Originally appeared on The Morning.
By Dhananath Fernando
Privatising SriLankan Airlines is a hot topic once more, although this discussion is decades old now. Founded as Air Lanka in 1979, the airline was described by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew as “a glamour project, not of great value for developing Sri Lanka”.
In 1998 Air Lanka signed a 10-year management contract with Dubai-based Emirates Airline for 40% of shares and provided the Emirates management the ability to make most of the management decisions. Air Lanka was rebranded as SriLankan Airlines. However, after 10 years, Emirates realised that the Sri Lankan Government was not going to renew the contract.
According to SriLankan Airlines Annual Reports from 2008, the final year in which Emirates operated the airline, it made a profit of Rs. 4.4 billion. It was mentioned in some reports that this profit included insurance claims after the terrorist attacks on the Bandaranaike International Airport.
Fig 1: Losses and Profits of Sri Lankan Airlines
However, since then, SriLankan Airlines has not made a single cent of profit. Cumulatively it has lost Rs. 372 billion since 2008. The airline made a loss of Rs. 44 billion in 2019, Rs. 47 billion in 2020, and Rs. 45 billion in 2021. Losses in 2019 were equivalent to 93% of the Samurdhi scheme’s budget – Samurdhi being the main social safety net in place to protect the poor. The losses were also equivalent to 84% and 90% of the Samurdhi budget in 2020 and 2021, respectively. These losses are equivalent to 17% of 2019’s health sector allocation in the National Budget.
The problem is both clear and dire. We maintain a national airline at a substantial loss and ask the common people, many of whom don’t even possess a passport or haven’t even stepped on an aeroplane, to foot the bill. In other words, we are maintaining a failing airline at the expense of the education and healthcare of our people.
There are multiple reasons why SriLankan Airlines incurs losses. It is too politicised and many politicians and their relatives are not charged for extra baggage when they travel. Board appointments and recruitments have all been politically driven. Simply put, it is bad management. The general remedy for bad management is to replace it with good management so we can make the enterprise profitable. This has been the popular suggestion each time that the privatisation of SriLankan Airlines has been proposed. That is the exact thing we have been trying to do since we ended the management contract with Emirates.
We have to ask ourselves why the outcome hasn’t changed even after the same remedy has been proposed and implemented repeatedly. Simply put, when you don’t invest sufficient money, time, or reputation into a business, no one has the ability to make it profitable. All the business leaders who have been appointed to lead the firm already have their own businesses, so it is obvious that SriLankan Airlines will become a secondary priority.
Airlines are a very competitive business. Even privately-owned airlines are finding it difficult to compete and maximise profits, so how can we expect a State-owned and managed airline to do the same? There is a difference between a private company making a loss versus a State-owned company making a loss. A private company’s losses are borne by the private investors, who knowingly and consensually made the choice to invest their money in a potentially risky endeavour. But when public companies make losses, taxpayers have to pay and their money will be spent without their consent. How can this be justified, especially in a country like Sri Lanka where people suffer from a lack of basic needs, and when our healthcare, education, and social safety nets need significant improvement?
So what can be done about SriLankan Airlines? SriLankan Airlines’ business has few strategic units: The airline operation, catering, and the ground handling operation. Each section has some assets as well as liabilities. Overall, the airline has a lot of liabilities and debt. Most of the debt is guaranteed by the Treasury (part of it dollar denominated), which is part of the debt that is to be restructured as per the announcement on 12 April 2022.
Table: Debt guaranteed by Sri Lanka treasury for Sri Lankan Airlines
Accordingly, one option is that we ask strategic investors to pitch in to buy SriLankan outright. The bidding process has to be made transparent and competitive. The airline as a group is making colossal losses, so it is unlikely that we will be able to realise significant proceeds from the sale. As has been said, beggars can’t be choosers.
Another option is for divisions like catering to be sold at concessionary rates to a potential buyer, again through a competitive bidding process, so that we don’t have to shoulder the burden of managing an operation while also closing any future window for corruption.
There is also the option to explore the feasibility of a similar kind of management contract or a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) similar to that which existed with Emirates. However, our airline is now in such a poor shape financially that the feasibility of a management contract is questionable.
There are suggestions to list the airline on the Colombo Stock Exchange and allow investors to buy shares. Generally listings are successful when the company is doing well. At the moment, given the present economic conditions of the country and the historical performance of the entity, this may be challenging.
Finding a strategic investor through a competitive bidding process is still a possibility given our connectivity with the main South Indian airports. Some Indian and international airlines may have an interest in expanding their network and will see a potential win-win situation.
We have to begin the process of privatisation as it is obvious that we can’t run a business on taxpayer money at a time when the people are struggling for their basic survival. The citizens of Sri Lanka gave the management experts of all political parties and their close associates multiple opportunities over 14 years to turn the airline around and bore significant losses in return. Let us hope that policymakers will understand the gravity of the situation and that they will not allow such a huge drain on our coffers to continue unimpeded.
For explanation of SLA losses for 4 years.
The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.