Sri Lanka’s next leader faces a web of crises

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

In two weeks, a newly-elected president and government will take charge of steering the country.

At the beginning of the forex crisis, we warned that an economic crisis often comes as a package of five interconnected crises.

Balance of payments crisis

A balance of payments crisis occurs when excessive borrowing from the central bank (money printing) leads to inflation. In countries like Sri Lanka, where the local currency is not a reserve currency and the economy relies heavily on imports, printing too much money increases the demand for goods and services – many of which are imported.

If exports, remittances, and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) fail to keep up with this increased demand for imports, we run out of foreign exchange reserves, causing the currency to depreciate.

Debt crisis

When foreign currency reserves are depleted, the country struggles to meet its obligations to creditors. While borrowing from international markets might offer temporary relief, credit rating downgrades make this option limited, triggering a debt crisis. On 12 April 2022, Sri Lanka officially declared it could no longer service its debts, despite having the intention to do so.

Banking crisis

If local banks have provided significant loans to the government and the government defaults, a banking crisis can unfold. Sri Lanka narrowly avoided this scenario.

Humanitarian crisis

With debt defaults and depleted foreign reserves, imports become limited. Inflation makes basic necessities unaffordable for the poorest segments of society. In Sri Lanka, poverty numbers surged from three million to seven million, pushing more than 30% of the population below the poverty line.

Political crisis

When a government faces multiple crises such as these, political instability inevitably follows, as we have seen in Sri Lanka. The President was ousted, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister resigned, and an interim Government was formed.

Although the political crisis continues, it is only one phase in an ongoing cycle of instability, with the Presidential Election being a milestone in this process.

Current political landscape

The incumbent President has introduced significant relief measures, including raising public sector salaries, forgiving agricultural loans, and making other promises. However, if re-elected, he will struggle to deliver on these promises within the limited fiscal space, potentially leading to a deviation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme.

Alternatively, he might be forced to raise taxes or borrow more, which would increase interest rates and add to the economic strain.

If another candidate is elected, they will face the same fiscal limitations and may have to reverse salary increases to maintain fiscal discipline.

In the case of a Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) government, the challenges are compounded. The Economic Council within the SJB sends mixed signals about achieving revenue targets to support proposed expenditures. Additionally, the broad alliance of political factions under the SJB presents internal challenges, especially concerning sensitive reforms like State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) restructuring and maintaining Central Bank independence.

Not all factions have aligned views based on previous voting records and public statements. Managing these internal differences will be critical for an SJB government, especially in the context of carrying forward the relief measures introduced by the current President.

Similarly, in a National People’s Power (NPP) government, the same challenges apply. The NPP, primarily led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), advocates for a more State-led development approach, but many professionals in the party’s outer circle lean toward market-driven policies. This could lead to internal conflict, making reforms difficult to implement without alienating part of the party.

This situation resembles the ‘Yahapalana’ Government, where the President and Prime Minister held differing ideologies. As a result, governance became more about managing stakeholders than effective government operation.

If you recall, the Prime Minister made economic decisions through the Cabinet Committee on Economic Management (CCEM), which was later replaced by the National Economic Council appointed by then President Maithripala Sirisena. Stakeholder management within an NPP government could prove just as challenging.

On top of these internal struggles, Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections are expected to follow, adding even more political promises that will further constrain the fiscal space. Reforms tend to slow down during election periods, making debt restructuring more difficult and putting the IMF programme and long-term debt sustainability at risk.

While we may see temporary relief from one or more of these crises, the interconnected nature of these issues means that one crisis could easily trigger the others. The risk factors remain extremely high, underscoring how difficult and sensitive sovereign debt restructuring and recovery can be. There is always a risk of setbacks before we see real progress.

The path forward

Whoever takes office, the best-case scenario involves continuing with reforms aimed at growing the economy, with all political parties supporting these efforts with transparency and accountability.

Stakeholder management will be crucial, but there is no other way to avoid the complete package of five crises. Economic growth, fiscal discipline, and political unity are essential if Sri Lanka is to emerge from this difficult period.

Nearing debt negotiation deal amid economic uncertainty

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

Sri Lanka is hopeful that we can reach a debt negotiation before the first half of the year. Many are focused on the potential for reductions in principal and interest rates or extensions of debt maturities.

According to a recent update from the Ministry of Finance, we are yet to finalise a settlement with our bondholders, although we are close to an agreement. The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the Sri Lankan Government’s proposal is about 9.7%, while the bondholders’ proposal is 11.51%. The total cash outflow according to the bondholder proposal for 2024-2028 is approximately $ 16.6 billion, compared to $ 14.7 billion for the Government’s proposal. Ideally, we should reach a settlement close to the Government’s proposal if all goes well.

Both the initial and revised proposals indicate that bondholders are reluctant to reduce the interest accrued during the suspension of debt repayments. In both proposals, there have been no haircuts on $ 1,678 million of accumulated interest. Only a 4% interest rate has been proposed for 2024-2028.

Bondholders have suggested a 28% reduction on existing bonds, reducing the total bond value from $ 12,550 million to $ 9,036 million. Both parties appreciate the depth of the haircut, particularly with respect to economic growth. These adjustments depend heavily on adhering to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) baseline projections. If we fail to achieve the necessary growth rates, we will receive a deeper concession, and vice versa.

Achieving the best debt restructuring plan for Sri Lanka is crucial and our future hinges on economic growth. The debt level must be compared with the size and growth of the economy because only growth can ensure our ability to repay our debt. Our debt sustainability can only be secured through high growth rates, not solely through the debt relief offered by bondholders.

Economic and governance reforms are essential for growth. Notably, bondholders have proposed an innovative idea called Governance-Linked Bonds (GLB), where Sri Lanka would receive an additional benefit of 50 basis points on two selected bonds, each worth $ 800 million, if we implement two key governance reforms – one qualitative and one quantitative. The quantitative target is to reach a 14% tax-to-GDP ratio in 2026 and 14.1% in 2027.

A list of qualitative targets primarily focuses on publishing procurement contracts and tax exemptions, both of which are included in the IMF Staff-Level Agreement. However, the governance linked bonds, according to the proposal, would only apply to two bonds maturing in 2034 and 2035, each worth about $ 800 million.

While GLBs are an excellent idea, it is questionable whether the incentive is sufficient to encourage a strong governance programme. The savings from a 50 basis point cut in interest for $ 1,600 million would be about $ 80 million. Given that our accumulated interest is also about $ 1,600 million, there is a risk that governments could easily deviate.

Nevertheless, GLBs would send a strong signal to the market that the Sri Lankan administration is committed to governance reforms, which would enhance confidence in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s real challenge is avoiding a second debt restructuring. We can only achieve this by taking necessary steps and reforms to grow the economy, not solely relying on debt restructuring agreements.

Even if we secure a 30% haircut, our debt-to-GDP ratio in 2032 would still be approximately 95%. Over 50% of countries that have undergone a first debt restructuring have experienced a second. In Sri Lanka’s case, a second debt restructuring would be extremely painful for the population.

Moreover, our interest rates must remain high to meet the Government’s debt servicing requirements, attracting more funds. However, high interest rates discourage investment as people prefer to deposit their money in banks, leading to a low investment environment that could slow down growth. This slowdown would bring us back to the challenge of managing debt sustainability. This vicious cycle must be avoided.

Growth can only be achieved through improved productivity in a competitive environment, which arises when people are incentivised to perform. When the State dominates business and we try to manage everything independently, people do not become competitive.

Ultimately, growth is the only viable solution. Sadly, it is the only solution. Growth occurs when markets function effectively.

Understanding corruption: How Sri Lanka’s economic system favours a select few

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

Dr. Sharmini Cooray, one of the Advisors to the Sri Lankan Government regarding the IMF, at the 73rd Oration at the Central Bank made an interesting comment, “Lots of Sri Lankans say nothing works in Sri Lanka. That’s not true. Things work well for a small group of people”. 

Unfortunately Sri Lankans do not understand how things are set up to work for a small group of people. The common narrative is that corrupt individuals created the system we are in today, but the stark reality is that the economic system has been set up in a way to incentivise corruption for individuals. Misdirected anger is then projected on individuals forgetting that the system itself creates the corrupt individuals. This is not to say that the individuals are completely absolved of responsibility, a part of the responsibility is on the individual, yet without fixing the system we cannot fix individuals. 

Below are a few examples of how the current system works for corruption.

Last week the President as the Minister of Finance issued a Gazette notification to increase the Special Commodity Levy (SCL) from Rs.0.25 (25 cents) per Kg to Rs.50 per Kg overnight. The problem here is twofold; it creates the possibility for corruption that incurs a cost to the consumer but also ensures that the government loses tax revenue. 

Information symmetry

Information symmetry or availability of information for all players in the market is very important. As the finance minister increases the tariff by almost 5000% if one importer gets to know of this decision before it is enacted he can easily import adequate stocks for about a year early at Rs. 25 cents per Kg before the festive season. The other players' prices now simply become uncompetitive because their 1Kg of sugar has to be at least higher than Rs. 49, given the tariff rate imposed overnight. As a result the small and medium sugar importers will be wiped out of  the market as they simply cannot compete where one or few players have already imported enough stocks at 25 cents tariff and now the rest have to import at Rs.50 per Kg tariff rate. That is how things are made to work only for a small group of people. One of the main criticisms for the Gotabhaya Rajapaksa Government was that the sugar scam was done in a similar manner. 

Most importantly the tariff increase on sugar will not generate revenue for the government because adequate sugar has been already imported. After about a year it is just a matter of another gazette notification to the finance minister to bring the tariff back to 25 cents and claiming that the relief has been provided to the betterment of the poor people. So ultimately a selected group of people are just getting benefited with the support of the politicians. The truth is the loss tariff revenue will be collected from the poverty stricken by increasing the indirect taxes such as VAT.  

This is one reason this column constantly highlighted the need for keeping a simple tariff structure with menial deviations among HS codes as well as over a period of time. This is just one way of how things are only getting worked out for a selected group of people. 

As a result the public builds a bad perception with a misunderstanding of markets that all businesses are run on the same operating system. The truth is the system affects other businesses very badly because of not having a level playing field. 

The solution is to change regulation where any tariff lines cannot be imposed just by the minister of finance. It ideally has to go through parliament and keep the tariffs on HS codes simple and consistent. The more we keep it complicated the more we incentivise corruption. 

The need for a competitive system has to be institutionalized. The best governance system is making sure competitiveness remains stable. We can only do that by removing laws empowering policy makers that further information asymmetry and provide more power to the people so the market system continues. 

Tax shenanigans 

Not only have we  increased SCL by 5000%, our VAT has also been increased by 3%. When we observe the VAT rate changes, the threshold changes over the last 5 years is very concerning. By doing so we have violated the tax principle of “Stability” by changing things often. When we make one mistake at the beginning, retroactively correcting it is not easy. The VAT increase may have come to compensate for the 20,000 salary hike for the 1.5 million government employees. To make things politically digestible, an attempt may be to increase the VAT before the budget as a press release and announce a big salary increase for government employees as victory. On top of it there vehicle permits and so many perks are the system of how things are making well for a small group of people.  

The simple truth is to make governance work, we have to make market works. Governance is the system of making markets work and making a level playing field. The moment we deviate from markets there is no way we can keep the governance going.  

What happened to our debt?

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lanka’s debt situation is still a mystery for some. During a panel discussion, I pointed out that Sri Lanka’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have amassed a staggering 1.8 trillion in debt, all guaranteed by the Treasury and classified as ‘Public Debt’. One question from the audience was, “What did we do with the money we borrowed?” The simple answer is that money was borrowed primarily to service the interest on the initial loans Sri Lanka took out. Therefore,  despite borrowing substantial amounts, there is nothing tangible or visible to show for it, as a majority was essentially sunk into interest. 

To provide context, since 1999, approximately 74% of the increase in debt can be attributed to interest payments and currency depreciation. Interest payments accounted for a substantial 40% of the debt accumulated since the 1990’s, while the exchange rate depreciation contributed to 33%. 

What Sri Lanka faced was a precarious combination in terms of borrowing and our monetary policy. Our expansionary monetary policy played a significant role in the depreciation of the currency over the years, exacerbating the situation further. Compounding this issue was the fact that approximately 50% of our borrowing was in foreign currency. As it is indicated in 2022, with Modern Monetary theory in play, the significant depreciation of the exchange rate since 2020 led to an accumulation of debt beyond our repayment capacity.

Printing more money artificially increases the demand for foreign exchange.  However, after depleting our reserves in an attempt to defend the currency, the only option left was to allow the currency to float, leading to a sharp depreciation. In the case for Sri Lanka, it was not just the currency depreciation; social unrest, debt default, and numerous other crises followed when the government resorted to borrowing from the Central Bank through money printing.

As at the end of June 2023, our total public debt has increased to USD 96.5 billion, with approximately 50% of it in domestic debt. The country’s public debt now stands at about 127.4% of GDP. Even if debt restructuring is successful after negotiations with the Paris Club and separate discussions with China, we only anticipate a reduction to 95% of GDP by 2032. 

Undoubtedly, expediting the debt restructuring process is crucial, especially given the unpredictable twists in geopolitics. While the tentative agreement with China Exim Bank to restructure the debt is a positive development for Sri Lanka, we must fast track negotiations with our other foreign creditors. Complicating matters, as we approach an election year, there is a significant risk of derailing the process as unfortunately, there is a lack of consensus among political parties regarding the economic stabilization program for the next few years. This further exacerbates the challenges Sri Lanka faces.

Solution 

If Sri Lanka is genuinely committed to resolving its debt crisis, a crucial step is to establish a consensus on public finance across the major political parties. At the very least, adherence to a single plan, such as the IMF program, is necessary. However, even the IMF program alone will be insufficient to take Sri Lanka to the next stage of economic stability. Therefore, there must be a fundamental agreement on specific reforms across party lines. For example, there exists a common minimum program in Parliament, shaped with contributions from the business community and organizations like Advocata. It is not too late to revisit and endorse this document. Committing to these agreed-upon reforms before political parties develop their individual manifestos in the coming years could provide a stable foundation for Sri Lanka's economic future.

Investing in Public Transport

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

As a schoolboy, one promise that I remember being consistently made in Budget speeches was the development of the Marine Drive up to Moratuwa. But now, even in 2023, it has only been developed up to Dehiwala.

When the project was announced, I remember Sri Lankans celebrating. When the project was cancelled, we still celebrated. After leaving school, I often took the train to work, so I practically grew up with the Sri Lankan railway system and the Marine Drive. While the Marine Drive has progressed at a snail’s pace, the Sri Lankan Railway remains almost the same.

Later, when the Light Rail Transit (LRT) project was approved, there was renewed hope and celebrations. Consultants were hired and feasibility studies were done. TV commercials were aired on the impact it could create. However, following some back and forth, a new set of consultants were paid, who then cancelled the project. Again, we celebrated the cancellation, and now once again, we are in discussions to resume the project.

One does not need to be an economist to understand the importance of developing a solid public transport system which helps to improve efficiency, minimise pollution levels, and increase convenience for commuters.

As an initial incentive to get more commuters to consider using buses, the Government attempted to implement bus lanes. The provision of a dedicated lane for vehicles shuttling a large number of passengers would have reduced commute time and congestion, and also incentivised commuters to switch from private vehicles to public transport. Unfortunately, the actual adherence to bus lanes was short-lived; if you look at buses today, they move all over the lanes.

Further, there is a route permit system which effectively blocks the entrance of new players. This has created an oligopolistic market system, with a higher chance for cartelisation of the market. Additionally, the Government has imposed a price ceiling which stunts the space for innovation and value-added services.

For example, the 138 Kottawa-Pettah route – considered to be a route utilised by a significant proportion of the middle class – has no air-conditioned bus service. The lack of an efficient market system has led the players to not even be incentivised enough to employ air-conditioned buses.

The market system works when there are no entry and exit barriers and when room is created for innovation through the pricing mechanism to reflect the scarcity value of the product or service. In the current system, nothing is possible. And yet, modifying the public transport system is not a difficult task and will provide significant relief for the people.

One main problem in Sri Lanka for any type of investment is the ownership of land. Unfortunately, this is not an easy puzzle to resolve. There is no digitised land registry and more than 80% of land (including the forest cover) is owned by the Government – this land can be efficiently used for urban development.

Efficient public transportation with greater accessibility and affordability will create urban living hubs around it. One way to solve this puzzle is to start the digitisation of registration of lands in commercial areas within Colombo and Gampaha. Often, these projects tend to progress at a sluggish pace, falling significantly short of the required speed. The delays have not only driven up the cost but have also resulted in a loss of credibility.

Unfortunately, politicians often prioritise projects with short-term timelines, typically ranging from three to five years, as they require something tangible to showcase before the next election. Therefore, with the current governance structures, even these projects that are scheduled to take place would simply be an attempt to build political capital, instead of improving public transport in order to generate value for the people of Sri Lanka.

Debt restructuring: What’s next?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lanka is passing through a crucial week in its history. The details of the final domestic debt restructuring are yet to be known, but we will soon come to know the final details. However, domestic debt restructuring won’t be the be-all and end-all that will confer the expected level of economic growth – we need reforms across the board for a growth trajectory. Progress can only be achieved through a comprehensive reform plan.

Domestic debt restructuring

No debt restructuring plan is easy. Debt restructuring itself is a very painful process. The ideal solution is to have a sound economy in order to avoid any type of debt restructuring, but we are far from such a scenario. The consequences of any type of debt restructuring would be broadly negative. It would only be positive compared to consequences of not undergoing debt restructuring.

When someone borrows money and later says that they cannot pay it back as promised, it is never a pleasant experience. Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring is no exception. The debt restructuring will have consequences at this stage; it is just a matter of who will bear the burden and whether the relief will be enough for Sri Lanka to at least settle the remainder of its debts.

In the proposed plan by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), it has been suggested the Central Bank, superannuation funds, and the holders of Sri Lanka sovereign bonds and other USD bond holders (issued under Sri Lankan Law) bear the burden of local debt. International sovereign bond holders and bilateral creditors are expected to primarily bear the burden of foreign debt.

Although technically it seems as if bond holders and other creditor segments bear the burden, the truth is that most of the burden has already been shared by people of Sri Lanka through inflation.

In the initial plan, the banking sector was excluded from the debt restructuring process. The CBSL has provided four broad reasons to justify this exclusion.

The banking sector pays about 48% taxes (after tax revisions) (30% corporate tax and 18% VAT on financial services) as opposed to previous taxes of 39% (24% corporate tax and 15% VAT on financial services)

The Non-Performing Loan (NPL) ratio of banks is on the rise (8.4% NPLs in 2022 Q2 to 13.3% in May 2023)

Banks are expected to be impacted by International Sovereign Bond (ISB) restructuring as well as Sri Lanka Development Bond (SLDB) restructuring (banks hold 17% in ISBs and SLDBs)

Many concessions and moratoriums were already provided during Covid, Easter attacks, and the economic crisis, where about Rs. 1.6 trillion worth of loans were under concessions, amounting to about 15% of total loans

The main question is whether the provided debt restructuring is adequate for Sri Lanka to reach its target of 13% Gross Financing Needs (GFNs), 2.5% primary surplus, and 95% of debt to GDP ratio by 2032.

If the restructuring is not adequate enough for us to settle our debts, we will likely have to undergo another restructuring. Most countries which have gone through sovereign debt restructuring have to go through two subsequent debt restructurings on average. We are yet to see the analysis by the CBSL on how to ensure that this restructuring plan is adequate for us to achieve targets.

Ideally, we should avoid any further debt restructuring, because further restructuring would be more difficult, economically and socially.

Impact on superannuation funds

With the proposed restructuring, the social conversation is on the impact on superannuation funds. The Government has assured a minimum of 12% until 2025 and a 9% interest until maturity for the EPF. This is projected to amount to an average of 9.1% in rate of returns.

However, we have to keep in mind that any interest rate needs to be compared to inflation. There is no value in getting a 9% interest rate if inflation is 12%. If so, the Central Bank has to ensure that inflation remains around 5% for the real interest to be 4%.

However, the key impact of the proposed debt optimisation plan on superannuation funds would be that as per the Government’s projections, the rate of return would be 9.1%, which is slightly lower (0.3%) than the current returns. This means that if the status quo continues (for instance with no DDO) at 9.4%, the rate of return will be 0.4% higher than if superannuation funds took part in DDO.

The EPF is a nearly Rs. 3 trillion fund where withdrawals per year are less than Rs. 150 billion. Its collection was approximately Rs. 170 billion in 2022 and generally there is a Rs. 30 billion surplus between collections and refunds every year. People can still withdraw the money and their balance will not be affected, instead, it will result in the forgoing of the additional returns the fund could have made.

Domestic debt restructuring to be considered with other reforms

This debt restructuring will only bring partial relief, even if we undertake the necessary reforms. Even if this debt restructuring is successful, our debt to GDP ratio will be 95% in 2032 as per predictions. That is still a very high number. Ideally, an emerging market like Sri Lanka should remain in the range of 60%.

Sri Lanka will only be able to emerge from this crisis if we move forward with State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) reforms, monetary sector and monetary reforms, and trade reforms. For us to grow our economy, we have to engage in trade. Secondly, we have to avoid growing our debt further through unproductive SOEs. If we fail to fix the rest, we will most likely return to square one, with a much difficult context.

What we, the common people, can do is push our policymakers to allow the market system to operate and limit the size of the Government while pushing for key reforms.

Low-hanging fruit from a disastrous harvest

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

We all want quick fixes to reset the economy. Difficult times like these make quick fixes a vital necessity as patience amongst the public runs thin. However, when an economy grows to a level of high dysfunctionality – as ours unfortunately has – the availability of quick fixes is extremely limited. 

The first step towards economic recovery is for individuals to understand that given the nature of the current crisis, quick fixes simply do not exist. The process of economic recovery can be likened to the growth of a plant. A mere need for a quick harvest does not mean that what is sown can be reaped in just a few days – it takes its own time. All that we can do is to sow the right policy strategy. We will eventually reap what we sow; if we sow the wrong ideas and wrong policies we will have to reap painful outcomes in future, similarly to how we are currently reaping the pain of what we sowed many years ago. 

However, a few quick fixes can still be attempted. One such attempt can be made in the tourism sector. We all know that there is a shortage of fuel for transportation and hotels don’t have reliable electricity. It’s true that tourists consider the situation of the country before they visit, and we are far from presenting an ideal situation. That said, in economic terms what we can do is to provide incentives on the regulatory side for people to visit Sri Lanka. 

One possible measure is to provide an on-arrival short stay visa for selected countries, which will encourage and increase tourist arrivals. Merely maintaining existing regulations will not help in economic recovery as it does not attract tourism. At the same time, Sri Lanka’s aviation authorities charge very high prices for landing and other aviation related services. For example, an economy class flight from Singapore to Colombo costs Rs. 155,000, of which Rs. 35,000 (23%) is incurred in airport and Government taxes. If we reduce those charges, prices of air tickets to Colombo will come down. 

One business leader recently informed me that the price of a flight from Chennai to Colombo was significantly higher than a flight of the same distance and duration from Chennai to other airports in India. Despite the same travel class on the flight, the same quality of staff, and the same distance, the price is mainly driven up by levies and taxes charged when the border is crossed. Given this, bringing down our rates may mean that some audiences may consider visiting Sri Lanka. 

In my humble opinion, when foreign media questioned the Prime Minister on tourism, his answer should have been: “It is a difficult time for all of us, but even with all those difficulties we have the best beaches and the most amazing sunsets and Sri Lanka is still ranked very high on all travel magazines.” 

Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that tourism alone will not be sufficient to turn our economy around. We made this mistake earlier and attempted to settle our sovereign debt through tourism receipts. Generally, about 80% of tourism income will go back as a USD outflow due to the consumption of imported items required to sustain tourism. At the moment, we have little going for us and this is just a suggestion that is scraping the bottom of the barrel. 

Moreover, we have to establish a unified bankruptcy law. It will take time, but it is needed urgently, and it’s important to start now. With the economic downturn, many organisations have had to downsize or wrap up their operations. This is the same sequence of events that has taken place in other countries that were facing similar crisis situations. 

In Sri Lanka, private limited companies have some cover on bankruptcy, but about 80% of the business establishments in Sri Lanka are Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Most of these businesses are registered as proprietorships or as partnerships. When these enterprises are impacted, closing down the company is often the easiest and least painful option, as it helps the entrepreneurs move forward and get to the next phase of their lives quickly. If they have to spend a lot of time wrapping up their existing businesses that are not sustainable, it will slow down the economic recovery process, as a lot of valuable time, energy, money, and effort of capable people will be wasted on shutting down a company which is no longer viable. Therefore, an easy exit for businesses is as important as easy entry. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka’s labour laws do not support such an exit process and therefore, the process of exit is slowed. 

Finally, while accepting that there are no quick fixes to overcome the current crisis, we have to steel ourselves to go through the tough process of bridging reforms for markets to work. Markets work with credibility, a sound legal framework, and the rule of law. Given that the current situation has more to do with a question of credibility, legal reforms often go hand in hand with political reforms. Therefore, policymakers have to look at the reforms from a holistic point of view rather than just seeking out a quick fix. We are at the stage of sowing seeds for future reaping – if we don’t manage this situation well, we will reap a bad harvest once again.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Tackling poverty with competent policies

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

I learnt poverty through two sources. Firstly, I myself have experienced poverty. 

At university, a basic lunch was served for Rs. 20. It was just three curries, and often the only source of protein was a watery fish curry or half an egg. A watery chicken curry with saffron rice was only served on Fridays. It was a very basic meal. There was an option to get a re-serving for Rs. 5.

The re-serving provided only the curries (not the protein source) on the condition that you went with the unfinished plate. Students who couldn’t afford Rs. 20 for the full meal would wait until a friend finished their first round, borrow their unwashed plate, and join the line for just the Rs. 5 re-serving. At one point in my life I was one of those students. 

That’s why this column has alerted the reader many times to the possibility of rising inflation due to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). Money matters, and when inflation starts skyrocketing, basic essentials will be in short supply and the poor will suffer. 

Secondly, I learnt about poverty through my volunteer experience at CandleAid Lanka (1). CandleAid is a Government-approved humanitarian organisation founded by Captain Elmo Jayawardena. I have seen and heard so many stories of poverty and overcoming poverty from around the country during my interactions with CandleAid and Capt. Jayawardena. Out of all the stories, the story of Pahalagedara Jayathilaka is simply inspiring and reshaped my understanding of what poverty means for the poor.

Pahalagedara Jayathilaka was a crippled child who started his education in a borrowed wheelchair. His father had passed away from cancer when he was 10. Once, when narrating Jayathilaka’s story, Capt. Jayawardena said: “Jayathilaka’s best meals at university had been a cream bun or a fish bun.”

To cut a long story short, from the bottom of the poverty barrel, with the sheer determination and pure courage of his mother, Jayathilaka successfully entered the University of Moratuwa. He had come to Moratuwa with just his crutches and Rs. 1,000 in hand. Then CandleAid had provided him with an education sponsorship, through which he obtained superb results and a first class in Mechanical Engineering, and subsequently received a scholarship to the National University of Singapore (NUS). Today he is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Oncology of the University of Oxford (2).

In the terminology of economic research, there are many definitions of poverty, such as urban poverty and rural poverty, but the jargon of researchers is not sufficiently descriptive of the circumstances people find themselves in. When you are actually facing poverty, your decision-making processes, consequences, and outcomes in life are very different. 

For people in poverty, what matters the most is a fair opportunity to have a chance to succeed in life. It is an evolving process and it will never be an overnight miracle. 

They can overcome their circumstances if we establish the proper macroeconomic environment. That is what most of us forget; we forget the basics and try to target poverty without realising that macroeconomic instability causes poverty. 

I believe Pahalagedara Jayathilaka was unstoppable because he got a fair chance to compete as well as  support from a private charitable organisation. He was upskilled, an opportunity was created, and his fate was changed. 

The question during these unprecedented times is: how can we save our poor, and how can we support more people like Jayathilaka to create outstanding success stories? Of course, most people may not have stories as outstanding as Jayathilaka did, but they will at least gradually move above the poverty line and acquire a higher standard of living.

Before any suggestions are made, we need to understand that bringing down the inflation rate is the best way to help the poor. We created this problem of high inflation through bad monetary and fiscal policy, so bringing down inflation and creating stability through competent policy has to be the first priority. 

Furthermore, this column has often suggested the establishment of an efficient cash transfer system through the Government mechanism. While that is still an option, we all know how inefficient our Government apparatus is. 

The other option is to encourage private charitable organisations to help the poor. These organisations have good targeting systems and they have the capacity to reach people like Pahalagedara Jayathilaka and identify those who are truly in need. They are already doing a commendable service at a grassroots level, managing highly agile and impactful charitable projects to look after the poor. 

It would of course be the best case scenario if the Government can manage this, but our experience is that the Government’s management of all affairs is far below even our most basic expectations. 

Most charitable organisations have a far better reputation than the Government, and it is likely that expatriates will be more open to the idea of donating to these organisations than to the State to manage relief for the poor. This will bring in foreign exchange inflows, which will add further relief to our State coffers to manage essential imports.  

The best way to eradicate poverty is by creating wealth. To create wealth we need to first create opportunities, because the easiest tradeable good that the poor have is labour and human capital. We need to set up competitive processes to upskill our labour; poor people will gradually emerge from the poverty trap through the dignity of labour, and not by just becoming henchmen for a political party or by waiting in long queues to get a small cash subsidy or a handout.

A cash transfer system is a must. We should move as fast as possible on this matter. However, looking at how slowly things move with Government bureaucracy, it’s reasonable to assume that this will take time. 

Regardless, poor people cannot stay hungry for long. That is why we have to tackle inflation as public enemy number one and stop adding further inflationary pressures to our economy. Until we get the cash transfer system up and running, private charitable organisations should at least be approached or requested to come forward to utilise their network. They will be able to work faster than the Government and find and support many other Pahalagedara Jayathilakas who can excel. 

I still remember how Captain Jayawardena concluded his long story with a lot of emotion all those years ago. 

Every word I wrote about Jayathilaka is the absolute truth. Jayathilaka does not need colouring.

References:

• https://www.ft.lk/News/some-call-it-courage-e28093-the-definition-is-inadequate/56-39233

• https://www.oncology.ox.ac.uk/team/jayathilake-pahala-gedara

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Salvaging the debt-ridden National Carrier

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Privatising SriLankan Airlines is a hot topic once more, although this discussion is decades old now. Founded as Air Lanka in 1979, the airline was described by Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew as “a glamour project, not of great value for developing Sri Lanka”. 

In 1998 Air Lanka signed a 10-year management contract with Dubai-based Emirates Airline for 40% of shares and provided the Emirates management the ability to make most of the management decisions. Air Lanka was rebranded as SriLankan Airlines. However, after 10 years, Emirates realised that the Sri Lankan Government was not going to renew the contract. 

According to SriLankan Airlines Annual Reports from 2008, the final year in which Emirates operated the airline, it made a profit of Rs. 4.4 billion. It was mentioned in some reports that this profit included insurance claims after the terrorist attacks on the Bandaranaike International Airport. 

Fig 1: Losses and Profits of Sri Lankan Airlines

However, since then, SriLankan Airlines has not made a single cent of profit. Cumulatively it has lost Rs. 372 billion since 2008. The airline made a loss of Rs. 44 billion in 2019, Rs. 47 billion in 2020, and Rs. 45 billion in 2021. Losses in 2019 were equivalent to 93% of the Samurdhi scheme’s budget – Samurdhi being the main social safety net in place to protect the poor. The losses were also equivalent to 84% and 90% of the Samurdhi budget in 2020 and 2021, respectively. These losses are equivalent to 17% of 2019’s health sector allocation in the National Budget. 

The problem is both clear and dire. We maintain a national airline at a substantial loss and ask the common people, many of whom don’t even possess a passport or haven’t even stepped on an aeroplane, to foot the bill. In other words, we are maintaining a failing  airline at the expense of the education and healthcare of our people. 

There are multiple reasons why SriLankan Airlines incurs losses. It is too politicised and many politicians and their relatives are not charged for extra baggage when they travel. Board appointments and recruitments have all been politically driven. Simply put, it is bad management. The general remedy for bad management is to replace it with good management so we can make the enterprise profitable. This has been the popular suggestion each time that the privatisation of SriLankan Airlines has been proposed. That is the exact thing we have been trying to do since we ended the management contract with Emirates. 

We have to ask ourselves why the outcome hasn’t changed even after the same remedy has been proposed and implemented repeatedly. Simply put, when you don’t invest sufficient money, time, or reputation into a business, no one has the ability to make it profitable. All the business leaders who have been appointed to lead the firm already have their own businesses, so it is obvious that SriLankan Airlines will become a secondary priority. 

Airlines are a very competitive business. Even privately-owned airlines are finding it difficult to compete and maximise profits, so how can we expect a State-owned and managed airline to do the same? There is a difference between a private company making a loss versus a State-owned company making a loss. A private company’s losses are borne by the private investors, who knowingly and consensually made the choice to invest their money in a potentially risky endeavour. But when public companies make losses, taxpayers have to pay and their money will be spent without their consent. How can this be justified, especially in a country like Sri Lanka where people suffer from a lack of basic needs, and when our healthcare, education, and social safety nets need significant improvement?

So what can be done about SriLankan Airlines? SriLankan Airlines’ business has few strategic units: The airline operation, catering, and the ground handling operation. Each section has some assets as well as liabilities. Overall, the airline has a lot of liabilities and debt. Most of the debt is guaranteed by the Treasury (part of it dollar denominated), which is part of the debt that is to be restructured as per the announcement on 12 April 2022.

Table: Debt guaranteed by Sri Lanka treasury for Sri Lankan Airlines

Accordingly, one option is that we ask strategic investors to pitch in to buy SriLankan outright. The bidding process has to be made transparent and competitive. The airline as a group is making colossal losses, so it is unlikely that we will be able to realise significant proceeds from the sale. As has been said, beggars can’t be choosers. 

Another option is for divisions like catering to be sold at concessionary rates to a potential buyer, again through a competitive bidding process, so that we don’t have to shoulder the burden of managing an operation while also closing any future window for corruption.

There is also the option to explore the feasibility of a similar kind of management contract or a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) similar to that which existed with Emirates. However, our airline is now in such a poor shape financially that the feasibility of a management contract is questionable. 

There are suggestions to list the airline on the Colombo Stock Exchange and allow investors to buy shares. Generally listings are successful when the company is doing well. At the moment, given the present economic conditions of the country and the historical performance of the entity, this may be challenging.   

Finding a strategic investor through a competitive bidding process is still a possibility given our connectivity with the main South Indian airports. Some Indian and international airlines may have an interest in expanding their network and will see a potential win-win situation. 

We have to begin the process of privatisation as it is obvious that we can’t run a business on taxpayer money at a time when the people are struggling for their basic survival. The citizens of Sri Lanka gave the management experts of all political parties and their close associates multiple opportunities over 14 years to turn the airline around and bore significant losses in return. Let us hope that policymakers will understand the gravity of the situation and that they will not allow such a huge drain on our coffers to continue unimpeded. 

For explanation of SLA losses for 4 years.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Becoming the victim of one’s own policies

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

At a recent press conference, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) announced that importing goods through open accounts was going to be banned as a move to curb the money transfer through undiyal and hawala. In my view, this will have a negative impact on the supply of essential food items, drugs, and some raw materials. 

When a merchant imports goods, they can pay their supplier through a letter of credit. A letter of credit is simply a letter of guarantee by a bank or a financial institution to the supplier/seller that the correct amount will be paid in full on time. To open a letter of credit, the Sri Lankan importers should be able to buy foreign exchange or simply purchase US Dollars. But as we are all aware, all Sri Lankan banks have a drastic shortage of foreign exchange. The shortage is of such severity that we can’t import essentials, and in some cases even life saving drugs. 

In the case of imports, if the buyer and the seller have mutual trust, a letter of credit is not mandatory. They can settle on a credit basis later on. The goods will be cleared on Documents against Payments (DP) or Documents against Acceptance (DA). Most importers and their buyers/suppliers have long-standing business relationships. They pay later either through different modes including hawala and undiyal. This is no secret. They pay an additional charge for hawala and undiyal to buy USD for a reason, which is simply that our banks don’t have sufficient dollars to facilitate imports even if the importer requests the opening of a letter of credit. Otherwise, no businessman would want to pay a higher price for forex if there were cheaper options available. Especially in the areas of food, medicine, essentials, and raw materials, these open account transactions are common. According to a recent news report, approximately $ 1.6-1.8 billion worth of transactions are done on open accounts every month. 

So what could happen when the Central Bank forces these importers to conduct transactions only through letters of credit? Simply put, they may not have any option other than to stop importing. Because banks don’t have USD, they can’t even import on open accounts to settle later. The Central Bank expects more USD to flow into formal channels since the demand for USD through undiyal and hawala is set to decline with the new regulation banning open accounts. Even if the Central Bank’s assumption is right, it won’t happen overnight. Given the uncertainty, importers will either hold or slow down the imports to observe the situation. It will take a few months to settle even if all USD inflows started flowing through official channels. What would happen to our essential food items, certain raw materials for businesses, and drugs during those long months? 

However, so far the Gazette notification has not been issued by the Central Bank, and we have to wait and observe the situation in the next few months.

It is not the first time the Central Bank has burnt its fingers by unnecessary attempts to control the market. 

First, the Central Bank imposed a 100% cash margin requirement on vehicle imports in 2018 and later vehicle importation was banned completely (1).

Later, the Central Bank’s 100% cash margin requirement on selected imports categorised as non-essentials was extended from vehicles to many other imports (2). This column questioned how an officer decides what is essential and what is not essential. A digital camera may not be considered an essential by a writer or a banker, but a camera is an essential to a wedding photographer whose livelihood depends on it. 

Then, the Central Bank stopped the forward purchasing market and only provided space to open letters of credit with a 180-day limit. 

It was then decided to artificially keep the currency at Rs. 200 per USD, and the undiyal and hawala market expanded dramatically.

All the main Key Performance Indicators (KPI) of the Central Bank have been eroded drastically during the same period in which these controls were imposed. Our inflation has increased to 29.8% and our food inflation has increased to almost 50%. Our currency has depreciated by more than 75% in a matter of a few months. Simply put, our Central Bank has fallen far short on all its key indicators regardless of back-to-back controls and interventions. Many new theories employed by CBSL economists, including Modern Monetary Theory, have backfired spectacularly and unfortunately it is the poor people who have to pay the ultimate price in hunger and inconvenience for the grave mistakes of the Central Bank and the Monetary Board.  

As a remedial action to these mistakes, our Central Bank has now made an attempt to ban open accounts and cripple the undiyal and hawala systems. 

In my humble opinion, this may potentially create shortages of essentials and inconvenience the traders and importers who have been supplying the essentials at a higher price. These merchants have been bearing the higher cost of the informal markets boosted by the Central Bank due to mistakes beyond their control made by policymakers. 

We have to first ask ourselves why an importer should bear a higher price on USD to import. Without fixing our monetary policy, there is no point passing the blame to the hawala and undiyal markets. They have existed for centuries in Sri Lanka and around the world because of their competitive and evolving nature. The buck stops with policymakers, and not with merchants or foriegn currency middlemen.

Quite frankly, it will accomplish very little to close the stable door after the horse has already bolted.  

References:

• https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/node/4093

• https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/news/margin-deposit-requirement-of-importation-under-letter-of-credit
  

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Walking the talk on reforms: First step to Lankan recovery

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Often we all see the world the way we want to see it, and not as it is. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis is also seen by many people through their own perception of reality. 

In previous years, we believed that self-sufficiency, State-led industrialisation, State-centred economic planning, and more recently, Modern Monetary Theory, were the way forward for our economy. The current crisis has shown that none of that has really helped us; by contrast, it has exacerbated a poor situation to where we are today.  

Next comes the question of overcoming the crisis. This has to be analysed with context; the most significant piece of context is that we are facing the worst situation we’ve been in since independence in 1948 – and it is only getting worse. 

There are some suggestions to increase industrialisation, improve exports and the trade balance, and incentivise Foriegn Direct Investments (FDIs). However, it is of no use to have lofty goals of industrialisation when we can hardly provide an uninterrupted electricity supply. 

Foreign investors are planning to leave. Investors are by no means considering entering the country. Thus, potential solutions have to be evaluated based on this context. Simply having a wishlist of suggestions with minimal viability will add very little value at this juncture. We need rational solutions to solve the crisis immediately, rather than policies that can only be enacted in times of relative normalcy. 

The Government needs to bring its finances into a sustainable state. Revenue must increase and expenditure should be reduced. Reducing the losses of State enterprises is a way to reduce the deficit without touching social expenditure.

With that in mind, here are a few suggestions for reform:

1. Privatise SriLankan Airlines

At a time when people are struggling to feed their families and when our official usable reserves are less than $ 200 million, there are very few upsides to running a fully State-owned airline making losses equivalent to the value of our entire Samurdhi scheme, which, despite its flaws, is the main social safety net in Sri Lanka. Privatisation will provide strong signals that we are serious about reforms. 

For the last 15 years, we have not made any profits on SriLankan Airlines. We can disclose all finances and ask for interested companies to buy it outright with assets and liabilities. Having a higher liability than assets is the main problem in this instance. With the suspension of debt repayment of State enterprises, Treasury guarantees for the State are on hold at the moment. 

Even if we need to pay a certain amount to the buyer to take it off our hands and sell it off with staff, it is much better than keeping the enterprise in-house and incurring colossal losses repeatedly. The new buyer can be given the responsibility of staff restructuring. We can follow the playbook through which Air India was sold outright by the Modi Government. Our airline is unfortunately no longer an asset but a liability to our national coffers. 

However, it is not only the National Airline that makes losses. There are many institutes that add little value to the public, make massive losses, and are a very high burden on the Treasury. Some of these public enterprises are classified as ‘strategic’ and others as ‘non-strategic,’ but two things they have in common is that, more often than not, they make substantial losses and have very limited transparency. 

There were some discussions to revive Sri Lankan Airlines by appointing business leaders with a profit motive, converting it to a budget airline, and appointing committees to reform and restructure. We have run out of time to even attempt these options. Unfortunately, hard times require hard decisions and we do not have the time, money, or options to avoid them. 

With interest rates and Treasury bill interest rates reaching above 20%, running loss-making enterprises on borrowed money will make our local debt increasingly unstable the more we delay reforms. Most importantly, we don’t need to wait for pressure from creditors or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to kickstart reforms; we can begin them now.

2. Better utilisation of idle assets

Improving service efficiency and increasing revenue of railways through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have to be the way forward for better utilisation of idle assets. 

Sri Lanka Railways is categorised as a department of the Government, even though it is actually a State-Owned Enterprise. Sri Lanka Railways holds a considerable amount of State land which is used very unproductively. 

Fort Railway Station, Maradana Railway Station, and the surrounding land along the track between these two stations are prime examples. Major railway stations such as Kollupitiya, Wellawatte, and Bambalapitiya are all prime beachfront properties which are very poorly maintained and completely underutilised. Land prices in Colombo are extremely high. There are plenty of such examples under the Railways Department with zero or negative value addition to our economy. Sri Lanka Railways first has to be made a State-Owned Enterprise, and then the sector needs to be opened for private sector investment. 

In the past, some train compartments were operated by private players and it was a very successful and lucrative business model. If we eliminate the State railway monopoly and open up the time table, tracks, and properties to the private sector, we can cut down on our fuel consumption significantly, provide a convenient service to passengers, and even turn a loss-making liability into a revenue-generating asset.

Given the very high energy prices at present – which are only set to increase – many people need the option of efficient and robust public transit infrastructure. In any case, the majority of people in Sri Lanka cannot afford to purchase and operate personal vehicles, and trains have been the main source of transportation in areas where they are available.

It is also of paramount importance that the most vulnerable segments of the population benefit from a rehauled cash transfer system, which should cover the energy price component in public transport. Everyone, regardless of their socio-economic stratification, should be given a fair chance to compete in life. 

However, it should be emphasised that these two steps alone will not help overcome the crisis. However, it is a good start to get the wheels rolling on reforms. These reforms will provide an unambiguous signal to investors and the world that we are no longer a NATO (No Action, Talk Only) nation, but a nation that walks the talk.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

How protectionism killed Sri Lankan industry

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was probably a crisis which was analysed (indeed over-analysed) and predicted from an early stage, but we failed to avoid it. We all knew that it was coming and therefore remedies were presented much earlier, but our policymakers simply turned a blind eye. They didn’t have the courage to face reality. Instead, they thought that wishful thinking would save Sri Lanka from the current crisis, and today, we have hit rock bottom. Unfortunately, we are just at the beginning of the crisis and have not even reached the recovery phase.  

It is important to reiterate that self-sufficiency, Modern Monetary Theory, industrial policy, protectionism, and import substitution failed yet again, and this time brought our people down on their knees. While we look towards solutions, we must also understand that it is not easy to rebuild an economy once it collapses. Recovery takes time, and recovery can only happen with the right set of policies.

There is one school of thought that argues that the lack of industrialisation is the reason for Sri Lanka’s balance of payments crisis. The main argument is that if we produced more to export, we would have had more USD revenue and this crisis would not have taken place. So the argument again comes back to import substitution, which involves banning imports or imposing higher tariffs on imports in order to produce locally. The argument is that this can save import expenditure while local manufacturing can scale up in order to focus on exports and bring export revenue. In the same theory, it is recommended that the government picks up which industries should be supported and which industries should not. This is simply going back to the same theory of the central planning model where a few officers decide which industries are good and which are bad. Often quoted examples for this are Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. So today, let’s evaluate the strategy of industrialisation based on market principles. 

In simple terms, you become a good sailor by facing rough waters. Similarly the government selecting which industries to support and which industries to avoid will have consequences for all industries. Industrialisation should take place in a market system that optimally allocates all the available resources. If the government intervenes to assist one industry, it will have a knock-on effect on all other industries. Japan is indeed a classic example. The high-powered Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) recommended that Toyoda not produce cars. But he ignored their advice and today no explanations are required on Toyota’s success and competitiveness. In fact, in our apparel industry, big companies follow Toyoda’s example in the lean manufacturing techniques they pioneered. Rather than providing government support, price controls imposed by the Japanese Government impacted the automobile industry. So government intervention in the markets and industries is a sure recipe for failure. 

In Sri Lanka’s case, industries such as wall tiles, floor tiles, steel, aluminium, bathware, shoes, confectionery, and many others have been protected for decades. Have they become globally competitive due to protectionism and import substitution? In fact, import substitution is the worst we can do to develop exports because it creates an incentive to only produce for the local markets and discourages producers from producing for the global market given the tariff and non-tariff protection. Do our rubber, seafood, apparel, and electronic chips industries require any protection for them to be globally competitive? The simple answer is: no.  

In cricket terms, we can’t create a world class batsman by asking the bowlers to bowl loose deliveries. We can’t create a good bowler by asking the batsman to go soft on bowlers. Only in a competitive environment are heroes created. The protection is a sure way of killing the heroes and robbing poor consumers and exporters simultaneously. That is exactly what we have been doing for the last few decades. 

No export promotion can be done through import substitution; in fact, import substitution is killing our export potential. When the exporters have to pay more than 40% higher for construction materials, it is impossible for even our best performing exports to be competitive in global markets. 

If we observe the trade data, it is clear that our imports and exports are both declining as a percentage of GDP. In 2009, Sri Lanka had nine import taxes in addition to standard customs duties, and five of them are ‘para-tariffs’. Between 2004-2009, our total nominal protection doubled from 13.4% to 27.9%. Higher protectionism also indicates our continuous drop in both imports and exports.

Things got worse over time. The average effective rate of protection for manufacturing production increased from 47% to 63% from 2000 to 2015, and production for the domestic market was over 70% more profitable compared to production for exporting (World Bank, 2005; DCS, 2018). 

Accordingly, industrial policy and import substitution are contributory factors to where we are today with low exports and low productivity in the economy. 

In the history of industrialisation there are certain instances where some countries protected local industries, but in the success stories, protection had been given for a specified, strict time period or output and had a price-based structure.

Countries such as South Korea and Vietnam too became competitive not through import substitution but by allowing the markets to work. In a paper authored by Advocata Advisor Prof. Premachandra Athukorala, he quotes General Park Chung-Hee, who is considered the father of the Korean economic miracle: 

“The economic planning or long-range development programme must not be allowed to stifle creativity or spontaneity of private enterprises. We should utilise to the maximum extent the merit usually introduced by the price mechanism of free competition, thus avoiding the possible damages accompanying a monopoly system. There can be and will be no economic planning for the sake of planning itself.”

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Compounded crises: IMF the only way out

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Economic crises are difficult to solve. In the case of a natural disaster, we know that it will come to an end at some point. We just have to manage for a short period until everything settles. By contrast, economic crises are different. They generally come in a package of five separate but intertwined crises if not managed well. It is clearly best to avoid crises, but when the crisis hits, and if we fail to manage it, the situation becomes significantly worse. Sri Lanka, unfortunately, seems to be managing the situation badly. 

What we are currently experiencing is the balance of payments crisis. Simply put, we don’t have sufficient US Dollars to import essentials, including fuel and medicine. As a result, the lifestyle that we used to live cannot be sustained as long as these conditions prevail. 

The second crisis just around the corner is the debt crisis. We have a $ 1 billion payment to be paid on 25 July and our usable reserves amount to only about $ 150 million. It has clearly come to the point where restructuring debt is unavoidable. Debt restructuring will be a painful process for creditors and debtors equally. This will have an unavoidable impact on the local economy. Additionally, the debt restructuring can be done with an IMF programme. The IMF is the only organisation that can bring credibility to a country that has proved that “it is not good for money”.

The critical question is, how is Sri Lanka going to finance its trade until we negotiate with the IMF and have an agreed-upon programme of restructuring debt? If we had sufficient reserves, we would at least have had a backup option, but we all know reserves are not built for day-to-day imports but for an emergency situation like Covid-19. The other option is to get support from bilateral partners until we finalise the negotiations. Even for that to take place, generally an IMF programme is essential as they need to have some assurance that the money will be utilised to import essentials but not to bail-out any bond holders. Hence it is essential to enter into an IMF programme as early as possible, rather than beating around the bush. 

In an ideal scenario, as a country we should have moved forward with reforms before going to the IMF seeking funds and advice. Indeed, if we had carried out these reforms at the right time, then we would not have needed to go to the IMF. But if we are not doing things correctly, it’s sensible to go to the IMF, not only because of the money, but for credibility and discipline. The current situation is that we are already late – and the clock is ticking. There are massive shortages nationwide, which have the potential to get worse. The Government is yet to be clear about whether we intend to have an IMF programme and even as this article is being written, the country did not even have a finance minister to initiate any such discussions.

The third crisis of the package is the financial crisis. Particularly in the process of debt restructuring, some of these bonds are held by domestic banks. So restructuring will affect the local financial system. Furthermore, most of the local banks have extended credit guarantees for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and it is likely that their debt will also be required to be restructured. So the impact on the financial sector can trigger a third crisis.

As these triple crises bear down, the political capital enjoyed by the Government will undoubtedly wear away. As a result, political instability will start kicking in. Especially in a country like Sri Lanka, where most essential services like fuel, electricity, and water are provided by the Government, the moment interruptions start, public resistance increases at a higher rate. In the Sri Lankan case, the political crisis has overtaken the debt crisis and the financial crisis. We are in the middle of a political and balance of payment crises and the other two crises are just a matter of time. 

The final crisis in the package is the humanitarian crisis. Especially if we fail to secure some funding lines without also delaying IMF negotiations, there is a risk of extended power cuts and further deterioration of living conditions. This can trigger a humanitarian crisis. If we drift to a disorderly default, as the Financial Times reports, “Disorderly default is the same as civil war.”

Already there are stories in the news about shortages of medicine and medical equipment and postponement of surgeries, all of which impact the humanitarian needs of the people. So urgent action is needed! However, Sri Lanka is in a complete state of dysfunction; there is no solid Government or cabinet ministers to make decisions, while public resistance keeps mounting. 

The nature of an economic crisis is that one crisis will keep instigating another and it’s not going to just go away. It takes a lot of time to overcome after things go out of control. 

We are very far behind and we need someone who really understands the depth of reforms needed and the work plan we have to adhere to. The general optimistic sentiment of ‘this shall too pass’ really won’t work here. We have expected the same to happen for a long time but it really hasn’t happened. 

Before we move to reforms, we need to keep in mind, for future reference, the cost of bad economic policy. Self-sufficiency, protectionism, intervening in markets, and ad hoc policy decisions are a recipe for a disaster and sadly we are facing one now.

We have to immediately increase interest rates and remove all surrender requirements by the Central Bank. In an economic crisis, dimensions are different. We have to immediately go to the IMF with a short- and medium-term plan with political consensus on implementation for the next five to eight years.

The problem and the solutions are already known. We need credibility, commitment to undertake reforms, and competence for execution of reforms to overcome. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

There’s a childhood memory engraved in my mind, of an incident with a fellow schoolmate concerning an act of borrowing. Back then, we borrowed money from each other constantly to eat sweets and junk food and buy video game gadgets. A particular friend of mine had the habit of borrowing a little money every week and settling the same again after a week’s time right on schedule. After a few weeks, I realised he borrowed the same amount of money from another friend as well. 

Like a well-planned roster, he proceeds to settle his debt with the other friend in a week’s time. One day my frequently borrowing friend did not settle my money as he promised. When I confronted him on the matter, he plainly stated that he settled the amount owed to me with the money he borrowed from my other friend and vice versa. At this one instance, the other friend had refused to lend money to my frequently borrowing friend so he was unable to settle with me. 

But what was particularly amusing was what he said after. “What I have been borrowing and settling for the past few weeks is money from the two of you to each other. So to resolve the matter, the two of you must settle with each other because it’s your money. Not mine.” 

Sri Lanka’s debt servicing is a much more complex version of what my classmate did; we settle our creditors by borrowing from someone else. Most sovereign countries do the same. However, this can only be done when someone agrees to give us money. Similar to the incident with my friend, the moment people refuse to lend us money, the cycle starts collapsing. That is exactly what happened to Sri Lanka. As a result, the country has lost its credit rating by international rating agencies and has thereby lost market access. 

The current strategy we follow is requesting lifelines from our bi-lateral partners as a form of assistance. As a result, in just five days, India threw in about $ 1.4 billion worth of credit lines and swaps to secure our fuel, medicine, essential supplies, and debt repayments. 

Initially, China provided us with a swap of 10 billion Yuan as a back-up, which the Central Bank absorbed as reserves according to their data. 

At the same time with some of the bi-lateral partners, our relationship has not been professional. We cancelled the LRT project with Japan, which is our main bilateral creditor as well as the main funder for one of our main multilateral partners, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). To make matters worse, we keep the trade channels such as vehicles and spare parts closed, which is precisely where the bilateral relationships can be strengthened. 

Our mismanagement of bilateral relations is reflected, even with China. Recent events, such as our shortsighted handling of diplomatic relations over the fertiliser issue, with China blacklisting a state bank for not honouring payments, illustrates this issue. 

Economically and geopolitically, we have lost market access for borrowing on one hand, and on the other, we have somewhat tarnished the relationship with our friends at a time when we need their assistance the most. So far, we have been very lucky to still have their continuous support regardless of the setbacks even though the fault is on our end entirely. As a recommendation, the Government should not take the silence of some bilateral partners lightly, but work double-time to restore trust and understanding in business and trade. 

The current strategy of paying our International Sovereign Bonds through bilateral swaps and depending on credit lines for essentials will eventually come at a geopolitical expense. We become more vulnerable with our past track record of working with our bilateral partners. 

In this context, the Central Bank increased policy rates by 50 basis points, a policy move in the right direction. However, this comes – unfortunately – too late to stop the inflationary pressure constantly building, probably due to the faulty use of Modern Monetary Theory, which we have been following for some time now. The policy rate revisions will encourage people to save more money instead of spending more. This will somewhat ease the pressure, but at the same time slow the economy down. But we can’t afford to accelerate the economy with a historic balance of payment crisis which was already exacerbated by a price control on US Dollars (USD) in an attempt to encourage imports and discourage exports. 

Surprisingly, policymakers have not taken any reforms to overcome the situation, believing that debt servicing through borrowed money will solve the problem. Very high hopes have been kept on tourism but the same thing that happened to remittances will happen to tourism when we try to keep the exchange rate very low. We encourage people to keep the USD in grey markets so people will become further reluctant to sell their hard-earned USD to the Central Bank. 

At the same time, we need to understand tourism also increases the consumption of the economy where, with USD inflows, there will be a fair share of USD outflows concurrently. Thus, keeping all our eggs in the basket of tourism would not be advisable at all. If policymakers recall, at the beginning of the pandemic, remittances were at a record high. With mounting debt, our policymakers replied that our solutions remained in our remittances, which today are in decline due to our own policy failures. In this context, there are certain areas for restructuring that policymakers have to consider if they were to come out of the crisis: 

1. Restructuring of our social security net. A market pricing-based digital cash transfer system with better targeting than Samurdhi is recommended to provide poor people the opportunity to keep their noses above the water to navigate through the economic reform period

2. Restructuring and Reforms on the State sector and State-owned enterprises are a must. Listing the debt of State-owned enterprises, privatisations, consolidations and outright sale of some of the assets owned by State-owned enterprises is required for the private sector, including land. Government care has to be limited through a reasonable voluntary retirement scheme

3. Restructuring and Reforming in our Central Bank .The current tools of excessive interventions by the Central Bank on interest rates, exchange rates and every part of monetary policy has to be refined

4. Restructuring and reforming our tax system and tariff system is a must. Currently, our income and corporate tax systems are too complicated and it has to be simplified if policy makers are interested in increasing revenue. The complicated tariff structure has to be simplified with three tariff bands. Bringing down tariffs will also help the Government increase the revenue and boost trade

5. Restructuring and reforming our production structures for it to be aligned with global production and supply chains is vital to increase export revenue. At the same time, a deregulation drive has to be initiated to ensure conducive business environment for locals and foreigners

6. If our debt is unsustainable, we have to consider a restructuring of debt, but with the above-mentioned reforms. Attempting to do a debt restructuring without a solid commitment to reform will worsen the problem and debt restructuring could become a frequent event causing us to lose our credibility and market access if we fail to do the necessary reforms

All these ideas are not new and not a first mention in this column. These have been repeatedly spoken of by countless economic experts. It is simply that the call to action rate is very low. Policymakers whose job is to change policies and get things done. Not to behave like my classmate – paying debts with borrowed money, wiping their hands clean, and shifting the responsibility elsewhere at the last minute.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Will Budget 2022 help reset Sri Lanka’s economy?

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Dr. Roshan Perera

A budget sets out the government’s plan for the economy together with the financial resources required to achieve those plans. It also indicates the broad policy direction and priorities of the government. Any assessment of the Budget cannot be undertaken without an understanding of where the economy is right now. In other words, the Budget must be evaluated in the current economic context.

Looking at the key economic indicators, it is clear that the economy is at a critical juncture. The country suffered the sharpest decline in economic growth in 2020. Although growth is picking up, the economy is likely to remain below pre-pandemic levels. Inflation is rising due to external pressures from supply side disruptions and shortages in international markets. Domestically, financing of the Government’s budget through banking sources (Central Bank and commercial banks) is exerting upward pressure on prices. On the fiscal front, government revenue declined to historic lows due to the impact of sweeping tax policy changes as well as the slowdown in economic activity. Meanwhile, the Government has very little leeway on expenditure, as much of it goes to pay salaries of government servants and to make interest payments – all contractual obligations. The consequent widening fiscal deficit has been financed through increasing borrowings leading to higher debt levels and debt service payments. Downgrading of the sovereign by rating agencies has limited access to international capital markets, exacerbating issues in the macroeconomy. The current economic crisis is not due to the Covid-19 pandemic alone. Sri Lanka entered the pandemic with a slowing economy and a weak fiscal position; the result of years of poor economic policies undertaken by successive governments.

Budget 2022 was an opportunity for the country to reset and for the economy to move to a more sustainable growth path. With Sri Lanka losing access to capital markets and large debt service payments over the next few years, the urgent need was to restore fiscal credibility and strengthen market confidence. Because credibility of the fiscal strategy is vital for stabilising the macroeconomy and restoring the confidence of investors. Hence, the primary focus of the Budget 2022 should have been on correcting the twin deficits, i.e., the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit, because of the spillover effects into the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates.

According to the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework, the fiscal deficit is projected to decline to 8.8% in 2022 from 11.1% in 2021 (see Table 1 for details).

With minimal wiggle room on the expenditure front, the focus of fiscal consolidation is on revenue generation. Tax revenue is projected to increase by 50% in 2022 from the revised estimates for 2021. Given that actual revenue consistently falls short of estimates, how realistic these projections are is called into question. A major portion of the increase in tax collection in 2022 is expected from the introduction of several new taxes. In addition, the VAT rate on banks and financial service providers is proposed to be raised to 18% from 15% as a one-time increase. Collectively, these taxes are estimated to raise Rs. 304 billion, accounting for around 46% of the total projected increase in tax revenue in 2022 (See Table 2 for details).

As a comparison, the Interim Budget for 2015 introduced a super gains tax of 25% applicable on any company or individual with profits over Rs. 2 billion in the tax year 2013/14 as a one-off tax. The revenue collected from this tax was Rs. 50 billion. Furthermore, the social security contribution is similar to the Nation-Building Tax (NBT), which was a 2% tax on turnover imposed on entities with liable turnover in excess of Rs. 15 million per annum. In 2019, the NBT generated revenue of Rs. 70 billion before it was abolished in December 2019. With a higher turnover threshold and the current restrictions on imports, it will be challenging to raise the estimated revenue from the proposed social security contribution. In addition, the ability to raise the proposed revenue depends on how expeditiously required legislation can be presented to Parliament. Delays in passing legislation have hampered revenue collection in the past.

The question that needs to be asked is why introduce new taxes on a revenue administration that is already stretched when there is ample room to revise thresholds and rates on several existing taxes. This would have been much simpler to implement and would have required minimal amendments to existing legislation. In addition, taxes with retrospective effect, such as the surcharge tax, are not good signals for prospective investors.

The big question is whether the revenue estimates in Budget 2022 are based on reasonable projections. What if the proposed revenue collection does not materialise? Is there leeway to cut expenditure to match the revenue shortfall? If not, will this mean a widening budget deficit and additional borrowing? With minimal access to foreign financing sources, this will mean higher borrowing from domestic sources, particularly the banking sector. This will have economy-wide implications through higher domestic interest rates and crowding out resources from the private sector.

On the expenditure front, overall, there has not been a huge increase in total expenditure. However, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Public Security account for around 12% of total expenditure, while spending on health and education accounts for 6% and 4%, respectively, of the total. In terms of the composition of expenditure, salaries and wages comprise 34% of recurrent expenditure while interest payments account for 37%. While the Government has limited room to cut expenditure, making permanent another 53,000 graduate trainees may not provide the best signal in terms of the Government’s commitment to reversing the fiscal situation. Furthermore, the Budget for 2022 has reduced the allocation for subsidies and transfers. An important lesson from the pandemic was the need to build buffers during good times to be able to assist vulnerable households and micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) who were disproportionately affected. Although the Budget proposes a one-off cash transfer to selected groups such as MSME entrepreneurs, school bus and van drivers, three-wheel drivers, and private bus drivers who were affected by the lockdowns, it does not address informal workers in other sectors of the economy who account for around 60% of the total workforce. Ad hoc cash transfers are not sufficient to address these issues. A more comprehensive social protection scheme is required to prevent vulnerable groups from falling into poverty due to unexpected events.

Macroeconomic stability also requires external sector stability. Large foreign debt service payments and dwindling foreign reserves have led to import controls and a tight rein on foreign exchange market. But a more sustainable solution to the external crisis is to encourage exports. The Budget refers to transforming the economy into an advanced manufacturing economy and encouraging exports to earn foreign exchange. This requires addressing the structural weaknesses in the economy hindering competitiveness and productivity. In this light, the question to ask is if spending priorities and policy measures announced in Budget 2022 address these bottlenecks. The Budget has allocated Rs. 5 billion for infrastructure for new product investment zones. In addition, the Budget refers to “…a special focus on expanding the IT sector and promoting BPOs and…a techno-entrepreneurship-driven economy”. However, the allocation for digitalisation is less than Rs. 5 billion. This is in comparison to the allocation for highways of around Rs. 270 billion and rural development programmes (Gama Samaga Pilisandara) of around Rs. 85 billion.

(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Advocata Institute and a former Director of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka)

A framework for economic recovery

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Dr. Roshan Perera

A twin deficit problem

For much of its post-independence period Sri Lanka has been characterised by twin deficits: fiscal deficits and deficits in the external current account. What this implies is the country spends more than it earns and consumes more than it produces. The two deficits are linked because the deficit in the external current account reflects the sum of the deficit in private savings (where private investment is greater than private savings) and government dissaving (where government expenditure is greater than government revenue). If a government continues to consume more than it earns and/or domestic private savings are not sufficient to finance investment in the economy this is reflected in a widening of the deficit in the external current account. 

If a country is running a deficit in the external current account deficit it is important to understand what is driving this deficit. If it is due to a deficit in private savings and investment that may not be such a bad thing because the shortfall is probably being financed through foreign direct investments (FDI) and in any case it is leading to an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Thereby increasing future growth potential of the country. On the other hand, if the current account deficit is due to the government spending more than it earns, this would need to be financed through increased borrowings. And a country just like a household cannot continue to borrow indefinitely. There will come a day of reckoning. You will come to a point where you are not able to service your debt or you may be able to service your debt, but you won’t have the income to buy what you need to live (food, clothing, education, health etc).  It may come to a point where your creditors will stop lending to you. Or even if they do lend, they will charge you a very high interest rate which will only worsen your debt situation. So, what is true for a household is true for a country.  

Consequences of living beyond our means

Large deficits in the fiscal and external account have been financed through borrowings both from the domestic market (which has crowded out resources for the private sector) and external sources (which has led to an unsustainable level of foreign debt). Although in the short-term high government spending may stimulate economic growth in the medium to long term it acts as a drag on growth due to its impact on interest rates and the exchange rate. 

When a government borrows continuously from the domestic market it crowds out resources from the private sector and drives up interest rates. Thus, making it unviable for a firm to borrow because the cost of borrowing is higher than the return it could earn from investing. In addition, when a country has a large external debt, it attempts to fix the currency to stabilize the debt stock. But this could result in an overvalued exchange rate which leads to an anti-export bias and an import bias which further worsens the trade deficit and external finances. This is contrary to what an economy like Sri Lanka with a small market (both in terms of size and per capita income) needs. As expanding trade is the only sustainable path to faster growth and employment generation. 

The availability of concessional financing from multilateral and bilateral donors enabled the country to run fiscal and external deficits over many decades. Although access to low-cost financing ended when the country graduated to middle-income status, we didn’t change our spending patterns to suit our income. Instead, we sought alternative sources of financing, borrowing from financial markets and commercial sources at high interest rates and with shorter repayment periods. Consequently, by 2016, the share of foreign debt from non-concessional sources rose to over 50%. This has enormously increased debt service payments. Today, Sri Lanka has one of the highest levels of government debt in its history and its debt service payments are one of the highest in the world (absorbing 72% of government revenue in 2020). This has led to both domestic and external resources being diverted to servicing past debt to the detriment of future growth. 

Policy Priorities

Advocata Institutes’ recent report “A Framework for Economic Recovery” propose several policies to address macroeconomic imbalances and structural reforms for sustainable and inclusive growth. 

Firstly we need to address the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. Primarily, correcting the twin deficits because they have spillover effects into the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates. Priority should be given to fixing the tax system. Tax revenue which was over 20% of GDP in the 1990s has plummeted to 8% in 2020 and is likely to fall further in 2021. Expanding the tax base and improving tax administration are key to reversing the long-term downward trend in government revenue. Currently the personal income tax threshold in Sri Lanka is more than four times its per capita GDP and even higher than the tax threshold in countries with per capita incomes that are several times that of Sri Lanka, such as Singapore and Australia. A high tax threshold removes a significant portion of the working population that can contribute to tax revenue. Tax exemptions for businesses should be rationalised and the granting of exemptions centralised under one authority.  Evidence suggests that sweeping tax exemptions are not the most important factor in attracting investments and foregoing this tax revenue is not sustainable in the long term. 

With declining tax revenue collection, the government faces severe resource constraints. Expenditure on contractual obligations interest payments, salaries and wages and pension payments) has come at the cost of spending on building human capital (health and education). This needs to be reversed. Serious attention needs to be paid in the budget to rationalising the public sector and strengthening budgetary oversight mechanisms so that the government is held accountable for how they use the resources entrusted to them.

Secondly, we need to stimulate economic growth and improve the country’s competitiveness. Sri Lanka has experienced very volatile growth rates and in recent times spurts of debt fuelled economic growth. But this growth has neither been inclusive nor sustainable. We need to generate growth that is both inclusive (benefits all our citizens) and sustainable (growth that does not jeopardise future generations). The budget needs to address the structural weaknesses in the economy hindering productivity driven growth. Some policies that we discuss in our report are: (1) improving the business environment by reducing regulatory barriers which are needed to attract foreign direct investment. Sri Lanka lags its peers in the areas of doing business and competitiveness; (2) unlocking access to land which has been identified as a major bottleneck for investment; (3) creating a flexible labour market and raising labour force participation. There are a plethora of legislation governing labour in SL which act as a serious impediment for job creation. Further, Sri Lanka has a rapidly aging population and is no longer benefitting from a demographic dividend. However, it has access to a large untapped source of female labour. Encouraging greater female participation in the labour force requires removal of legislation restricting employment of female workers and improved provision of services such as childcare and safe transport; (4) addressing infrastructure gaps to enhance productivity and efficiency of the factors of production. We need to invest in infrastructure that has high social and economic returns. This requires better processes for project appraisal and selection, better management of risks which otherwise could lead to cost overruns and project delays and greater accountability to reduce waste and corruption.

Finally, the budget needs to build buffers to strengthen the resilience of the economy to shocks. 

Households have been disproportionately affected by the ongoing pandemic because they lack the buffers to cushion them from economic shocks. Workers, particularly in the informal sector, have lost jobs due to the impact of lockdowns and the closure of borders. Although the government provided some relief to households affected by the pandemic by way of income transfers, the lack of fiscal space constrained the government’s ability to adequately respond to the crisis. In addition, Sri Lanka’s existing social protection scheme has significant coverage gaps. Establishing a universal social safety net and reducing targeting errors will ensure that those who need support receive it when they need it most. 

Micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) play a vital role in the Sri Lankan economy. This sector was severely affected by measures taken to contain the spread of the virus, such as travel bans, lockdowns and social distancing. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic, the government and the Central Bank introduced various emergency liquidity support programs, debt moratoriums and extension of credit at concessionary interest rates. These schemes may have prevented some firms from bankruptcy. However, the inability of the government to continue providing such relief given the prolonged nature of the pandemic and fiscal constraints requires other measures to be put in place to deal with such situations. Given the size of this sector and its importance to the economy, ensuring the solvency of these firms as well as increasing their productivity is paramount to Sri Lanka’s long term economic growth prospects. Many firms will emerge from this pandemic with seriously impaired balance sheets. Firms that are not resilient, uncompetitive, or heavily indebted will probably fold due the crisis. To reduce the adverse economic impact of ad hoc closures, the government must ensure access to an effective bankruptcy regime. Such a mechanism will strengthen economic resilience, while incentivising firms to prioritise strategies to repair balance sheets in the medium term before they reach bankruptcy.  

(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Advocata Institute and a former Director of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka)

Budget 2022: Macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms for inclusive and sustainable growth

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dr. Roshan Perera

Years of profligate living finally caught up with us. Sri Lanka, for much of its post-Independence period, has been living beyond its means: We have been spending more than we earn and consuming more than we produce. Our extravagant lifestyle was made possible by the availability of concessional financing from multilateral and bilateral donors. This ended once we graduated to a middle-income country. But we didn’t change our spending patterns to match our income. Instead, we sought alternative sources of financing. We borrowed from financial markets and commercial sources at high interest rates and with shorter repayment periods.

Consequently, by 2016, the share of foreign debt from non-concessional sources rose to over 50%. This had an enormous impact on our debt service payments. Today, Sri Lanka has one of the highest levels of government debt in its history and its debt service payments are one of the highest in the world (absorbing 72% of government revenue in 2020). This led to both domestic and external resources being diverted to servicing past debt to the detriment of future growth.

According to current estimates, Sri Lanka has around $ 26 billion in foreign debt obligations due between now and 2026. Sovereign rating downgrades made rolling over this debt challenging. But these are contractual obligations and there could be serious repercussions if a country defaults on its debt. Due to the decline in foreign inflows owing to the pandemic, the Government resorted to short-term measures such as bilateral swaps to shore up foreign reserves. However, there was a steady drawdown of the country’s foreign reserves to meet these debt obligations. Foreign reserves, as at end-September 2021, declined to $ 2.5 billion (which was equivalent to 1.5 months of import cover). Foreign currency obligations falling due within the next 12 months amount to around $ 7 billion. The current level of foreign reserves is grossly inadequate to service the Government’s debt.

Furthermore, using a country’s foreign reserves to pay debt obligations is not a good strategy in the long term. Foreign reserves play an important role in an economy – by providing a buffer against possible external shocks, smoothing temporary fluctuations in the exchange rate, and providing confidence to foreign investors.

With limited access to foreign financing, the Government is relying more on domestic sources to bridge the fiscal deficit. To keep interest costs low, domestic interest rates have been suppressed, which has effectively dried up the market for government securities. This has led to debt monetisation, with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) purchasing a major share of government securities issued in the primary auction. However, there are costs involved with this strategy, as high monetary growth leads to high inflation. It also undermines the independence of the CBSL and hinders its use of its key monetary policy instrument, the interest rate, to manage inflation.

So, what needs to be done? Advocata Institutes’ recent report titled “A Framework for Economic Recovery” proposes several policies to address macroeconomic imbalances and structural reforms for sustainable and inclusive growth. These policies are not new. If you examine macro stabilisation programmes that have been implemented in this country (or in other countries that have faced similar economic issues), you would broadly find similar recommendations. This does not mean the recommendations made in the past were wrong – but rather that successive governments did not follow through on the reforms needed to ensure long-term macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth.

This time is different in one aspect. Sri Lanka has lost access to financial markets due to its rating downgrade. Hence, it is not able to easily refinance its foreign debt. In previous stabilisation programmes, although debt sustainability was a major concern, it was addressed through a fiscal consolidation programme. This alone may not be sufficient in the current context. The country may need to engage in a pre-emptive debt restructuring exercise to prevent default. A wilful default could disrupt access to future financing, reduce investor confidence, affect credit ratings, and have a negative impact on the reputation of the country. However, debt restructuring is a complex process and securing a deal that is acceptable to a majority of creditors is fraught with difficulty, as there are many stakeholders involved, and conflicts of interest are inevitable, hence the need to engage with an institution such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the negotiation process.

The focus of Budget 2022 should be to address the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. Primarily, correcting the twin deficits, i.e. the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit, because these have spillover effects into the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates. Priority should be given to fixing the tax system. Tax revenue, which was over 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1990s, has plummeted to 8% in 2020 and is likely to fall further in 2021. Expanding the tax base and improving tax administration are key to reversing the long-term downward trend in government revenue.

Currently, the income tax threshold in Sri Lanka is more than four times its per capita GDP and even higher than the tax threshold in countries with per capita incomes that are several times that of Sri Lanka, such as Singapore and Australia. A high tax threshold removes a significant portion of the working population that can contribute to tax revenue. Tax exemptions should be rationalised and the granting of exemptions centralised under one authority. Evidence suggests that sweeping tax exemptions is not the most important factor in attracting investments, and foregoing this tax revenue is not sustainable in the long term. With declining tax revenue collection, the Government faces severe resource constraints.  Expenditure on contractual obligations (interest payments, salaries and wages, and pension payments) has come at the cost of spending on building human capital (health and education). This needs to be reversed. Serious attention needs to be paid in the budget to rationalising the public sector and strengthening budgetary oversight mechanisms so that the Government is held accountable for how they use the resources entrusted to them.

Secondly, we need to stimulate economic growth and improve the country’s competitiveness. Sri Lanka has experienced very volatile growth rates and in recent times, sudden spurts of debt-fuelled economic growth. But this growth has neither been inclusive nor sustainable. We need to generate growth that is both inclusive (benefits all our citizens) and sustainable (growth that does not jeopardise future generations). The budget needs to address the structural weaknesses in the economy hindering productivity-driven growth. Some policies that we discuss in our report are:

1. Improving the business environment by reducing regulatory barriers, which is needed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Sri Lanka lags behind its peers in the areas of doing business and competitiveness

2. Unlocking access to land that has been identified as a major bottleneck for investment

3. Creating a flexible labour market and raising labour force participation. There are a plethora of legislation governing labour in Sri Lanka which act as a serious impediment for job creation. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has a rapidly ageing population and is no longer benefitting from a demographic dividend. However, it has access to a large untapped source of female labour. Encouraging greater female participation in the labour force requires removal of legislation restricting employment of female workers and improved infrastructure such as childcare and safe transport services

4. Addressing infrastructure gaps to enhance productivity and efficiency of the factors of production. We need to invest in infrastructure that has high social and economic returns. This requires better processes for project appraisal and selection, better management of risks which otherwise could lead to cost overruns and project delays, and greater accountability to reduce waste and corruption.

Finally, the budget needs to build buffers to strengthen the resilience of the economy to shocks. Households have been disproportionately affected by the ongoing pandemic because they lack the buffers to cushion them from economic shocks. Workers, particularly in the informal sector, have lost jobs due to the impact of lockdowns and the closure of borders. Although the Government provided some relief to households affected by the pandemic by way of income transfers, the lack of fiscal space constrained the Government’s ability to adequately respond to the crisis.

In addition, Sri Lanka’s existing social protection scheme has significant coverage gaps and needs to be extended to include informal sector employees, daily wage earners, and self-employed workers. Ad hoc payments are not sufficient to keep people from falling into poverty. Urgent action is needed to establish a universal social safety net and reduce targeting errors to ensure those who need support receive it when they need it most.

Micro, small, and medium-scale enterprises (MSMEs) play a vital role in the Sri Lankan economy, accounting for over half of Sri Lanka’s GDP and over 90% of total enterprises and 45% of employment in the non-agriculture sector. This sector was severely affected by measures taken to contain the spread of the virus, such as travel bans, lockdowns, and social distancing. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic, the Government and CBSL introduced various emergency liquidity support programmes, debt moratoriums, and extension of facilities at concessionary interest rates. While these schemes may have prevented some firms from bankruptcy, the Government is unable to continue providing such relief, given the prolonged nature of the pandemic and the fiscal constraints it faces.

However, given the size of this sector and its importance to the economy, ensuring the solvency of these firms as well as increasing their productivity is paramount to Sri Lanka’s long-term economic growth prospects. As the pandemic continues to affect economic activity, many firms will emerge with serious impact on their balance sheets. Therefore, as economies transition to normalcy, it is important to repair balance sheets by reducing unsustainable debt and rebuilding cash reserves. Firms that are not resilient, are uncompetitive, or are heavily indebted will collapse during such crises. To reduce the adverse economic impact of ad hoc closures in the most productive manner, the Government must ensure access to an effective bankruptcy regime. Such a mechanism will strengthen economic resilience, while incentivising firms to prioritise strategies to repair balance sheets in the medium term before they reach bankruptcy.

In conclusion, the key focus of policymakers should be on addressing macroeconomic imbalances. Priority should be given to correcting the twin deficits, i.e. the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit, stimulating economic growth, and improving competitiveness while building buffers to strengthen the resilience of the economy to shocks.

(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Advocata Institute and a former Director of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka)

Hanky-panky under the blanket

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Who benefits from the licensing systems that come about with our blanket bans?

Recently I was thinking about why people do certain things and why they don’t. I realised there are things that have been banned but still, people do. Consumption of certain types of drugs is just an example. At the same time, there are things that are not banned,  but still, some people don’t use them. Smoking is a good example. It’s not banned but data shows that people are now less likely to smoke due to health reasons. Analysing human behaviour shows us that there are reasons to engage in some activities while reasons to avoid them. Undoubtedly knowledge, information, and many other factors influence and incentivise certain actions over others. However, there are certain activities, where the Government decides on behalf of the people, that such are either good or bad for the broader population and try to control the choices of people. Our ban on chemical fertiliser is one such instance out of many. 

Another round of discussions has erupted over whether the fertiliser ban is relaxed or not. In a recent statement, the Government reiterated that there are no changes in their policy announced earlier. This trend of banning product categories on the grounds that it is not good for society has been common over the past few years. Then-President Maithripala Sirisena proposed a ban on chainsaws and carpentry sheds as an attempt to protect forests. Another proposal was to ban glyphosate to maintain our soil structure and avoid unknown kidney diseases. Then recently another development was the banning of sachet packets, banning the importation of palm oil, numerous discussions to ban cattle slaughter, and now the blanket ban on the use and importation of chemical fertiliser. 

Whether these decisions were made based on grounds of scientific analysis or analysing data and economic principles, remains a serious question. These recent decisions will have serious consequences on economic activity, especially in the import sector. A key point to note is that these outright blanket bans have led to the proposition of issuing a license for the importation of the particular product category. 

Many policymakers as well as common Sri Lankans lack an understanding of the negative consequences of licensing. Having a licensing process, for example, to import chemical fertiliser will lead to an increase in prices, open avenues for corruption and bribery, activate informal black market activity, and allow inferior quality products to enter the market. This cost of maintaining a licensing regime will have to be borne by the general public. 

Any Sri Lankan who has attempted the construction of a house or shop or wall has to go through a process of getting the plan approved by the technical officer at the Local Government. It is a license or an approval that allows any individual to build any construction. Those who have gone through the system know how painful the process is. In the first place, meeting the technical officer is not easy. Secondly, regardless of how compliant the draft was, he/ she always has suggestions and changes. As a result many common people hand over the drafting process of the building to the technical officer himself so he can approve it. 

The economics behind this is that when anyone has an authoritative power to decide the “go” or “no-go” of a project the person who has the decision making power is naturally motivated to capitalise an incentive over the approval. On the other hand the person who wants approval is getting naturally motivated to incentivise the decision maker to provide the approval even compromising the quality and standard. The same dynamics work in every licensing process, including the licensing of imports. Examples of the licensing processes include the exercise department for alcohol shops, Sri Lanka Customs, passport office, driving license and Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV). 

When we first impose a ban and secondly issue a licensing system it is a double whammy to the economy. By creating a blanket ban we are creating a scarcity of resources which is in demand. Then by issuing a licence we are making the utilisation of that scarce resource unproductive. Simply, the more we keep the discretionary authority the more we leave room for corruption and inefficiency. Secondly, the immediate  implementation of a licensing process can lead to increased scarcity, where fewer goods are available relative to the population. Therefore there can be market shortages putting thousands of people into hardship and inconvenience. Unfortunately in Sri Lanka’s case these interventions and restrictions have come into place when the market system was working perfectly well, especially for the benefit of the general consumer. This therefore needs much thought and reflection. 

If the intentions behind imposing a ban on a certain product category are correct, then logically, there cannot be a justifiable reason to allow a few people to import the particular product, especially if the product is harmful for human consumption in the first place. 

As an example, if palm oil is carcinogenic, the cancer-causing ability doesn’t disappear just because few people are importing it. Instead it could be higher as now the market system is completely broken down as a result of the ban and as a result of the license only a few players are able to import any substandard products due to the limited competition. Secondly, when a licensing system is in place it allows close associates and people connected with authority to be issued with licenses, reaping benefits at the cost of the general public. The flip side is that  these licenses are issued not on a competitive basis. So the room for the political authority to share profits with a person who is getting a licence is higher than operating in a competitive environment. 

In a market where different players compete to supply a product, the general consumer will benefit from lower prices. Now as a result of a license raj the majority will be made worse off as a few players connected to the political authority can keep prices higher.  

Allowing a few people to import essential compounds and organic fertiliser is not different in my view. This will end up in few people controlling the entire market causing very high prices for the farmers which will end up in very high prices on food for common people. 

Additionally, the politicians who would back the licensing process will defend the same importers of suppliers in any case of any malpractice or importation of any substandard products.  

Just like I thought about why some people do certain things while others don’t, there are reasons why politicians prefer licensing. Simply the licensing process incentivises them and that is why they push for it regardless of the colour of the political flags they host. The current trend of setting up a licence raj which India had until the 1991 reforms and which were experimented in Sri Lanka in the 1970s is the surest way of making our entire country unproductive. 

However the ultimate loser of this game is the consumer and the farmer. Overall, Sri Lanka will lose while few politicians get some short term gains and the entire ecosystem feels the effects of instability. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

To get rich, reward the hardworking

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Market-oriented policy reforms needed

Bill Gates famously said: “If you are born poor it’s not your mistake, but if you die poor it’s your mistake.” I believe this statement is quite apt if applied to Sri Lanka’s economy. Our recent economic trajectory shows a deep struggle to maintain economic growth and reduce poverty. We also don’t have a strong record of building prosperity for Sri Lanka since Independence.

The reasons and solutions have been discussed consistently by many experts, most often analysed and even over-analysed. Some policymakers understand the problem but fail to implement solutions, while some neither comprehend nor implement known programmes. In worst cases, some fail to comprehend but instead implement policies that worsen the situation. Sri Lanka’s post-Independence failure is a result of a combination of the above scenarios. It is a sequence of half-hearted attempts for much-needed reforms.

Sri Lanka is reaching a crucial juncture in its history; of having to pay for the country’s past mistakes and struggling to keep up with global developments yet again. On a more optimistic note, this presents Sri Lanka with the opportunity to understand the pressing need and importance of implementing much-needed economic reforms. However, to much of our dismay, the current political discussion is solely concentrated on evaluating the symptoms of the problem and not on accelerating the process of implementing the solutions we desperately need.

There has always been a debate on the rankings provided by different rating agencies on our dwindling foreign reserves. Some argue that our little island nation can survive the current foreign debt crisis, given our cash inflow and outflow numbers. Others present the case on Sri Lanka’s poor debt management.

The policy discussion needs to move beyond this and expand its scope to discuss solutions. The most practical short-term solution available to Sri Lanka right now is to seek the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) assistance. However, this is not to be confused with a “be-all and end-all” solution, as it is only a painkiller to provide temporary relief from the agony the country’s economy is in at the moment. Working with the IMF will give us the credibility needed to convince the rating agencies that we are serious about addressing our macroeconomic problems, slow growth, high debt, and twin deficits in the fiscal accounts and the Balance of Payments.

However, it is time Sri Lanka addresses the million-dollar question we’ve been avoiding for decades – the need to implement hard economic reforms. Today’s column discusses the desperate need for reforms from a market-oriented perspective.

Sri Lankan society can be broadly divided into four main subsections on a matrix of “working hard” and “getting wealthy/successful”. Getting wealthy or successful can be loosely defined as earning in proportion to the effort put in/risk they take.

Below are the four subsections that Sri Lankan society can be divided into:

1. Individuals who work hard and become prosperous

2. Individuals who work hard but don’t become prosperous

3. Individuals who do not work hard but become prosperous

4. Individuals who do not work hard and and do not become prosperous

If Sri Lanka wants to avoid the mistake of dying poor, Sri Lankans must work harder. Hard work takes place when the incentive structure works and people get rewarded for their hard work and the risks they take. That can only be done through the market. The market system allows prices to work. It’s not only a profit-making system but a profit and loss signalling system. This encourages people to utilise resources optimally.

It is vital that we allow the market to function independently if we are to fix the economic crisis at hand. Its proper function will ensure the prosperity of all Sri Lankans.

The more we delay reforms and preoccupy ourselves debating and evaluating the symptoms of the problem, the further away we get from the opportunity of setting the price mechanism right. This allows the sustenance of a system that rewards the non-hardworking over the hardworking. This will only encourage the latter to seek opportunities and prosperity outside of Sri Lanka.

While cartels and market manipulators thrive, the average Sri Lankan suffers from excessive regulations and red tape. Most micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) struggle to keep their heads above water. Their productivity is hampered with no return or reward for their hard work. The more we strengthen the cartels and market manipulators, the more we discourage the hard-working Sri Lankan. 

The quadrant of not becoming prosperous and not working hard could be a personal choice, but most often, when the incentive structures are not in place, people have no impetus to do the hard work. That is why our reforms have to be focused on improving competition and price mechanisms, as it would encourage people to work harder. 

Sadly, the policy discussion is not one of the myriad solutions we can adopt. It is solely concentrated on our short-term ability to pay our creditors.

If Sri Lanka intends on getting rich, the solution lies in market-based reforms.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Can we print our way out of this economic hole?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

I had a friend in school whose aspiration was to be the president of Sri Lanka. One day, our school teacher asked him: “So what are you going to do when you become the President?”

He had a simple answer. “I am going to end poverty in Sri Lanka and make all citizens wealthy by ensuring they all have enough money.” In response, the teacher further questioned: “How are you going to do it?” To which my friend answered: “It’s not difficult. I will print money and distribute one million per citizen among all citizens so they have money to buy all the goods and services they want.”

This sounded like a great idea to schoolboys who did not know anything about economics. “Why can’t governments print money and increase the income of people and allow them to buy goods and services as they wish?” were our initial thoughts.

The teacher then questioned: “What if the market doesn’t have enough goods and services to buy with the money you expect to give away. Do you think that having money in hand but no goods and services in the market will help people consume what they need?”

Through my teacher’s counter-questioning I realised that “money” or fiat currency is just a piece of paper. The amount of goods and services we can buy from that money is what matters instead of the quantitative or numerical amount of money in hand.

Take a Rs. 100 note and a $ 100 note for example. Both of them might represent a 100 but we can buy more goods and services from $ 100 than Rs. 100. Therefore, managing “money” or the currency must be done very carefully. 

The economy is a broader concept where the supply of money is just one tool within this system. This economic system performs the function of optimising limited and scarce resources to meet unlimited wants. Prices determine what could be bought or sold by the quantity of money.

If there is strong demand for one good over another, its price will go up and the supply of that good will go up, as producers try to make more money to get more profits.

Excessive creation of money without regard to the number of goods and services produced in a country leads to price inflation, which distorts relative prices. Sri Lanka’s economic problems are multifaceted. Therefore, we have to evaluate whether we can overcome our economic challenges by printing money as suggested by my school friend. This dilemma brings Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) into context.

Some advocates of MMT say money can be printed by governments without a problem. Other advocates say governments can borrow large amounts of money without a problem. At the end of the day, printing money is also a form of borrowing from the Central Bank. Still, other proponents say taxation can be used to stop the inflationary effect. 

While different proponents of MMT have proposed slightly different views, some of the key ideas are that governments can increase deficit spending without a problem and that they can also print money. Still, others argue that money can be printed to repay bonds, and therefore there will be no default on debt.

However, it is important to remember that the comparison of a government to a household only goes so far. This is because sovereign nations can print money which a household cannot. Some believers of MMT claim that in an environment where a country hasn’t reached full employment, printing money or quantitative easing doesn’t cause inflation. Some others argue that if inflation picks up, taxation can be used to take spending power and reduce inflation.  

When a country like Sri Lanka prints more money it can cause two problems. One is that it will

create a balance of payment problem when economic activities and credit picks up. Sri Lanka or any other country cannot live in complete isolation. We have to import some basics such as fossil fuel, pharmaceuticals, and inputs for our exports. Statistics by the Central Bank show that about 80% of our imports are capital and intermediate goods, required for consumption and for our exports. When we print excessive money, that will increase imports and create a balance of payment crisis. In addition, the fall in reserves and the fall in exchange rate will lead to a loss of confidence. Then, foreigners who had loaned money and other investors will take their money back. This is called capital flight. That is one reason the yields of sovereign bonds have increased to very high levels and we cannot issue more sovereign bonds.

But what about rupee debt, you may ask.

One question commonly asked is why Sri Lanka cannot print money if the US and Japan can print money in trillions. This is possible for the US and Japan to some extent because both the US dollar and the Japanese yen are pure floating exchange rates. The US dollar in particular is also used abroad. However, that did not prevent the collapse of the US dollar in 1971 when it was pegged to gold and money was printed in excess.

When the US dollar was a floating currency also it was not immune. After very low rates from 2001, a massive credit bubble was fired in the US and the dollar weakened. Inflation and oil and house prices went up and then collapsed.

Sri Lanka does not have a pure floating currency. Sri Lanka collects reserves through the purchase of dollars and then the sale of dollars to defend the value of the rupee against the US dollar at different rates. 

Such countries are much more at risk from printing money than those with a pure floating exchange rate. Consecutive governments of the past resorted to the practice of financing our budget deficit by money printing. One reason Sri Lanka has had to go to the International Monetary Fund many times over the last 70 years is mainly due to such balance of payment crises caused by the excessive printing of money.

Restricting imports reduces the amount of goods and services available in a country and leads to higher prices. When countries without floating exchange rates print money, not just inflation but hyperinflation also can happen.

Zimbabwe created excessive amounts of fiat money that led to inflation rates of more than 1,000% per year. As the currency crashed, notes of million-dollar Zimbabwe banknotes were printed. Eventually people shifted to US dollars. Inflation then stopped. But many were left destitute. Large numbers left as refugees. Creating money without regard to the availability of goods and services can ruin an economy. And worse. It devastates the poor.  

It is true that the economy of a country cannot be compared to the economy of a household because people trade in different currencies and trade between countries is a global phenomenon bringing in competitive synergies.

But when money is printed, the main objective of economic policy becomes “saving foreign exchange”.

The MMT advocates of the West did not say to control imports. Some people hold up Japan as an example due to its high debt levels and attempts at trying to ignite inflation there through money printing. But there is no import control in Japan.

So we should not forget that the main objective of an economy and economic policy is not to just have money in every citizen’s hand or saving US dollars to pay our debt. The prime objective of a well-functioning economy is to improve the quality of life of the people and reduce poverty. We can only achieve these objectives by utilising our scarce resources optimally. Hence my teacher’s question, “what if we all have money but not enough goods and services for our consumption?” must be analysed in depth.

Therefore, improving the quality of life, eradication of poverty, and using our resources optimally have to be the broader objectives of the economic policies we implement. This does not mean that we divert from our focus of facing the ever-growing economic challenges before us. However, our solutions to meet short-term economic challenges should not dilute our aspirations or our long-term economic goals of improving quality of life and eradicating poverty.

Monetary history has shown over and over again that the oversupply of money causes inflation and currency depreciation and balance of payments problems. When money printing is continued, it will end in hyperinflation like in Zimbabwe. The poorest sections of the society will be most affected by hyperinflation.

Countries like Venezuela and Zimbabwe are prime examples of the various consequences that can occur as a result of governments running their money printing machines overtime. It results in a situation where they have money, but not the adequate amount to afford their necessities.

What is the solution?

It is understandable that in a global pandemic and a credit collapse some countries printed money, especially when there was no economic activity to make use of the money. But expecting to use it as a permanent solution may cause long-term damage to our economy. 

To optimise the use of our resources, we have to remove the structural impediments that stop the people from doing growth-creating economic activity. 

We must restructure our state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and open public sector resources to the private sector, in order to attract money, for example, rather than print money. Ultimately, it is the production of goods and services and getting all Sri Lankans to contribute to economic growth that will help meet our long and short-term economic objectives. Expecting that production will kickstart when excess money is supplied through money printing is surely a not solution. Instead, we should examine the barriers that have to be removed in order to ramp up production. These barriers keep dragging our economy behind.

We should not forget the scenario where everyone was given money through money printing but there were insufficient goods and services to purchase. This lesson taught by my school teacher to my aspirational friend who wanted to lead the country, is a lesson for the whole country. A lesson as to why such thinking is fundamentally flawed.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.