COVID-19 plagued world.

With a handful of allies, the SLPP will have a two-thirds parliamentary majority, which will allow it to change the constitution at will. First will come the repeal of the Nineteenth Amendment, which limits presidential powers and strengthens parliament and the judiciary.

Optimists argue that Sri Lanka now has the political stability and decisive governance it lacked under the previous government. President Rajapaksa has centralized power in his small circle, crowded with retired senior military officers. Even more than his brother Mahinda, he favours Big Man rule, exercising untrammelled power, issuing orders and expecting them to be executed without dissent or delay. That has worked, so far, to limit the spread of COVID-19 in Sri Lanka. But will it work to tackle more complex and long-standing problems concerning the economy, interethnic relations, public administration and much else besides?

Countries become stable and prosperous by nurturing effective institutions and social trust over time, not with Big Man politics with its never-ending command-and-control, short-term, ad hoc fixes. That is something the Rajapaksas -- and all but a tiny minority of Sri Lankans -- don't seem to understand. Sri Lanka is now hurtling back to illiberal democracy. It may provide short-term political stability, but I doubt it will lead to better governance.

This Rajapaksa government, like the last one, espouses a collectivist economic ideology. Its first budget was full of tax cuts and expenditure entitlements, guaranteed to increase the fiscal deficit and public debt. The policy consists of diktats and constantly changing regulations on taxes, monetary expansion and import controls.

Sri Lanka was already in a debt trap when this government came to power. Total public debt is about 90% of gross domestic product, and total external debt, at over $50 billion, is about 60% of GDP. Then COVID-19 struck. The budget deficit may go up to 10% of GDP this year, and the economy may shrink by up to 5%. There is no fiscal space for tax cuts and extra public expenditure. The government desperately needs to negotiate debt moratoria, extra loans and possible debt restructuring with the International Monetary Fund and others. But, for now, it has no plan.

The Rajapaksas are unapologetic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. President Rajapaksa and the SLPP were elected with a huge majority of Sinhala votes but only a tiny percentage of ethnic-minority votes.

The Sinhala-Tamil cleavage is long-standing. The Easter Sunday blasts last year, perpetrated by Islamic radicals, opened a new cleavage between Sinhala Buddhists and Christians, on the one hand, and Muslims, on the other. The Rajapaksa Sinhala-Buddhist supremacist agenda is guaranteed to keep ethnic tensions on the boil. Muslims will be most at risk if that gets out of control.

President Rajapaksa has largely ignored the West, the IMF and other international organizations, but he is friendly with Narendra Modi, a fellow strongman and ethno-religious nationalist. China, however, remains "first friend." Money talks: Chinese state-backed investment is the only big game in town. There is a real possibility that Sri Lanka will rely on new Chinese loans to avert a macroeconomic crisis, especially if it does not come to a new agreement with the IMF.

Sri Lanka increasingly resembles a Chinese tributary state -- rather like a brief interlude in the fifteenth century, when Admiral Zheng He abducted a local king and took him to Beijing to pay obeisance to the emperor, after which an annual tribute was sent to China.

Sri Lanka is a bewitchingly beautiful country. Since ancient times, it has won the hearts of many a visitor. I would know since I grew up there -- I am half Sri Lankan, half British -- and have spent the past decade travelling all over the island to write a travel memoir.

But Sri Lanka is a little country with layer upon layer of complexity and paradox, and a dark side that has benighted its post-independence politics and institutions. As an adviser to the last government, I saw up close its shambolic disintegration. Understandably, Sri Lankans voted for the only realistic alternative: the Rajapaksas. The prospect of another decade of Rajapaksa hegemony does not fill me with optimism.

Prof. Razeen Sally is a visiting associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is also the author of "Return to Sri Lanka: Travels in a Paradoxical Island."