Price controls are not the way to bring down the price of chicken

By Pravena Yogendra

Originally appeared on Newswire, Lanka Business Online, the Morning and Daily News

Most HoReCa channels in Sri Lanka sell a packet of chicken rice and curry at a higher price than a comparative packet of fish rice and curry. The price of a portion of chicken rice and curry is ~30% more than that of a portion of fish rice and curry. This differential has remained over time, as this existed in the pre-crisis environment as well, albeit at low prices.

Is this because of a difference in production costs or due to undue policy intervention by the government?

Sri Lanka has a long history of implementing price controls dating back to the 1970s. In recent years, the government has implemented price controls on various essential goods, including food, fuel, and pharmaceuticals. While the resulting lower prices may have been popular among consumers, they have had significant unintended consequences on the economy.

Such price controls create distortions in the marketplace by interfering with the pricing mechanism, thereby preventing resources from being allocated efficiently. The government’s current effort to control the retail price of chicken is a case in point.

Chicken and eggs are the most affordable and culturally accepted meat source in Sri Lanka. The domestic poultry industry produces 240,000 MT of chicken per year, with current per capita consumption standing at 10.8 kg. 

The recent economic events, such as the forex shortage and the ban on chemical fertilizers, led to a series of events that artificially inflated chicken prices, making them expensive for regular consumption. As a result, the state felt the need to intervene by controlling the price of broiler chicken.  

However, these price controls have only been imposed on the organized/ formal market. Industry specialists classify the domestic chicken market into the formal/ organized market, which accounts for 60% of the market, and the informal/ wet market, accounting for the remaining 40%. Branded broiler chicken producers cater to the organized market, and small and medium-scale poultry farmers cater to the wet market.

The formal market comprises highly productive tax-paying private-sector poultry operators whose products are on par with international quality, health, and safety standards, presenting an excellent opportunity to expand into export markets. This is proven by the fact that these poultry operators supply to sectors that insist on high-quality standards, such as multinational hotels and restaurants operating domestically and abroad.

However, the pricing restrictions imposed on these more productive players have created a situation where the producers cannot pass on their increased production costs to consumers, resulting in them facing compressed profit margins. The short-term implication would be a lower placement of chicks, resulting in a contraction in production, leading to shortages in the market. The medium to long-term significance would be a decline in investments channeled into capacity expansion, which also reduces innovation and technological progress.  

 It is also important to note that since the wet market players form the larger part of the industry, they are the price setters; and the branded players must follow suit to maintain demand for their products. Wet market chicken prices are mainly determined by the price and availability of other protein substitutes. 

Taxation significantly impacts the retail price of chicken while the burden on fish is lower. Fish is VAT exempt. The major source of costs is labour and entrepreneurship with inputs such as fuel (kerosene) having low tax incidence. In comparison, chicken is subject to VAT, with most producers lying above the VAT threshold of LKR 80Mn. The major cost is the cost of feed which is subject to VAT. It is estimated that both direct and indirect taxes account for 19.6% of the retail price of chicken. The tax treatment between the two alternatives significantly impacts relative prices, disadvantaging chicken over fish. This non-equitable VAT treatment of the two substitutes is expected to be further exacerbated in January 2024 as VAT rates are set to increase by 3% to 18%. 

Although the state is focusing on controlling the final retail price of chicken, the real issue lies in inflated input costs. Poultry producer’s input costs have escalated due to the depreciation of the rupee, higher staff costs, and higher admin costs. However, manufacturers' main point of contention has been the feed cost.

Maize is the largest component of poultry feed, accounting for ~60% of weight and 45% of feed cost. Although nutritionists discovered that rice can be used as a 1 for 1 substitute for maize, its utilization for purposes other than human consumption remains highly regulated, resulting in minimal availability

Domestic maize prices are currently at abnormally high levels as maize production is still reeling from the after-effects of the fertilizer crisis.

Sri Lanka's annual maize requirement is ~500,000 MT, of which ~300,000 MT are produced domestically. Roughly ~210,000 MT are cultivated during the primary Maha season and another ~90,000 MT during the secondary Yala season. The yield on maize cultivation by smallholders is currently 1.5 tons per acre. However, industry experts believe that a yield of 2.5 tons per acre can be achieved if correct farming practices are deployed. A kg of maize currently retails at ~LKR 160. Pre-crisis, it used to retail at LKR 45.

Industry practitioners believe that several efforts can be undertaken to improve the productivity of domestic maize cultivation, thereby bringing costs down. A higher yield can be achieved if proper agricultural land is utilized. Currently, maize farming is conducted on encroached forest land. Due to red tape, the 17,000 hectares allocated by the Mahaweli scheme for agriculture remain largely unutilized.

Farmers can also yield more if maize fields are irrigated instead of rainfed. Experts also believe that the right farming practices are not undertaken as proper soil analysis and spraying are not performed.

Currently, maize can be imported from Pakistan at USD 250-260 per tonne, which works out to LKR 110 per kg, including a special commodity levy of LKR 25. The SCL is a contentious tax and was even highlighted in the recently issued IMF technical assistance report, citing corruption. 

The SCL is a seasonal, quantity tax imposed on certain essential commodities as a composite tax in lieu of other prevailing levies such as customs duty, VAT, EDB, CESS, Excise duty, PAL, and NBT. The SCL has come under fire as it is subjective and arbitrary, imposed at the discretion of the finance minister, creating uncertainty among industry stakeholders.

In the case of maize, seeds imported for the purpose of animal feed production have been subjected to SCL during lean production periods, to facilitate imports. When the SCL is not in effect, a general duty of 20%, CESS of 30%, VAT of 15%, and SSCL of 2.5% are imposed at the border. 

Therefore, not only does the SCL drive up the cost of chicken, but it also creates uncertainty due to the unpredictability and subjective nature of the tax

Maize continues to remain a controlled import that can only be imported by license holders. Licenses to import maize are issued by the import controller based on recommendations issued by the agricultural minister, who issues said recommendations based on his view of the industry’s maize requirement. 

Sri Lanka's organized players are second to none in the poultry breeding process- they have adopted international quality standards regarding feed conversion ratio, mortality rates, farm productivity, etc., putting them on par with foreign players. In addition to being highly efficient, the industry also contains sufficient productive capacity to be self-sufficient, thereby rendering the case for importation redundant.

The industry also maintains biosecurity standards and adheres to industry and farming best practice to ensure healthy, safe, and high-quality output that match the quality and certifications required by export markets. 

The government should step back from intervening in the market for both maize and broiler and allow the magic of the hidden hand to do the heavy lifting. Not only will this lead to more stable prices, but competition will drive further innovation and productivity improvements, leading to more production and lower prices.

Reforming Sri Lanka's Tax System: A Path to Fiscal Stability and Economic Growth

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Dr Roshan Perera, Thashikala Mendis, Janani Wanigaratne

This article provides an insight on the Personal Income Tax structure in Sri Lanka as the second part of a series discussing potential tax reforms

Raising government revenue is critical for Sri Lanka to recover from the current economic crisis and create a more sustainable economic environment. However, taxes should be paid by those who can bear the burden. 

Personal Income Taxes (PIT) is an effective instrument in generating revenue as well as in reducing inequality through revenue redistribution.  In Sri Lanka, there has been a steady decline in revenue from PIT from 0.9% of GDP in 2000 to 0.2% of GDP in 2022. Revenue collection is  lower than that of even other low income economies. Furthermore, PIT tax revenue as a percentage of direct tax revenue declined from 40% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2022, although GDP per capita increased from USD 869 in 2000 to USD 3,474 in 2022. 

Advanced economies raise approximately 9% of GDP from PIT, while emerging economies and low income economies raise only 3.1% and 2.1% of GDP, respectively. (1)  Sri Lanka reports the  lowest contribution of PIT as a percentage of GDP in 2021, both among  advanced economies in Asia such as South Korea, as well as developing economies such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and Vietnam (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: Performance of Personal Income Tax Collection among Selected Countries

Source : IMF Data Library, OECD

Narrow Tax Base

The narrow tax base is one of the main reasons for Sri Lanka’s low PIT revenue performance. A narrow base not only limits revenue generation but it also makes revenue collection reliant on a small segment of the population. 

The number of income tax payers under the  Pay As You Earn (PAYE)/Advanced Personal Income Tax (APIT) Scheme (2) as a percentage of the total employed population shows  a relatively small proportion of the workforce contributing to income taxes (see Table 1). In 2019,  the proportion of tax paying employees was 33%. This proportion declined to less than 1% in 2021 due to abolishing of PAYE taxes with effect from 1st January 2020.  A voluntary APIT System was introduced with effect from April 1, 2020, where employees can opt in. This shift not only led to a revenue decline but also created monitoring gaps. With effect from January 1, 2023, it was mandated for employers to deduct APIT from employees' income, reverting to the original PAYE scheme.

(2 ) Note: PAYE/APIT is where employers deduct income tax on employment income of employees at the time of payment of remuneration.  PAYE was replaced by APIT with effect from April 2020. This measure of replacing PAYE with APIT essentially made PAYE optional. However, with effect from January 2023, deduction of Withholding Tax (WHT), Advanced Income Tax (AIT)  and APIT has been made mandatory.

Table 1: Employee Contribution to PIT

Source: IRD Performance Reports, Labour Force Survey

The large informal sector also contributes to the narrow tax base and low PIT performance. According to the Labor Force Survey (3) 2022,  the informal sector accounts for around 58% of total employment (see Table 1).  A large portion of the economy operating  outside formal regulation enables tax evasion and avoidance. Transforming the current informal self-employment system to a modern formal employee-employment system would be one way to improve tax revenue collection. 

Two alternative recommendations are proposed to capture informal economic activities into the tax net.  Establishing a universal online payments system would reduce cash transactions in the economy enabling better monitoring; and secondly, by introducing a unique digital identification system that connects tax accounts with income sources, bank accounts, motor vehicle and land registration etc. Authorities could cross check information provided in income tax returns as well as identify individuals who do not file returns. 

Tax Free Threshold and Tax slabs/Brackets

In the recent amendment to the Inland Revenue Act (4),  the tax free threshold for income was reduced from Rs.3 million per annum to Rs.1.2 million per annum. Further, the tax brackets were reduced  from Rs.3 mn to Rs.0.5 million.  Accordingly, the incremental tax rate for each additional Rs. 0.5 million of income was set at 6% (see Table 2).

Table 2:  Tax Threshold and Tax Brackets

Source :Inland  Revenue (Amendment) Act, No. 4 of  2023

Applying the current tax free threshold, income taxes are applicable to  approximately the top 15% of households where around  36% of total  income is concentrated (see figure 2) (5).

(5) Note This is based on the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2019

Figure 2: Share of Income by Population 2019

Source : HIES Survey Annual Report 2019

According to the national poverty line (6) for  July 2023, the minimum monthly expenditure per person required to meet basic needs is Rs. 15,978. Hence, the total cost for a family of four is approximately Rs. 65,000 per month. Assuming salaries and wages remain unchanged at 2019 levels,  more than two-thirds of income is spent by households up to the 9th decile, (see Table 3).  Any additional financial burden including income taxes could further reduce the disposable income of households up to the 9th income decile. Hence, information on household income and expenditure patterns must be considered when setting income tax thresholds.

Table 3 :  Mean Household Expenditure as a % of Mean Household Income

Source : HIES Survey Annual Report 2019 (7)

Although the current tax system applies differential tax rates based on income brackets, an analysis of the effective tax rates paid within these brackets indicates a less than progressive tax system.  An individual crossing the tax free threshold of Rs.1.2 million per annum (equivalent to a monthly income of Rs. 100,000) pays an effectives tax rate of 1%, which gradually increases to 12% until the highest income bracket is reached at over Rs. 3.7 million (which is equivalent to a monthly income of Rs. 308,333). All the income levels above this income would be taxed at the highest nominal marginal rate of 36%.  However, after a particular income level the effective tax rate flattens (see Table 4). This implies that individuals in the highest income categories effectively pay less taxes. Expanding the income tax brackets would introduce more fairness and progressivity into the tax system.

Table 4 :  Effective Rate of Tax

Source :  Author’s Calculation

Figure 3: Personal Income Tax as a percentage of Annual Income

Source : Authors’ Calculation

The fairness of the tax system is further exacerbated as those whose main income sources are subject to capital gains are taxed at only 10% versus those whose income are subject to PIT who are taxed at a higher rate of 36%. 

As wages and salaries rise to keep up with inflation, individuals may find themselves earning more in nominal terms, but their purchasing power remains relatively unchanged.  Adjusting thresholds for inflation ensures that employees are not disproportionately burdened by bracket creep where taxpayers are pushed into higher brackets due to inflation. A proper rationale and scientific basis for determining thresholds, tax slabs, and tax rates is needed to increase revenue collection and ensure fairness in the tax system.Also, the proposed tax system should generate the estimated tax revenue by the end of the year.

Frequent ad hoc policy changes

Tax policy is frequently subjected to change, without proper economic rationale. For instance, the tax slabs for PIT have been revised 9 times while the tax free threshold was revised 5 times since 2000. Frequent and ad hoc policy changes complicate tax administration and reduce tax compliance.

Conclusion

The country has failed to meet  the first quarter targets for revenue under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility Program. Raising government revenue will be critical to remaining within the program. Improving revenue collection from income taxes will be critical to achieving the revenue targets, while broadening the tax base will ensure the burden of taxation falls on the broadest shoulders.

Part one of the OPED series on Reforming Sri Lanka's Tax System: A Path to Macroeconomic Stability and Sustainable Economic Growth can be found here

Prof Colombage: Tax Amnesty Bill: A quick fix for budget gap?

Originally appeared on The Daily FT

By Prof. Sirimevan Colombage

Tax amnesties have the potential to encourage corruption and money laundering. They could weaken law enforcement in such grey areas, as income tax officers are prohibited to investigate the perpetrators of white-collar crimes who benefit from tax amnesties

The Ministry of Finance gazetted the Tax Amnesty Bill on 12 July in order to provide relief to tax defaulters who are prepared to voluntarily disclose their undisclosed taxable income or assets, against liability from investigation, prosecution and penalties under specified laws.

This Bill is introduced in the backdrop of the Government’s annual revenue loss of over Rs. 500 billion caused by the haphazard tax cuts implemented in 2020. The resulting budget deficit is largely funded by borrowings from the Central Bank and commercial banks, falling in line with the dubious Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), as explained in my last week’s FT column.

Tax Amnesty Bill

The new Tax Amnesty Bill provides a wide range of reliefs to tax evaders who had failed to disclose any taxable income or assets before March 2020. 

These reliefs include writing off penalties and interest, and permitting to invest the undisclosed taxable assets in financial instruments such as shares of a resident company, Treasury bills and bonds, debt securities issued by a company or to buy movable or immovable property in Sri Lanka. This facility will be effective after the commencement of the Act until 31 December 2021. The voluntary disclosures are subject to 1% nominal tax. 

Under the Bill, the Commissioner-General of Inland Revenue and other officers in the Department are bound to preserve absolute secrecy of the declarant’s identity and the content of the declaration. 

Benefits of tax amnesties debatable

Tax amnesties are used in developed and developing countries around the world to raise revenue collection and to improve tax compliance. In Sri Lanka, several tax amnesty laws were implemented beginning from 1964. 

While tax amnesties might serve as a quick fix to raise tax revenue during a fiscal crisis, their effectiveness in generating higher revenues in the medium and long term is found to be doubtful, as evident from the past experiences of tax amnesties operated in Sri Lanka and other countries. 

Tax amnesties have the potential to encourage corruption and money laundering. They could weaken law enforcement in such grey areas, as income tax officers are prohibited to investigate the perpetrators of white-collar crimes who benefit from tax amnesties. 

Investment attracted through a tax amnesty might leak out from the country once the tax evaders who made such investments decide to leave the financial market after cleaning their black money. Such tendencies would have adverse effects on the country’s money and capital markets.

 Types of tax amnesties

The word amnesty is originated from the Greek word ‘amnestia’. A tax amnesty can be defined as a package of concessions offered by a government to a specified group of taxpayers to exempt them from tax liability (including penalties and interest) relating to a previous period, and to relieve them from legal prosecution. Thus, tax amnesties usually involve both financial and legal concessions. 

Tax amnesties can be designed to cover all taxpayers, broad categories of tax payers (e.g. small taxpayers) or certain tax types (e.g. corporate income tax, personal income tax).

Objectives of tax amnesties

The fiscal authorities implementing a tax amnesty usually view it as an efficient tool to raise government tax revenue in both short and medium terms. In the short-term, amnesties can generate additional revenue from tax evaders. Such extra income in the short-term is most welcome during periods when a government faces a severe budget crisis due to revenue shortfalls and expenditure overruns, as in the case of the fiscal pressures faced by the Sri Lankan Government at present. 

In the medium term, a successful tax amnesty is expected to widen the tax base by bringing tax evaders into the tax net, and thereby to improve tax compliance.

Some tax amnesty measures have a wider scope than immediate revenue and tax compliance motives, aimed at broader objectives such as improving capital inflows and domestic investment. The new Tax Amnesty Bill falls into this category, as it provides facilities for tax invaders to invest in financial instruments, in addition to tax reliefs. 

 Tax amnesty inadequate to recover revenue losses 

Following the victory of the Presidential election in November 2019, the newly formed Government took steps to revise the Inland Revenue Act so as to provide a wide range of concessions to taxpayers, without considering their adverse consequences on fiscal and monetary stability. 

Accordingly, tax concessions were offered with respect to personal income tax rates, tax-free thresholds and tax slabs. Also, Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) tax on employment receipts, withholding Tax and Economic Service Charge were removed. Downward revisions were made to the Value Added Tax and Nation Building Tax to stimulate business activities.

As a result of those tax cuts, the total tax revenue fell by Rs. 518 billion from Rs. 1,735 billion in 2019 to Rs. 1,217 billion in 2020. This amounted to a loss of almost one third of the total tax revenue. It resulted in an expansion of the budget deficit by Rs. 229 billion from Rs. 1,439 billion in 2019 to Rs. 1,668 billion in 2020. Thus, the budget deficit rose from 9.6% of GDP in 2019 to 11.1% in 2020.

Income tax revenue alone fell by a whopping Rs. 160 billion from Rs. 428 billion in 2019 to Rs. 268 billion in 2020 due to the tax cuts. Such revenue loss cannot be recovered by the proposed tax amnesty. Even optimistically assuming a 10% increase in income tax revenue following this tax amnesty, the additional revenue generated would be only Rs. 43 billion, which is hardly sufficient to compensate for the policy-driven revenue loss.  

Tax amnesty discriminates against honest taxpayers

The short-term revenue mobilisation, which is often considered as the main benefit of tax amnesties, may be offset by various other factors. In particular, taxpayer compliance may decline after the amnesty due to the loss of credibility of the tax administration. The reason is that tax amnesty could be viewed as a weakness of tax administration. The regular taxpayers might see tax amnesty as a penalty for them and a reward for tax defaulters. 

Hence, an amnesty may create disincentive in the form of moral hazard among law abiding tax payers not to pay taxes. If people expect further rounds of tax amnesties in the future, then they will feel tax evasion would be profitable. As a result, the number of tax evaders will rise causing deterioration of tax compliance. 

Repeated tax amnesties would result in revenue losses due to reduced compliance. This might lead to a vicious circle which would necessitate more and more generous and frequent tax amnesties to widen the tax net.

 Costs of tax amnesty offset benefits

The direct cost of administering the amnesty, which includes administrative resources and advertising, might offset the additional revenue collected through the amnesty. Also, the foregone tax revenue on account of waived penalties and interest levies might be quite high. Hence, the net benefit of tax amnesty would be marginal, if not negative. 

 Policy alternatives

Notwithstanding the benefits of tax amnesties, there are various other alternative policy strategies that can be used to enhance revenue mobilisation in both the short and medium terms. In contrast to tax amnesties, such alternative strategies are geared to deal with the root cause of the fiscal gap, namely weak tax compliance. 

In general, low tax compliance is due to (a) weak tax administration, (2) weak legal system or enforcement of the law, and (c) poor tax policy characterised by complexities, regressive taxes and high taxes. 

Abandoned tax reforms under EFF

The above-mentioned weaknesses have been prevalent in the tax system of Sri Lanka for many decades. An attempt was made to overcome such weaknesses through the tax reforms that were to be implemented under the now abandoned Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the period, 2016-2019. 

Accordingly, administrative improvements were initiated in the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) and Customs Department. The new Inland Revenue Act was launched in 2018, and IRD continued its outreach strategy to ensure that the new tax rules and incentives are clearly understood by taxpayers. 

Specific improvements in electronic database and surveillance systems were introduced to enhance income tax and Value Added Tax (VAT) revenue mobilisation. Steps were also to be taken to enhance capacity building in IRD including training programmes for the staff.  Most of such tax reforms were abandoned due to the suspension of the EFF prematurely in 2019.

Low tax compliance could be better addressed by such far-reaching improvements in tax administration, rather than favouring corrupt tax defaulters vis-à-vis law-abiding taxpayers through tax amnesties. It is widely recognised that tax amnesties could induce corruption and money laundering. 

Therefore, tax reforms that go beyond tax amnesties are essential to overcome the structural weaknesses of Sri Lanka’s tax policy and administration.

(Prof. Sirimevan Colombage is Emeritus Professor in Economics at the Open University of Sri Lanka and Senior Visiting Fellow of the Advocata Institute. He is a former Director of Statistics of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, and reachable through sscol@ou.ac.lk)

Daniel Alphonsus : A Crises Manifesto: Exorcising Hunger, Unemployment and Debt

Originally appeared on Echelon

By Daniel Alphonsus

An unprecedented crisis can only be met with comprehensive and deep reform. Bandages and tinctures will not do.

There are crises and there are crises. But the truly momentous calamities, those that set the stage for the decades that follow are few and far between. Surveying 20th century Sri Lankan history, two such events stand out – the Great Depression and the rice-queues of the 1970s. Those traumatic experiences dictated economy policy for the decades that followed. In the case of the Great Depression, rapid reductions in commodity prices, combined with a global credit crunch, ravaged Sri Lanka’s undiversified plantation economy. A consensus emerged for reducing Sri Lanka’s dependence on international markets.

The Ceylon Banking Commission report of 1934, in many ways the premier pre-independence analysis of Sri Lanka’s economy, observed, “Never before was the vulnerability of the economic structure of Ceylon more forcibly revealed than during this period. The three major products, namely, tea, rubber, and coconut, which between them account for over 90% of the wealth of the country, suffered seriously during the depression. The creed of economic self-sufficiency which became an article of faith in the economic policies of other countries spread to Ceylon as well.” Inspired by war-time planning and the Soviet command economy’s success in industrializing Russia, there was also widespread agreement that in the newly independent third world, governments, not firms, would be the motor of this historic transformation from global dependence to national independence.

Exhilaration soon gave way to enervation. The failure of import-substitution and appalling government record of running enterprises – including the critical plantation sector – paved the way for the open market reforms of 1977. The desperation was palpable. On election platforms, Sirima Bandaranaike accused J.R. Jayawardene of being in bed with the Americans, thinking that would dissuade voters from supporting him. But the ploy boomeranged. Voters, who just two or three decades ago were Asia’s second richest but now had to wait in queues for rice, voted with their stomachs. Their reasoning was simple, if J.R. is in bed with the Americans, then he will be able to secure relief from them.

Despite a quarter-century of the open market model coming to a sudden and unexpected halt in 2004, economically speaking, we are still the children of the 1977 revolution. This year may mark the twilight of that epoch, or at the very least a new chapter.

For Sri Lanka is facing an unprecedented economic crisis. It is a crisis of four tempests, whose sum is a raging storm that threatens to engulf the entire island in its dark thunderous deluge. They are:

1. Coronavirus: the global and domestic combined supply and demand shocks caused by the Coronavirus.

2. Original Sin: borrowing liberally from international capital markets in foreign currency, at high-interest rates and with low maturities for low-productivity construction and import consumption.

3. Negative Growth Shocks: the economic slowdown caused by floods, droughts, the constitutional coup and Easter Bombings.

4. Stalled Reform: with the exception of the new Inland Revenue Act, the failure to carry through any serious structural reform since 2004 has seen real growth fall.

As a result, we may be on the verge of Sri Lanka’s first sovereign default since Independence. Prior to the pandemic, though the trajectory was grim, there was still hope of avoiding that catastrophe. That hope is now waning fast. The origins of this crisis lie in the early years of this millennium. In 2004, the quarter-century long bipartisan consensus for reform stalled. In many cases – such as tariffs and privatizations – reform reversed. Due to time-lags the reforms of the late 90s and early 2000s continued to bear fruit for some years. But by the turn of the millennium, high-interest dollar debt increasingly became growth’s chief hand-maiden.

Post-2007 commercial borrowings from international capital markets rose rapidly from almost zero. This fueled a construction and consumption boom soon after the war’s end in 2009. Project loans were spent on empty airports and useless towers. Sovereign Bonds were issued to bridge the government’s ballooning budget deficit; caused by an unprecedently massive and swift expansion of the public sector.

Over the last few years, supported by an IMF programme, the government worked hard to reduce Sri Lanka’s debt-burden and dependence on international capital markets. Sri Lanka ran a non-trivial primary surplus for the first time in 2017, repeating that success in 2018 and upto November 2019 despite the coup and the Easter Bombing. But this alone was not enough.

In reality, the value of public debt rarely declines. What matters is reducing public debt relative to the size of public repayment capacity. In its simplest form, it’s about reducing the value of this equation:

This can be done in two ways. Reducing the value of the numerator, “Public Debt”. Or by increasing the value of the denominator, “Annual GDP”. In the last few years, Sri Lanka adopted a ‘fiscal consolidation’ approach which rightly attacked the numerator. But coalition dynamics and time-lags thwarted progress on the denominator, growth, which is more important. The new government reversed course significantly loosening fiscal policy. It implemented a sweeping range of tax cuts which drastically reduced government revenue. In the language of our equation, these tax-cuts increased the numerator. The wager – to describe the strategy charitably – was that rising public debt would be off-set by an even faster surge in GDP growth, thus reducing the relative value of public debt. That plan has clearly failed. Today, public debt is touching 95% of GDP. The true value, when one calculates all liabilities such as Treasury guarantees for invoices, is likely much higher.

As a result, markets seem to think Sri Lanka is at risk of defaulting for the first time in its history. Bond yields are in the double digits. Among emerging markets, only Argentina, Zambia and Lebanon have higher risk premiums on their debt. A default will be a further blow to an economy that has been ravaged by floods, coups, the Easter Bombings and COVID. The country will be shut off from international capital markets. It will not be able to finance the budget deficit. Inflation unless government spending is cut. Taken together, they could well lead us into an Argentine, Lebanese or Greek-style vicious cycle of default and political instability. An unprecedented crisis can only be met with comprehensive and deep reform. Bandages and tinctures will not do. As Italy has shown neither will attacking the numerator alone: decades of focusing on primary surpluses without structural reforms have only resulted in stagnation. Rather we need the second-round of 1977 type reforms that served Sri Lanka so well. There are many ways of thinking about such a reform programme. However, as the catalyst this time is likely to be a sovereign default, it is easier to label reforms as either an “attack on the numerator” or an “attack on the denominator”.

Attacking the Numerator: Reducing Debt

Reducing public debt – ‘attacking the numerator’ – can be done in three ways. First, increasing taxes. Second, reducing expenditure. Third, selling assets. Sri Lanka will probably have to do all three.

Increasing Taxes: Property Taxes and Tax Loopholes

 It is well known that Sri Lanka has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world and has a regressive tax system. This year Sri Lanka’s tax-to-GDP ratio could rank among the lowest 15 countries in the world. However, in the midst of economic contraction raising taxes that reduce consumption and investment could catalyze growth shocks. One solution would be to tax savings, especially those savings that are not productive. The biggest example of such savings is land ownership. A Western Province property tax could raise substantial revenue and encourage efficient use of idle property. In the last decade property prices in Colombo rose by 300%, much of this windfall is the direct result of public infrastructure spending. Our tax system also has many loopholes. Consider the case of excise taxes on cigarettes. Estimates suggest the government could prevent over two hundred billion rupees of revenue leakage over the next decade by introducing a formula for cigarette prices. Similarly, the duty on beedi clearly points to political rather than economic considerations in excise taxation.

Reducing Expenditure: Too Many Men

Sri Lanka has a bloated public sector. From a revenue, productivity and ultimately security viewpoint the large size of the military is a challenge. Around 40% of government salary expenditure is spent on the military. The military, nearing 280 thousand men (compared to the British Army’s approximately 100,000), is holding back our most able men from productive employment. Transferring most of these men to reserves and offering subsidized labour to the export industry through an apprenticeship scheme would substantially improve public finance and propel growth. A similar story of job growth can be found in the public sector.

Selling Assets: Sell Enterprises

The government is poor at managing businesses. State-owned enterprises are renowned for their mismanagement, waste and corruption. The direct cost is colossal. But the indirect costs are even greater. Despite competition from Ports Authority run terminals, SAGT and China Merchant Holdings have played a key role in making Colombo one of the world’s great ports. Imagine if airports and air-services had been similarly open to competition and private enterprise; Sri Lanka could have become an aviation and air-sea hub, as well as a shipping-hub. There are countless other examples throughout our economy.

At this stage of economic development, there is little reason for the state to run enterprises. In fact, the state can increase the value of the assets it owns by selling enterprises without selling land per se. For example, state-owned hotels, container terminals and air terminals could be privatized without selling the land on which they operate. In other words, privatize the enterprises, not their land-holdings. The tax-payer would be significantly better off as the privatization proceeds can be used to settle debt. In addition lease values, for the land, will rise and the land-value will appreciate faster too.

From a productivity point of view, key targets for privatization could be Sri Lankan Airlines, Ratmalana Airport, Jaya Container Terminal and Unity Container Terminal. One simple method of doing this would be to place all SOEs operating in competitive industries in a holding company that has an explicit mandate to sell them within a set time-frame, failing which they are automatically listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange.

Attacking the Denominator: Productivity Growth

There is only one tried and tested way of going from third world to first in the space of a few decades: manufacturing exports. Sri Lanka successfully completed the first step of this process by the 1980s when it established apparel exports industry, which remains Sri Lanka’s only manufacturing export. In 1983, Sri Lanka was about to move up the value chain to semi-conductors, which would have led to South-East Asian and East Asian style growth. But Black July was engineered, and the semiconductor plants being built in Katunayake by Motorola and Harris Corporation were shipped-off to Penang. Similarly, we missed the wave of Japanese investment that was about to begin at that time.

Since then Sri Lanka hasn’t developed a major manufactured export. The challenge for Sri Lanka is to create new higher-productivity export industries. This is a complex task requiring government effort. But Sri Lanka has done it before. The tested strategy of the 1977 revolution is as follows. First, create investment zones where the usual constraints affecting investment can be managed. That is the genius of the Free Trade Zones. Second, make Sri Lanka’s exports competitive: reduce tariffs (a tax on imports is a tax on exports) and sign Free-Trade Agreements. Third, enable efficient factor allocation: remove regulatory constraints on agricultural production and update labour laws. Fourth, unleash the power of the developmental state by fast-tracking the MCC grant, designing clever export subsidies and most importantly completing land reform.

Investment Oases

The engines of Sri Lanka’s manufacturing exports are the Free Trade Zones. It is here that the apparel industry started. It is also the zones that were the cradle for the island’s solid-tyre export industry and they remain the primary site of all other manufactured exports. The reason for this is that zones make it much easier for an investor to open a factory. Land, electricity and water are available; regulatory permissions are already secured; customs officers and other government agencies are on hand. Over time an eco-system of trained labour and ancillary suppliers also develops. Despite being near capacity, Sri Lanka failed to build any new free trade zones between 2002 and 2017. So its no surprise to hear investors complain that access to land is the primary constraint for investment.

Almost all of Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zones are managed by the BOI. One exception is the DFCC Bank run Linden Industrial Zone. The BOI run model worked well and was competitive in the 1980s. Today the world has moved on. In order to attract new investors in sectors outside apparel, Sri Lanka needs to allow international zone operators. For example, Sri Lanka should court a Chinese free trade zone operator, a Japanese free trade zone operator and a Singaporean one to establish facilities in Sri Lanka. These zone operators will then leverage the relationships they have with manufacturers in their countries and regions, doing the job successive governments have failed to do since the late 1980s.

The energies of Sri Lanka’s own private sector could also be unleashed in zone-management. MAS and Brandix run successful textile parks in Sri Lanka and India. There is no reason they couldn’t successfully run a zone in Sri Lanka. The failure is not the central government’s alone. As far as I know, no other province has done what the Wayamba Provincial Council did within a couple of years of the formation of a provincial government: establish not one but two province run industrial zones, at Heraliyawala and Dangaspitiya respectively. The Northern Province with its devolutionary fervour, combined with access to the KKS Port and Palaly Airport, should be particularly ashamed.

A pilot project could deploy under-utilized state land around Ratmalana to create an electronics free-trade zone. There is no better place in Sri Lanka due to proximity to a port, railway and airport, universities and technical schools and trained labour.

Export Competitiveness

But no one will build factories in Sri Lanka if input costs are high. In this era of global supply chains, one country rarely adds more than 20% to 30% of a product’s final value. Therefore, being able to import components and raw materials at the same prices as in competitor countries is vital. However, Sri Lanka has some of the highest effective tariff rates in the world. To make matters worse they are highly complex, creating ample room for discretion and thus delays and corruption. If Sri Lanka is to become the trading and manufacturing hub of the Indian Ocean, it will have to benchmark its tariffs against Dubai and Singapore. This is not new to Sri Lanka. In 1994 it has a simple three-band tariff structure. It is only after 2004 that Sri Lanka’s effective tariff rate sky-rocketed, primarily due to the cascading effects of CESS and PAL. Their abolition would be a very good start.

Similarly, during the 1977-2004 Sri Lanka’s real effective exchange rate was kept more or less constant. A weaker currency makes foreign goods dearer domestically and makes Sri Lankan goods cheaper on global markets. This helped ensure the competitiveness of exports and acted as an automatic, non-discretionary import substitution incentive. However, from 2004 onward the real effective exchange rate started creeping upwards, discouraging exports and encouraging imports. By 2017 Sri Lanka’s real effective exchange rate was 31% higher than in 2004.

Finally, Sri Lanka’s competitiveness is eroding because all its competitors are signing free trade agreements (FTAs). Sri Lanka must fast-track deeper goods and service trade integration with India, China and ASEAN. Most importantly, we need to become part of the two-major trade agreements the CPP11 and the RCEP. The constraints of space and time, robbed of the opportunity to discuss the importance of a new Customs Act, the implementation of the National Export Strategy or other reforms to facilitate cross-border trade. Suffice to say they too are essential.

Efficient Factor Allocation

Land, labour, capital; it is the development and allocation of these factors that determines the wealth of nations. Sri Lanka’s capital allocation is relatively efficient. Our challenge today is to ensure the efficient allocation of land and labour.

Land

Many cite East Asia’s successful land reform as the key to their economic prosperity. Studwell’s How Asia Works is perhaps the most persuasive and readable account. There is much to commend in this analysis. Granting freehold land to families already farming it will increase agricultural productivity. This is true of Sri Lanka too. One critical land reform, that can be implemented quickly, will be to make small-holders of the existing tea-estate workers. This will improve productivity, as the principal-agent problem will be solved. In addition, with freehold rights, they will have every incentive to replant and improve the land. Access to credit will not be an issue; the land itself will act as collateral.

As for the RPCs, the factories and land equal to the value of their remaining leaseterm can be transferred to them freehold. They can then offer extension services and an out-grower model to the new small-holders. In a similar vein, there is absolutely no good reason for the continuation of the Paddy Lands Act, especially in the wet-zone. In fact, some of the land in the wet-zone restricted by the Paddy Lands Act was never paddy land in the first place. This law is a major barrier to more productive use of land for high-value export crops, such as spices.

Having got land out of the way, we can move on to labour. Sri Lanka’s labour laws have created a de facto caste system of a few highly protected insiders and a sea of completely unprotected informal workers. In fact, the failure to make labour law more flexible is an important reason why over a million Sri Lankans work in the hazardous conditions of the Gulf. It is better to have some protection for many, than a great deal of protection for a few. Especially as labour law is a major constraint to growth. The downsides of more flexible labour laws can be effectively managed through a targeted social security net, such as in the Danish Flexisecurity model, which combines high levels of labour market flexibility with generous social safety nets, such as solid unemployment insurance.

The Developmental State

Finally, Sri Lanka needs to restructure its state to facilitate rather than hamper development. The first is a question of a simply accepting reality. What credibility does a country have when it refuses the largest grant in its history (MCC), while going-cap in hand asking for debt moratoria from its creditors?

Second, the state-owned enterprises in natural monopoly sectors, such as railways and power-lines need to be depoliticized and forced to be efficient. Depoliticization can be significantly achieved by simply passing a new law. The law can require that the appointment of directors of all State-Owned Enterprises be subject to the approval of a Constitutional Council appointed nominating board, with clear ‘fit-and-proper’ criteria. A similar mechanism is already in place for banks.

Furthermore, efficiency can be improved by introducing competition, resolving conflicts-of-interest and raising transparency. Sri Lanka’s competition law does not cover state-owned-enterprises: this allows public sector monopolies to enjoy rents at the expense of citizens. That needs to go. It is also absurd, for example, that the Sri Lanka Ports Authority is owner, operator and regulator of port terminals. The public sector is rife with such conflicts-of-interest which appear designed to breed corruption and mismanagement.

These are the key changes, but information matters too. As they are owned by the tax-payer, SOEs should have greater disclosure requirements than firms listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange. But a start would be to simply require SOEs to follow all CSE disclosure requirements, this can be done by law or by requiring SOEs to list their debt on the CSE. Or both.

There are also government departments that need to be made into SOEs. The railways are the most important example. If the railways were able to borrow money, which they could if they were an SOE, they could then finance the electrification and double-tracking through the development of land the CGR owns around railway stations.

Way Forward

The real economic policy statements in Sri Lanka are not budgets but IMF programmes. Budgets are often nothing more than promises of bread and the certainty of circuses. They bear little reality to actual revenue and expenditure, much the less actual economic management. As such the crescendo of this crisis, and thus opportunity, will be the inevitable IMF programme. It is almost certain that Sri Lanka will enter into its 17th IMF programme later this year or early in 2021. Sri Lanka has been in IMF devil-dances for much of its post-independence history. We have failed to undertake the reforms needed to grow and to protect our sovereignty. The IMF kapuralas have also failed to require front-loading reforms: allowing Sri Lanka to get away with cosmetic compliance rather than really restructuring the economy.

With COVID, the IMF is also overextended; perversely this improves its bargaining position. As a result, this programme can be a water-shed that combines both fiscal consolidation and export-driven productivity growth. It must be a landmark programme with a single objective: to be the last programme the IMF has with Sri Lanka. Then, as in 1977, Sri Lanka may just pull-off a Phoenix-like rise from the ashes. If not, then the demons of hunger, unemployment and debt-collectors will follow.

(Daniel Alphonsus was an advisor at Sri Lanka’s Finance Ministry. He also worked at Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry and at Verite Research. Daniel read philosophy, politics and economics at Balliol College, Oxford and public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School where he was a Fulbright Scholar.)

පීරියඩ්ස් වලට ( ඔසප් වීමට ) බදු ගහන ආණ්ඩු

අනුකි ප්‍රේමචන්ද්‍ර 

කාන්තවන්ගේ ඔසප් වීමට සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කියන්නෙ පීරියඩ්ස් කියල. 

කාන්තාවන්ගේ සාමාන්‍ය පීරියඩ්ස් වලට අසාමාන්‍ය බදු ගැසීමට සහ ඔසප් වීම පිළිබඳ ඇති මිත්‍යා මතවලට එරෙහිව නැගිටිය යුතු කාලයයි. 

ඔබ බොහෝවිට මේ ගැන නොදන්නවා වෙන්නට පුලුවන්. ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ඔසප් වීම පිළිබඳව සහ ඔසප් සනීපාරක්ෂාව පිළිබඳව සමාජයේ ඇති කතිකාවත එටරම්ම ගැම්බුරු නැහැ. එමනිසා සමහර විට ශ්‍රී ලාංකාවේ කාන්තාවන්ට ඔසප් වෙනවාද යන තරමටම අපේ සමාජ කතිකාවත ප්‍රාථමිකයි.  ඇත්තටම කතාව තමයි ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ කාන්තවන්ගේ ඔසප් සනීපාර්ක්ෂාව ඉතාම දුර්වලයි. ඔසප් වීම සහ ඔසප් සනීපාර්ක්ෂාව පිළිබඳ අධ්‍යාපනය අඩු වීම, සමාජයේ ඔසප් වීම පිළිබඳ තිබෙන මිථ්‍යා මත වගේම විවෘතව මේ මාතෘකාව කථා කිරීමට බිය වීමම දුර්වල ඔසප් සනීපාක්ෂව ඇති වීමට හේතු කිහිපයක්. 

දුර්වල ඔසප් සනීපාරක්ෂාව නිසා බොහෝ ශ්‍රී ලාංකික කාන්තාවන් අනෙක් රටවල් වල කාන්තාවන්ට වඩා සිටින්නේ පිටුපසින්. 

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ සනීපාර්ක්ෂකතුවා භාවිතය සලකන්නේ සුභෝගභෝගී භාණ්ඩයක් විදියටයි. එහෙමත් නැත්තම් කලු වෙළඳපොලේ විකිනෙන භාණ්ඩයක් ලෙසටයි. 

ශ්‍රී ලංකාව තුල සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සහ කාන්තා සනීපාරක්ෂාව පිළිබඳ මිත්‍යා මත සහ සමාජ පීඩනය නිසා දිනපතාම සනීපාර්ක්ෂාව අතින් අපි අත්ත දුප්පත් තත්වයට පත්වෙමින් තිබෙනවා. 

ඔසප් සනීපාර්ක්ෂාවෙන් දුගීවීම 

ඔසප් සනීපාර්ක්ෂාවෙන් දුගීවීම කියන්නෙ කාන්තාවන්ගේ සනීපාර්ක්ෂාවට වියදම් කිරීම මිල අධික වීම සහ එම වියදම් දරා ගැනීමට අපහසු වීමයි. 

ශ්‍රී ලංකාව මෙම ප්‍රශ්ණයට තදින්ම මුහුණ දෙන රටක්. සාමාන්‍යයෙන් වෙළඳපොලේ සනීපාර්ක්ෂක තුවා විකිනෙන්නේ රු. 120 - 175 ත් අතර මිලකටයි. ආනයනය කරන වෙළඳ නාම රු. 350 දක්වා මිලකටයි අලෙවි කරන්නේ. එම නිසා  ආනයනික සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා මිලදී ගැනීම කාන්තවන්ට සිහිනයක් පමණක් මෙන්ම එය සුපෝගභෝගී භාණ්ඩයක් බවට පත් කර තීබෙනවා. 

ආනයනික සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා එතරම් මිල අධික වීමට ප්‍රධාන හේතුව රජය අයකරන අසීමාන්තික සහ අසාධාරණ බදු ප්‍රමානයයි.  

2018 සැප්තැම්බර් මාසයේ සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සඳහා අය කරන මුලු බදු ප්‍රමාණය 102% සිට 62% දක්වා මුදල් අමාත්‍යතුමා අඩු කරනු ලැබුවේ එවකට පැවති සෙස් බද්ධ ඉවත් කිරීමෙන්. මෑතකදී මුදල් අමාත්‍ය මංගල සමරවීර මැතිතුමා රොයිටර් පුවත් සේවයට ප්‍රකාශ කර තිබුනේ පාසල් දැරියන්ගේ සහ කාන්තාවන් ආර්ථිකයට එකතු කර ගැනීමට කාන්තා සනීපාරක්ෂාවට පනවා ඇති ඉතිරි බදු ප්‍රමාණයත් ඉවත් කරන බවයි. 

සාමාන්‍යයෙන් කාන්තාවක් තම ජීවිත කාලය තුල දින 2535 ආර්තව කාල නැතහොත් ඔසප් කාල ගත කරනු ලබනවා. එක්වර බැලූ බැල්මට එය එතරම් දීර්ඝ කාලයෙක් ලෙස නොපෙනුනත් එය වසර හතක පමණ දීර්ඝ කාලයක්. කාන්තවකට ඉතා අවම සනීපාර්ක්ෂක තත්ව යටතේ ඔසප් කාල වලදී සනීපාරක්ෂකතුවා වල මිල අධික වීම නිසා රෙදි කඩවල් භාවිතයට තල්ලු කිරීම සාධාරණ යැයි ඔබ සිතනවාද? 

සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සුපෝගභෝගී භාණ්ඩයක් බවට පත්වීම ඉතාම කණගාටුදායක තත්වයක්. මිලෙන් වැඩි අත් ඔරලෝසු සහ සුවඳ විලවුන් සුපෝගභෝගී භාණ්ඩ ලෙස සැලකෙන්නේ එම භාණ්ඩ සමාජයේ ඉහළ ආදායමක් උපයන පිරිසට පමණක් මිලදී ගත හැකි නිසයි. පවතින බදු ක්‍රමය දැන් සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සුපෝගභෝගී භාණ්ඩයක් බවට පත් කර තිබෙනවා. 

මෙම වසරේ කාන්තාවන්ගේ ඔසප් සනීපාරක්ෂාව පිළිබඳ ජාත්‍යන්තර දිනයේ තේමාව "ඔසප් වීම කාන්තවාට බලපායි" යන්නයි. පසුගිය සතියක ප්‍රසිද්ධ ඉරිදා පුවත්පතක පල කර තිබුනේ නාගරීකරණය වීම සමඟ දැන් "නවීන" කාන්ථාවන් මහදවල් සුපිරි වෙළඳසැල් වලින් සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා මිළඳී ගන්නා බවයි. එම පුවත් පත් වාර්ථාවට අනුව කලින් කාන්තාවන් සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා මිලදී ගත්තේ ඉතාම රහසිගතව සහ බ්‍රවුන් පේපර් කවරයකින් එතීමෙන් අනතුරුවයි. එයින් තහවුරු වන කාරණයනම් තවමත් සනීපාරක්ෂකතුවා විවෘතව මිලදී ගැනීම අනුමත නොකරන බවයි.

අවාසනාවට කරුණ නම් අපි පිළිගැනීමට අකමැති වුවත් ලිපියේ කතෘ දරණ මතයම සමාජයේ තවත් බොහෝ දෙනා දැරීමයි. මම පසුගිය දිනක නුවර සිට නැවත කොළඹ පැමිණෙන අතර මඟ සාමාන්‍ය සිල්ලර කඩයෙකින් සනීපාර්ක්ෂක තුවායක් මිලදී ගත්විට කඩයේ මුදලාලි මෙම සනීපාක්ෂක තුවාය කඩදාසි ගණාවකින් ඔතා ඉතාම රහසිගත ලබාදුන්නේ හරියට මම ඔසප්  කාලයක් පසුකිරීම මහා අපරාධයක් ලෙස සලකමිනුයි.ඔසප්භාවය ගැන කථාකරන විට සමහරු සංස්කෘතියට බනිනවා. සමහරු සමායයේ තිබෙන මිථ්‍යා මතවලට දොක් නගනවා. නමුත් අවසාන ප්‍රතිථලය මිලියන 10.5 තරම් කාන්තාවන් ආර්ථව චක්‍ර දිළිඳුභාවයට පත්වීමයි. 

ඔසප්  චක්‍ර පිළිබඳව ගැරහීම ආර්ථව දිළිඳුබව ඇති කරන්නේ කොහොමද? 

සනීපාර්ක්ෂක තුවා සැඟවමින් විකුනන මේ සෙල්ලම ඔසප්  චක්‍ර පිළිබඳව වැරදි මත ගණනාවක් සමාජගත කරනවා. හරියට කාන්තාව මත් කුඩු මිලදී ගන්න තත්වයට සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවායක් මිලඳී ගැනීම සමාන කරනවා. කාන්තාවකට මෙතරම් අත්‍යාවශ්‍ය භාණ්ඩයක් කලු කඩයේ විකුණන තත්වයට සමාජයේ ඇති කුමන හෙතුවක් පත් කලත් එහි අවසාන ප්‍රතිඵලය වෙන්නේ කාන්තාවන් සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා මිලඳී ගැනීමට භය වීම සහ අධෛර්‍යට පත් වීමයි. සනීපාර්ක්ෂක තුවා පිළිබඳ සමාජයේ ඇති දුර්මතවල කොතරම් බරපතලද කියනවනම් වෙළදසැල් වල මෙය විකුනන්නේ සඟවාගෙනයි. එයම හේතුවක් වෙනවා කන්තවන් එම සනීපාර්ක්ෂක තුවා වල මිල, ප්‍රමතිය පිළිබඳ විවෘතව කථා නොකිරීමට. ඕනෑම මාතෘකාවක් සඟවා කතාකිරීමෙන් මෙවැනි තත්වයක් ඇතිවීම වැලැක්විය නොහැකියි. අපි ඇකමැති සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සන්නාම අපිට අකමත්තෙන් වැඩි මිලකට, අඩු විවිදත්වයක් සහිතව ගැනීමට සිදුවීම මෙහි අවසන් ප්‍රතිඵලයයි. 

ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා වෙළඳපොළ දේශීය වශයෙන් නිපදවන සන්නාම කිහිපයක් මඟින් අත්පත් කරගෙන තිබෙනවා. එම දේශීය වෙළඳනාම වලට ආර්ක්ෂාව සැපයීම සඳහා ආනයනික සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සඳහා ඉතා ඉහල ආනයනික බද්දක් අය කරනවා. අපගේ අසල්වැසි ඉන්දියාව සමඟ සැසඳීමෙදී අපගේ රටේ විකිණෙන සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා වල විවිධත්වය ඉතාම අවමයි. එක් එක් කාන්ත්වාට අවශ්‍යා සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා වර්ග එකිනෙකට වෙනස්. එය තීරණය වන්නේ එම කාත්වාගේ කායික සොභාවය සහ ලක්ෂණ අනුවයි. 

සනීපාරක්ෂකතුවා කලු වෙළඳපොළේ විකිනෙණ භාණ්ඩයක් ලෙස සැලකෙන නිසා ලෝකයේ අනිත් වෙළඳපොලවල් වල දක්නට ලැබෙන නැවත සේදිය හැකි සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා, කාබනික කපු වලින් නිපදවෙන සනීපාරක්ෂකතුවා, නැවත භාවිතාකලහැකි සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා ලෙස ඇති විවිධ නිෂ්පාධන  කාණ්ඩ දැක ගැනීමට නොහැකියි. අපිට උදාවී තිබෙන තත්වය තමයි අපිට නොගැලපෙන, අපි ඇකමැති සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා වැඩි මිලකට මිලට ගැනීම. මේ පිළිබඳව හඩක් නගන්නටවත් කවුරුවත් එක්නොවෙන තරමට සමාජ මතය සනීපාරක්ෂතතුවා මහා රහසිගත කලුකඩ භාන්ඩයක් කර හමාරයි. 

නැහැ, ඔබ මිලදීගන්නා සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා පැකැට්ටුව කොලවලින් ඔතා ලබාගැනීමට තරම් රහසිගත සහ භයානක මත්කුඩු වර්ගයක් නොවෙයි.

නැහැ, අසීමිත ලෙස බදු ගසා සමාජයේ කිහිපදෙනෙකුට පමණක් මිලදී ගැනීමට හැකිවන ලෙස ඉතා ඉහල මිලකට අලෙවි කලයුතු භාණ්ඩයක් නොවේ සනීපාරක්ෂකතුවා.

කාන්තාවක් විදියට මම ඔබෙන් කාරුණිකව ආයාචනා කරන්වා කාන්තවනේ ඔසප් වීම පිළිබඳ විවෘත සංවාදයකට එකතුවන්න කියල. සමාජයේ ඔසප් වීම පිළිබඳ දුර්මත සහ විකාර මත වෙනස් කරන්න අපි එකතු වෙමු. සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සුපෝගභෝගී භාණ්ඩයක් නොවෙයි. ඔසප් වීම සාමාන්‍ය ජීව ක්‍රියාවලියක් වෙද්දි සනීපාරක්ෂක තුවා සුපෝගභෝගී කිරීම හරිම අසාධාරණ නැද්ද?

View this article in English here.

Will the sugar tax leave a bad taste in your mouth?

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Rising rates of obesity and incidence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) have long been a point of concern for the Sri Lankan health sector. As a country, we have made significant strides in addressing the challenge of communicable diseases, and now policymakers are shifting focus onto NCDs. The imposition of a tax on sweetened drinks in 2018 was a point of serious debate. It was both lauded as an admirable step in tackling the issue of NCDs, while simultaneously facing serious protest from the soft drink industry.

In 2018, the 51-day Government reduced this tax, and now the present Government stated that it will re-impose the tax, citing health concerns as the motivation behind it. While a final decision is yet to be taken on this, given that this is the same Government that imposed the tax, it seems likely that we will be seeing a tax increase.

Political packaging

Imposing this tax is an easy way to gain some political mileage. The narrative presented is simple – obesity and non-communicable diseases are a serious health concern for the Sri Lankan population. Sugar consumption is a contributor to this problem and as a responsible Government, they need to take steps to discourage consumption – this will be done through a tax per gram of sugar in carbonated drinks. In essence, the tax is packaged as a health-positive policy measure. Indeed, at face value, the tax does present as such. However, there are a few questions which can be raised.

Is this tax fair?

There are two things in life that are certain – death and taxes. While it may be that we will have to continue paying taxes, these taxes should be sensible, effective, and should not be prohibitively burdensome. This idea has been espoused in basic principles of taxation to ensure the tax is effective and equitable. One of the principles the OECD expounds is that of neutrality: “Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of business activities.” Neutrality also means that the tax system will raise revenue while minimising discrimination in favour of or against an economic choice.

In the case of the sugar tax being imposed by the Sri Lankan Government, it is clear that the principle of neutrality is not adhered to. At a fundamental level, it is a “sin tax” or a “fat tax” – a tax being imposed to change the economic choices of the population – the aim of the tax is not to raise revenue, but to shift consumer behaviour away to more healthy options. Given that the sugar tax is applicable only to carbonated drinks, and excludes other sweetened drinks like fruit juice or milk packets, it is clear that the principle of neutrality has been ignored here.

Does unfair equal ineffective?

The principle of neutrality in taxation is all well and good, but does this affect people? The answer is yes. When the principle of neutrality is violated and a tax is imposed in a manner that is inequitable to business activities, it loses its effectiveness. The objective of this tax is to discourage the consumption of carbonated drinks with a high sugar content, to achieve a higher goal of good health. When the tax is imposed unfairly only on carbonated drinks, it means the consumers which simply substitute a carbonated drink with an alternative – and there is no guarantee that the alternative will be a sugar-free, healthy one. In fact, the likelihood is that people will switch to a different product with a similar calorie/sugar count – if a bottle of fruit juice is cheaper than a bottle of Sprite in the supermarket, you don’t want to pay more for the bottle of Sprite and you are likely to buy the juice instead. The health concerns will not end up being addressed because consumers will simply substitute one drink which is high in sugar with another drink that is also high in sugar.

Unfortunately, in the case of taxing food and beverages, the issue is that consumers can simply choose to continue to consume a similar level of sugar, just from a different source. Given that this tax only applies to one category of sweetened beverages, consumers can easily substitute it with another, cheaper beverage. There is also the question of whether sales of carbonated beverages drop; international evidence has mixed results. While the WHO (World Health Organisation) applauds these taxes, other studies question whether the tax affects sales of carbonated drinks to an extent that it would have an effect on overall health, or whether consumers are simply shifting preference to an alternative which is an equally sugary substitute.

The final word on this is that there is, at best, uncertainty about whether this tax creates a positive health externality; and at worst, consumers switch to unhealthy alternatives while businesses lose out on revenue.

It’s bloody unfair!

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Ceylon Today, The Island and Daily Mirror

By Anuki Premachandra

Today (28) is Menstrual Hygiene Day. Most of you might not be aware of it because in Sri Lanka, we pretend that women don’t bleed. 

Poor menstrual hygiene is caused by a lack of education on the issue, persisting taboos and stigma, limited access to hygienic menstrual products and poor sanitation infrastructure that undermines the educational opportunities, health and overall social status of women and girls around the world. As a result, millions of women and girls are kept from reaching their full potential. 

In Sri Lanka, we treat access to menstrual products as both a luxury and a black market good. Steeped in social stigma, the negative characterization of these necessities have overwhelmingly resulted in a growing prevalence of ‘Period Poverty’. 

Period Poverty isn’t just another term 

Period Poverty refers to having a lack of access to sanitary products due to financial constraints. This problem is quite serious in the case of Sri Lanka. Commercially produced sanitary towels typically sell between Rs. 120-175. Imported brands can go up to Rs. 350, putting them out of reach for most women, thereby making it a luxury for some. 

The heavy tax on sanitary napkins is a key contributor to these disproportionately high prices. 

In September 2018, the Minister of Finance reduced the tax on sanitary napkins to 62% from 102%, following the removal of the CESS tax. The Minister for Finance Mangala Samaraweera recently mentioned in a Reuters article that he was looking at ways to reduce the tax further as he recognises the effect of period poverty on girl’s school attendance and the participation of women in the economy. 

The average woman has her period for 2,535 days of her life. That’s nearly seven years of depending on unhygienic cloth rags and makeshift solutions if sanitary napkins are beyond your financial reach. 

This is a classic characteristic of a luxury good. Expensive watches or perfumes are only within the purchasing power of some, because only they are rich enough to afford it. 

Unfortunately sanitary napkins have fallen to the same misfortune. Is it justifiable that something so essential as a pad is something that only those with financial capacity can afford? 

This year’s tagline is ‘Menstruation Matters’ and could not be more relevant to Sri Lanka. A few weeks ago, a Sunday newspaper ran an article on urbanisation that expressed views on how the ‘modern’ woman buys sanitary napkins in this country – indeed, a round peg in a square hole. Nonetheless, it is interesting to analyse the thinking behind this narrative. 

The writer explains how women in modern society now purchase their sanitary napkins in broad daylight over supermarket counters, instead of the sanitary napkins being sold wrapped in newspaper or brown bags in efforts to hide the identity of the product. There is clear disapproval of purchasing sanitary napkins out in open! 

Unfortunately, the ideal transaction etiquette the writer holds dear is more common in Sri Lanka than we’d like to accept. A few weeks ago, when I purchased a packet of sanitary napkins in Kandy, the grocery uncle went to great lengths to wrap my purchase up in newspaper, because god forbid if someone finds out I’m on my period, right? Some blame culture, some blame our values – but the result of this stigma is the imminence of ‘Period Poverty,’ which 10.5 million women in our country are burdened with. 

How does stigmatising our periods aggravate Period Poverty?

This little charade of hiding your pads and the norms which reinforce this act makes it almost seem like you’re buying a boxful of heroin, and not pads. 

Treating a product this essential like you would a good sold in the black market means that the social stigma around periods extends to the purchase of sanitary napkins. 

The stigma is so strong that stores don’t sell the product without masking its identity, women don’t openly discuss the purchase of this product, leading us to accept the product as it is, without questioning its price or quality merely due to the lack of open conversation. We’re made to accept whatever that is sold to us – at a higher price and with little variety. 

The local sanitary napkin market is dominated in Sri Lanka by a few brands. The protection of these brands is also why there is such a huge tax on the imports. When compared to supermarket aisles in India, Sri Lankan aisles carry very limited variances of the product. 

The demand for specific types of sanitary napkins differ from woman to woman – our physiologies are different. We barely see pads that are for example, organic cotton, washable and reusable, etc. in our aisles because when we treat pads as a black market product, we’ve put ourselves in a situation where we’ve just got to accept whatever that is available in our reach!

No, your pads are not a packet of drugs whose identity needs to be masked and sealed. No, it is not fair that pads are made expensive (through taxes and very minimal competition) to the point that only a selected few can afford them. 

This Menstrual Hygiene Day, I urge you to start having open conversations about issues of this nature. We need to change this narrative. Pads should not be a luxury. Period. 

View this article in Sinhala here.

Tariffs and the law of unintended consequences

Originally appeared on Sunday Times

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

The law of unintended consequences is a theory that dates back to Adam Smith, but was popularised by the sociologist Robert K. Merton. In short, the law explains the reality that when governments intervene to create a set of outcomes, as the theory of cetris paribus (holding other factors constant) cannot be achieved in a market situation - the result is a series of unintended consequences.

Colonial India and Cobras

This law is also known as the ‘Cobra Effect’, dating all the way back to when the British first colonised India. The British were understandably concerned about poisonous snakes in India, Cobras apparently being a source of some worry. The solution they presented was to provide a reward for every Cobra that was killed, creating a clear incentive for locals to capture and kill any Cobras in the vicinity. While this worked well in the short term, the British slowly realised that enterprising individuals were actively breeding Cobras; creating a very profitable business out of collecting bounties. Once this was clear, the British removed the bounty, and now as this was no longer a profitable venture, the breeders released all their Cobras. The final outcome of this was an increase in the general Cobra population, completely the opposite of what the intervention set out to achieve.

While this makes for a good anecdote, the economic realities of the law of unintended consequences are often more dire. Interventions into the market are often well-intended, but have the potential to backfire. A shining example of this is the case of tariffs. Forbes recently published an article which detailed the unintended consequences of a washing machine tariff imposed in the US. This well-meaning tariff was introduced to protect domestic producers in the US, and boost employment in that industry. If one evaluates the effectiveness of the tariff simply on those two criteria, then the tariff has been a resounding success; US washer and dryer industry created around 1,800 new jobs. This could easily be written off as a success story.

The Cobra effect on washing machines

However, the focus here is only on the producer, and the consumer has been removed from the narrative. The first unintended consequence was that as imported machines were now more expensive, domestic manufacturers could safely raise their prices, without fear of losing out on sales. The second unintended consequence was that dryers also became more expensive. As a complementary good to washing machines in the US, manufacturers of dryers saw this as the perfect window in which to raise their prices and increase their profits (clotheslines would save Sri Lanka from this unintended consequence).

Taking all this into account, according to Forbes, this has cost American consumers around USD 1.5 billion. One could argue that this increase in prices and resultant cost to consumers can be justified by the 1,800 jobs that were created. The reality is that each job is equivalent to USD 815,000 in increased consumer costs. This tariff policy effectively protects the local industry at the cost of their own consumers.

Why should Sri Lankans care about washing machine prices in the US?

While we can agree that this does appear to be an unfortunate example of unintended consequences, and that it is pretty clear that domestic consumers got a bad deal here, why should the average Sri Lankan care? After all, we have sunlight soap and clotheslines.

Sri Lankan consumers should care because the same unintended consequences that took place oceans away in the United States is happening here, in our little island nation. Tariffs have long been the favoured tool of successive governments. Tariffs sound really good on paper, and better if said paper is an election manifesto. ‘We will protect our domestic producers’ is a statement that tugs at the heartstrings of too many voters. The fine print ‘at the cost of domestic consumers’ is not something that is publicised, but it should be.

Tariffs have been imposed on goods ranging from household care, personal care and food. The price of items as diverse as school shoes and construction material are affected by this. The entire country complains about how the cost of living is too high, and unreasonably high tariffs are one of the drivers behind this. Unfortunately for us, the imposition of these tariffs create exactly the same series of unintended consequences that American consumers have to face. The price of the weekly shop an average Sri Lankan does whether it is from the delkanda pola, the closest supermarket or the handiye kade is affected by tariffs. A potato, even if it is locally produced is more expensive than it needs to be, because tariffs push the price of imported tomatoes up, allowing domestic producers to raise prices with the consumer losing out.

Tariffs on essential goods in Sri Lanka can range from 45% to 107.6%. There needs to be a serious re-evaluation of the role of tariffs in our economy – the rationale behind imposing them, the consequences of the tariff (which are well understood and cannot be discounted or ignored), and ideally a faster regime for phasing them out.

An ‘unhealthy’ tax regime: Is the Govt. stifling basic needs?

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Anuki Premachandra

This year’s global theme for World Health Day, which falls today, is universal health coverage (UCH) for all. In comparison to most countries in the region, Sri Lanka is in a positive trajectory towards this, with a policy goal to ensure universal health coverage to all citizens through a well-integrated, comprehensive health service.

UHC is a health care system focused on medical service delivery – it predominantly revolves around accessibility, affordability, and availability of healthcare services. However, in the case of Sri Lanka, health needs to be looked at from a broader perspective.
This World Health Day, while commending the country on a great public healthcare system and better access to water and sanitation than most other countries in the region, I’m going to explore the case of how some simple taxes on items that contribute to your health can lead to complicated concerns on your health. Are Sri Lanka’s tax policies depriving you of accessibility, affordability, and availability of proper healthcare, hygiene, and sanitation?

Taxing your menstrual health
Menstrual hygiene is not commonly discussed in Sri Lanka, having very little literature and understanding of proper menstrual hygiene management. This is also probably a reason why a basic item required for proper menstrual hygiene – sanitary pads – have total taxes as high as 62.6% levied on them, despite being a country with 4.2 million menstruating women. More often than not, women are compelled to use unhealthy menstrual hygiene products or practices owing to their monetary conditions. Naturally, an intervention like taxes only worsens this situation. The most appalling of findings is that unhealthy menstrual practices can contribute to cervical cancer, one that unfortunately has proven to fall to the plight of many Sri Lankan women.

Every year, 1,136 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer and 643 die from this disease in Sri Lanka (HPV Centre, 2018). Cervical cancer ranks as the second most frequent cancer amongst women in the country, wherein poor menstrual hygiene management is a direct causal factor of this. Of our population, 52% is women, out of which 4.2 menstruating women stand the risk of being diagnosed with cervical cancer due to poor menstrual hygiene. If we are taxing something as necessary as sanitary napkins that contribute to healthy menstrual practise, are we not then making health a privilege instead of a basic human right?

Taxing your access to proper sanitation
In a recent interview, Senior Advisor at the Sri Lanka Water Partnership Kusum Athukorala stated that the main problem they have had to deal with when conducting sanitation programmes in rural schools is the lack of a proper disposal mechanism for sanitary pads. It is either this or the lack of proper toilet facilities. According to the WHO, although sanitation coverage in Sri Lanka is 92% – the best in the South Asian region – an area that they too have identified as one that requires further development is rural school sanitation. Period-friendly toilets matter.

Additionally, although over 50% of our population have access to household sanitation facilities, diving deeper into the breakdown of these numbers is important. Despite great sanitation coverage, 7.2% of our urban population, 7.6% of our rural population, and 17% of our estate population still rely on a shared toilet facility for their sanitation needs, according to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016. Why then do our rural schools lack proper toilets and why does a portion of our population rely on shared toilets for their sanitation needs? The answer lies in the prohibitively high cost of building toilets.

Total import taxes on sanitary ware like commodes and squatting pans are over 60% and wall tiles, floor tiles, and finishing ceramic are taxed at over 100%. Out of our population, one million people live in temporary houses and 1.2 million people live in underserved settlements. Access to proper toilet and hygiene facilities are very limited in these types of households owing to the exorbitant cost of constructing one. Having access to sanitation is a basic human right, yet a portion of our population suffer on a daily basis from the lack of access to a clean and functioning toilet. Without toilets, untreated human waste can impact a whole community, affecting many aspects of daily life, and ultimately pose a serious risk to health. The issue runs deeper into societal impacts, such as teenage girls often leaving school at the onset of menstruation due to lack of privacy and the risk of contaminating infections due to unhygienic toilet facilities. This narrative needs to change.

This World Health Day, while we commit our country to global goals that provision for more accessible and affordable healthcare facilities for all, let’s also look at health in a broader perspective. In Sri Lanka, universal health coverage can be realised through affordability, accessibility, and availability of better health, sanitation, and hygiene facilities – end taxes on periods and toilets!

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Anuki Premachandra is the Manager – Research Communications at the Advocata Institute. She has a background in public policy with an active involvement in policy communications. She is also an advocate for the reduction of the period tax and contributes to research and policy work in that subject area. If you have any questions or feedback on this article, she could be contacted on anuki@advocata.org or @anukipr on Twitter. Advocata is an independent policy think tank based in Colombo, Sri Lanka which conducts research, provide commentary, and hold events to promote sound policy ideas compatible with a free society in Sri Lanka.

A woman's monthly tax

In a country with 4.2 million menstruating women, only 30% of them use sanitary napkins (SAARC Chamber Women Entrepreneurs Council). This statistic is appalling and the truth in this is saddening. As a nation where 52% of its population is women, the reality that sanitary napkins are only an option to a handful 30% is an injustice.

A few weeks ago, we highlighted the absurdity of diaper taxes. The tax on diapers is so high that when calculated, for every three diapers bought, the Sri Lankan Government is ‘stealing’ at least one of them. The same applies for the case of sanitary pads and tampons where the government charges a colossal import tax of 101.2%. This 101.2% is on a woman’s basic need, but falls into the general pile of tax calculation without regard of its intrinsic value and purpose.

Are we so focused on our protectionist values that we cannot decipher how unfair and discriminatory it is to tax a women on something that is beyond her control?

A recent Roar article highlighted how most women cannot afford sanitary napkins and have to switch to using cloth rags instead. Cloth rags are both a sanitary and health concern. We are depriving women of what should be a basic right. The average price of a packet of 10 pads in Sri Lanka is Rs. 200. Imported pads are priced between Rs.200 – 250, and locally produced pads are also around Rs. 150 – 200. Protectionist taxes are meant to ensure that local production is boosted and that as consumers and women, we have diverse choice and a range of prices to choose from. However, the reality is that local producers actually have the comfort of enjoying a big profit margin per packet as the prices of the products in the market are high in itself, owing to taxes.

Import taxes on sanitary pads and tampons are calculated as follows:

We’ve also compiled a cross-tabulation of prices of pads and tampons globally:

A cost of a single pad is 24% more in Sri Lanka than it is in USA and 26% more than the retail price of a sanitary napkin in India.

On the other hand, tampons are limitedly available, and when they are, the price of a tampon in Sri Lanka is 20% more than it is in the states?

Aunt Flo’s visits usually are about 5 days long on average meaning that if 4 pads are used a day, a Sri Lankan women spends a total of Rs. 520 a month on something entirely beyond her control. This might not seem like a lot to most people reading this, but when you really look at it, for someone barely making minimum wage a day, this cost becomes a financial burden on them. If the average age of mensuration is between 13 – 45 years, this then means that a Sri Lankan woman spends at least Rs. 199,680 on sanitary napkins itself!

It seems like the rest of the world is progressing fast with global movements against discrimination and injustice. It seems like it’s about time we caught up with #MeToo and #Timesup. We don’t think it’s acceptable that you have to spend close to 200,000 just because you’re a woman. Do you?