Reforming the tax incentive structure in Sri Lanka

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Roshan Perera, Thashikala Mendis, and Janani Wanigaratne

The second tranche of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was delayed as the country failed to meet some of the program targets including the Government revenue target. This prompted the IMF in their latest review to reiterate the need to “strengthen tax administration, remove tax exemptions, and actively eliminate tax evasion” to ensure revenue is collected as per the program targets. This requires intense efforts by the Government if the country is to achieve sustainable macroeconomic stability.

Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in Sri Lanka has the potential to significantly contribute to Government revenue. However, CIT performance has been dismal with collection averaging around 1% of GDP over the last two decades although economic growth averaged around 4% during the corresponding period. It peaked at 1.9% in 2022 due to some one-off taxes.1 Compared to other countries in the region as well, CIT collection in Sri Lanka has been abysmally low (see Figure 1).

Further, CIT collection is concentrated in a few sectors in the economy. The 230 companies listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) for financial year 2019/20 account for around 25% of total corporate income tax collection. However, financial services, food & beverages, and telecommunications account for a disproportionate share of taxes (see Figure 2). Sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, real estate and transportation which account for more than 25% of GDP, contribute less than 2% in CIT. Tax holidays and concessionary tax rates to selected sectors have eroded the CIT tax base, leading to lower CIT revenue collection. Ad hoc tax concessions complicate tax administration, distort resource allocation and provide opportunities for rent seeking and corruption.

Tax incentives

With the liberalisation of the economy in 1977 and the shift to a more export oriented development strategy, the Government sought to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering attractive tax incentives, first under the GCEC Act No. 4 of 1978 and subsequently the Board of Investment (BOI) of Sri Lanka from 1992. Tax incentives were also offered under the Inland Revenue Act. The enactment of the Strategic Development Projects (SDP) Act, No. 14 of 2008 permitted the Minister in charge of investment the discretion to grant incentives to projects deemed of strategic importance with only subsequent ratification by Cabinet and Parliament.

The lack of clear criteria of what constitutes a “strategic development project” in the SDP Act and the discretion given to the Minister to decide on what constituted a “strategic” project led to generous tax holidays and incentives granted to projects that were not in any sense strategic (see Table 1 for a list of projects granted under the SDP Act). Furthermore, tax concessions under the Act have been awarded to projects that are not purely foreign funded, violating one of the core objectives of this Act, which is to attract foreign investment.

The operation of multiple tax jurisdictions has led to an overlap of tax incentives, obscuring the process of monitoring the overall benefits and costs of tax incentives provided. Lack of transparency and well-defined criteria as well as poor evaluation of projects has led to the granting of tax incentives without proper justification, leading to large revenue losses.

Transparency, availability and accessibility of information regarding companies that have received tax incentives, especially under the BOI Act, are limited3. In light of this, the IMF diagnostic report has highlighted the need for a more transparent data sharing protocol.

The case of Port City

More recently the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act, No. 11 of 2021 was given the authority to grant tax incentives within the Port City.

The CPC Act grants incentives to businesses that are identified as strategically important. Extraordinary Gazette 2343/604 lists several industries as strategically important. Even though the Act provides a descriptive definition of a business of strategic importance, the rationalisation for these industries to be selected for special incentives is unclear. Especially as some of these industries already exist in Sri Lanka, which puts them at a disadvantage. Moreover, under section (4) subregulation (3) of the Extraordinary gazette 2343/60, one of the criteria for granting incentives is the ability of the business to demonstrate to the Port City Commission the potential contribution to Sri Lanka’s economy and social development by fostering innovation, knowledge transfer, technology transfer, research and development. This criteria is vague and subjective, thus allowing the Commission to grant incentives at its discretion.

Granting incentives often leads to differential tax treatment creating an unlevel playing field. While an entity in an already established industry within the country located within the CPC is provided generous tax incentives, the firm located outside is subject to the normal taxes operating in the rest of the country. Such differential treatment could create labour market distortions, as the employees in the Port City benefit from tax exemptions.

Sri Lanka has not been able to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) despite the plethora of incentives offered. It is questionable whether we can expect different results by applying the same failed strategy with the Colombo Port City. For instance, out of 74 land plots, only 6 were leased so far, and even those have not yet materialised.

To improve the performance of CIT, reforming the existing incentive structure is critical.

Improving investment environment

Evidence suggests that tax incentives are not the most important factor attracting FDI. Rather investors prioritise factors such as macroeconomic stability, access to skilled labour, and quality infrastructure facilities when making investment decisions. Therefore, shifting focus from relying on tax incentives to creating a favourable macroeconomic environment and policy consistency while providing the necessary resources and infrastructure will be more important to attracting investments. This will reduce distortions in the economy while ensuring the Government’s revenue base is protected.

Renegotiating tax incentives

Given the weak fiscal position of the country and the debt restructuring exercise being carried out at present, a similar exercise to renegotiate existing tax incentives may be warranted. Rationalising existing tax incentives would widen the tax base and enable lowering corporate tax rates.

Centralising tax incentives

If tax incentives are to be granted it should be done by a centralised authority. This authority should be able provide justification for granting special tax incentives by carrying out a cost benefit analysis. Clear objectives and proper criteria for granting incentives should be established and the authority held accountable for monitoring the progress of the investments to ensure the objectives of the investment are fulfilled. Failure to meet the objectives should lead to an immediate cancellation of the incentives granted. To ensure transparency, all incentives granted should require Cabinet and Parliamentary approval and information on incentives granted made publicly available through gazette notices. Sunset clauses will ensure that incentives have a limited timeframe and are periodically reviewed.

Conducting tax expenditure analysis

Tax expenditure refers to concessions such as tax exemptions, deductions, concessionary tax rates, etc. granted to specific industries or entities. While typically a government budget provides estimates of government revenue, tax expenditures are rarely reported. However, given the generous tax incentives offered it is vital to ensure the costs and benefits of tax expenditures are properly accounted for. Conducting regular tax expenditure analysis will enable comprehensive cost benefit analysis to evaluate the potential revenue loss and the expected economic benefits of tax incentives. Moreover, it is essential to carry out regular assessments to ascertain whether the revenue loss resulting from tax exemptions is justified by the employment, GDP contribution, and economic impact of these projects.

Global Minimum Tax 5

When tax incentives and holidays are granted, it should be ensured that their rates are not lower than the rate recommended by the Global Minimum Tax (GMT). This is an agreement introduced by the OECD/G20 in October 2021, with the purpose of establishing a minimum tax rate of 15% for large multinational companies. It allows countries with taxable parent companies of Multinational Enterprises (MNE) to impose a top-up tax on the profits of any foreign subsidiary that pays an effective rate less than 15%. It also allows the host country where the MNE subsidiary carries out its activities to charge a top-up tax rate on subsidiaries, if the home country of the parent company imposes a CIT rate less than 15%. So even if the countries are free to grant tax holidays and incentives with a CIT rate lower than 15%, the agreement grants the taxing rights to either the FDI exporting countries or the countries in which the MNE subsidiaries are operated. Therefore the MNEs would not be benefitted by lower rates as they will be taxed by either country.

The countries that do not adopt this GMT rule would lose out on tax income as the other countries will adjust their domestic tax rules to top up undertaxed profits. This proposal has already been strongly backed by 130 countries. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka was one of the nine countries that did not agree to this proposal.

The country is struggling to meet its revenue targets. The potential of CIT as a significant source of revenue has not been not fully exploited. A plethora of tax incentives granted under numerous agencies have seriously eroded the tax base. Reversing these trends are vital for restoring fiscal sustainability and enabling the Government to promote sustainable and inclusive growth.

Footnotes:

1This is due to the imposition of a retrospective one-time surcharge tax of 25% on individuals, companies, and partnerships with a taxable income exceeding 2 billion for the 2020/2021 tax assessment year.

2Based on the taxes paid by around 230 listed companies on the Colombo Stock Exchange in 2019/2020.

3Information on projects granted under the SDP Act are publicly available through gazette notices which are mandatory. This is unlike projects granted incentives under the BOI Act which are not publicly available. An RTI filed to extract this information was also not responded to by the relevant authority.

4http://documents.gov.lk/files/egz/2023/8/2343-60_E.pdf

5World Bank, 2023, “Can the global minimum tax agreement reduce tax breaks in East Asia?” https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/can-global-minimum-tax-agreement-reduce-tax-breaks-east-asia#:~:text=In%20October%202021%2C%20the%20G20,to%20be%20implemented%20in%202024.

(Roshan Perera is a Senior Research Fellow at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via roshananne@gmail.com. Thashikala Mendis is a Data Analyst at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via thashikala@advocata.org. Janani Wanigaratne is a Research Consultant at Advocata Institute. She can be contacted via janani.advocata@gmail.com.

The opinions expressed are the writers’ own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.)

New electricity tariff structure leaves room for considerable improvement

Originally appeared on the Daily Mirror, Timesonline.lk

By the Resident Fellow of Advocata Institute

The recent revision of electricity tariffs is a step towards reducing the fiscal burden caused by the supply of electricity below its cost of production. While the new tariff structure is an improvement on the previous one, anomalies remain.

 In determining tariffs, there are three characteristics of electricity that must be noted:

I. Electricity is a commodity that is interchangeable, both in its generation and use. One megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity produced from coal or hydropower contains the same amount of energy. Different categories of users consume the same product.

II. It must be produced and used simultaneously. Electricity storage is still prohibitively expensive. Supply must meet demand exactly in the power grid.

III. The cost of supplying electricity fluctuates throughout the day, depending on the power generation mix, cost of fuels used, transmission costs and energy losses.

As electricity is a commodity, there should be no difference in the prices charged to different users. The tariff should also reflect the varying cost of supply, depending on the time of day and should as far as possible, balance the generation of electricity with its use. For sustainability, the tariff needs to be on a cost-recovery basis.

The new tariff addresses some of the shortcomings of the existing structure but there is still considerable room for improvement.

1. The proposed structure reduces the discrimination between different types of bulk supply customers.

For users below 42kVA, the different rates that were charged to hotels, government and general-purpose bulk supply, have been amalgamated into a single general-purpose tariff but a lower rate remains applicable to ‘industrial’ customers. However, it is positive that the differential between the general-purpose bulk supply and customers categorised as ‘industrial’ has decreased.

For larger bulk customers, it is welcome that the distinction between categories has been done away with and a single tariff, close to cost recovery and reflecting time of use, has been applied.

The Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) consultation document states that the average cost of generation is Rs.32.87 but the tariff charged to low-use industrial users (Rs.20) and low-use general-purpose customers (Rs.25 for those below 180kWh) is both below cost.

The only justification for a discriminatory tariff is for a lifeline tariff for the poor. While the domestic users below 90kWh do receive a subsidised tariff, the domestic consumers, who exceed this, pay the highest tariff (Rs.50 for usage between 90-180kWh, Rs.75 above 180kWh), which is almost double that of all bulk users. Thus, high-use domestic consumers are subsidising industrial and commercial users.

Moreover, instead of increasing the rate for each block of use, the moment domestic customers exceed 60 units, the tariff increases from an average of Rs.9 to Rs.16. A customer, who consumes 59 units, will pay Rs.9 but one who consumes 61 units will pay Rs.16 per unit. This is unfair and can promote corruption in meter reading. In general, such cross subsidies are undesirable, as they can lead to inefficient resource allocation or have unintended consequences.

For example, the higher domestic tariff may serve as a disincentive for remote work. Remote or flexible work arrangements can reduce transport costs, congestion, energy use and for some, enable a better work/life balance. The government should be facilitating flexible work but the higher rates applicable to some domestic consumers may be a disincentive.

The PUCSL has an unusual definition of industry. It includes, ‘agriculture’, ‘forestry and fishing’, ‘mining and quarrying’, ‘manufacturing’, ‘electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply’, ‘water supply, sewerage and waste management. As a matter of principle, the producer should not make judgment on how the product is used or attempt to encourage or discourage particular activities through prices. If the government does wish to encourage particular industries, it is more efficient to do this through a transparent system of grants, rather than distorting prices.

Economic activity is increasingly complex and a value chain can involve many different sectors. For example, the tea industry involves agriculture, processing in factories, transport, warehousing, blending, financing, marketing and exports. Moreover, products are now more knowledge intensive, so a greater part of the value addition arises in non-production-oriented components of the value chain. With differential tariffs, parts of the same value chain may pay different prices for use of the same commodity.

Religious and charitable bodies continue to enjoy preferential treatment under the domestic tariff category but there is a small decrease in the discount offered to these bodies. High-use customers in this category should also be subject to a time of use (TOU)-based tariff. Advocata reiterates that there should be no price discrimination between users; at most there should be two categories, households and businesses.

2. It is welcome to note that the new tariff structure extends the TOU tariff to the agriculture subsector but this should be extended to smaller bulk users and made compulsory for the high-use domestic category. For customers using solar power on a net metering basis, the export and import tariffs should be based on TOU. A TOU-based tariff reflects the changing cost of generation across the day. Generation during peak hours relies more heavily on thermal power, which is more costly. Tariffs charged to customers should reflect this, so that the consumers are incentivised to shift demand to off-peak hours.

3. The new tariff maintains a lower rate for low-use domestic customers and it is welcome that the new structure applies marginal tariffs based on different slabs of usage. The previous system was inherently unfair to the consumer; the new tariff removes this anomaly.

4. The decision to charge for street lighting, which should be paid for by the local authorities, is welcome. Previously, as the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) did not charge for street lighting, the local authorities, which have control over when the lights are switched on and off, had no particular incentive to switch off street lights during day time. A lower rate for street lighting is justified because the major part of the use falls into off-peak hours.

5. It is regrettable that the PUCSL permitted the CEB to compel selected clients to pay for electricity in US dollars. This is a step towards forced dollarisation of payments and is precluded under Section 4 of Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949. The proposal is meant to address the current shortage of US dollars for importation of fuel for the energy sector. However, this would only divert resources from other alternative users and may not be the most efficient way of allocating the scarce foreign exchange in the country. It would be preferable to allow US dollars to flow into the banking sector (by removing any restrictions and requirements such as forced conversions and surrendering requirements) and for those funds to be allocated based on price (exchange rate).

The increase in the electricity tariff is unavoidable but will impose an additional burden on consumers. Therefore, it is imperative that this must be accompanied by increased transparency and efficiency

within the utility.

Consumers may expect to pay for higher world prices but cannot be expected to pay higher costs, due to inefficiency, waste or corruption. State enterprises need to be open and transparent in their affairs, particularly in procurement and where possible should operate in competitive markets.

As a first step, the CEB should provide a detailed breakdown on the components of its tariff:

• Energy costs: (Own generation costs and that paid to the private generation companies). This must be broken down into the fuel cost and the costs of operating the power stations, such as the manpower and maintenance costs as well as the capital cost of the stations.

• Network costs: This reflects the cost of transporting electricity through the power grid.

• Overhead: This is to recover the costs of central administration, billing and meter reading, data management, retail market systems as well as market development initiatives.

The opinions expressed are the authors’ own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute.

Invest to progress, not to regress: Bridging the infrastructure gaps in Sri Lanka

Originally appeared on the Daily FT, the Morning, Lanka Business Online, Groundviews, Ada Derana Biz English

By Tiffahny Hoole and Janani Wanigaratne

Sri Lanka is going through a crisis of a magnitude that has never been witnessed in its economic history. The country is in disarray as people wait in lines to purchase essentials. Official reserve assets have plummeted to a $ 1,920 (1) million by May this year and the debt to GDP ratio has reached an all time high of 104.6% by 2021. (2) The country is struggling to meet its domestic needs while having fallen into a debt default for the first time in its history. Why did Sri Lanka’s debt obligations escalate to the point of an economic crisis? Debt taken on to finance unproductive infrastructure is a part of the problem. (Debt was also taken to finance recurring expenditure including interest on past debts and subsidies to SOEs). 

Professor Amal Kumarage, one of the leading experts on transport infrastructure in Sri Lanka says, “Sri Lanka’s inability to service debts is a clear indication of inefficient infrastructure investment. Over 50% of the foreign loans in the past decade were for different transport infrastructure projects that have not delivered the anticipated economic outcomes. The professionals who promoted unfound optimism in economic analysis of these projects to please the political masters must come forward and accept their responsibility for contributing to this crisis.”

Since the end of the civil war, there has been a longstanding commitment towards developing large-scale infrastructure projects (See table 0.1). (3)In the first eight months of 2020, Sri Lanka’s public expenditure on infrastructure development amounted to Rs. 98 billion. (4) The Ministry of Finance aims to maintain public investment at an average of 5-6% of the GDP per annum till 2025. (5) In terms of performance however Sri Lanka infrastructure falls short – it ranked 61 out of 141 under the overall infrastructure performance indicator by the ‘Global Competitiveness Report 2019’. (6)  

Sri Lanka does have an infrastructure gap but it must invest in the right projects. The World Bank (2014) reports that Sri Lanka still needed $ 36 billion worth of investments to close its infrastructure gap, which amounts to 40.5% of the GDP in 2018. (7) To avoid wasteful investments, Sri Lanka requires a fact-based project selection process and an optimised operation and maintenance system for existing large-scale infrastructure projects to close this gap.(8) This would also reduce the country’s spending significantly. Among the numerous factors that fuelled this crisis, lavish investments in infrastructure of limited benefits seems to have played a crucial role. 

Useful infrastructure projects should enable the best return to public investment with higher efficiency, increased safety and minimal environmental damage. It should also have a positive spillover effect which may range from generating employment and increased foreign direct investment to improved tax revenue.

How are large-scale infrastructure projects financed? 

In an effort to close the gap between existing and required infrastructure, the Government resorted to foreign loans. Foreign borrowing amounted to $ 1,710 million in the first eight months of 2021.(10) This accounts to an increase of 16% of foreign financing disbursement in comparison to the previous year.(11) Sri Lanka’s disbursement commitments consist of loans from multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral partners including China, Japan and India(.12) 

With the provision of foreign loans to finance large-scale infrastructure projects among numerous other borrowings, Sri Lanka’s debt to GDP ratio has reached 104.6% in 2021. Based on the high foreign loans obtained, in conjunction to Sri Lanka’s current economic status, there seems to be a strong indication that large-scale infrastructure projects severely indebted the State. If so, where did Sri Lanka go wrong? 

Lack of preliminary procedure 

Taking on multi-million dollar investment projects is a complex task. Large infrastructure projects need to pass the test of utility in order to serve long-term demands before public money is spent.(13)

This means, thorough scrutiny is mandatory to enable the gains of large-scale infrastructure to be fully realised. This would include looking at the interest rates, grace periods and maturity periods provided. It also requires a comprehensive understanding of the type of loan provided. These can be achieved through conducting proper feasibility studies and risk assessments which will shed light on the project’s potential to service debt and its sustainability in the long run. For instance, loans obtained through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank require a competitive bidding process to select a contractor. (14) In contrast, projects funded by bilateral agencies are through tied loans.(15) This means that bidding is limited to contractors from the lender’s country.916) During the period of 2005-2018, 28 out of 35 high value bilateral loans were procured without a competitive bidding process.(17) The inability to gauge all available contractors at competitive rates to construct large-infrastructure potentially results in poor quality infrastructure at a cost of very high prices.(18) 

The National Procurement Agency was a statutory body that handled competitive public procurement. However, right before the height of Sri Lanka’s investment spree in 2008, it was removed. In lieu of this, the Standing Cabinet Approved Review Committee (SCARC) was set up in 2010 to approve projects without public tendering or parliamentary approval. This creates additional concerns over the commercial viability of the project approved.(19)

Take for instance the Colombo Port City. Soon after SCARC approval, it was heavily criticised on the claims that its Environmental Assessment Impact was compromised. Further fuelled by the opposition from the fishing community, the project was temporarily suspended. The interim review of these concerns cost the Government $ 143 million as compensation. If proper procedures were followed, these costs could have been circumvented.(20) 

Public infrastructure or political infrastructure? 

Investments in large and complex infrastructure projects have also been a fertile ground for corruption, thereby increasing the risk of creating ‘White Elephants’(.21) Rather than considering the economic value of obtaining loans from foreign lenders, governments utilise large-infrastructure projects as a tool to win the votes from the public. In the event such projects are not completed within their term, successive governments are inclined to halt its operations.(22) This leads to unconsummated, poorly built infrastructure with limited benefits to the people.

Gaps in information: Calling for increased transparency

An effective mechanism of ensuring public money is spent to the best of its ability is to increase the access to information. There is a significant gap in data available to the public on large-infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka. For instance, a comprehensive breakdown of the loan amount, its repayment and interest rates are inconsistently provided in the Ministry of Finance Annual Reports. Selected projects financed through bilateral agencies have been completely omitted. Furthermore, information pertaining to the project’s appraisal and performance is not publicly available. This hampers the ability for the public to conduct an analysis on the investment made. The public must relegate to submitting Right to Information applications to the relevant implementing agency. However, comprehensive responses are rare.  Nevertheless, investment on large infrastructure is a necessity. It has been assessed that 1 dollar worth of infrastructure investment can raise GDP by 20 cents in the long run.(23) Furthermore, infrastructure development can facilitate trade and foreign direct investment. 

In order to ensure that the benefits of each and every infrastructure project undertaken is fully realised, it is vital to set up a comprehensive framework with active public policy, transparent and competitive procurement, proper evaluation and an in-depth financing structure.(24) Hard infrastructure should be accompanied by soft components such as policies and regulations in order to facilitate efficient performance.(25) Therefore, a long-term plan for national infrastructure that is publicly available has the potential to pivot the feeding ground of corruption to the stepping stone of development. 

Refernces:

1CBSL

2CBSL

3https://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/pb10_Infrastructure-Challenges.pdf

4https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/0d77beee-4e42-478b-9089-7f09be23a0e0

5https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/0d77beee-4e42-478b-9089-7f09be23a0e0

6https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/publications/annual_report/2020/en/13_Box_02.pdf

7Chinese Investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka

8https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/bridging-infrastructure-gaps-has-the-world-made-progress

9CBSL Annual reports from various years

10https://www.treasury.gov.lk/api/file/16e9c6ec-7a13-4220-a8a7-1427c5d14785

11http://www.erd.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=216&lang=en

12http://www.erd.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=216&lang=en

13https://www.echelon.lk/a-circus-of-white-elephants/

14https://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/VR_Eng_RR_Feb2021_Opportunities-to-Protect-Public-Interest-in-Public-Infrastructure-1.pdf

15https://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/VR_Eng_RR_Feb2021_Opportunities-to-Protect-Public-Interest-in-Public-Infrastructure-1.pdf

16ibid

17ibid

18Key Informant Interview

19‘Locked in’ to China: The Colombo Port City Project

20‘Locked in’ to China: The Colombo Port City Project

21https://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/VR_Eng_RR_Feb2021_Opportunities-to-Protect-Public-Interest-in-Public-Infrastructure-1.pdf

22https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ8010-Sri-Lanka-RP-WEB-200324.pdf

23https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/four-ways-governments-can-get-the-most-out-of-their-infrastructure-projects

24https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/177093/adbi-wp553.pdf

25https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29823/infrastructure-supporting-inclusive-growth.pdf

Janani Wanigaratne is a research intern at the Advocata Institute. She can be contacted at janani.advocata@gmail.com. Tiffahny Hoole is a former researcher at the Advocata Institute. She can be contacted at tiffahny.advocata@gmail.com. The Advocata Institute is an Independent Public Policy Think Tank. The opinions expressed are the authors’ own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute.

Is Wealth Tax the Solution to Sri Lanka’s Low Tax Revenue Collection

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Biz Adaderana , The Morning, Daily Mirror, The Island and Lanka Business Online

By Sathya Karunarathne

Successive governments have run fiscal deficits. Inadequate revenue collection and unrestrained government expenditure have worsened the country’s fiscal position.  

Tax revenue which averaged over 20% of GDP in 1990 has declined to under 10% of GDP in 2020. Ad hoc tax policy changes have significantly eroded the tax base. Weak tax administration has also contributed to the sharp decline in tax collection.

While tax revenue has contracted, government expenditure has ballooned over time. Today, government revenue is not sufficient even to meet its expenditure on salaries and wages and transfers and subsidies to households which include pension payments and social welfare payments such as Samurdhi.  

In this context, there are various proposals put forward to raise government revenue. One proposal is the reintroduction of the wealth tax.  

A wealth tax is expected to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, achieving equality. This tax shifts the tax burden to affluent households, taxing an individual’s net wealth, which is the market value of total owned assets. Proponents of wealth taxation argue that this is a progressive system of taxation and is a more powerful tool in comparison to income, estate or corporate taxes as it addresses the issue of wealth concentration.  

Moreover, a tax should ideally satisfy basic characteristics of taxation: it should not be distortionary; it should be fair, and it should not be difficult to collect. 

The rationale for a wealth tax

One of the earliest proponents of the wealth tax for developing countries was Nicholas Kaldor.  Based on his recommendation, a wealth tax together with an income tax, expenditure tax and a gift tax were introduced in Sri Lanka in 1958. However, these new taxes yielded little revenue due to difficulties in determining the tax base and problems in administration.  Following the recommendation of the Tax Commission in 1990, the government abolished the wealth tax from the year of assessment 1992/1993.

Wealth taxes have mainly been implemented in European countries. In 1990, twelve countries in Europe had a wealth tax. Today, there are only three: Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.  Several non-European countries have also imposed wealth taxes from time to time including such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan 

In recent times there has been renewed interest in wealth taxes. Presidential candidates in the US proposed various forms of a wealth tax. In the UK and France, there were proposals to impose “super taxes” on the rich. The primary justification was to address the increasing inequality in society.  

Issues with a wealth tax

Despite renewed interest in the wealth tax as a progressive tax based on equity, it scores poorly on the criteria of efficiency, and administrative feasibility.  

Many factors have justified the repeal of wealth taxes in OECD countries. The reasons cited are related to efficiency costs, risk of capital flight particularly in light of increased capital mobility and wealthy taxpayers' access to tax havens, failure to meet redistributive goals as a result of narrow tax bases, tax avoidance and evasion, high administrative and compliance costs compared to limited revenues (high cost yield ratio).  

To understand the efficiency costs of wealth taxes one can look at taxing a person’s wealth accumulated through savings. Despite the common consensus that taxing savings is an effective way to redistribute, a person’s saving decisions reveal little about their underlying lifetime resources and wellbeing. It only reveals their preference to consume tomorrow rather than today. Thereby a wealth tax imposes a tax on those who prefer to spend their money later as opposed to taxing the wealthy. Efficiency costs refer to the reduction of the welfare of the taxed individuals by more than $1 to generate $1 of revenue. Therefore, the efficiency cost of a wealth tax in terms of taxing savings is a reduction of  future consumption that can be bought with earnings, reducing incentive to work for those who prefer to consume the proceeds later and reducing incentive for young people to save for their retirement.

Capital flight is the possibility of holding assets outside of one's resident country without declaring them.As wealth taxes are imposed on residents it increases the risk of the wealthy

reallocating their assets to avoid taxation. Therefore a high tax burden encourages taxpayers to change their tax residence to a lower tax jurisdiction or tax havens.

Both income-generating and non-income generating assets are taxed under wealth taxation. They can include land, real estate, bank accounts, investment funds, intellectual or industrial property rights, bonds, shares, and even jewellery, vehicles, art and antiques. However, this tax base for wealth taxes has often been narrowed through exemptions. These exemptions have been justified most commonly on the grounds of social concerns such as the negative social implications of taxing  pension assets. Further liquidity issues (eg - farm assets), supporting entrepreneurship and investment (eg- business assets), avoiding valuation difficulties ( eg- artwork and jewellery) and preserving countries cultural heritage (eg - artwork and antiques) have also been cited as reasons for wealth tax reliefs. While some of these exemptions can be justified, they have led to the reduction of revenue raised from wealth taxes. They have also contributed to wealth taxes being less equitable as the wealthiest such as businesses benefit from these exemptions defeating the very purpose of imposing a wealth tax which is to meet its redistributive goals.

Narrow tax bases in wealth taxation often leads to tax avoidance and evasion opportunities. For example, Spain's 1994 wealth tax exemption for the shares of owner managers resulted in wealthy businesses reorganizing their activities to reap benefits of the exemption resulting in a significant erosion of the wealth tax base. 

Further, several other factors have also discouraged countries to sustain a wealth tax. They are namely, the difficulty in determining the tax base or what assets to be taxed, underreporting and undervaluation of assets, difficulty in measuring wealth taxes, distinguishing between individuals who are asset rich but cash poor, the constant need to value assets and audit returns increasing administrative and enforcement costs

Low revenue collection as well as the other reasons discussed have led to the abolishing of wealth taxes in most countries  (See Table 1 for details) . Tax revenue from individual net wealth taxes in 2016 ranged from only 0.2% of GDP in Spain to 1.0% of GDP in Switzerland. Sri Lanka’s experience with wealth taxation was no different with the tax yielding low revenue as reported by the 1990 Tax Commission.

Table 1: Implementation of Wealth Taxes in Selected Countries

Conclusion 

Taxing the wealth of the rich to generate income and to eliminate economic inequality sounds promising in terms of political debate. However, wealth taxes have failed to generate adequate revenue, failed to meet redistributive goals as a result of narrow tax bases, proven to have high administrative and enforcement costs, resulted in tax evasion and avoidance due to underreporting and undervaluation of assets, increased the risk of capital flight and access to tax havens and may have contributed to the reduction of investment and employment. 

Therefore, imposing a wealth tax may not be the ideal policy response to Sri Lanka’s low tax revenue, especially given the country’s previous experience with the tax yielding low revenue.

Sathya Karunarathne is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at sathya@advocata.org. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.