VAT: The good, the bad and the solutions

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

The Value Added Tax (VAT) increase from 15% to 18% and the removal of about 95 items from the VAT exempted list to a VAT applicable list has raised concern among politicians and people alike. 

When taxes change too often, public confusion and erosion of tax revenue both have to be expected. VAT was once 8% in Sri Lanka and then revised to 12%. It was again increased to 15% and finally now to 18%. The VAT threshold was once at Rs. 12 million and later increased to Rs. 300 million. Currently it is at Rs. 80 million and expected to be reduced to Rs. 60 million. 

When the VAT threshold was increased to Rs. 300 million from Rs. 12 million, the number of individuals registered for VAT dropped to 8,000 from 28,000. Our policymakers are discussing expanding the tax base after diluting our tax base through our own inconsistent policies. 

One of the key principles of taxation is stability, according to the Tax Foundation. The other principles are simplicity, transparency, and neutrality. When tax rates and thresholds are changed often, thIMFe markets and individuals react and tax revenue will erode. 

A complicated context 

Sri Lanka’s context is sadly more complicated than many other cases. We have given a commitment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on increasing our tax revenue because our interest costs are extremely high. Most of the interest is inherited due to bad financial management over the years and there is very little meaning in blaming each other. 

On one hand, the Government has no other option but to increase revenue through taxation. However, on the other hand, when taxes are increased the economy will contract. Growth, which is also a key requirement for us to emerge from the crisis, will be affected due to the lowered purchasing power of the people. When the economy contracts, tax revenue will also start to decline.  

Given the perennial weaknesses in our tax administration, the Government has selected the most convenient option of VAT to be increased, since it can be collected easily compared to other taxes. VAT is considered to be better compared to other taxes such as the Nation Building TAX (NBT) or the Social Security Levy (SSL), which are considered to be cascading taxes, where throughout the economic process one tax is applied on top of the other. 

This leads to a situation where the effective tax rate becomes very high, but with VAT, tax will only be applicable for the value added throughout the supply chain. Also, high income earners generally contribute a higher VAT in total as VAT is a consumption tax. People with higher incomes tend to consume more, so the more they spend, the more taxes the Government can recoup. 

The negative impact of VAT can be witnessed when it is applied to food items. The poorest of society gets adversely impacted, since their percentage of expenditure on food is very high compared to people who fall into higher income brackets. 

There will be considerable impact on the overall prices for the common people with the new VAT revisions. The price of petrol and diesel is expected to increase by about Rs. 50-60 (provided the other taxes are not changed and global fuel prices remain the same). LP Gas (12.5 kg cylinder) will increase by about Rs. 500-600. 

Prices of solar panels, electronic items, laptops, and mobile phones are expected to rise. This will also have an impact on inflation as well, but we need to keep in mind that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon. With high prices, people may consider cheaper alternatives and supply and demand will readjust, provided we keep our monetary policy right. 

Solutions 

A key solution to bringing down prices of food items is to remove the Special Commodity Levy (SCL) applied to these items. The SCL not only increases prices, but the provisions provided to the minister to impose and remove the SCL overnight opens significant room for corruption. The recent increase of the SCL on sugar to Rs. 50 from 25 cents is a good example of how an overnight gazette creates room for corruption and passes the burden to the people. 

Other taxes on food items including CESS, Ports and Airport Development Levy (PAL), and many other para-tariffs should be removed. There is a myth that productivity can be improved by imposing tariffs on domestic food items. If that is the case, our industries for milk, yoghurt, cheese, and many other food items have to be extremely productive and efficient. Instead of domestic product growth, we see the same producers ask the Government for further protection. 

Tax competitiveness as a framework 

 Moving forward, Sri Lanka has to look at tax competitiveness as a framework for thinking about taxes. In the global context, everything is about competitiveness, including the tax system. As an example, if corporate tax is 25% in competing markets in the region, we cannot increase the corporate tax to 30%, only considering the revenue requirement of the Government. 

At the same time, we cannot compromise our healthcare and education systems, which help to develop better skills through taxpayer money, by bringing taxes unnecessarily down and compromising our tax revenue. In a market system, competition and prices play a key role, and the same is applicable for taxes, FDIs, and many other variables. 

We have to first take the basic steps of improving tax administration. We then have to rationalise our expenditure and spend where we need to spend, thereafter raising revenue by being competitive. A VAT increase to increase Government revenue alone will not solve our macro instability. We have to ensure macro stability by being competitive in all aspects of the economy.  

What happened to our debt?

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lanka’s debt situation is still a mystery for some. During a panel discussion, I pointed out that Sri Lanka’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have amassed a staggering 1.8 trillion in debt, all guaranteed by the Treasury and classified as ‘Public Debt’. One question from the audience was, “What did we do with the money we borrowed?” The simple answer is that money was borrowed primarily to service the interest on the initial loans Sri Lanka took out. Therefore,  despite borrowing substantial amounts, there is nothing tangible or visible to show for it, as a majority was essentially sunk into interest. 

To provide context, since 1999, approximately 74% of the increase in debt can be attributed to interest payments and currency depreciation. Interest payments accounted for a substantial 40% of the debt accumulated since the 1990’s, while the exchange rate depreciation contributed to 33%. 

What Sri Lanka faced was a precarious combination in terms of borrowing and our monetary policy. Our expansionary monetary policy played a significant role in the depreciation of the currency over the years, exacerbating the situation further. Compounding this issue was the fact that approximately 50% of our borrowing was in foreign currency. As it is indicated in 2022, with Modern Monetary theory in play, the significant depreciation of the exchange rate since 2020 led to an accumulation of debt beyond our repayment capacity.

Printing more money artificially increases the demand for foreign exchange.  However, after depleting our reserves in an attempt to defend the currency, the only option left was to allow the currency to float, leading to a sharp depreciation. In the case for Sri Lanka, it was not just the currency depreciation; social unrest, debt default, and numerous other crises followed when the government resorted to borrowing from the Central Bank through money printing.

As at the end of June 2023, our total public debt has increased to USD 96.5 billion, with approximately 50% of it in domestic debt. The country’s public debt now stands at about 127.4% of GDP. Even if debt restructuring is successful after negotiations with the Paris Club and separate discussions with China, we only anticipate a reduction to 95% of GDP by 2032. 

Undoubtedly, expediting the debt restructuring process is crucial, especially given the unpredictable twists in geopolitics. While the tentative agreement with China Exim Bank to restructure the debt is a positive development for Sri Lanka, we must fast track negotiations with our other foreign creditors. Complicating matters, as we approach an election year, there is a significant risk of derailing the process as unfortunately, there is a lack of consensus among political parties regarding the economic stabilization program for the next few years. This further exacerbates the challenges Sri Lanka faces.

Solution 

If Sri Lanka is genuinely committed to resolving its debt crisis, a crucial step is to establish a consensus on public finance across the major political parties. At the very least, adherence to a single plan, such as the IMF program, is necessary. However, even the IMF program alone will be insufficient to take Sri Lanka to the next stage of economic stability. Therefore, there must be a fundamental agreement on specific reforms across party lines. For example, there exists a common minimum program in Parliament, shaped with contributions from the business community and organizations like Advocata. It is not too late to revisit and endorse this document. Committing to these agreed-upon reforms before political parties develop their individual manifestos in the coming years could provide a stable foundation for Sri Lanka's economic future.

Reforming the tax incentive structure in Sri Lanka

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Roshan Perera, Thashikala Mendis, and Janani Wanigaratne

The second tranche of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was delayed as the country failed to meet some of the program targets including the Government revenue target. This prompted the IMF in their latest review to reiterate the need to “strengthen tax administration, remove tax exemptions, and actively eliminate tax evasion” to ensure revenue is collected as per the program targets. This requires intense efforts by the Government if the country is to achieve sustainable macroeconomic stability.

Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in Sri Lanka has the potential to significantly contribute to Government revenue. However, CIT performance has been dismal with collection averaging around 1% of GDP over the last two decades although economic growth averaged around 4% during the corresponding period. It peaked at 1.9% in 2022 due to some one-off taxes.1 Compared to other countries in the region as well, CIT collection in Sri Lanka has been abysmally low (see Figure 1).

Further, CIT collection is concentrated in a few sectors in the economy. The 230 companies listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) for financial year 2019/20 account for around 25% of total corporate income tax collection. However, financial services, food & beverages, and telecommunications account for a disproportionate share of taxes (see Figure 2). Sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, real estate and transportation which account for more than 25% of GDP, contribute less than 2% in CIT. Tax holidays and concessionary tax rates to selected sectors have eroded the CIT tax base, leading to lower CIT revenue collection. Ad hoc tax concessions complicate tax administration, distort resource allocation and provide opportunities for rent seeking and corruption.

Tax incentives

With the liberalisation of the economy in 1977 and the shift to a more export oriented development strategy, the Government sought to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering attractive tax incentives, first under the GCEC Act No. 4 of 1978 and subsequently the Board of Investment (BOI) of Sri Lanka from 1992. Tax incentives were also offered under the Inland Revenue Act. The enactment of the Strategic Development Projects (SDP) Act, No. 14 of 2008 permitted the Minister in charge of investment the discretion to grant incentives to projects deemed of strategic importance with only subsequent ratification by Cabinet and Parliament.

The lack of clear criteria of what constitutes a “strategic development project” in the SDP Act and the discretion given to the Minister to decide on what constituted a “strategic” project led to generous tax holidays and incentives granted to projects that were not in any sense strategic (see Table 1 for a list of projects granted under the SDP Act). Furthermore, tax concessions under the Act have been awarded to projects that are not purely foreign funded, violating one of the core objectives of this Act, which is to attract foreign investment.

The operation of multiple tax jurisdictions has led to an overlap of tax incentives, obscuring the process of monitoring the overall benefits and costs of tax incentives provided. Lack of transparency and well-defined criteria as well as poor evaluation of projects has led to the granting of tax incentives without proper justification, leading to large revenue losses.

Transparency, availability and accessibility of information regarding companies that have received tax incentives, especially under the BOI Act, are limited3. In light of this, the IMF diagnostic report has highlighted the need for a more transparent data sharing protocol.

The case of Port City

More recently the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act, No. 11 of 2021 was given the authority to grant tax incentives within the Port City.

The CPC Act grants incentives to businesses that are identified as strategically important. Extraordinary Gazette 2343/604 lists several industries as strategically important. Even though the Act provides a descriptive definition of a business of strategic importance, the rationalisation for these industries to be selected for special incentives is unclear. Especially as some of these industries already exist in Sri Lanka, which puts them at a disadvantage. Moreover, under section (4) subregulation (3) of the Extraordinary gazette 2343/60, one of the criteria for granting incentives is the ability of the business to demonstrate to the Port City Commission the potential contribution to Sri Lanka’s economy and social development by fostering innovation, knowledge transfer, technology transfer, research and development. This criteria is vague and subjective, thus allowing the Commission to grant incentives at its discretion.

Granting incentives often leads to differential tax treatment creating an unlevel playing field. While an entity in an already established industry within the country located within the CPC is provided generous tax incentives, the firm located outside is subject to the normal taxes operating in the rest of the country. Such differential treatment could create labour market distortions, as the employees in the Port City benefit from tax exemptions.

Sri Lanka has not been able to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) despite the plethora of incentives offered. It is questionable whether we can expect different results by applying the same failed strategy with the Colombo Port City. For instance, out of 74 land plots, only 6 were leased so far, and even those have not yet materialised.

To improve the performance of CIT, reforming the existing incentive structure is critical.

Improving investment environment

Evidence suggests that tax incentives are not the most important factor attracting FDI. Rather investors prioritise factors such as macroeconomic stability, access to skilled labour, and quality infrastructure facilities when making investment decisions. Therefore, shifting focus from relying on tax incentives to creating a favourable macroeconomic environment and policy consistency while providing the necessary resources and infrastructure will be more important to attracting investments. This will reduce distortions in the economy while ensuring the Government’s revenue base is protected.

Renegotiating tax incentives

Given the weak fiscal position of the country and the debt restructuring exercise being carried out at present, a similar exercise to renegotiate existing tax incentives may be warranted. Rationalising existing tax incentives would widen the tax base and enable lowering corporate tax rates.

Centralising tax incentives

If tax incentives are to be granted it should be done by a centralised authority. This authority should be able provide justification for granting special tax incentives by carrying out a cost benefit analysis. Clear objectives and proper criteria for granting incentives should be established and the authority held accountable for monitoring the progress of the investments to ensure the objectives of the investment are fulfilled. Failure to meet the objectives should lead to an immediate cancellation of the incentives granted. To ensure transparency, all incentives granted should require Cabinet and Parliamentary approval and information on incentives granted made publicly available through gazette notices. Sunset clauses will ensure that incentives have a limited timeframe and are periodically reviewed.

Conducting tax expenditure analysis

Tax expenditure refers to concessions such as tax exemptions, deductions, concessionary tax rates, etc. granted to specific industries or entities. While typically a government budget provides estimates of government revenue, tax expenditures are rarely reported. However, given the generous tax incentives offered it is vital to ensure the costs and benefits of tax expenditures are properly accounted for. Conducting regular tax expenditure analysis will enable comprehensive cost benefit analysis to evaluate the potential revenue loss and the expected economic benefits of tax incentives. Moreover, it is essential to carry out regular assessments to ascertain whether the revenue loss resulting from tax exemptions is justified by the employment, GDP contribution, and economic impact of these projects.

Global Minimum Tax 5

When tax incentives and holidays are granted, it should be ensured that their rates are not lower than the rate recommended by the Global Minimum Tax (GMT). This is an agreement introduced by the OECD/G20 in October 2021, with the purpose of establishing a minimum tax rate of 15% for large multinational companies. It allows countries with taxable parent companies of Multinational Enterprises (MNE) to impose a top-up tax on the profits of any foreign subsidiary that pays an effective rate less than 15%. It also allows the host country where the MNE subsidiary carries out its activities to charge a top-up tax rate on subsidiaries, if the home country of the parent company imposes a CIT rate less than 15%. So even if the countries are free to grant tax holidays and incentives with a CIT rate lower than 15%, the agreement grants the taxing rights to either the FDI exporting countries or the countries in which the MNE subsidiaries are operated. Therefore the MNEs would not be benefitted by lower rates as they will be taxed by either country.

The countries that do not adopt this GMT rule would lose out on tax income as the other countries will adjust their domestic tax rules to top up undertaxed profits. This proposal has already been strongly backed by 130 countries. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka was one of the nine countries that did not agree to this proposal.

The country is struggling to meet its revenue targets. The potential of CIT as a significant source of revenue has not been not fully exploited. A plethora of tax incentives granted under numerous agencies have seriously eroded the tax base. Reversing these trends are vital for restoring fiscal sustainability and enabling the Government to promote sustainable and inclusive growth.

Footnotes:

1This is due to the imposition of a retrospective one-time surcharge tax of 25% on individuals, companies, and partnerships with a taxable income exceeding 2 billion for the 2020/2021 tax assessment year.

2Based on the taxes paid by around 230 listed companies on the Colombo Stock Exchange in 2019/2020.

3Information on projects granted under the SDP Act are publicly available through gazette notices which are mandatory. This is unlike projects granted incentives under the BOI Act which are not publicly available. An RTI filed to extract this information was also not responded to by the relevant authority.

4http://documents.gov.lk/files/egz/2023/8/2343-60_E.pdf

5World Bank, 2023, “Can the global minimum tax agreement reduce tax breaks in East Asia?” https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/can-global-minimum-tax-agreement-reduce-tax-breaks-east-asia#:~:text=In%20October%202021%2C%20the%20G20,to%20be%20implemented%20in%202024.

(Roshan Perera is a Senior Research Fellow at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via roshananne@gmail.com. Thashikala Mendis is a Data Analyst at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via thashikala@advocata.org. Janani Wanigaratne is a Research Consultant at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via janani.advocata@gmail.com.

The opinions expressed are the writers’ own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.)

Shaping Sri Lanka’s growth narrative

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Securing the second tranche from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an important step, especially to support our ability to successfully carry out the debt restructuring process. It is not just about the $ 330 million that this tranche brings; it is about the credibility it gives to the reform process and the confidence it instils in the international community, including bilateral and multilateral creditors. 

The moment we deviate from the IMF programme and allow our debt to remain unsustainable, we risk regressing to square one. However, we should not get our aims and priorities mixed up. Our aim is not to secure IMF tranches. We need to prioritise achieving deep and meaningful reforms. The IMF tranche will follow as a result. 

Ultimately, our goal should be to ensure that, in the future, we never find ourselves in a position where we need to turn to the IMF for assistance.

As this column has discussed many times, it is essential to recognise that the IMF can only stabilise the economy and facilitate credit access, which is a crucial element in our debt restructuring process. The responsibility to clear out the roadblocks that stand in the way of economic growth rests solely on our shoulders. We have to carry out reforms that go beyond the scope of the IMF programme. 

Three key reforms aiming to boost economic growth will be discussed below.

Reforms to attract more tourists 

Focusing on tourism can significantly contribute to the country’s economic recovery. In addition to bringing in foreign exchange, their spending in domestic markets contributes significantly to Government revenue through VAT. Instead of fixating on the number of inbound tourists, our focus should be on the number of nights a tourist stays in the hotel/country. Simplifying the entry process will attract more tourists, and more importantly, entice them to prolong their stay. 

In line with Daniel Alphonsus’ recent article, making the visa process more flexible for tourists is crucial. Our focus should not be on visa fees, but rather to encourage tourists to spend more. This allows local industries to capture the revenue and enhances Government revenue through VAT and various other forms of fees and indirect taxes.

Offering a two-year multiple-entry visa for citizens from countries with a per capita GDP four times higher than Sri Lanka’s is a strategic move to attract high-income tourists. Given our current fiscal situation, carrying out extensive global promotional campaigns are beyond our financial capacity. Therefore, our focus should shift to initiatives that can be implemented effectively with just a stroke of a pen.

Addressing labour force shortages 

Retaining skilled talent within Sri Lanka is a challenge faced by many industries, including blue chip companies. These labour shortages are anticipated to affect us from next year onwards, jeopardising the sustainability of existing businesses.

To address this issue and prevent businesses from relocating, it is essential to allow companies the flexibility to recruit from international markets. This approach is crucial to sustaining businesses and their supply chains. Permitting companies to hire skilled labour from outside Sri Lanka will not only alleviate pressure on the country’s labour market, but also offer advantages to consumers and businesses competing in global markets.

Further, it encourages the transfer of knowledge and skills, leading to improved productivity. For example, collaborating with professionals from countries like Japan could introduce advanced productivity management techniques, enhancing overall efficiency. Free movement of people is a crucial step in improving our productivity and driving the economic growth of the country.  

If relaxing labour market regulations proves too complicated, a pragmatic alternative is to permit foreign spouses of Sri Lankans to work in Sri Lanka. This measure could help in attracting more skilled workers, providing an incentive for Sri Lankans with families of mixed citizenship to return and settle here. Importantly, this reform won’t incur any costs for the Government; it simply involves changing existing regulations.

Industrial zones for private sector and simplifying tariffs  

For us to emerge from this crisis, our primary focus should be on global trade. The complicated tariff structure that is currently in place enables corruption and is a source of frustration for both exporters and importers. Simplifying the tariff structure into three to four tariff bands is essential to streamlining Government revenue administration. 

The existing high and complicated tariffs lead to massive leakages of tariff revenue. Moreover, these tariffs discourage imports, hampering productivity and burdening consumers. Implementing a straightforward tariff structure is imperative, removing para-tariffs such as CESS and PAL. Furthermore, we must ensure that the tariff structure for any HS Code is easy to compute and has minimal deviations.

A significant bottleneck in our system that hinders investments and export growth is the shortage of land for industrial activities. Currently, 95% of the land in Board of Investment (BOI) industrial zones in the Western Province is occupied. Investors are required to obtain approximately 17 approvals in order to set up operations and this process can take more than two years. 

Regrettably, the BOI has not initiated any development projects in the last 15 years. A viable solution that the Government should consider is utilising State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)-owned land and allowing the private sector to develop industrial zones on it. 

Private sector-run industrial zones can operate as a plug-and-play model, where the private sector attracts investors and secures the necessary approvals in advance. This approach does not require any Government investments; in fact, it can generate more revenue for the Government through leasing or selling the land for development. 

If Sri Lanka is genuinely committed to economic growth and recovery from the crisis, our primary focus should be on implementing these reforms rather than solely relying on the IMF.  While the IMF can provide us with short-term stability, it’s our responsibility as Sri Lankan citizens to shape our own growth narrative.

Why was the IMF Tranche Delayed?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

There is some uncertainty in the market regarding the reasons for the delay in the IMF's second tranche. The simple reason is that although we have made some progress, given the depth of the crisis, our speed of reforms is inadequate for a swift recovery, particularly in revenue collection.

A shortfall in revenue collection, expected to be about 15% compared to initial projections by the year end, has been cited as a key reason. Secondly, until we finalize debt restructuring, especially external debt restructuring, the risk factors remain high in achieving our desired debt-to-GDP ratio. Even after the expected debt restructuring, in 10 years, our debt-to-GDP ratio will still be above 90% according to estimates.

Thirdly, the Central Bank's reserve collection has slowed down. Consequently, with our macroeconomic indicators sending mixed signals, it can not be assured that the economic recovery is still on the right path. Furthermore, at the press briefing held on the 27th of September IMF officials reiterated that more work needs to be done to sustain the reform momentum.

It is crucial to identify the reasons for the delay in reforms. Our framework for driving reforms is not well-established. The current structure, where the President acts in the capacity of the Minister of Finance, appoints committees, and delegates tasks, is flawed. Some tasks are interconnected, and the entire drive must come from the Finance Minister alone.

Further, these two roles can have contradictory interests. The Finance Minister holds an unpopular job, requiring revenue increases through taxation and expenditure reduction. Conversely, when the President, a politician expecting re-election, occupies the role, there's a natural tendency to make popular decisions, deviating from essential reforms.

Our reform process is highly complicated, demanding direct involvement of the Finance Minister in debt negotiations with external creditors in several categories, namely multilateral, bilateral, and private creditors. This task alone is equivalent to a few full-time jobs. Additionally, structural reforms are expected to focus on State-Owned Enterprises, where considerable trade union influence will come into play with appointments made by fellow cabinet ministers. Thus, driving such unpopular yet critical reforms becomes nearly impossible, especially when the finance minister is also the President or vice versa. More importantly, for key appointments such as the Central Bank Monetary Board and Governance Board, the President nominates with the Minister of Finance's approval and the Constitutional Council's endorsement. When the President and the Finance Minister are the same, the objective of checks and balances significantly diminishes.

In the case of India's reforms in the 1990s, it was Dr. Manmohan Singh who spearheaded reforms. He had Dr. Montek Singh Alhuwalia as the Chairman of the National Planning Committee to drive reforms. With his experience working with the IMF and a keen understanding of the Indian perspective, the reforms initiated in the 1990s continue to fuel India's growth, making it one of the countries with the highest economic growth rate.

The IMF Governance Diagnosis report, subsequently released, provided numerous recommendations out of which approximately 16 recommendations have been prioritized, mainly focusing on governance and transparency.

One reason this column advocates moving beyond IMF reforms is that corruption cannot be curtailed solely through governance structures. The size of the government must be limited in conjunction with effective governance structures. Aligning governance structures with the vast expanse of the government is nearly impossible.

Furthermore, the IMF primarily brings stability; the responsibility for growth lies in our hands. We must unlock our growth potential through necessary reforms, extending beyond the IMF program. This underscores the urgency of accelerating comprehensive reforms and establishing a dedicated team to drive these changes. Regrettably, what we observe is mere enactment of legislation without robust mechanisms to execute and ensure continuity of the process, and this leading to delays in the IMF's second tranche.

Sri Lanka needs a bottom-up approach

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Regrettably, over the years, Sri Lanka's approach to development has primarily relied on aid and subsidies for its impoverished population. Many politicians have spoken about poverty, but they have often neglected to address its root causes. If our policies were centered on eradicating poverty rather than simply targeting the poor, our development framework could have evolved significantly.

As the adage goes, "there are no poor people, only poor places or countries." A recent report by LirneAsia revealed a startling increase in poverty numbers, rising from 3 million to 7 million people, pushing over 4 million individuals below the poverty line. If our long-standing strategies, such as fertilizer subsidies, Samurdhi, and fuel subsidies were on the right track, how did an economic crisis suddenly plunge 4 million Sri Lankans into poverty?

The ability to maintain strong international relationships and secure more aid has been considered a crucial qualification for candidates, during election cycles. Within the voting community, politicians offering the most substantial subsidy handouts are often perceived as popular leaders. While it is true that we need comprehensive international relationships in modern politics and must take care of our citizens, we must do so while keeping a development-oriented mindset at the core. Regrettably, development cannot rely solely on foreign aid, nor can we lift people out of poverty by offering aid exclusively to the poor.

This situation is not unique to Sri Lanka; it's a global phenomenon. No country has achieved development solely through aid programs. Instead, countries that have reached the development stage share strong institutions and reasonably functioning market systems as common denominators.

The primary focus of any government or political leader should revolve around two key conceptual frameworks:

1. Are we establishing institutions that promote a level playing field?

2. Are we encouraging a functioning market system?

Development is generally a bottom-up approach. People often know what's best for themselves better than politicians or leaders do. We simply need to provide them with opportunities in a competitive environment. Recently, I had the privilege of meeting a few small and medium-sized exporters. The entire system and processes seemed designed to hinder their export activities. Many exporters emphasized the difficulties they face when exporting in Sri Lanka, including challenges and harassment from government regulatory authorities, such as Sri Lanka Customs.

A prime example of our low export numbers is not only market access problems but the barriers within our own system that obstruct exports. One exporter from Kandy, specializing in vanilla exports, highlighted how customs consistently questioned HS codes and demanded repetitive documentation, causing him to spend more time on export processes than on developing his product and capacity. These challenges are consistent across the board for exporters, explaining why Sri Lanka's exports remain stagnant despite numerous committees, task forces, and chairpersons at the Export Development Boards.

Real change should start from the bottom by removing barriers for businesses and offering people the freedom to pursue their desired endeavors. Such reforms may not bring personal glory, as they empower individuals to make their own choices. In contrast, an aid-driven approach often results in leaders or countries seeking personal recognition through associated aid packages.

In Sri Lanka's case, we must remind ourselves that only we can make a difference and pull ourselves out of this crisis. While we need the support of international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and bilateral and multilateral creditors, they alone cannot rescue us from our predicament. It is only through economic reforms and the development of inclusive institutions that we can compete on a level playing field and extricate ourselves from this mess. Both small and large reforms are essential, and we must implement them swiftly and effectively.

IMF Programme #17: takes two to tango

Originally appeared on the Daily FT, Ada derana, Groundviews

By Daniel Alphonsus

On Sri Lanka’s reform-regress-run to the IMF crisis cycle

Countries never learn from others’ mistakes, they only learn from their own. Sri Lanka is an exception: we don’t even learn from our folly. Apparently neither does the IMF. Sri Lanka’s 17th IMF programme is set to be approved on March 20th. Is it welcome? Yes. Will it break Sri Lanka’s reform-regress-run to the IMF crisis cycle? Probably not. 

All reforms undertaken over the past half-year to win IMF board approval are reversible. None of them constitute entrenched changes in economic policy or governance. We are building our recovery on the shakiest of foundations. The fuel and electricity price ‘formulae’, tax plus interest rate increases and greater exchange rate flexibility can all be altered, more or less, at the stroke of a pen.  

This is not surprising. Sri Lanka has a chequered history of cosmetic compliance: ticking the boxes of virtue and sensibility via international undertakings during desperate times, and then reverting to business-as-usual once crisis abates. We have good reason to think that, this time too, the future will rhyme with this past. Undoubtedly, post IMF board approval, some reforms less easy to rewind will come to pass - the new Central Bank Act being the most notable. 

But the IMF’s bargaining power peaks prior to board approval. That is the decisive point in this process. It is the pivotal moment for any attempt to use this crisis to build the foundations required for breaking the crisis cycle and going from third-world to first. If the most contentious and critical reforms are not pushed through prior to board approval, there is good reason to think they will not come to pass. Remember that of its 16 programmes thus far, Sri Lanka’s has only completed two extended / structural programmes. The remainder are either relatively insignificant standby-facilities or derailed extended programmes

Considering the unprecedented nature of the current crisis, this is a colossal missed opportunity. As argued in a prequel article, Programme 17 could have and should have broken this cycle. Public opinion was desperate, the government commanded a super-majority in Parliament and the IMF held all the aces. The distinction between what is desirable and what is feasible had, almost overnight, dissolved. The cry for fuel and electricity was so piercing and loud that a comprehensive and deep programme permitting profound economic restructuring was possible for the first time since 1977. 

Moreover, even if some of the required reforms come to fruition over Programme 17’s next few reviews - it will still be a missed opportunity. Reform takes time, effort and energy. These are scarce resources. As major structural reforms - such as the central bank act, fiscal rules, privatisations and labour market reforms - were not completed as prior actions, it means the first few reviews will be focussed on them. This will leave little room for some of the more complex long-term reforms; especially in land, the public service and regulatory policy (e.g. competition policy). 

Of course, we are a sovereign state, so primary responsibility for this failure lies in our own polity. But we find little hope in ourselves. As weary and jaded citizens we tend to assume inertia, or worse, on our side as a given. Which is why this article is about the IMF’s failure. 

What could the IMF had done differently? Especially considering its familiarity with Buenos Aires, it should know that it takes two to tango. As Keynes famously said of the IMF and World Bank; the Bank’s a fund, and the Fund’s a bank. Considering the creditor-borrower relationship between the IMF and Sri Lanka; as a creditor the IMF should bear some responsibility for the failure of so many programmes over such a long period of time. The IMF’s own kapuralas have conceived of programme conditionality as a form of collateral. The IMF ought demand more conditionality as collateral prior to lending. This, of course, requires review of past country programmes and, as we all know, economic history and country expertise are not exactly first-rank priorities at the Fund. 

Anyone involved in economic policy-making in Sri Lanka, the IMF included of course, knows that much of the technical work was already done. When the staff-level agreement was signed in September last year, there was a great deal of reform that just required political will and nothing else. Cabinet had approved an earlier version of the new central bank bill during the last days of the Samaraweera ministry. Placing energy price formulas on a statutory footing shouldn’t take more than a day’s drafting. Fiscal rules legislation was already in a relatively advanced stage. Non-legislative measures could also have been mandated - the state could readily have divested its stakes in Sri Lanka Telecom and Lanka Hospitals. These firms are already listed with established valuations. Considering the 200 days between the staff-level agreement in September and board approval now, we had more than enough time to list the major state banks and Sri Lanka Insurance; maybe even privatize the East, Jaya and Unity container terminals. After all, for better or worse, remember the plantations were effectively privatized within fourty-eight hours. These delays are all the more astonishing due to the hypocrisy of asking for favours from our creditors while refusing to sell underperforming assets. 

Primary balance vs growth 

Considering the political cost of market pricing energy and increasing taxes, from a political point of view, there is tremendous incentive for the political leadership to undertake structural reform in return for less pain. Sri Lanka’s future debt sustainability (or lack thereof) is a function of current and future (a) government revenue, (b) government expenditure and (c) GDP growth. By raising Sri Lanka’s growth potential, both the IMF and long-term creditors could and should have been willing to trade-off revenue and expenditure targets for entrenched, high quality structural reform. The one percent rate hike - which the central bank opposed - just before placing Sri Lanka on the board agenda illustrates this well. Clearly, this temporary, one-off one percent increase in interest rates was considered decisive for obtaining board approval. Why then was not actually passing the central bank bill in Parliament - which is likely to shape inflation rates for decades? Note that in my view, the IMF’s bargaining power at this juncture could be so strong that a trade-off between primary balance linked targets and structural reforms may not exist. The IMF may have been able to demand both. That is the IMF could have had the cake, eaten the cake and called it a letter of intent. 

Primary balance today vs primary balance tomorrow

Even if one does not buy the argument of reducing the primary balance target today in exchange for growth tomorrow, two strategies superior to the status quo could have been pursued. 

First, instead of trading off the primary balance versus growth, we could have exchanged a primary balance improvement today for a larger primary balance improvement tomorrow. The IMF could have permitted reducing the primary balance target today in exchange for entrenched reforms that result in a paradigm shift in Sri Lanka’s primary balance trajectory for the future. For example, coming back to the central bank bill, through greater depoliticization and limitations on central bank funding of government deficits, this landmark reform is likely to change Sri Lanka’s medium to long term primary balance trajectory. The ‘net present value’ of this change in primary balance terms - even when discounted for the probability of it being unenforced - is likely to be greater than a few percentage point changes in the primary balance today. 

Optimizing this trade-off would also have the added benefit of placing less pain on the public and reducing the extent of contractionary policy amidst Sri Lanka’s worst economic crisis in decades. 

Second, there are some measures that can improve the primary balance today, and tomorrow. A good example is the sale of shares in state banks. The sale of minority stakes in BOC and People’s Bank will raise money for the exchequer, boosting the primary surplus. However, especially if the banks are listed, it will also make it more difficult for the state banks to permit the government to create enormous contingent liabilities via loans to the CEB and CPC, resulting in a healthier future primary balance. 

Overdiscounting the future

The argument often made in response is that the IMF cannot tradeoff the certainty of hitting quantitative targets today, in return for structural reforms whose fruits may not materialize tomorrow. This view is misguided. First, deep understanding of context enables a reasonably good assessment of the probabilities of a structural reform producing a desired outcome - enabling the computation of rough expected values. For example, we know that once a privatization takes place it is unlikely to be easily undone. Second, even after first discounting on the basis of probabilities, a second round of discounting can take place to compensate - to some degree - for the uncertainty inherent in structural reform.

Bailamos
There are two dancers in this toxic tango. They both need to take stock of the past, break with it and dance a new dance. Introspection is a good start. The IMF and our government should get together and commission a review of all past programmes to inform the design and implementation of the current programme. In the meantime, the priority should be to ensure as many structural reforms as possible are pushed through prior to the first review. If we are able to use entrenched, high-quality structural reform to credibly improve Sri Lanka’s medium term growth and primary balance trajectory, we should be able to avoid some of the short-term pain and contraction that we would otherwise experience. Then, maybe instead of toxic tango, we can look forward to a solid baila session. With the President, as he did with Iranganie Serasinghe, accompanying the IMF’s managing director for a round of kaffirhina. After all, compared to austerity, structural reform is a sumhiri pane.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Which reforms should take the spotlight after the IMF?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

According to news reports and a tweet by International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, Sri Lanka is likely to enter its 17th IMF programme since its membership began. We are yet to know the details of the programme, but we have an overview of key areas as per the press conference in September 2022, when we entered the Staff-Level Agreement. Out of the previous 16, we have only completed nine programmes and have given up in the midst of seven programmes without completion.

This time, things are slightly different, because on the previous 16 occasions our debt was sustainable, but this time it is not. Dropping out in the middle of the programme while we are under a debt restructuring plan will erode even the remaining confidence of investors and many other stakeholders.

There seems to be an overestimation that the IMF can fix all our problems. We have been trying to debunk this myth for a long time; the IMF cannot fix our economy. It is merely a lifeboat to make sure we don’t drown in our debt. Only we can fix our economy through economic reforms.

What the IMF can bring us is credibility. Credibility will provide us breathing space on a few fronts. It will provide room to negotiate debt with external creditors and enable us to obtain some relief before we start our debt repayments. This credibility will allow Sri Lanka to tap into more bilateral and multilateral funds to reactivate some of its economic activity.

It is imperative that we reform the economy and move forward with all this funding. Other countries that have gone through debt distress have fallen into a cycle of defaulting. We have to avoid this, which can only be done by creating a competitive economy.

A competitive economy can only be achieved through economic reforms and not in any other way. Most of these reforms are simple to understand but complicated to execute, as many of the beneficiaries of the current inefficiencies will be on the losing end. They will all have to work hard and compete in a market environment.

While there are many reforms to be undertaken, which will also be included in the IMF agreement in different forms, I would like to prioritise three key reforms.

Social safety nets to protect the poor

During an economic crisis, people are angry as well as hungry. Protecting the most vulnerable section of society has to be a priority. Ultimately, the objective of all economic principles we practise is to eradicate poverty.

Poverty eradication cannot be undertaken simply by distributing money to the poor. We can only eradicate poverty by opening up opportunities for the impoverished to engage in economic activity and expand their capacity to add productive value to society. During difficult times, they should have some support so they can worry less about basics and worry more about joining economic activities.

The current expenditure on our main social safety net programme – Samurdhi – is about Rs. 55.4 billion. This is peanuts compared to the losses of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) over eight months in 2022, which amounted to Rs. 632 billion. Most of the losses in petroleum caused by the Government’s fuel subsidy have benefitted 60% of the wealthiest families in the country.

Rather than entertaining the inefficiencies of the CPC and transferring fuel subsidies to those who can obviously afford it, the money should be channelled to the poor. This needs to be done by proper targeting and via cash transfers to their accounts, rather than in a material form.

It was reported that about 3.7 million families have applied for the social safety net system, but unfortunately, the Government authorities have been on strike without having verified the families that have applied. Cash transfer systems should ideally be connected to inflation with a targeted time frame, so that those below the poverty line are incentivised for upskilling and to contribute to economic activity.

State-Owned Enterprises reforms

It is no secret that our State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are massive burdens to taxpayers with limited value being added to our economy. Therefore, selected SOEs should be privatised, which will improve the income levels of employees.

It cannot be emphasised enough that the privatisation process has to be transparent and should take place on a competitive basis. Politicians cannot be the facilitators of these transactions. There are some SOEs which can be opened up for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Certain SOEs can be consolidated and others can be brought under a holding company.

Some of these SOEs are managed extremely poorly. Therefore, with the current liabilities, finding a buyer too seems next to impossible. As such, unfortunately, some of the debt may have to be absorbed by the Government, considering the stoppage of longer-term money leakage. We have to realise that the Government has no role in doing business. This has been proven many times globally and in Sri Lanka. Without SOE reforms, Sri Lanka simply has no future.

Trade reforms

In many forums where we converse about solutions for Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, a common refrain is that “Sri Lanka has to come out of this crisis”. A country of 22 million, which is almost the same population as the city of Mumbai, cannot grow by selling goods and services to its own citizens.

Sri Lanka’s market size is very small, so we have to sell to a global market. However, we cannot sell to a global market without being competitive. As such, imports are a big component in being competitive. What we need is a simple unified tariff structure; when things are simple, we can limit the room for corruption.

The complicated para-tariffs such as cess, PAL, and many other tariffs added one on top of the other have to ideally be within three main tiers. For instance, 5%, 10%, and 15% customs duty so that importers are clear on what to pay and can estimate in advance.

Monetary policy has to be fixed with trade reforms so that we will not face a currency crisis. It is true that the US Dollar is required for imports, but import demand is created by the Sri Lankan Rupee when the exchange rate is artificially low and money is added to the monetary system in the form of filling the deficit in Government expenditure and income.

When we fix this monetary policy, the currency will remain solid and exports will automatically start picking up with the stability in the market. The scarce US Dollar resources will be shared only for the prioritised needs through the pricing system.

In conclusion

If we can implement these three reforms within the next 12 months and maintain them for three years, we most likely will not require an IMF bailout for the 18th time.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Feasibility of estimating economic recovery via LKR appreciation, CSE performance

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Sri Lankans base their assessment of the economy’s performance on two crucial factors. One is on the operations of the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) and the other is on the exchange rate – the appreciation or depreciation of the LKR to the USD.

However, neither are the right indicators to measure the performance of the economy. The companies listed on the CSE are insignificant compared to the number of business establishments in Sri Lanka.

Around 99% of the business establishments in Sri Lanka are Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) but they are not listed on the CSE. However, the MSME sector accounts for 75% of all employment. Large firms are responsible only for 25% of all employment, but not all large corporations are listed on the CSE.

For instance, MAS Holdings, which is one of Sri Lanka’s leading apparel manufacturers and employers in the sector, is not on the CSE. Moreover, just before the economic downturn in Sri Lanka, there was a bull run at the CSE. A performing economy is measured through the reduction of poverty and when the populace contributes to solving an economic problem.

The second popular measure to assess economic performance is the exchange rate. Recently, with the appreciation of the LKR, there is a sentiment that the economy is recovering. Previously, when the LKR was depreciating, the perception was that the economy was not doing so well.

Appreciation or depreciation of a currency has its own consequences, but connecting the exchange rate to performance of the entire economy is definitely not the right way to look at things.

There were few reasons behind the recent appreciation of the LKR. Nevertheless, the exchange rate is simply the price we pay to buy USD. Like for many other commodities and services, the price of USD is determined through demand and supply. Suppliers of USD are mainly exporters, service exporters, remittances, foreign grants, and tourism. Main buyers are importers, the Central Bank, service importers, etc.

If you are wondering how the Central Bank becomes a buyer of USD, that is one way reserves are built. Until the last week of February, the Central Bank had a direction for all commercial banks to surrender 25% of their USD flows from exporters. That limit has now been reduced to 15%, which means that banks will have an additional 10% of USD than they did before, so the availability of USD in the market is slightly higher. Further, over the last few months, the Central Bank has been the main buyer of USD/forex and as a result our reserve levels have improved slightly.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) also approved a $ 400 million facility to support Sri Lanka to purchase essential items, so the inflows to the market are likely to increase. As a result of high supply and constant demand, the exchange rate has come down slightly.

Another reason is that the Central Bank increased the middle spot rate for banks to Rs. 5 from Rs. 2.50 last week. In simpler terms, previously, the Central Bank had provided a direction on the price of the USD. It is similar to a price control but slightly more flexible. As a result, banks can now provide better rates so that forex sellers are willing to supply.

As the economy contracted by 7.1% in the first nine months of 2022 and the World Bank projects a further 4.2% contraction for 2023, demand for imports has been low. On top of this, most imports are restricted. Additionally, tourism is slowly picking up and with many Sri Lankans migrating for work, it helps to recover remittances to an extent.

We need to realise that none of the above changes are reforms. They are just dynamics in the market. These little fluctuations are not an indication to measure whether we are moving in the right direction.

Reforms mean establishing a dynamic market and creating a suitable environment as soon as possible given the gravity of our crisis. When reforms are implemented, the exchange rate will become predictable rather than subject to speculation.

Reforms involve systems design and thinking, so that the system works even when a new person takes over. It is important not to mix up market changes and reforms. Markets will always fluctuate based on the availability and scarcity of resources, but reforms are about creating an environment for markets to work. Even the forex market optimises the use of resources.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Why it takes so long to recover from an economic crisis

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

I have been reflecting on the last few years of public policy and discussion, which I can broadly divide into three main chapters:

Chapter 1 – Denial

Chapter 2 – Realisation

Chapter 3 - Recovery

Chapter 1 – Denial

There was a time when even respected businessmen thought an economic crisis was a distant scenario. Many politicians, across all party lines, failed to consider a situation of 12-hour power cuts and long fuel lines, and viewed debt restructuring and accessing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as taboo conversations.

We relied on a $ 3.6 billion bailout from an unknown Omani fund and thought China and the Port City would bail us out as a last resort. Some even thought the discovery of a sapphire cluster might be the breakthrough Sri Lanka needed. Sri Lankans believed we were a special nation with a magical power that would rescue us in some other way.

Despite our strategic location, beautiful weather, and natural beauty being undeniable assets, they do not guarantee a rescue from our own bad policies. Our denial was so strong that an international institution titled their report on the Sri Lankan economy as ‘Denial is Not a Strategy’.

Chapter 2 – Realisation

The moment of truth came, but we were too late to respond. None of our bailout expectations materialised and the international financial architecture found it difficult to save us. Our debt is unsustainable and the IMF requires a commitment from our creditors before providing us financial assistance.

We are struggling due to global geopolitics and our poor diplomatic service and lack of professionalism doesn’t allow us to be taken seriously. We hurt all our friendly nations as well as India, China, Japan, and the US. Islamic countries too were concerned and unhappy with us over different issues.

People only realised the depth of the crisis when medicine was in short supply and their loved ones considered leaving the country. Inflation skyrocketed, prices increased, and poverty affected about 30% of the population.

Chapter 3 – Recovery

The moment people realised the severity of the crisis, they started asking about when we would recover. The simple answer is that it takes a long time and now many of us understand why. Overcoming a crisis of this scale, which in itself is a combination of multiple crises, cannot be done easily.

Simultaneously, we face a balance of payment crisis, a debt crisis, a financial crisis, a humanitarian crisis, and a political crisis. The cost of delaying a response to the crisis and mismanagement has to be shared by us all, with mounting tax increases and high inflation pressure from the grassroots.

As a result, we can see constant protests and interruptions to public life, further worsening the situation. At the same time, this opens a new political space where any political party can make unrealistic promises and auction for votes. This vicious cycle is why recovery from the economic crisis takes a long time.

The specifics of debt restructuring are still a mystery to us. We don’t know how the restructuring will be carried out or the impact it will have on the banking industry. It is also unclear how the markets will respond.

Without domestic debt restructuring, even if we apply a 50% haircut on International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) and Sri Lanka Development Bonds (SLDBs), our debt to GDP ratio after 10 years will be 136%, according to a Verité Research study published in October 2022. Cost of servicing new debt and the cost of rolling over previous debt at a high yield curve will not bring down our debt to GDP ratio.

Nevertheless, it is still possible for domestic debt to be restructured and banking recapitalisation is necessary. According to the same document, investments in Government securities, primarily Treasury bills and Treasury bonds, account for more than 30% of the interest revenue for the total banking industry.

Hence, changing the interest rates on these securities will affect the stability of banks. On the other hand, 82% of the money in the EPF and ETF has been put into Government securities.

As the required changes take place, no one will be happy, so people and opinion leaders will react in different ways. The changes will go back and forth and recovery will be prolonged. Elections will come and decision-making authorities will change and policy decisions will also go back and forth.

All this is why it takes so long to recover from an economic crisis.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Our only saviour is reforms

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Whether we will be able to receive International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board approval is now a topic of discussion even amongst the most economically-illiterate person. Let us first set the context.

The Sri Lankan Government and the IMF came to a Staff-Level Agreement in early September 2022. One of the key milestones we have to pass through is to get to some level of negotiation with our creditors. Our credit portfolio is diverse. We have multilateral senior creditors followed by bilateral creditors, including members of the Paris Club, mainly Japan.

On the other hand, there are two main creditors who are non-Paris Club members; India and China.

Paris Club members agree on equal treatment in debt restructuring. In simple words, all member countries of the Paris Club will be treated equally when it comes to restructuring. India has also agreed to assist Sri Lanka in the debt restructuring plan and has provided a letter to the IMF. However, according to the IMF, letters provided by China are not adequate. It has indicated a two-year moratorium, but given the financial needs expected by the IMF, Sri Lanka will not be on a sustainable debt path after a two-year moratorium alone.

Generally, credit assistance provided by multilateral donor agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank is not restructured, provided it has been given with very long maturity periods and very low interest rates. Therefore, restructuring those loans has not been the practice. That is how the global financial architecture is designed, given their assistance in eradicating poverty and the IMF being the lender of last resort. 

However, over the last few years, there has been a request by private creditors, bondholders, and some stakeholders that the credit of multilateral donor agencies should also be restructured and China is one party that has made this request. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is too negligible an economy to make that request or challenge the global financial architecture. .

Given the delays, there is now an emerging conversation on whether we have any other alternative options if the IMF agreement is further delayed. In fact, I asked this question at the meeting convened by the National Council Sub-Committee on identifying short- and medium-term programmes related to economic stabilisation, on whether alternative options were being considered in the likelihood of a delay. According to its Chair MP Patali Champika Ranawaka, the committee has not considered it, but he has an aim of being prepared for the worst-case scenario.  

As we have been saying over the years, we have come to this situation through our own policy errors and with our bad reputation, we do not have many choices in hand. Therefore, finding a solution without the IMF is a major challenge, but we, as a country, cannot avoid the consequences should this agreement get further delayed; social discussion is needed on what we can do to get it soon and on the available alternatives. 

Managing with what we have

One option is to drastically cut down our consumption, including essentials such as food and medicine, and face the situation with what we have. That option can trigger some level of social unrest because ‘a hungry man is an angry man’. 

Even at this level of consumption contraction, our poverty rate has increased above 30% according to a Parliament committee. Out of about five million households, about 1.7 million receive Samurdhi and another 1.1 million are on the waiting list. Of course, Samurdhi is not a good indication, as some people who should receive Samurdhi benefits are not recipients, while others who should not be in the programme are included. However, managing with what we have is one available option that comes with its own consequences. 

Moving ahead with debt restructuring without China?

The next option is to move ahead with debt restructuring without China. This option has a significant limitation because IMF confirmation is required even to restructure the debt of bilateral creditors. Without the IMF, it will be difficult to get Paris Club members and other stakeholders to a debt negotiation table. The more we delay and if China takes a very hard stance, which is likely, we have to request the IMF to move ahead with those who have agreed and hold China’s debt payments until we come to some level of agreement.

We have to understand China’s point of view and geopolitics as well. Our crisis has also become a tug of war between two economic powerhouses. On one hand, China does not want to align or agree with a US-led programme. On the other hand, the relief measures given to Sri Lanka have to be provided to all other countries making similar requests in future.

Pakistan and many African countries and emerging economies are expected to face debt distress in the coming years. China’s growth predictions are low, impacting global economic growth. Hence, the more we delay opening up Sri Lanka to geopolitical sensitivities, the more we will be pushed to align with certain superpowers. If we were to depend on China or India for continuous relief measures, it would be extremely difficult to avoid becoming a geopolitical pawn.

Possible reforms and opportunities 

In this context, it is clear that all available options (with the IMF or without the IMF), will result in extremely difficult times. However, in a crisis, there will be winners as well. Regardless of any of the aforementioned options, there are basic levels of reforms we have to undertake in any scenario. 

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms must be at the forefront. Without this, we have no future. One good opportunity is to capture the drive within the Indian market. Even if Sri Lanka does nothing, there will be spillover effects from India. The Indian economy, especially the North Indian economy, is growing very fast and we have to connect to their market. If we had played our cards right, we could have become a good connection point for trade between India and China. Instead, we made enemies all over. However, there is still potential. 

The more we delay reforms, it will further exacerbate the problem. As such, reforms are the only saviour in any scenario. It is sad to see how we are distancing ourselves from reforms, with political developments triggering another round of economic and political uncertainty which will lead to social uncertainty. Let us hope reforms move forward fast. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

What next for Sri Lanka?

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

New predictions are emerging that debt restructuring and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Board-level agreement may take until the end of this year. Another ongoing discussion is about the Local Government Elections and postponement of elections. Electricity tariffs are to be increased and 10 banks have been downgraded by Fitch Ratings as a recalibration of Sri Lanka’s sovereign rating.

Overall, it appears that economic reforms are being sidelined faster than expected, without realising the consequences of each action. It is true these complicated problems have no easy, straightforward solutions. No solution will be perfect and the validity, impact, and effect of any solution will be weighed against time. To put it simply, a solution that appears valid and reasonable today may not sound reasonable in a few weeks or months.

Each action has its consequences and inaction will also have consequences. It will be a battle between the consequences of action and inaction and the continuation of this for the next few years.

Reforms and restructuring

Let’s take the case of reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). With the election cycle commencing with Local Government Elections, attempts at restructuring SOEs such as the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) may be delayed. This delay means that inefficiencies will continue and tariffs will be increased without any competitive basis. This will in turn impact all businesses as well as macroeconomic indicators given the monopoly and the size of the electricity business. It may also extend the duration of power cuts and pave the way for another wave of protests, worsening the business environment.

Reforms too will be painful. Trade unions and some employees will be affected and an electricity monopoly can interrupt the life of the common man in multiple ways, with political and capital implications.

The cost of not implementing reforms will be much higher politically and economically, as it would be a cyclical result. Therefore, the reasonable decision is to restructure loss-making SOEs. Unfortunately, there is no other way out and delaying this further may invite darker years in the future.

The delays in the debt restructuring process will have its own consequences, both economically and geopolitically. The debt restructuring delay is a repercussion of maintaining bad foreign relations.

Poor international relations

How we treated India over the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) and in discussions on the East Container Terminal was extremely unprofessional and irresponsible. There is a significant difference between disagreement, negotiation, and unprofessional treatment.

By suspending the Light Rail Transit (LRT) project, we lost the respect and trust of Japan. We even annoyed China with the fertiliser matter and continuous regulatory delays with the Port City project. Our relations with the Middle East deteriorated with the cremation of dead bodies of the Muslim community during Covid.

We are not even in the good books of the US over the way we dealt with the MCC grant. Simply put, we do not have a friend who will extend a helping hand during troubled times. It is said that countries have longer memories than people. As such, we have limited our options due to our own grave mistakes.

A stalemate in a crisis

Economics and politics often go hand in hand. During an economic crisis, instability in politics is unavoidable. Our President does not have a direct mandate and the composition of the Parliament may not really reflect the people’s voice with the dawn of the completely new sociopolitical environment.

This was one reason the discussion of a common minimum programme was floated by concerned individuals and professionals, but it appears that this too has been discarded, with everyone slowly turning their attention to the election cycle. The calibre of our politicians is too inferior for them to understand the dynamics involved and to come up with responsive and novel policies and political options.

We are now in a stalemate, with a lot of short-term distractions. In such situations, we become distracted and waste our time on non-value adding activities without realising the massive deterioration of the quality of life. A deeper analysis shows that while the absence of economic reforms is a major issue, the fragility of our institutions is a bigger concern, with the institutional capability for the functioning of a basic society being almost nonexistent.

Solutions

Appointing capable and credible human resources for debt negotiations with China is essential to avoid delays. Acceleration of debt restructuring will unblock many other barricades, enabling us to move forward. There is a huge vacuum of capable human resources needed to carry out reforms. Therefore, providing space for already appointed committees to recruit more capable people and working out a time-bound solution matrix is important. The solution now lies in setting up institutions that can execute reforms to get us the required results.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Compounded crises: IMF the only way out

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

Economic crises are difficult to solve. In the case of a natural disaster, we know that it will come to an end at some point. We just have to manage for a short period until everything settles. By contrast, economic crises are different. They generally come in a package of five separate but intertwined crises if not managed well. It is clearly best to avoid crises, but when the crisis hits, and if we fail to manage it, the situation becomes significantly worse. Sri Lanka, unfortunately, seems to be managing the situation badly. 

What we are currently experiencing is the balance of payments crisis. Simply put, we don’t have sufficient US Dollars to import essentials, including fuel and medicine. As a result, the lifestyle that we used to live cannot be sustained as long as these conditions prevail. 

The second crisis just around the corner is the debt crisis. We have a $ 1 billion payment to be paid on 25 July and our usable reserves amount to only about $ 150 million. It has clearly come to the point where restructuring debt is unavoidable. Debt restructuring will be a painful process for creditors and debtors equally. This will have an unavoidable impact on the local economy. Additionally, the debt restructuring can be done with an IMF programme. The IMF is the only organisation that can bring credibility to a country that has proved that “it is not good for money”.

The critical question is, how is Sri Lanka going to finance its trade until we negotiate with the IMF and have an agreed-upon programme of restructuring debt? If we had sufficient reserves, we would at least have had a backup option, but we all know reserves are not built for day-to-day imports but for an emergency situation like Covid-19. The other option is to get support from bilateral partners until we finalise the negotiations. Even for that to take place, generally an IMF programme is essential as they need to have some assurance that the money will be utilised to import essentials but not to bail-out any bond holders. Hence it is essential to enter into an IMF programme as early as possible, rather than beating around the bush. 

In an ideal scenario, as a country we should have moved forward with reforms before going to the IMF seeking funds and advice. Indeed, if we had carried out these reforms at the right time, then we would not have needed to go to the IMF. But if we are not doing things correctly, it’s sensible to go to the IMF, not only because of the money, but for credibility and discipline. The current situation is that we are already late – and the clock is ticking. There are massive shortages nationwide, which have the potential to get worse. The Government is yet to be clear about whether we intend to have an IMF programme and even as this article is being written, the country did not even have a finance minister to initiate any such discussions.

The third crisis of the package is the financial crisis. Particularly in the process of debt restructuring, some of these bonds are held by domestic banks. So restructuring will affect the local financial system. Furthermore, most of the local banks have extended credit guarantees for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and it is likely that their debt will also be required to be restructured. So the impact on the financial sector can trigger a third crisis.

As these triple crises bear down, the political capital enjoyed by the Government will undoubtedly wear away. As a result, political instability will start kicking in. Especially in a country like Sri Lanka, where most essential services like fuel, electricity, and water are provided by the Government, the moment interruptions start, public resistance increases at a higher rate. In the Sri Lankan case, the political crisis has overtaken the debt crisis and the financial crisis. We are in the middle of a political and balance of payment crises and the other two crises are just a matter of time. 

The final crisis in the package is the humanitarian crisis. Especially if we fail to secure some funding lines without also delaying IMF negotiations, there is a risk of extended power cuts and further deterioration of living conditions. This can trigger a humanitarian crisis. If we drift to a disorderly default, as the Financial Times reports, “Disorderly default is the same as civil war.”

Already there are stories in the news about shortages of medicine and medical equipment and postponement of surgeries, all of which impact the humanitarian needs of the people. So urgent action is needed! However, Sri Lanka is in a complete state of dysfunction; there is no solid Government or cabinet ministers to make decisions, while public resistance keeps mounting. 

The nature of an economic crisis is that one crisis will keep instigating another and it’s not going to just go away. It takes a lot of time to overcome after things go out of control. 

We are very far behind and we need someone who really understands the depth of reforms needed and the work plan we have to adhere to. The general optimistic sentiment of ‘this shall too pass’ really won’t work here. We have expected the same to happen for a long time but it really hasn’t happened. 

Before we move to reforms, we need to keep in mind, for future reference, the cost of bad economic policy. Self-sufficiency, protectionism, intervening in markets, and ad hoc policy decisions are a recipe for a disaster and sadly we are facing one now.

We have to immediately increase interest rates and remove all surrender requirements by the Central Bank. In an economic crisis, dimensions are different. We have to immediately go to the IMF with a short- and medium-term plan with political consensus on implementation for the next five to eight years.

The problem and the solutions are already known. We need credibility, commitment to undertake reforms, and competence for execution of reforms to overcome. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Prof Athukorala: Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and reality – Part 3

Originally appeared on The Daily FT.

By Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala

IMF programmes and economic performance

There are two ways to evaluate the impact of IMF stabilisation programmes: (a) counterfactual evaluation: comparing outcome with what would have happened without the programmes; and (b) comparing results to objectives: evaluate performance against the benchmarks imposed by the policy-makers. 

It is not possible to apply the first approach to assess the impact of IMF programmes using data for a single country simply because there is no suitable counterfactual (situation in the absence of the programme) for assessing how the country would have fared without the programmes. This approach can be applied with ‘proxy’ counterfactuals only in multi-country comparative analyses (Goldstein and Montiel 1986, Barro and Lee 2005, Easterly 2005, Vreeland 2003). We apply here the second methodology, using economic growth (measured by annual growth rate of real GDP) as the key performance criterion.

In Table 2, the average growth rate of the Sri Lankan economy during the years under IMF programmes (‘programme years’) is compared with that of the entire period (1965-2019) and years without IMF programs (excluding the ‘pandemic’ year of 2020). The growth rate in all programme years (4.91) is 0.42 higher compared to that of the non-programme years (4.49). When the programmes years are separated into years under fully-implemented programmes (proposes under with the entire committed fund was disbursed by the IMF) and partially implemented programmes, the growth impact of the fully implemented programmes is found to notably higher, as one would expect (5.16%). 

Note that doing the period under study (1965-2009), all non-programme years are preceded by programme years: the period stars with the first IMF programme in1965. Therefore, lower growth rates in the non-programme years reported in Table 2 shows that, on average, the positive growth impact of the programs has not percolated beyond the programme years. The average growth rate during the non-programme years is 4.49 compared to 5.16 during the average growth rate during the fully-implemented programmes. 

This simple comparison of growth rates ignores the possibility that the growth impact of reforms could have shaped by exogenous shocks such as the two JVP uprisings (in 1971 and during 1988-89), escalation of the separatist war, and changes in the terms of trade. Also, the economy has the natural tendency to grow over time at a certain rate regardless of reforms. Moreover, the degree of openness of the economy to foreign trade could impact on the nature of the adjustment process in the economy (Arpac and Bird 2009). The real issue is whether the IMF programmes have produced better growth performance after allowing for these other factors.

We undertook an econometric analysis to delineate the impact of IMF programmes after controlling for these influences. The results indicate that average growth rate is 1.26 percentage points higher using the 33 years under all programmes compared to the non-programme years. This estimated growth impact is however statistically significant only at 20% (that is, there is a 20% probability that this estimate is likely due to chance). By contrast, for the 25 years of completely fully-disbursed programmes, the growth rate is 1.45 percentage points higher compared to the non-programme years and incomplete programme years are taken together. This estimate is statistically significant at the one-percent level (that is, there is only one percent probability that this growth impact is likely due to chance).

In sum, the results of the econometric analysis is consistent with what we observed in the simple data tabulation (Table 2). This estimated growth impact is all the more impressive when we take into account what the econometricians call the possible ‘negative selection bias’. A country normally approaches the IMF at a time of macroeconomic distress. It would not, therefore, be surprising if we had found no statistically significant association or even a negative association between programme participation and economic growth (Easterly 2005). 

It is clear from this evidence that the growth outcome during the IMF programme years has been respectable. But, have the programmes been successful in rectifying macroeconomic imbalances of the economy to set the stage for sustainable growth? This is an important issue because the very purpose of IMF stabilisation programmes is to achieve ‘adjustment with growth’. 

Addressing this issue requires an in-depth analysis of individual programmes, paying attention to the programme objectives, problems cropped up in the implementation process, and the impact of the programmes on the overall incentive structure of the economy. However some tentative inferences can be made by comparing the relevant macroeconomic variable across years of the fully-disbursed programmes and non-programme years. The relevant data are summarised in Table 3. 

The data clearly indicate the catalytic effect of the programmes on net capital inflows to the country. During the programme years, net capital inflows relative to GDP was 1.4 percentage points higher compared to the non-programme years (or the level of net capital inflows was about 32% higher than during the non-program years). Increase in capital flows seems to have helped maintaining imports and government expenditure at relatively higher levels. However, there is no evidence of net capital inflows augmenting domestic investment: investment as a percentage of GDP is strikingly similar between programme years and non-programme years.

There is some evidence of improvement in the country’s international competitiveness (measured by the real exchange rate change), but this has not persisted beyond the programme years.

Government revenue was notably higher during the programme years, with an increase in tax revenue making a significant contribution to the increase. However, this was overwhelmed by the Government’s failure to contain Government expenditure. The difference of the magnitudes of excess domestic demand (which is equal to the sign reversed value of net capital inflows), current account deficit and the budget deficit during programme years and non-programme years are striking similar. 

This pattern suggests that domestic excess demand, which is driven by the failure to contain the budget deficit, is the prime driver of the failure of the reform programmes to contain the external imbalance (widening current account deficit). The current account deficit during the programme years is 50% larger compared to that in the non-programme years (4.8% compared to 3.2% of GDP).

The date relating to the domestic imbalance (domestic expenditure over income) of the economy and the overall Government budget balance are depicted in Figure 1. Note that the domestic imbalance is by definition equal to the current account balance (the external imbalance), after allowing for changes in foreign reserves and valuation effect on foreign assets resulting from exchange rate changes. The figure therefore vividly demonstrates that the explanation of the persistent external imbalance of the economy is deeply rooted in the failure of fiscal management. The widening budget deficit that propels domestic excess demand has been an endemic structural feature of the economy, notwithstanding repetitive recourse to IMF adjustment programmes during the period under study.

Concluding remarks: Seeking or rejecting IMF support

There is no evidence to suggest that the IMF has been a determining hand in shaping economic stabilisation reforms in Sri Lanka. In all 16 stabilisation programmes supported by the IMF during 1965-2020, the decision to go to the IMF has been dictated by the country’s own failure to keep the macroeconomic house in order. There is no evidence to suggest that the IMF insisted on implementing a stereotyped policy package in all ‘crisis’ cases. Moreover, governments in both ideological camps have gone to the IMF in times of need.

The Sri Lanka-IMF relationship during the UF movement during 1970-77 indicates that there is room to enter into an IMF programme even for a national government with an incompatible ideological position provided it agrees with the IMF on the importance of achieving macroeconomic stabilisation. During the right-of-the centre UNP regimes of 1977-’94, the IMF supported trade liberalisation, but subject to its standard conditionality relating to macroeconomic stability. In hindsight, one could surmise that the outcome of the liberalisation reforms would have been much more impressive had the Government followed IMF-World Bank advice (and Shenoy’s advocacy) for combining trade and investment liberalisation with macroeconomic stabilisation. 

There is convincing evidence that the growth rate of the economy was significantly higher during the years of fully-implemented IMF stabilisation programmes. However, the long-standing fundamental macroeconomic disequilibria of the country has persisted despite the repetitive reliance on IMF programmes. This simply reflect policy failures of the country to use the breathing space provided by the programmes to undertake the required structural adjustment reforms: the ‘repetitive client status’ of the country does not, therefore, make a case for rejecting IMF support. 

Borrowing from the IMF is much cheaper than raising funds through sovereign bond issues and borrowing from other commercial sources. Unlike other donors, the IMF always lend funds to the Central Bank of the country strictly for meeting external payments. Therefore, IMF programmes do not have a direct impact on the domestic money supply and hence domestic inflation. More importantly, entering into an IMF programme acts as a catalyst to generate additional financial assistance. 

Other international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and individual donor nations find comfort to lend to Sri Lanka as the lending risks are reduced given the financial discipline that an IMF programme instils. Financial credibility achieved by entering into an IMF programme also helps raising funds at competitive interest rates from private capital markets.

Delaying the inevitability of approaching the IMF can be costly in the form of more stringent conditionality. The IMF team visited Sri Lanka in February 2020 to meet with the new administration and discuss its policy agenda has pre-warned about Sri Lanka’s formidable macroeconomic adjustment challenges: ‘Ambitious structural and institutional reforms are needed to anchor policy priorities, buttress competition and foster inclusive growth. Fiscal prudence remain critical to support macro-economic stability and market confidence, amid high level of debt refinancing needed. Given risks to debt sustainability over the medium term, renewed effort to advance fiscal consolidation is essential for macroeconomic stability.’ [https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/07/pr2042-sri-lanka-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-sri-lanka]

(Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, an Emeritus Professor of Economics at Australian National University and an Advisor for Advocata Institute and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

Prof Athukorala: Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and reality – Part 2

Originally appeared on The Daily FT.

By Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala

Since 1965 Sri Lanka has been a ‘repetitive client’ of the IMF. The country has entered into 16 economic stabilisation programmes during 1965-2000. Macroeconomic management of the country has been under IMF programmes for approximately 33 years of the 55-year period.

1970-’75: Trotskyite Finance Minister seeking IMF support again

The United Front coalition (UF) came into power in 1970 promising to ‘to lay the foundation for an irrevocable transition to the economy to a socialist one’ (Perera 1970a, p. 4-5). The development strategy of the new Government envisaged combining ‘outward looking development with the right mixture of internal policies and approaches to domestic resource mobilisation which prove to be socially acceptable’ (Perera 1970b, p. 176).

By 1970, Sri Lanka’s repayment obligations to the IMF had become an important factor that contributed to high level of capital amortisation because of repetitive recourse to borrowing in the second half of the 1960s (Central Bank Annual Report 1971, p. 194). NM, the Finance Minister, started negotiation for a fifth SBA with IMF within months of the new Government coming into power. In his 1970 Budget Speech he argued that “we cannot brush aside and completely ignore these international institutions; we can repudiate their terms only if we are prepared to face the far-reaching distortions” (Perera 1970).

The initial discussions were held in June 1970 in Colombo with D.S. Savkar, Assistant Director, West Asia Division of the IMF. NM attended and addressed the IMF-World Bank annual conference in Copenhagen in September 1970 and persuaded the IMF Managing Directors Paul Schweitzer to visit Colombo on 20 October 1970. Final discussion were held in Washington DC in December 1970. In the negotiations, NM was assisted by a strong team of technocrats including W. Tennekoon (Central Bank Governor), M. Rajendra (Secretary to the Treasury) and H.A. de S. Gunasekera (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Employment).

The IMF was firmly of the view that the imbalance of payments can only be set right by a further devaluation of the Rupee. The Finance Minister opposed to the idea because of the perceived inflationary impact it would have and managed to convince the IMF team that the Government had the capacity to reduce the budget deficit by taking firm actions to reduce the budget deficit, promoting domestic saving, relaxing credit controls, encouraging exports and pursuing a vigorous programme of import substitution. The IMF approved a SBA of $ 25.6 million on 17 May 1971. To facilitate the implementation of the SBA, the IMF enlisted assistance of the World Bank and some downer countries for an aid programme.

After signing the SBA, NM emphatically defended his decision to go to the IMF in the Parliament: ‘effort to put its own house in order was not the result of IMF advice but was the obvious thing to do in the national interest’ (Hansard, Vol 91, November 10, 1971, cc 2621-2633).

The worsening balance of payment situation in the wake of the oil price increase in 1973 compelled the Government to negotiate another SBA. In preparation for negotiations the Government came up with some ‘sweeteners’ for the IMF: the rupee was re-linked to the pound sterling from the US$ when the pound was floated on 23 June 1972 resulting in an indirect devaluation of the rupee by about 7%.; in November 1972 the FEECs rate was increased from 45% to 65% with an expansion of the import coverage of FEEC scheme to nearly 75%, and the food subsidy bill was cut substantially on its own initiative. The negotiations took two years and a personal visit by the Finance Minister to the IMF before signing the agreement to the tune of $ 29.6 m on 30 April 1974.

Sri Lanka obtained only the first instalment ($ 8.5 m) under this SBA. The IMF withheld the balance because the Government failed to adhere to the ceiling imposed on domestic credit. Perhaps the Government was not under pressure to stick to IMF conditionality in that year because of the availability of ‘easy’ IMF finance under the newly-introduced Oil Facility (SDR 34 million) and the Compensatory Finance Facility (SDR 7.0).

The Government approached the IMF for another SBA in 1975. However, the discussions floundered allegedly on account of the Government’s reluctance to cut further subsidies as required by the IMF (Kappagoda and Paine 1981, p74).

The UF Government made considerable progress towards macroeconomic adjustment with the help of the IMF programmes. Both the annual debt servicing burden and the term structure of external debt significantly improved. However, as Kappagoda and Paine (1981) have convincingly argued, ‘the payment adjustment [cut in domestic absorption] proceeded faster than was warranted’ (p. 100).

The adjustment burden primarily felt on imports with serious adverse effects on the economy’s medium term prospects and consumer wellbeing. The groundswell of unhappiness of the electorate paved the way for the UNP to return to power with a landslide majority in June 1977.

1977-’88: The first wave of liberalisation reforms 

The widely-held view in the Sri Lankan policy circles is that the regime shift opened up the opportunity for the IMF to dictate ‘neo-liberal’ reform in Sri Lanka (Gunasinghe 1986, Lakshman 1985, Davis 2015). Lakshman (1985, p. 22), in particular, claims that ‘the determining hand of the IMF-WB group in shaping and implementing of the ‘open economy’ is abundantly clear’. This claim could not be further from reality.

Major reforms such as trade liberalisation and exchange rate depreciation and the opening up of the economy to foreign direct investment were, in fact, undertaken by the new Government in the ‘honeymoon’ period following the massive election victory, based on the recommendations of the Shenoy report. When the Government adopted pro-market policies for its own reasons, the IMF became an important partner of development policy, but, of course, subject to its standard conditionality.

As already noted, the balance of payments position was in relatively better shape at the time compared to the first half of the decade. There was also promising sign of massive concessionary capital inflows from the major donor nations in support of the economic opening by the new Government. Immediately after the new Government was formed, the Finance Minister, Ronnie de Mel made a one-month visit to a number of Western countries to seek aid and returned with promising pledges. In 1978, aid disbursements alone were sufficient to cover the current account deficit (Central Bank Annual Report 1978). There was no urgent need for approaching the IMF for balance of payments support alone. It seems that the Government choose to go to the IMF to gain credibility to the reform process. 

The Government presented a proposal for a $ 427 m under a SBA. However, in the absence of a well-prepared medium-term stabilisation programme, and because the Government’s disagreement with the IMF to phase out subsidies, the IMF approved a SBA of only $ 122 plus $ 50.3 million as a supplement from the IMF Trust Fund in 1978. Immediately after approving the SBA, the IMF opened a representative office in Colombo to work closely with the Government in monitoring the reforms. In January 1979, the IMF approved $ 317.2 m EFF programme to support structural adjustment reforms during the three-year period of 1979-’81.

The relationship between the Government and the IMF, however, began to come under strain from 1981 because of a significant disagreement relating to the policy priorities of the Government (Rajapatirana 2017). The Government swiftly implemented the Shenoy recommendations for economic opening, but it overlooked Shenoy’s recommendations for macroeconomic stabilisation, which was an integral part of the proposed overall reform package. It decided to accelerate the implementation of the Mahaweli Development Project (collapsing the original implementation period of 30 years to eight years), side by side with the liberalisation reforms. 

The IMF (and the World Bank) became concerned about the inconsistency between the objective of structural adjustment in the economy under liberalisation reforms and the inevitable macroeconomic instability resulting from the massive investment programme (Levy 1998, Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1991). 

Apart from the macroeconomic instability, there were also genuine concerns regarding the viability of the $ 664 m project: A study of the project financed by the World Bank in 1981 recommended a slower rate of implementation than what the Government envisaged to avoid possible cost blow-up. The study also expressed concern that donors had made aid commitments for the project without properly evaluating the project’s costs. 

In September 1983, the IMF approved another SBA of $ 105 m (as opposed to the Government’s request for $ 221 m). However, the IMF terminated the agreement after only half of the agreed amount was disbursed, over concerns about macroeconomic instability caused by the massive Mahaweli investment programme. The World Bank also withheld disbursement of allocations under a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) ($ 70 m) because of the Government’s dispute with the IMF. According to a confidential letter to the Ministry of Finance and Planning (leaked to Lanka Guardian), David Hopper, the Vice President of the South Asia Programme, emphatically stated that ‘the precondition for all Bank structural adjustment activities is an agreement with the IMF’ (Jayalath 1990). 

Ronnie de Mel, the Finance Minister, described the nature of the Sri Lanka-IMF relationship during this period as follows: ‘We have had discussions, intricate discussions, debates, long negotiations and many quarrels. We have had suspensions. We have had estrangements. It has been, in short, love-hate type relationship. It has been something like the relationship between Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton’ (Hansard, Vol. 22, No. 12, March 18, 1983, C 1768).

1988-2005: The second-wave reforms

The economic boom following the 1977 reforms mainly concentrated in the first three years (1978-81) when the economy grew at an average annual rate of 6.6%. In the ensuing years of the decade, liberalisation reforms were overtaken by the commitment to major infrastructure projects. The process of structural adjustment in the economy was hampered by the failure to complete implementation of the reform agenda, in particular labour market reforms and State enterprise reforms, and the adverse impact of the investment boom on tradable goods production in the economy because of the appreciation of the real exchange rate (Moore 1990, Dunham and Kelegama 1997).

Added to this was the economic disruption caused by the escalation of the separatist war from 1983 and JVP uprising in the south during 1987-’89. By the end of the 1980s, the Sri Lankan economy had come close to a foreign exchange crisis, with low foreign exchange reserves, massive security related Government expenses, and a misaligned exchange rate that propelled significant capital flight and under repatriation of export proceeds (IMF 2001). 

In this volatile economic climate, the UNP Government under the new leadership of President Premadasa embarked on the ‘second wave’ liberalisation reforms (Dunham and Kelegama 1995). The IMF supported the reforms under a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) of $ 209 m) and an Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of $ 478.6 m. Reforms included devaluation of the rupee against the US$ by 34% between mid-1989 and the end of 1993, further liberalisation of financial and commodity markets, revamping of the operations of the Board of Investment (BOI) with a one-stop-shop for investment approval process, privatisation of some State-Owned Enterprises (under an innovative politically-friendly label, ‘peopalisation’) and a poverty alleviation programme. 

Dunham and Kelegama (1995, p. 187) have characterised the second-wave reforms as an illustration of how ‘strong leadership proved critical in ... reforms, in a country where the state is not strong, and is neither cohesive nor disciplined, in organisational rearms’. 

The vigour of second-wave reforms was lost because of the tragic death of the President, but there was no back sliding from reform because economic outcomes had been impressive enough to make economic liberalisation by-partition policy (Kumaranatunge 2004). 

The new SLFP-led Coalition Government continued with trade liberalisation and privatisation of State enterprises. During 2001-2002 the Government received financial support for reforms under a SBA of $ 256.8 m. In releasing funds under the SBA the IMF was sympathetic to the difficulties faced by the Government in meeting conditionality because of the exigencies of the accelerating civil war. 

For instance, the IMF showed flexibility to extend the agreement to 19 September 2002 on a lapse-of-time basis to allow the completion of the final review and granted a waiver for the non-compliance of performance criteria and released the agreed amount, because non-compliance was largely due to factors beyond the control of the Sri Lankan authorities (escalating ethnic conflict and oil price hike). 

1995-2009: The period of escalating civil war

During the period from collapse of peace talks between the LTTE and Government in 1995 until 2009, the reform process was hampered by the escalating civil war. In 2003, the IMF approved a three-year PRGF to the amount of $ 392.7 m and an additional EFF in tune of $ 210.8 m over the period 2003-’06. Both programmes lapsed after the withdrawal of the first instalments.

The post-civil war era

Following the ending of the civil war in July 2009, the IMF approved the largest ever programme loan (SBA of $ 2.6 b) for Sri Lanka. The quarterly performance criteria (QPCs) related to the standard macroeconomic stabilisation measures. 

The Government’s poor record of revenue mobilisation, in particular continued decline in the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, and the budgetary burden of supporting loss-making public enterprises, and the backsliding on trade liberalisation came up in the negotiations but did not become part of the conditionality. This was presumably because the IMF wanted to provide the Government with policy autonomy in restoring the economy after the three-decade civil war.

In June 2016 the Government entered into a three-year EFF ($ 1.5 b) with the IMF. The EFF aimed to harness an additional $ 650 m in other multilateral and bilateral loans of about $ 2.2 b (over and above the existing financing arrangements). The stated objective of the programme was to help the new Government restore macroeconomic stability and resilience of the economy to facilitate sustainable and equitable economic growth (IMF 2016). 

The programme focussed on reforms to tax policy and tax administration with a focus on increasing direct tax collection, fiscal policy management, and State enterprise reforms to achieve fiscal consolidation while providing fiscal space for the Government’s key social and development spending programmes. Fiscal consideration reforms were to combine with flexible monetary targeting under a flexible exchange rate regime, reforms in the trade and investment regime, and rebuilding foreign exchange reserves. 

The reforms undertaken by the Government under the programme during 2016-’19 included a major revision to the value added and income tax systems and introducing a new building tax and rationalising the customs duty structure (Coomaraswami 2017). On 13 May 2019 the IMF Executive Board approved an extension of the EFF until June 2020 with rephrasing of remaining disbursements to complete the reform agenda. However, the implementation of the programme abruptly ended with the change of government in early 2020.

To sum up, since 1965 Sri Lanka has been a ‘repetitive client’ of the IMF. The country has entered into 16 economic stabilisation programmes during 1965-2000. Macroeconomic management of the country has been under IMF programmes for approximately 33 years of the 55-year period. The IMF fully disturbed agreed funds under 12 (approximately covering 25 years) of these 17 agreements. The conditionality attached to the agreements has notably varied over time depending on shifts in the development thinking of the IMF and macroeconomic conditions and the underlying political developments of the country.

(Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, an Emeritus Professor of Economics at Australian National University and an Advisor for Advocata Institute and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

Prof Athukorala: Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and Reality – Part 1

Originally appeared on The Daily FT.

By Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala

Read Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and Reality – Part 2 and Part 3

Sri Lanka is now in the midst of its worst macroeconomic crisis since independence. Whether to seek financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in managing the crisis is a hotly-debated issue in Sri Lankan policy circles. The debate is largely ideologically-driven: strongly-held, opposing views are expressed without facts.

The purpose of this paper is to demystify the debate by documenting and analysing Sri Lanka’s experience under IMF-supported macroeconomic adjustment programs, the economic circumstances that propelled the country to seek IMF support, and implications of these programmes for economic stabilisation and growth.

The discussion focuses on two key issues emphasised by the current political leadership and the Central Bank to justify their attempt to avert going to the IMF: IMF dictates policy reforms at the expense of national policy autonomy, and the conditions attached to IMF programs are harmful to national development. The paper primarily adopts an economist’s perspective, but where relevant economics is combined with politics in order to understand the vicissitudes of Sri Lanka-IMF relations.

The paper begins with a short introduction to the role of the IMF in economic stabilisation reforms in developing countries to provide the context for the ensuing analysis. The next section provides as analytical narrative of the history of Sri Lanka-IMF relations. The following section examines the impact of IMF programs on the Sri Lankan economy. The final section provides concluding remarks with a focus on the current debate on entering into an IMF programme.

The IMF and economic stabilisation

The IMF was set up in 1945 to provide member countries with bridging loans to help them get over balance of payments difficulties. A member’s access to the IMF’s financing is expressed in terms of tranches, equal to 25% of its quota of the IMF. The first four trenches (‘reserve’ tranches, in total up to 100% of its quota) can be accessed free of charge at the member’s own discretion.

The IMF also has other concessional credit facilities introduced to help member countries in the event of unforeseeable economic shocks: Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF), the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF), the Trust Fund and Subsidy Account (TFSA) financing, Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) and Emergency Assistance (EA).

When a country borrows beyond the reserve trenches or eligible concessional credit facilities, it has to agree on a reform package to overcome its problems that led to seek financial support. These lending programs are called structural adjustment (or stabilisation) programmes. The policy measures prescribed by the IMF relating to these lending programmes are known as ‘IMF conditionality’.

The main structural adjustment loan programme is the Stand-By Agreement (SBA) facility, introduced in 1952. The key objectives of SBAs are to rebuild the external reserves, strengthen the fiscal position, maintain monetary stability, and fortify the domestic financial system. The length of the typical SBA programme is 12 to 18 months and loans are to be repaid within a maximum of five years.

The other IMF stabilisation facilities are the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) (established in 1974); Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) (1982) and later remained Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and Poverty Reduction and Growth facility (PRGF) introduced in 1999 in place of the ESAF specifically to help low-income countries. These programmes have been established to provide support to comprehensive structural adjustment programmes that include policies of the scope and character required to correct structural imbalances over an extended period. Normally the duration of these programmes varies from three to five years, and repayment is over four to 10 years from the date of drawing. 

Under the structural adjustment programmes, the IMF releases funds by quarterly credit tranches. The country has to observe the quarterly programme criteria at each test data. The interest rate comprises two components: the service charge and a ‘fixed margin’ (an annual interest rate). The service charge is calculated weekly, based on a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) rate (applicable to all borrowings from the IMF) and the fixed margin is applicable to loans up to 300% of the member’s IMF quota and a surcharge is applicable to loans beyond that limit. The interest rate is normally about one third of the average rate applicable to sovereign bonds issued by the typical developing country.

Unlike the other multilateral and bilateral lenders who lend to the government of the borrowing country, the IMF always lends funds to the central banks of the country. The IMF loans to the central bank are strictly for the purpose of building international reserves to meet external payments. Therefore, borrowing under IMF programmes does not have any direct impact on domestic money supply and hence on domestic inflation. 

Entering into an IMF supported programme also acts as a catalyst to generate additional international financial assistance in three ways (Bird and Rowlands 2007). First, having a macroeconomic adjustment programme with the IMF is often a prerequisite for obtaining World Bank adjustment loans. Second, as part of entering into a stabilisation programme, the IMF arranges aid consortia of donor countries to assist the given country, Most of the donor funds harnessed under these consortia are outright grants or long-term loans that carry low interest rates. Third, credibility of the reform program gained by entering into an IMF programme helps raising funds at competitive interest rates from private capital markets.

The core of an IMF stabilisation programme is a ‘letter of intent’ that contains ‘performance criteria’ (conditionality) agreed with the IMF. The performance criteria vary from case to case, but typically centre on four key variables: budget deficit, the rate at which domestic credit is created, interest rates for both depositors and borrowers, and the exchange rate. In recent decades, the IMF has begun to focus on domestic pricing policy for petroleum products, when the domestic prices are badly out of line with world prices. 

In the typical developing economy where the local capital market is weak and access to foreign credit is limited, domestic credit expansion is largely driven by the budget deficit. In IMF reform programs the major emphasis is, therefore, placed on fiscal reforms, cutting the budget deficit through both government revenue reform and rationalising government expenditure. (There is a saying that the acronym ‘IMF’ stands for ‘It’s Mostly Fiscal’!) 

A straightforward reduction of absorption (expenditure) is likely to entail a decline in total output and employment unless wages are exceptionally flexible and labour and capital is highly mobile among economic sectors. Therefore, exchange rate depreciation is recommended to make tradable goods (exports and imports competing goods) relatively more profitable compared to ‘non-tradables’ (mostly services and construction). The expansion of domestic tradable goods production relatively to non-tradable production is expected to help maintaining growth dynamism of the economy in face of policy-induced contraction in aggregate domestic absorption (Cooper 1992).

The decision to go to the IMF for assistance rests entirely with the IMF members. However, the relationship between the IMF and its developing-country members under stabilisation programmes has not always been smooth. Much of the disagreements hinge on judgements relating to conditionality attached to the lending programmes. While the principle of conditionality is not generally contested, often there are strong reservations on the part of members about the design and application of conditionality. The national officials are typically more optimistic than the IMF staff and the favourable developments they anticipate could imply less difficult action. 

On the other hand, in some cases, the national government’s discontent could also arise because, in setting conditions, the IMF staff has the tendency go beyond the basic framework. For instance, they could get into details of exactly what expenditures should be cut or what taxes should be raised to reduce the budget deficit, instead of leaving the responsibility for meeting the targets with the officials of the country concerned by taking into account country-specific political as well as economic considerations. 

Negotiating a stabilisation programme in a crisis context has the tendency to give the unwarranted impression that a country is rushing into action with a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis the IMF. The governments may resent IMF conditionality because of the loss of sovereignty implied and also because of a belief that the IMF’s objectives do not necessarily coincide with those of the national government. 

In such a context, naturally there is a tendency on the prat of the governments to make the IMF a scapegoat for (to hold the IMF responsibility for) politically unpopular decisions taken by them or for their own poor economic management. Indeed, such scapegoating often lead many to believe that the IMF forces countries to take politically disagreeable, and sometimes economically costly, action (Cooper 1992, Bird 2007).  

Sri Lanka and the IMF 

Sri Lanka (then ‘Ceylon’) became a member of the IMF (and the World Bank) on 29 August 1950. It accepted the obligation for liberalisation of the current account transaction under the IMF Article VIII in March 1994. 

Sri Lanka did not recourse to IMF financing throughout the 1950s, given the healthy external reserve position built up during the Second Word War, which was subsequently buttressed by the Korean War commodity boom (1950-51) and the tea boom (1954-55). The country obtained IMF finance for the first time in 1961, and then in 1962, within the reserve trenches. 

1964: Trotskyite Finance Minister seeking IMF support

Sri Lanka’s first attempt to borrow from the IMF under an SBA was by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) Coalition Government in 1964. By that time import restriction and capital controls had been carried out to the maximum and it was becoming increasingly difficult to introduce further restrictions without damaging the economy (Corea 1971). Because of the nationalisation of the foreign-owned gas and petroleum outlets in 1961, Sri Lanka became the first country against which the US Government invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the suspension of US aid to countries expropriating US property without compensation (Olson 1977). Following this, the international aid community virtually isolated Sri Lanka.

The pragmatic Trotskyite Finance Minister, Dr. N.M. Perera (NM) decided to approach the IMF. In September 1964, at the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank held in Tokyo, the Sri Lankan team led by NM consulted the IMF on the possibility of obtaining financial support under an SBA. The Government was defeated in the Parliament before the negotiations ended. However, according to a statement made by Dudley Senanayake (the Opposition Leader) at a parliamentary debate, the negotiation with the IMF failed well before because NM was not prepared to touch the politically-sensitive subsidy on rice (Hansard Vol 73, No. 13, 1767 c. 2898).

1965-70: Four back-to-back SBAs

During 1965-1970, the right-of-the-centre United National Party (UNP) Government obtained IMF financial support under four SBAs. The IMF conditionality of the Letters of Intent of these SBAs reflected the very nature of the mainstream development thinking at the time, which favoured import-substitution industrialisation with the Government directly playing a major role. 

Redressing the fiscal imbalance by rationalising expenditure, in particular reducing subsidies was the key focus. Reforming State-Owned Enterprises was not part of conditionality even though converting their losses had already become a big drain on the Government budget. Under the third SBA signed in May 1968, a Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate Scheme (FFECS), a dual exchange rate systems, designed to provide incentives to sleeted ‘non-traditional’ exports and to lift quantitative restrictions on selected imports at a premium above the official exchange rate (initially set at 44%). Other than this, there was no emphasis by the IMF on unshackling the economy from import restrictions and other direct Government intervention in the economy.

An important development in the policy scene during this period, which has not received only scant attention in the post-independence development history of Sri Lanka, is a failed attempt by J.R. Jayewardene (JR), the then Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister, to seek IMF support for a major liberalisation reform. At the time the economy was in the doldrums because of the closed-economy polices pursued by the country from the late 1950s. JR ‘regarded the crisis as an opportunity to embark on a radical change in economic policies that would amount to a departure from the dirigiste policies’ (de Silva and Wriggins 1998, p168). 

He approached B. R. Shenoy, the Indian liberal economist (who had taught at the Ceylon University College in the late 1940s) for advice. Shenoy responded with a comprehensive policy blueprint for unshackling the economy (Shenoy 1966). JR presented the Shenoy report to the Cabinet but there was little chance of being adopted the radical reform package given the political adjustments and realignments within the multi-party Cabinet. He had to wait until the UNP’s election victory under his leadership in 1977 to implement the proposed reforms. 

(Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, an Emeritus Professor of Economics at Australian National University and an Advisor for Advocata Institute and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

Closing the gate once the horse has bolted

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Can price controls rein in uncontrolled depreciation?

People are infuriated over the recent drastic price hikes on essential food items, and analysts and policymakers are attempting to make sense of what triggered this.

Some argue that the increasing global commodity prices are indeed the root cause of these local price hikes. In my opinion, however, global price hikes cannot be the sole reason. This conclusion is misleading as the domestic prices of these food items are higher than the percentage increase of global commodity prices adjusted for the depreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee (SLR).

Steep depreciation of the currency

It is no secret that the Government sought refuge in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) in recent times. This has had a considerable impact on commodity prices due to the depreciation of the rupee. A depreciating rupee coupled with increasing commodity prices is certainly an ill-fated combination. Even though many economists alerted the Government of the risks MMT could pose, they fell on deaf ears.

When global market prices rise, it is inevitable that domestic markets adjust accordingly due to price signals. This means that people shift their consumption behaviours and patterns with price volatility. However, Sri Lanka’s essential commodity price hikes came suddenly and have given people no time to adjust their purchasing patterns.

As per Central Bank data, Sri Lanka’s food inflation is increasing. Advocata Institute’s Bath Curry Indicator, which tracks the weekly expenditure of a four-member household on rice and curry, found that prices increased by 45% on a YoY (Year-on-Year) basis in July and by 30% in August.

I’d like to conclude my argument by quoting Nobel Laureate Prof. Milton Friedman: “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”

Acute foreign exchange crisis exacerbated by MMT

The acute foreign exchange crisis we are in, too, is a major contributor to recent price hikes. Oversupply of money has drained our reserves and added additional pressure on the currency. For example, when the government provides Rs. 20,000 (which is beyond the government’s capacity) for low-income families, money will flow out of the system due to the purchase of imported goods. People will be inclined towards buying imported LP gas, lentils, sprats, and tin fish.

Further, maintaining a negative real interest rate, which is to keep interest rates artificially low by increasing money supply below the inflation rate, will motivate people to spend more money than to save. More spending equals more expenditure on imports, which will then exacerbate the country’s Balance of Payment (BOP) crisis.

Currently, banks have different exchange rates for different customers. The kerb market’s exchange rate for the US dollar is between Rs. 250 and Rs. 260.

If this trend continues, the country’s fuel prices, LP gas, milk powder, and many other commodity prices will continue to rise.

Price controls

The Government has announced strict price controls and has appointed a designated officer to curb hoarding by traders with the objective of decreasing essential commodity prices. Recent news reports claim that hoarded essential food items such as sugar have been confiscated from stores by the authorities.

However, price controls are proven to be ineffective and will lead to goods disappearing from markets, as a result creating black markets. Further, it is likely that price controls will result in importers stopping the importation of goods. The first lockdown saw an initial price control of Rs. 65 on lentils and a controlled price of Rs. 100 on tin fish. Later, the Government had to withdraw the price controls as it resulted in severe shortages, with traders halting imports and the sellers hesitating to trade at a loss. Price controls simply don’t work because the price structure is unique for each trader.

Competition is the only factor that drives prices down. For example, the cost structure of a trader who sells lentils in an air-conditioned shop and a trader who sells at the Sunday market is different. The price they mark is based on the cost, and consumers buy it based on the value they get. Price controls hamper the signalling mechanism, resulting in severe repercussions.

Why do traders hoard?

Even with increased raids by the Consumer Affairs Authority (CAA), traders continue to hoard. This behaviour is intricately linked with the foreign exchange crisis the country is in. The Central Bank introduced regulations stating that traders cannot buy US dollars for a future day (forward market) at the current exchange rate. Further, importers were requested to open Letters of Credit (LCs) for a 180-day credit period. As a result, importers brought essential commodities in agreement to pay the exchange rate to be in effect after 180 days. They brought the goods they already sold at a calculated exchange rate.

However, now the exchange rates are depreciating further. For example, when traders imported the consignments, our exchange rate was about Rs. 190. But with the currency depreciation, now they have to pay the current exchange rate as there is no forward market or interbank market in operation. This is pushing importers to hoard to secure stocks for the future. Importers will also be inclined to increase prices to cover their losses incurred due to exchange rate volatility.

All of these trickle down to the average consumer as higher prices on essential commodities. Higher prices, long queues for essential goods, and empty shelves are symptoms of wrong macroeconomic policies.

This column and many economists alerted the Government that it would come to this, and I am disappointed that the Government did not heed our advice.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reforms required, IMF or no IMF

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

At Advocata’s first deep-dive session on Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability, Harvard Prof. Ricardo Hausmann emphasised on the importance of avoiding an economic crisis at all costs. As he is of Venezuelan origin, it is safe to assume Prof. Hausmann has first-hand experience of having to live through the realities of such a crisis. He warned that “an economic crisis comes slowly and then suddenly”.

Every week, the Central Bank attempts with various tools to subjugate the situation, but unfortunately the intensity of the wind seems difficult to change. The Energy Minister initiating discussions with the UAE to purchase fuel on a long-term credit period while restricting the country’s USD payments with a 5% ceiling on USD deposits indicates how hazardous things can be in future.

The Central Bank’s recent inflation numbers have indicated high food inflation. Now the last resort in sight is to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Opinions on this are many.

In my view, emphasis should not be on the IMF. A credible plan to drive economic growth must take precedence. However, I don’t see such a plan in place as of now.

So let’s discuss solutions we can incorporate into a credible plan as the problem is clear.

Immediate policies

Cash transfer system for safety nets

Given the nature of the pandemic, it looks like we have to expect more lockdowns or limited travel in the immediate future. This will affect Sri Lanka’s MSME (micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise) sector and informal employment. At the moment, 99% of our establishments are MSMEs and more than 60% of our labour force is in the informal sector. MSMEs contribute more than 50% of our GDP. So any policy to stop spreading the virus through travel restrictions will undoubtedly affect our informal sector. We do not have a mechanism to protect them.

Samurdhi targeting and distribution through grama niladharis is extremely poor. Therefore, what governments often do is bring down prices of all food items, fuel, and other essentials across the board. This is direct intervention in the market in the form of subsidies. These subsidies end up in rich households due to their high consumption of commodities.

The solution is to introduce a cash transfer system to the vulnerable households. This will give them the freedom to choose what they want to spend on. The cash transfers can have multiple tiers based on the poverty levels. For example, when the global fuel prices are increasing, the cash transfer on fuel can be increased, but when prices decrease, the cash transfer can decrease proportionately. Simply, we have to introduce an agile digital safety net system in the future because market reforms are painful, especially for the poor.

Cutting down govt. expenditure and voluntary retirement scheme for govt. servants

A reason the Central Bank has to continue to follow Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is the ballooning government expenditure. It is true our expenditure is somewhat on par with our regional peers, but our labour market is completely distorted by about 1.5 million people, and most of them are unproductive and dissatisfied with their work conditions. Undoubtedly, this is beyond our government’s afforbality, especially with pension payments and other expenses incurred utilising prime property across the island wasting most of our resources. Our state-owned enterprises (SOE) absorb a greater portion of our government revenue, their debt in state banks adding a serious risk to the stability of the banking system. So a freeze in the government sector is a must and we do not have any alternatives left.

Debt restructuring and debt conversion

We have to leave our current strategy of trying to manage debt with short-term swap agreements. The more we wait, the more the pain we have to go through. Debt conversion is a strategy that can be explored. We can consider a few debts to equity swaps similar to what we did with the Hambantota Port on identified unproductive assets. Debt restructuring or reprofiling is another option, which, however, requires serious effort. It will be an extremely costly process, where we will have to work with foreign legal firms and our creditors. This will have both positive and negative consequences.

Unlocking our land supply

Land is one of the main factors of production. It is unimaginable that 80% of land is owned by the government and only 3% of the land have clear titles, as per a World Bank study. Without having land ownership for its people, there is no opportunity for capital flow that can expand the entire business ecosystem. The Government has to prioritise creating a digital land registry instead of other unproductive alternatives.

Above are just a few recommendations for a credible recovery plan, whether we go to the IMF or not. The real problem is not whether we are going to the IMF or not. It is looking at what reforms we have to make on our own and how we are going to make these changes, which are required to drive economic growth.

Prof. Hausmann said that the big bad wolf comes slowly and suddenly. I hope we move much faster and get the reforms done before “the big bad wolf that comes slowly and suddenly” comes for us.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Avoiding IMF won’t help us avoid austerity

Originally appeared on The Daily FT, Daily Mirror, Lanka Business Online, The Island, ColomboTelegraph

By Naqiya Shiraz and Rehana Thowfeek

Sri Lanka’s debt problems are  a topic of national conversation. Foreign reserves, already low at USD 4bn in May 2021 fell to USD 2.8bn after the most recent bond repayment of USD 1bn in July 2021 . The Government claims that the timely repayment of the bond is proof that doomsayers were wrong and that it indicates a robust economy. Is this correct?

While it is true that a default has been avoided thus far it does not necessarily mean that the economy is sound. The recent bond repayment comes at a cost: a foreign exchange squeeze. Bond holders are being repaid, but this means that foreign exchange that could otherwise have been used for imports are now being used to pay bond holders instead.

The government seems to be adamant in avoiding the bogeyman, the IMF, perhaps to avoid the tough medication an IMF program will bring. Yet avoiding the IMF does not mean we can escape the inevitable austerity that will follow. Austerity is in fact already upon us, in the form of restricted imports. The restrictions are denying essential inputs to the local economy and medicines and food to citizens. These restrictions work   in two ways:

1. The outright restrictions on imports

2. The shortages of foreign exchange in the market

The government has banned or restricted imports of what is termed “non-essential” items although the list includes goods like some clothing items, refrigerators and food items ( live fish, tomatoes for example). 

In addition, Central Bank’s attempts to control the rate of exchange have resulted in shortages of foreign exchange. The Central Bank has decreed an official rate of around 200/- but only limited amounts are being converted at these rates resulting in a shortage of hard currency.

 Banks are now rationing foreign exchange with the result that even items that are not banned are becoming unavailable.

“We cannot accommodate the requests for LCs so we have to ration them,” a banker said. “There is no regulation to say to ration them, but we are forced to do it.”

https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-rupee-forex-markets-in-pickle-as-lc-rationing-froths-83224/

The import restrictions were supposed to be restricted to luxury items but the currency shortage means that even medicine and some food items seem to be running short

While foreign bondholders will undoubtedly be pleased to have been repaid, local consumers and businesses must now suffer, making do without everyday products. The shortages in supply mean that prices rise: of whatever available imported products as well as local products. 

This affects not only consumers but also businesses. With banks being unable to open a Letter of Credit (LC’s), imports of intermediate goods, even exports by SME’s which have no access to BOI facilities are at risk. 

Unable to trade or operate due to lack of stocks or input material, import-dependent businesses are losing out. The net result is an overall decline in economic activity and welfare of all Sri Lankans. 

A person interviewed for this report explained the difficulty in obtaining asthma medication for his mother. He had to try 4 different pharmacies to get the required drugs.  He said that he believes larger stores have fewer stocks available as the volume of people going to them is much higher. 

Another respondent said chemotherapy drugs brought in from Europe were no longer available with only cheaper products from India, Bangladesh or Argentina being available. As he had no other choice he used the substitutes for part of his wife’s chemotherapy treatment but was worried about the quality and safety. 

The knock on effects of these are palpable. Prices of basic goods are increasing. Inflation in January 2019 according to the NCPI was 127 index points which increased to 146 in June 2021. That means prices have increased by 15% in little over two years as a whole. But prices of essential food prices have increased by a lot more. Food inflation particularly has dramatically increased by 25% (NCPI). According to the Advocata Institute’s Buth Curry Indicator, prices of food that would be consumed in a buth curry meal have increased by 45% from July 2020 to July 2021.

The effects don’t end there. Importers of seeds were complaining that their sales have dropped by 50% because of uncertainty over fertiliser imports. These importers bring in seeds that are not produced in Sri Lanka, for vegetables like beetroot and carrots. Sales have fallen as they are not being purchased by domestic farmers. Farmers are holding back from cultivating due to the uncertainty caused by the shortages of fertilizers needed for production. A consequence of this would be shortages and rising prices of fruits, vegetables and other produce in the coming months. This will not only affect farmers' incomes but also result in higher consumer prices. The government may have to resort to importing more food, thereby negating the impact of the fertilizer ban to begin with. Only recently, the cabinet approved the importation of 6000 metric tonnes of rice from Pakistan to manage the shortage in the market.

This fertiliser fiasco has affected the poor disproportionately. Larger businesses are able to stock up on fertilizer, but not everyone can afford to do that. It’s the small farmers that lose out on income. The incomes of these small farmers are in jeopardy. Coupled with the milk powder and gas shortage, prices of these essential commodities are forced to increase at an already difficult time. 

Economic policy affects the ordinary person in a society. These may be individual stories but they are certainly not one off situations. 

The fact of the matter is that the country is undergoing a self-imposed austerity program in the form of import restrictions and more recently a foreign currency shortage that has resulted in the rationing of even items that are not subject to control.  

The basic principles of economics cannot be ignored in policymaking. By avoiding the IMF for fear of austerity measures, has resulted in more damaging self-imposed austerity. We need to ask ourselves how sustainable this really is in the long term. The longer we wait, more stringent austerity measures will be needed. 

Rehana Thowfeek is an economics researcher by profession. She has a MSc in Economics from the University of Warwick and a BSc in Mathematics and Economics from the University of London. She has worked previously for Sri Lanka-based think tanks; Verité Research and the Institute for Health Policy. At present she works for a US-based food technology company as a researcher. Naqiya Shiraz is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at naqiya@advocata.org.

Hanky-panky under the blanket

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Who benefits from the licensing systems that come about with our blanket bans?

Recently I was thinking about why people do certain things and why they don’t. I realised there are things that have been banned but still, people do. Consumption of certain types of drugs is just an example. At the same time, there are things that are not banned,  but still, some people don’t use them. Smoking is a good example. It’s not banned but data shows that people are now less likely to smoke due to health reasons. Analysing human behaviour shows us that there are reasons to engage in some activities while reasons to avoid them. Undoubtedly knowledge, information, and many other factors influence and incentivise certain actions over others. However, there are certain activities, where the Government decides on behalf of the people, that such are either good or bad for the broader population and try to control the choices of people. Our ban on chemical fertiliser is one such instance out of many. 

Another round of discussions has erupted over whether the fertiliser ban is relaxed or not. In a recent statement, the Government reiterated that there are no changes in their policy announced earlier. This trend of banning product categories on the grounds that it is not good for society has been common over the past few years. Then-President Maithripala Sirisena proposed a ban on chainsaws and carpentry sheds as an attempt to protect forests. Another proposal was to ban glyphosate to maintain our soil structure and avoid unknown kidney diseases. Then recently another development was the banning of sachet packets, banning the importation of palm oil, numerous discussions to ban cattle slaughter, and now the blanket ban on the use and importation of chemical fertiliser. 

Whether these decisions were made based on grounds of scientific analysis or analysing data and economic principles, remains a serious question. These recent decisions will have serious consequences on economic activity, especially in the import sector. A key point to note is that these outright blanket bans have led to the proposition of issuing a license for the importation of the particular product category. 

Many policymakers as well as common Sri Lankans lack an understanding of the negative consequences of licensing. Having a licensing process, for example, to import chemical fertiliser will lead to an increase in prices, open avenues for corruption and bribery, activate informal black market activity, and allow inferior quality products to enter the market. This cost of maintaining a licensing regime will have to be borne by the general public. 

Any Sri Lankan who has attempted the construction of a house or shop or wall has to go through a process of getting the plan approved by the technical officer at the Local Government. It is a license or an approval that allows any individual to build any construction. Those who have gone through the system know how painful the process is. In the first place, meeting the technical officer is not easy. Secondly, regardless of how compliant the draft was, he/ she always has suggestions and changes. As a result many common people hand over the drafting process of the building to the technical officer himself so he can approve it. 

The economics behind this is that when anyone has an authoritative power to decide the “go” or “no-go” of a project the person who has the decision making power is naturally motivated to capitalise an incentive over the approval. On the other hand the person who wants approval is getting naturally motivated to incentivise the decision maker to provide the approval even compromising the quality and standard. The same dynamics work in every licensing process, including the licensing of imports. Examples of the licensing processes include the exercise department for alcohol shops, Sri Lanka Customs, passport office, driving license and Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV). 

When we first impose a ban and secondly issue a licensing system it is a double whammy to the economy. By creating a blanket ban we are creating a scarcity of resources which is in demand. Then by issuing a licence we are making the utilisation of that scarce resource unproductive. Simply, the more we keep the discretionary authority the more we leave room for corruption and inefficiency. Secondly, the immediate  implementation of a licensing process can lead to increased scarcity, where fewer goods are available relative to the population. Therefore there can be market shortages putting thousands of people into hardship and inconvenience. Unfortunately in Sri Lanka’s case these interventions and restrictions have come into place when the market system was working perfectly well, especially for the benefit of the general consumer. This therefore needs much thought and reflection. 

If the intentions behind imposing a ban on a certain product category are correct, then logically, there cannot be a justifiable reason to allow a few people to import the particular product, especially if the product is harmful for human consumption in the first place. 

As an example, if palm oil is carcinogenic, the cancer-causing ability doesn’t disappear just because few people are importing it. Instead it could be higher as now the market system is completely broken down as a result of the ban and as a result of the license only a few players are able to import any substandard products due to the limited competition. Secondly, when a licensing system is in place it allows close associates and people connected with authority to be issued with licenses, reaping benefits at the cost of the general public. The flip side is that  these licenses are issued not on a competitive basis. So the room for the political authority to share profits with a person who is getting a licence is higher than operating in a competitive environment. 

In a market where different players compete to supply a product, the general consumer will benefit from lower prices. Now as a result of a license raj the majority will be made worse off as a few players connected to the political authority can keep prices higher.  

Allowing a few people to import essential compounds and organic fertiliser is not different in my view. This will end up in few people controlling the entire market causing very high prices for the farmers which will end up in very high prices on food for common people. 

Additionally, the politicians who would back the licensing process will defend the same importers of suppliers in any case of any malpractice or importation of any substandard products.  

Just like I thought about why some people do certain things while others don’t, there are reasons why politicians prefer licensing. Simply the licensing process incentivises them and that is why they push for it regardless of the colour of the political flags they host. The current trend of setting up a licence raj which India had until the 1991 reforms and which were experimented in Sri Lanka in the 1970s is the surest way of making our entire country unproductive. 

However the ultimate loser of this game is the consumer and the farmer. Overall, Sri Lanka will lose while few politicians get some short term gains and the entire ecosystem feels the effects of instability. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.