Looming political and economic challenges ahead of elections

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

“We know what should be done to get the country on the right track, but we don’t know how to get power back after implementing the policies.” This is a popular statement I hear often when I meet quite a few politicians. The truth is that politicians do not know how to get back power because it’s not an attractive solution.

The popular policies that bring politicians into power are the very same that inspire their ousting at the very next election cycle. People hardly object to good policies unless the same politicians instigate false propaganda. The Right to Information (RTI) Act was just one such instance.

As an election is due next year, it is vital to understand and remember our priorities, otherwise our politicians are likely to take a wrong turn and pass the buck back to the people.

In an election year, the behaviour of any political party is to completely abandon rational economic reforms and play to populist narratives that result in outcomes that are the complete opposite, with the motive of coming to power.

Bringing down fuel prices and announcing other types of subsidies are common tactics. This is harmful, especially when those benefits cannot be financed sustainably, or in some situations, brought into life in the first place.

Even if it does not retain power, the newly-elected government will have a tough time preventing plans that have already been put in place and enacting better policies.

Political risk

In the current context, we run a very high risk of our politicians bringing us back to square one; i.e. another economic crisis. This, given the fact that 2024 is set to be an election year, is a recipe for disaster.

All political parties will shift their focus to slowly becoming more populist rather than being driven by objectivity. Therefore, the real risk is going back to another debt restructuring if we fail to grow the economy and our exports.

There are many politicians who do not understand the gravity of the need for reforms. Regardless of which party or coalition comes to power, there are fundamental issues that need to be addressed.

The process is more or less the same as handing over a house with structural issues from one tenant (government) to the other. The new tenant cannot function because neither the previous tenant nor the owner (people) is willing to fix the fundamental problems.

Risk of a second debt default

Given the unstable political environment coupled with a country already going through debt restructuring, the risks of a second debt default are astronomically high. As we are still struggling with finalising the first debt restructuring, adding a second one into the mix will leave us in dire straits.

The second one will undoubtedly be harder, especially given the significant increase in interest rates and being unable to print money with the new Central Bank Act. If we fail to raise money through markets in order to roll over debt and if we are not open to increasing interest rates, the only option we will be left with is to default again. At that point, most likely there will be pressure once again to amend the newly-enacted Central Bank Act to allow money printing.

Of course, that would be an inflationary measure and we will be back at square one with a balance of payments crisis, debt crisis, humanitarian crisis, and likely a banking crisis too.

Solutions: A common minimum programme for reforms

Reforms are easier in the first 100 days of any government. If we fail to enact reforms within the first 100 days, more often than not, no reforms will take place. Failing to undertake reforms in 100 days means a cost of a five-year delay plus many bad policy decisions in the middle, which are costly and difficult to reverse.

Ideally, if key political parties come to an agreement before an election on selected reforms and execute them regardless of who comes into power, it will at least ensure some stability for Sri Lanka. There are many ideas that all political parties have in common.

Regarding State-Owned Enterprise reforms, there is no political party that says the Government should run an airline. Even National People’s Power Economic Advisor Dr. Anil Jayantha, in an interview with Advocata, noted that they did not believe the Government should do any business with hotels.

Accordingly, there are many other similar areas where we can arrive at an agreement with little difficulty. Therefore, regardless of who wins elections, people can win and sustain some of the economic reforms.

The truth is that reforms are inevitable if Sri Lanka needs to move forward and for any political party to sustain its power. Implementing bad policies, especially considering the status of our country, will make it very difficult to sustain power, because then we will be setting the standard for a new normal in economics and politics.

Fiscal path amidst promises and uncertainties

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

Starting from the second week of November, every minute in Parliament will be focused on the national Budget. Fortunately or unfortunately, many of the promises outlined in the Budget are unlikely to be implemented or fulfilled.

At the same time, items that are not in the Budget may be implemented midway through the year, based on the direction of the wind. Things are especially likely to take a completely different turn in an election year.

A key criticism against this Budget is that the revenue proposals to cover up the expenditure proposals are not adequately mentioned. A revenue of Rs. 4,100 billion is expected for an expenditure of Rs. 6,900 billion. It’s akin to wanting to spend Rs. 69 while only having Rs. 41 in hand. The challenge is that we are uncertain as to how we will earn even Rs. 41.

An earlier proposal to increase VAT by 3% and remove the exemptions on VAT can be seen as a measure to increase revenue. There are a few proposals to increase the tax base, which is a step in the right direction, such as the requirement of a Tax Identification Number (TIN) for opening a current account, obtaining a building licence, and for revenue licences for vehicles.

The question that arises is what would happen if we fail to generate even the expected revenue and I think there are three scenarios that can occur if we fail to achieve the revenue targets in the middle of the year.

Scenario 1: Cutting down on capital expenditure

Approximately Rs. 1,200 billion has been allocated for capital expenditure in the 2024 Budget. This includes some proposals such as a new airport and building a few universities. So we will likely have to rechannel some of the capital expenditure to recurrent expenditure if we fail to generate revenue.

What is important to note is that, compared to last year, capital expenditure makes up a lower percentage of total expenditure. So in a context of starting with an already lower capital expenditure base, cutting capital expenditure from key areas of growth such as health or education further will maim our growth in the long run.

Slower growth is also not favourable for Sri Lanka because the need of the moment is growth. Only growth will increase our tax revenue and create more employment opportunities and business opportunities.

Scenario 2: High inflation

The second scenario would be the Government exploring the opportunity to get finances from the Central Bank to bridge the deficit. With the new Central Bank Act, the space for doing this is very low, but if past experiences hold true, anything is possible. There is a transition period of about 18 months and we should not underestimate the crafty nature of our politicians to find legal loopholes.

If the Budget deficit is being financed through the Central Bank (money printing), further increases in cost of living and high inflation are unavoidable. It will also drain our forex reserves and build additional pressure on our currency and likely end up with a currency depreciation after a few months’ cycle: a cycle not so distant in memory.

The Central Bank financing this Budget deficit will also challenge the sustainability of the IMF programme. As the next year is an election year, politicians will mainly think about the elections before the economy, despite promises made. While the new Central Bank Act tries to stop this from taking place, the possibility cannot be ruled out fully.

Scenario 3: Hike in interest rates

The third scenario is where the Government borrows money from the market to bridge the gap and allow interest rates to move. This will not cause inflation as the Budget deficit is not being financed through the Central Bank, but the cost of money will go up (interest rates moving up).

When the cost of money goes up, growth will contract. When this happens, businesses start winding-up operations and expansions become difficult. Also, banks will lend more money to the Government at higher interest rates, slowing down credit for the private sector.

When the economy slows down there may be an impact on the tax revenue on one side. On the other side, with limited growth, achieving debt sustainability will be challenging.

Solution

In order to prevent these scenarios from taking place, it is imperative that we reduce wasteful expenditure. The key solution is to focus on reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). SOE reforms can increase revenue, cut down expenditure, bring down our debt, and attract foreign investments.

The bank recapitalisation of Rs. 450 billion, mentioned in the Budget, is due to the debt owed by two SOEs that have losses which amount to Rs. 1,800 billion. The taxpayer is now expected to pay the bill. It amounts to about Rs. 20,000 per citizen from taxpayer money for bank recapitalisation. That is a staggering Rs. 80,000 per household of four members.

Boosting tourism is also another option. While there is a fund for tourism promotions which has to be utilised well for building our brand image, it will all be in vain if we do not do things as simple as removing regulatory barriers to tourism.

The final bird in our hand as a solution is the Colombo Port City. We have to accelerate the process and attract investments.

If we play our cards right, we can at least move a step ahead in 2024.

Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

There’s a childhood memory engraved in my mind, of an incident with a fellow schoolmate concerning an act of borrowing. Back then, we borrowed money from each other constantly to eat sweets and junk food and buy video game gadgets. A particular friend of mine had the habit of borrowing a little money every week and settling the same again after a week’s time right on schedule. After a few weeks, I realised he borrowed the same amount of money from another friend as well. 

Like a well-planned roster, he proceeds to settle his debt with the other friend in a week’s time. One day my frequently borrowing friend did not settle my money as he promised. When I confronted him on the matter, he plainly stated that he settled the amount owed to me with the money he borrowed from my other friend and vice versa. At this one instance, the other friend had refused to lend money to my frequently borrowing friend so he was unable to settle with me. 

But what was particularly amusing was what he said after. “What I have been borrowing and settling for the past few weeks is money from the two of you to each other. So to resolve the matter, the two of you must settle with each other because it’s your money. Not mine.” 

Sri Lanka’s debt servicing is a much more complex version of what my classmate did; we settle our creditors by borrowing from someone else. Most sovereign countries do the same. However, this can only be done when someone agrees to give us money. Similar to the incident with my friend, the moment people refuse to lend us money, the cycle starts collapsing. That is exactly what happened to Sri Lanka. As a result, the country has lost its credit rating by international rating agencies and has thereby lost market access. 

The current strategy we follow is requesting lifelines from our bi-lateral partners as a form of assistance. As a result, in just five days, India threw in about $ 1.4 billion worth of credit lines and swaps to secure our fuel, medicine, essential supplies, and debt repayments. 

Initially, China provided us with a swap of 10 billion Yuan as a back-up, which the Central Bank absorbed as reserves according to their data. 

At the same time with some of the bi-lateral partners, our relationship has not been professional. We cancelled the LRT project with Japan, which is our main bilateral creditor as well as the main funder for one of our main multilateral partners, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). To make matters worse, we keep the trade channels such as vehicles and spare parts closed, which is precisely where the bilateral relationships can be strengthened. 

Our mismanagement of bilateral relations is reflected, even with China. Recent events, such as our shortsighted handling of diplomatic relations over the fertiliser issue, with China blacklisting a state bank for not honouring payments, illustrates this issue. 

Economically and geopolitically, we have lost market access for borrowing on one hand, and on the other, we have somewhat tarnished the relationship with our friends at a time when we need their assistance the most. So far, we have been very lucky to still have their continuous support regardless of the setbacks even though the fault is on our end entirely. As a recommendation, the Government should not take the silence of some bilateral partners lightly, but work double-time to restore trust and understanding in business and trade. 

The current strategy of paying our International Sovereign Bonds through bilateral swaps and depending on credit lines for essentials will eventually come at a geopolitical expense. We become more vulnerable with our past track record of working with our bilateral partners. 

In this context, the Central Bank increased policy rates by 50 basis points, a policy move in the right direction. However, this comes – unfortunately – too late to stop the inflationary pressure constantly building, probably due to the faulty use of Modern Monetary Theory, which we have been following for some time now. The policy rate revisions will encourage people to save more money instead of spending more. This will somewhat ease the pressure, but at the same time slow the economy down. But we can’t afford to accelerate the economy with a historic balance of payment crisis which was already exacerbated by a price control on US Dollars (USD) in an attempt to encourage imports and discourage exports. 

Surprisingly, policymakers have not taken any reforms to overcome the situation, believing that debt servicing through borrowed money will solve the problem. Very high hopes have been kept on tourism but the same thing that happened to remittances will happen to tourism when we try to keep the exchange rate very low. We encourage people to keep the USD in grey markets so people will become further reluctant to sell their hard-earned USD to the Central Bank. 

At the same time, we need to understand tourism also increases the consumption of the economy where, with USD inflows, there will be a fair share of USD outflows concurrently. Thus, keeping all our eggs in the basket of tourism would not be advisable at all. If policymakers recall, at the beginning of the pandemic, remittances were at a record high. With mounting debt, our policymakers replied that our solutions remained in our remittances, which today are in decline due to our own policy failures. In this context, there are certain areas for restructuring that policymakers have to consider if they were to come out of the crisis: 

1. Restructuring of our social security net. A market pricing-based digital cash transfer system with better targeting than Samurdhi is recommended to provide poor people the opportunity to keep their noses above the water to navigate through the economic reform period

2. Restructuring and Reforms on the State sector and State-owned enterprises are a must. Listing the debt of State-owned enterprises, privatisations, consolidations and outright sale of some of the assets owned by State-owned enterprises is required for the private sector, including land. Government care has to be limited through a reasonable voluntary retirement scheme

3. Restructuring and Reforming in our Central Bank .The current tools of excessive interventions by the Central Bank on interest rates, exchange rates and every part of monetary policy has to be refined

4. Restructuring and reforming our tax system and tariff system is a must. Currently, our income and corporate tax systems are too complicated and it has to be simplified if policy makers are interested in increasing revenue. The complicated tariff structure has to be simplified with three tariff bands. Bringing down tariffs will also help the Government increase the revenue and boost trade

5. Restructuring and reforming our production structures for it to be aligned with global production and supply chains is vital to increase export revenue. At the same time, a deregulation drive has to be initiated to ensure conducive business environment for locals and foreigners

6. If our debt is unsustainable, we have to consider a restructuring of debt, but with the above-mentioned reforms. Attempting to do a debt restructuring without a solid commitment to reform will worsen the problem and debt restructuring could become a frequent event causing us to lose our credibility and market access if we fail to do the necessary reforms

All these ideas are not new and not a first mention in this column. These have been repeatedly spoken of by countless economic experts. It is simply that the call to action rate is very low. Policymakers whose job is to change policies and get things done. Not to behave like my classmate – paying debts with borrowed money, wiping their hands clean, and shifting the responsibility elsewhere at the last minute.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Debt restructuring: Between a rock and a hard place?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

According to news sources, the President has requested the Chinese Foreign Minister to assist Sri Lanka in restructuring our debt. The Finance Minister too has indicated to Japan and India, our long-standing bilateral partners, the need for more assistance to overcome the economic crisis Sri Lanka is going through. 

In a recent press conference, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Governor also mentioned that discussions for a new loan from China to restructure our debt is underway. 

However, it seems that the President and the CBSL Governor have given the term ‘restructuring’ two different meanings. One as run by the Global Times, the Chinese Communist Party-run newspaper, which said: “After President Rajapaksa’s request to restructure debt, Song Wei, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation stated that interest-free loans offered by the Chinese Government are applicable for debt relief while the concessional loans raised through the market cannot be written off.” 

However, as measures for debt restructuring, the CBSL Governor suggested taking more swap agreements, paying International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) and bilaterally skewing our debt profile from market borrowing. Considering all this, we are yet to know what would be the final decision.

In Sri Lanka’s external debt profile as at the end of 2020, about 57% was borrowed from financial markets (34% from ISBs and 8% from China Exim Bank). 

In my view, we cannot evaluate debt restructuring without really understanding the problem. The issue at hand is that Sri Lanka borrowed money in US Dollar terms with a short maturity at high-interest rates and invested in assets on non-revenue generating non-tradable assets. As a result, we had to borrow money at even higher interest rates to service the interest of previous debts which has snowballed to a point where Sri Lanka has lost access to capital markets.

So the choices are not between ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’. The choices are between ‘worse’ vs. still ‘worse’. That is why it is called an economic crisis. Either measure will result in a catastrophic impact on the people of Sri Lanka. So in this context let us evaluate debt restructuring. 

The objective of any debt restructuring is to avoid a similar situation in the future and ensure sovereign debt sustainability. So a debt restructuring plan without an economic reform plan to improve competition, trade, and efficiency of the economy will not bring us any sustainable solution. Rather, it will worsen the situation. 

Secondly, debt restructuring is also a very difficult process for a country like Sri Lanka with a limited resource base. Countries such as Argentina and Ecuador defaulted but they have large reserve bases including oil to get back on a path of recovery. But Sri Lanka is a small $ 82 billion economy with no experience on debt restructuring.

Debt restructuring is not an easy process given Sri Lanka’s debt profile. Usually, senior creditors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are unlikely to restructure debt as it is provided at a concessional rate and with a longer maturity period. In restructuring multilateral debt, generally, a new programme would be introduced to recover the previous debt. 

Restructuring bilateral debt is complicated. The debt of Paris Club members has to be negotiated at the Paris Club. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US are the members of Paris Club. So any bilateral debt restructuring from the above nations have to be at the Paris Club. According to data, 10% of our creditors are members of the Paris Club, with Japan being the main bilateral creditor for Sri Lanka.

Our debts with China and India, who are not Paris Club partners, have to be negotiated outside the Paris Club. Generally, any bilateral creditor would not agree to single-handedly bear the entire restructuring loss of one particular country. They will request other partners to assist. Even in the case of China, according to NewsIn Asia, Long Xingchun, a senior research fellow at the Academy of Regional and Global Governance of the Beijing Foreign Studies University, stated that restructuring loans with China alone is insufficient to help the island nation tide over its difficulty, which needs a package plan with other involved parties.

The geopolitical situation in Sri Lanka will give way to more geopolitical externalities in debt restructuring with bilateral partners. But it seems we have to move towards that direction as we have very limited alternatives at hand. 

Additionally, bilateral partners will also request to share the debt burden with commercial creditors including ISB holders. This is because in debt restructuring, the main objective is to distribute the loss as much as possible. 

Restructuring commercial debt has to be dealt with by international law and it is somewhat an expensive and time-consuming process to reach a consensus with all creditors. According to global debt restructuring expert Prof. Lee Buchheit, it can take about nine months to a few years based on the profile of the debt. 

In debt restructuring, there are four parameters generally considered. 

1. Reducing debt stock or principal amount commonly known as haircuts

2. Adjusting the interest rates to be paid or coupon rates commonly known as coupon adjustment

3. Extending the repayment or maturity period

4. Mix and match of all above

The general practice is creditors ask to conduct a debt sustainability study of the country before deciding the adjustment or deciding which parameters of restructuring are to be used. The only credible organisation to conduct an independent study is the IMF, and that is why in most of the debt restructuring processes, the countries are under the IMF programme. In Sri Lanka’s case, in the event of a restructuring as our President requested, we have to disclose all debt including the debt owed by the State-Owned Enterprises because the restructuring burden will be calculated across the board. 

Creditors are generally very reluctant to restructure debt especially when it is due to financial mismanagement. In case of a natural disaster or a negative externality, the negotiation would be easier compared to a situation concerning economic mismanagement. 

So the available choices for Sri Lanka are very limited and every choice may have its own set of consequences. Reserves are declining and people often complain about shortages of essentials and interruption of utilities. Businesses are complaining about the inconvenience of working with banks due to difficulties in opening Letters of Credit (LCs). Creditors and investors are embroiled in suspicion and confusion with constant credit rating downgrades. Debt restructuring will be complicated and an open Sri Lanka for geopolitical sensitivities will affect political stability. 

The choices at hand are difficult. This column has continuously highlighted the need for reforms since the beginning of the pandemic with full knowledge that delays will limit the alternatives. We need to shift gears and move forward with hard reforms before people become hard on reforms. 

References:

• https://newsin.asia/china-to-revise-lankan-loans-repayment-schedules/

• https://newsin.asia/china-to-revise-lankan-loans-repayment-schedules/

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1hezyj2YxA&list=WL&index=1&t=7182s

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Will Budget 2022 help reset Sri Lanka’s economy?

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Dr. Roshan Perera

A budget sets out the government’s plan for the economy together with the financial resources required to achieve those plans. It also indicates the broad policy direction and priorities of the government. Any assessment of the Budget cannot be undertaken without an understanding of where the economy is right now. In other words, the Budget must be evaluated in the current economic context.

Looking at the key economic indicators, it is clear that the economy is at a critical juncture. The country suffered the sharpest decline in economic growth in 2020. Although growth is picking up, the economy is likely to remain below pre-pandemic levels. Inflation is rising due to external pressures from supply side disruptions and shortages in international markets. Domestically, financing of the Government’s budget through banking sources (Central Bank and commercial banks) is exerting upward pressure on prices. On the fiscal front, government revenue declined to historic lows due to the impact of sweeping tax policy changes as well as the slowdown in economic activity. Meanwhile, the Government has very little leeway on expenditure, as much of it goes to pay salaries of government servants and to make interest payments – all contractual obligations. The consequent widening fiscal deficit has been financed through increasing borrowings leading to higher debt levels and debt service payments. Downgrading of the sovereign by rating agencies has limited access to international capital markets, exacerbating issues in the macroeconomy. The current economic crisis is not due to the Covid-19 pandemic alone. Sri Lanka entered the pandemic with a slowing economy and a weak fiscal position; the result of years of poor economic policies undertaken by successive governments.

Budget 2022 was an opportunity for the country to reset and for the economy to move to a more sustainable growth path. With Sri Lanka losing access to capital markets and large debt service payments over the next few years, the urgent need was to restore fiscal credibility and strengthen market confidence. Because credibility of the fiscal strategy is vital for stabilising the macroeconomy and restoring the confidence of investors. Hence, the primary focus of the Budget 2022 should have been on correcting the twin deficits, i.e., the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit, because of the spillover effects into the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates.

According to the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework, the fiscal deficit is projected to decline to 8.8% in 2022 from 11.1% in 2021 (see Table 1 for details).

With minimal wiggle room on the expenditure front, the focus of fiscal consolidation is on revenue generation. Tax revenue is projected to increase by 50% in 2022 from the revised estimates for 2021. Given that actual revenue consistently falls short of estimates, how realistic these projections are is called into question. A major portion of the increase in tax collection in 2022 is expected from the introduction of several new taxes. In addition, the VAT rate on banks and financial service providers is proposed to be raised to 18% from 15% as a one-time increase. Collectively, these taxes are estimated to raise Rs. 304 billion, accounting for around 46% of the total projected increase in tax revenue in 2022 (See Table 2 for details).

As a comparison, the Interim Budget for 2015 introduced a super gains tax of 25% applicable on any company or individual with profits over Rs. 2 billion in the tax year 2013/14 as a one-off tax. The revenue collected from this tax was Rs. 50 billion. Furthermore, the social security contribution is similar to the Nation-Building Tax (NBT), which was a 2% tax on turnover imposed on entities with liable turnover in excess of Rs. 15 million per annum. In 2019, the NBT generated revenue of Rs. 70 billion before it was abolished in December 2019. With a higher turnover threshold and the current restrictions on imports, it will be challenging to raise the estimated revenue from the proposed social security contribution. In addition, the ability to raise the proposed revenue depends on how expeditiously required legislation can be presented to Parliament. Delays in passing legislation have hampered revenue collection in the past.

The question that needs to be asked is why introduce new taxes on a revenue administration that is already stretched when there is ample room to revise thresholds and rates on several existing taxes. This would have been much simpler to implement and would have required minimal amendments to existing legislation. In addition, taxes with retrospective effect, such as the surcharge tax, are not good signals for prospective investors.

The big question is whether the revenue estimates in Budget 2022 are based on reasonable projections. What if the proposed revenue collection does not materialise? Is there leeway to cut expenditure to match the revenue shortfall? If not, will this mean a widening budget deficit and additional borrowing? With minimal access to foreign financing sources, this will mean higher borrowing from domestic sources, particularly the banking sector. This will have economy-wide implications through higher domestic interest rates and crowding out resources from the private sector.

On the expenditure front, overall, there has not been a huge increase in total expenditure. However, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Public Security account for around 12% of total expenditure, while spending on health and education accounts for 6% and 4%, respectively, of the total. In terms of the composition of expenditure, salaries and wages comprise 34% of recurrent expenditure while interest payments account for 37%. While the Government has limited room to cut expenditure, making permanent another 53,000 graduate trainees may not provide the best signal in terms of the Government’s commitment to reversing the fiscal situation. Furthermore, the Budget for 2022 has reduced the allocation for subsidies and transfers. An important lesson from the pandemic was the need to build buffers during good times to be able to assist vulnerable households and micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) who were disproportionately affected. Although the Budget proposes a one-off cash transfer to selected groups such as MSME entrepreneurs, school bus and van drivers, three-wheel drivers, and private bus drivers who were affected by the lockdowns, it does not address informal workers in other sectors of the economy who account for around 60% of the total workforce. Ad hoc cash transfers are not sufficient to address these issues. A more comprehensive social protection scheme is required to prevent vulnerable groups from falling into poverty due to unexpected events.

Macroeconomic stability also requires external sector stability. Large foreign debt service payments and dwindling foreign reserves have led to import controls and a tight rein on foreign exchange market. But a more sustainable solution to the external crisis is to encourage exports. The Budget refers to transforming the economy into an advanced manufacturing economy and encouraging exports to earn foreign exchange. This requires addressing the structural weaknesses in the economy hindering competitiveness and productivity. In this light, the question to ask is if spending priorities and policy measures announced in Budget 2022 address these bottlenecks. The Budget has allocated Rs. 5 billion for infrastructure for new product investment zones. In addition, the Budget refers to “…a special focus on expanding the IT sector and promoting BPOs and…a techno-entrepreneurship-driven economy”. However, the allocation for digitalisation is less than Rs. 5 billion. This is in comparison to the allocation for highways of around Rs. 270 billion and rural development programmes (Gama Samaga Pilisandara) of around Rs. 85 billion.

(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Advocata Institute and a former Director of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka)

A framework for economic recovery

Originally appeared on Daily FT

By Dr. Roshan Perera

A twin deficit problem

For much of its post-independence period Sri Lanka has been characterised by twin deficits: fiscal deficits and deficits in the external current account. What this implies is the country spends more than it earns and consumes more than it produces. The two deficits are linked because the deficit in the external current account reflects the sum of the deficit in private savings (where private investment is greater than private savings) and government dissaving (where government expenditure is greater than government revenue). If a government continues to consume more than it earns and/or domestic private savings are not sufficient to finance investment in the economy this is reflected in a widening of the deficit in the external current account. 

If a country is running a deficit in the external current account deficit it is important to understand what is driving this deficit. If it is due to a deficit in private savings and investment that may not be such a bad thing because the shortfall is probably being financed through foreign direct investments (FDI) and in any case it is leading to an increase in the productive capacity of the economy. Thereby increasing future growth potential of the country. On the other hand, if the current account deficit is due to the government spending more than it earns, this would need to be financed through increased borrowings. And a country just like a household cannot continue to borrow indefinitely. There will come a day of reckoning. You will come to a point where you are not able to service your debt or you may be able to service your debt, but you won’t have the income to buy what you need to live (food, clothing, education, health etc).  It may come to a point where your creditors will stop lending to you. Or even if they do lend, they will charge you a very high interest rate which will only worsen your debt situation. So, what is true for a household is true for a country.  

Consequences of living beyond our means

Large deficits in the fiscal and external account have been financed through borrowings both from the domestic market (which has crowded out resources for the private sector) and external sources (which has led to an unsustainable level of foreign debt). Although in the short-term high government spending may stimulate economic growth in the medium to long term it acts as a drag on growth due to its impact on interest rates and the exchange rate. 

When a government borrows continuously from the domestic market it crowds out resources from the private sector and drives up interest rates. Thus, making it unviable for a firm to borrow because the cost of borrowing is higher than the return it could earn from investing. In addition, when a country has a large external debt, it attempts to fix the currency to stabilize the debt stock. But this could result in an overvalued exchange rate which leads to an anti-export bias and an import bias which further worsens the trade deficit and external finances. This is contrary to what an economy like Sri Lanka with a small market (both in terms of size and per capita income) needs. As expanding trade is the only sustainable path to faster growth and employment generation. 

The availability of concessional financing from multilateral and bilateral donors enabled the country to run fiscal and external deficits over many decades. Although access to low-cost financing ended when the country graduated to middle-income status, we didn’t change our spending patterns to suit our income. Instead, we sought alternative sources of financing, borrowing from financial markets and commercial sources at high interest rates and with shorter repayment periods. Consequently, by 2016, the share of foreign debt from non-concessional sources rose to over 50%. This has enormously increased debt service payments. Today, Sri Lanka has one of the highest levels of government debt in its history and its debt service payments are one of the highest in the world (absorbing 72% of government revenue in 2020). This has led to both domestic and external resources being diverted to servicing past debt to the detriment of future growth. 

Policy Priorities

Advocata Institutes’ recent report “A Framework for Economic Recovery” propose several policies to address macroeconomic imbalances and structural reforms for sustainable and inclusive growth. 

Firstly we need to address the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. Primarily, correcting the twin deficits because they have spillover effects into the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates. Priority should be given to fixing the tax system. Tax revenue which was over 20% of GDP in the 1990s has plummeted to 8% in 2020 and is likely to fall further in 2021. Expanding the tax base and improving tax administration are key to reversing the long-term downward trend in government revenue. Currently the personal income tax threshold in Sri Lanka is more than four times its per capita GDP and even higher than the tax threshold in countries with per capita incomes that are several times that of Sri Lanka, such as Singapore and Australia. A high tax threshold removes a significant portion of the working population that can contribute to tax revenue. Tax exemptions for businesses should be rationalised and the granting of exemptions centralised under one authority.  Evidence suggests that sweeping tax exemptions are not the most important factor in attracting investments and foregoing this tax revenue is not sustainable in the long term. 

With declining tax revenue collection, the government faces severe resource constraints. Expenditure on contractual obligations interest payments, salaries and wages and pension payments) has come at the cost of spending on building human capital (health and education). This needs to be reversed. Serious attention needs to be paid in the budget to rationalising the public sector and strengthening budgetary oversight mechanisms so that the government is held accountable for how they use the resources entrusted to them.

Secondly, we need to stimulate economic growth and improve the country’s competitiveness. Sri Lanka has experienced very volatile growth rates and in recent times spurts of debt fuelled economic growth. But this growth has neither been inclusive nor sustainable. We need to generate growth that is both inclusive (benefits all our citizens) and sustainable (growth that does not jeopardise future generations). The budget needs to address the structural weaknesses in the economy hindering productivity driven growth. Some policies that we discuss in our report are: (1) improving the business environment by reducing regulatory barriers which are needed to attract foreign direct investment. Sri Lanka lags its peers in the areas of doing business and competitiveness; (2) unlocking access to land which has been identified as a major bottleneck for investment; (3) creating a flexible labour market and raising labour force participation. There are a plethora of legislation governing labour in SL which act as a serious impediment for job creation. Further, Sri Lanka has a rapidly aging population and is no longer benefitting from a demographic dividend. However, it has access to a large untapped source of female labour. Encouraging greater female participation in the labour force requires removal of legislation restricting employment of female workers and improved provision of services such as childcare and safe transport; (4) addressing infrastructure gaps to enhance productivity and efficiency of the factors of production. We need to invest in infrastructure that has high social and economic returns. This requires better processes for project appraisal and selection, better management of risks which otherwise could lead to cost overruns and project delays and greater accountability to reduce waste and corruption.

Finally, the budget needs to build buffers to strengthen the resilience of the economy to shocks. 

Households have been disproportionately affected by the ongoing pandemic because they lack the buffers to cushion them from economic shocks. Workers, particularly in the informal sector, have lost jobs due to the impact of lockdowns and the closure of borders. Although the government provided some relief to households affected by the pandemic by way of income transfers, the lack of fiscal space constrained the government’s ability to adequately respond to the crisis. In addition, Sri Lanka’s existing social protection scheme has significant coverage gaps. Establishing a universal social safety net and reducing targeting errors will ensure that those who need support receive it when they need it most. 

Micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) play a vital role in the Sri Lankan economy. This sector was severely affected by measures taken to contain the spread of the virus, such as travel bans, lockdowns and social distancing. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic, the government and the Central Bank introduced various emergency liquidity support programs, debt moratoriums and extension of credit at concessionary interest rates. These schemes may have prevented some firms from bankruptcy. However, the inability of the government to continue providing such relief given the prolonged nature of the pandemic and fiscal constraints requires other measures to be put in place to deal with such situations. Given the size of this sector and its importance to the economy, ensuring the solvency of these firms as well as increasing their productivity is paramount to Sri Lanka’s long term economic growth prospects. Many firms will emerge from this pandemic with seriously impaired balance sheets. Firms that are not resilient, uncompetitive, or heavily indebted will probably fold due the crisis. To reduce the adverse economic impact of ad hoc closures, the government must ensure access to an effective bankruptcy regime. Such a mechanism will strengthen economic resilience, while incentivising firms to prioritise strategies to repair balance sheets in the medium term before they reach bankruptcy.  

(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Advocata Institute and a former Director of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka)

Budget 2022: Macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms for inclusive and sustainable growth

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dr. Roshan Perera

Years of profligate living finally caught up with us. Sri Lanka, for much of its post-Independence period, has been living beyond its means: We have been spending more than we earn and consuming more than we produce. Our extravagant lifestyle was made possible by the availability of concessional financing from multilateral and bilateral donors. This ended once we graduated to a middle-income country. But we didn’t change our spending patterns to match our income. Instead, we sought alternative sources of financing. We borrowed from financial markets and commercial sources at high interest rates and with shorter repayment periods.

Consequently, by 2016, the share of foreign debt from non-concessional sources rose to over 50%. This had an enormous impact on our debt service payments. Today, Sri Lanka has one of the highest levels of government debt in its history and its debt service payments are one of the highest in the world (absorbing 72% of government revenue in 2020). This led to both domestic and external resources being diverted to servicing past debt to the detriment of future growth.

According to current estimates, Sri Lanka has around $ 26 billion in foreign debt obligations due between now and 2026. Sovereign rating downgrades made rolling over this debt challenging. But these are contractual obligations and there could be serious repercussions if a country defaults on its debt. Due to the decline in foreign inflows owing to the pandemic, the Government resorted to short-term measures such as bilateral swaps to shore up foreign reserves. However, there was a steady drawdown of the country’s foreign reserves to meet these debt obligations. Foreign reserves, as at end-September 2021, declined to $ 2.5 billion (which was equivalent to 1.5 months of import cover). Foreign currency obligations falling due within the next 12 months amount to around $ 7 billion. The current level of foreign reserves is grossly inadequate to service the Government’s debt.

Furthermore, using a country’s foreign reserves to pay debt obligations is not a good strategy in the long term. Foreign reserves play an important role in an economy – by providing a buffer against possible external shocks, smoothing temporary fluctuations in the exchange rate, and providing confidence to foreign investors.

With limited access to foreign financing, the Government is relying more on domestic sources to bridge the fiscal deficit. To keep interest costs low, domestic interest rates have been suppressed, which has effectively dried up the market for government securities. This has led to debt monetisation, with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) purchasing a major share of government securities issued in the primary auction. However, there are costs involved with this strategy, as high monetary growth leads to high inflation. It also undermines the independence of the CBSL and hinders its use of its key monetary policy instrument, the interest rate, to manage inflation.

So, what needs to be done? Advocata Institutes’ recent report titled “A Framework for Economic Recovery” proposes several policies to address macroeconomic imbalances and structural reforms for sustainable and inclusive growth. These policies are not new. If you examine macro stabilisation programmes that have been implemented in this country (or in other countries that have faced similar economic issues), you would broadly find similar recommendations. This does not mean the recommendations made in the past were wrong – but rather that successive governments did not follow through on the reforms needed to ensure long-term macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth.

This time is different in one aspect. Sri Lanka has lost access to financial markets due to its rating downgrade. Hence, it is not able to easily refinance its foreign debt. In previous stabilisation programmes, although debt sustainability was a major concern, it was addressed through a fiscal consolidation programme. This alone may not be sufficient in the current context. The country may need to engage in a pre-emptive debt restructuring exercise to prevent default. A wilful default could disrupt access to future financing, reduce investor confidence, affect credit ratings, and have a negative impact on the reputation of the country. However, debt restructuring is a complex process and securing a deal that is acceptable to a majority of creditors is fraught with difficulty, as there are many stakeholders involved, and conflicts of interest are inevitable, hence the need to engage with an institution such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the negotiation process.

The focus of Budget 2022 should be to address the macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. Primarily, correcting the twin deficits, i.e. the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit, because these have spillover effects into the rest of the economy through interest rates and exchange rates. Priority should be given to fixing the tax system. Tax revenue, which was over 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1990s, has plummeted to 8% in 2020 and is likely to fall further in 2021. Expanding the tax base and improving tax administration are key to reversing the long-term downward trend in government revenue.

Currently, the income tax threshold in Sri Lanka is more than four times its per capita GDP and even higher than the tax threshold in countries with per capita incomes that are several times that of Sri Lanka, such as Singapore and Australia. A high tax threshold removes a significant portion of the working population that can contribute to tax revenue. Tax exemptions should be rationalised and the granting of exemptions centralised under one authority. Evidence suggests that sweeping tax exemptions is not the most important factor in attracting investments, and foregoing this tax revenue is not sustainable in the long term. With declining tax revenue collection, the Government faces severe resource constraints.  Expenditure on contractual obligations (interest payments, salaries and wages, and pension payments) has come at the cost of spending on building human capital (health and education). This needs to be reversed. Serious attention needs to be paid in the budget to rationalising the public sector and strengthening budgetary oversight mechanisms so that the Government is held accountable for how they use the resources entrusted to them.

Secondly, we need to stimulate economic growth and improve the country’s competitiveness. Sri Lanka has experienced very volatile growth rates and in recent times, sudden spurts of debt-fuelled economic growth. But this growth has neither been inclusive nor sustainable. We need to generate growth that is both inclusive (benefits all our citizens) and sustainable (growth that does not jeopardise future generations). The budget needs to address the structural weaknesses in the economy hindering productivity-driven growth. Some policies that we discuss in our report are:

1. Improving the business environment by reducing regulatory barriers, which is needed to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Sri Lanka lags behind its peers in the areas of doing business and competitiveness

2. Unlocking access to land that has been identified as a major bottleneck for investment

3. Creating a flexible labour market and raising labour force participation. There are a plethora of legislation governing labour in Sri Lanka which act as a serious impediment for job creation. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has a rapidly ageing population and is no longer benefitting from a demographic dividend. However, it has access to a large untapped source of female labour. Encouraging greater female participation in the labour force requires removal of legislation restricting employment of female workers and improved infrastructure such as childcare and safe transport services

4. Addressing infrastructure gaps to enhance productivity and efficiency of the factors of production. We need to invest in infrastructure that has high social and economic returns. This requires better processes for project appraisal and selection, better management of risks which otherwise could lead to cost overruns and project delays, and greater accountability to reduce waste and corruption.

Finally, the budget needs to build buffers to strengthen the resilience of the economy to shocks. Households have been disproportionately affected by the ongoing pandemic because they lack the buffers to cushion them from economic shocks. Workers, particularly in the informal sector, have lost jobs due to the impact of lockdowns and the closure of borders. Although the Government provided some relief to households affected by the pandemic by way of income transfers, the lack of fiscal space constrained the Government’s ability to adequately respond to the crisis.

In addition, Sri Lanka’s existing social protection scheme has significant coverage gaps and needs to be extended to include informal sector employees, daily wage earners, and self-employed workers. Ad hoc payments are not sufficient to keep people from falling into poverty. Urgent action is needed to establish a universal social safety net and reduce targeting errors to ensure those who need support receive it when they need it most.

Micro, small, and medium-scale enterprises (MSMEs) play a vital role in the Sri Lankan economy, accounting for over half of Sri Lanka’s GDP and over 90% of total enterprises and 45% of employment in the non-agriculture sector. This sector was severely affected by measures taken to contain the spread of the virus, such as travel bans, lockdowns, and social distancing. To mitigate the impact of the pandemic, the Government and CBSL introduced various emergency liquidity support programmes, debt moratoriums, and extension of facilities at concessionary interest rates. While these schemes may have prevented some firms from bankruptcy, the Government is unable to continue providing such relief, given the prolonged nature of the pandemic and the fiscal constraints it faces.

However, given the size of this sector and its importance to the economy, ensuring the solvency of these firms as well as increasing their productivity is paramount to Sri Lanka’s long-term economic growth prospects. As the pandemic continues to affect economic activity, many firms will emerge with serious impact on their balance sheets. Therefore, as economies transition to normalcy, it is important to repair balance sheets by reducing unsustainable debt and rebuilding cash reserves. Firms that are not resilient, are uncompetitive, or are heavily indebted will collapse during such crises. To reduce the adverse economic impact of ad hoc closures in the most productive manner, the Government must ensure access to an effective bankruptcy regime. Such a mechanism will strengthen economic resilience, while incentivising firms to prioritise strategies to repair balance sheets in the medium term before they reach bankruptcy.

In conclusion, the key focus of policymakers should be on addressing macroeconomic imbalances. Priority should be given to correcting the twin deficits, i.e. the fiscal deficit and the external current account deficit, stimulating economic growth, and improving competitiveness while building buffers to strengthen the resilience of the economy to shocks.

(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Advocata Institute and a former Director of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka)

Prof Athukorala: Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and reality – Part 3

Originally appeared on The Daily FT.

By Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala

IMF programmes and economic performance

There are two ways to evaluate the impact of IMF stabilisation programmes: (a) counterfactual evaluation: comparing outcome with what would have happened without the programmes; and (b) comparing results to objectives: evaluate performance against the benchmarks imposed by the policy-makers. 

It is not possible to apply the first approach to assess the impact of IMF programmes using data for a single country simply because there is no suitable counterfactual (situation in the absence of the programme) for assessing how the country would have fared without the programmes. This approach can be applied with ‘proxy’ counterfactuals only in multi-country comparative analyses (Goldstein and Montiel 1986, Barro and Lee 2005, Easterly 2005, Vreeland 2003). We apply here the second methodology, using economic growth (measured by annual growth rate of real GDP) as the key performance criterion.

In Table 2, the average growth rate of the Sri Lankan economy during the years under IMF programmes (‘programme years’) is compared with that of the entire period (1965-2019) and years without IMF programs (excluding the ‘pandemic’ year of 2020). The growth rate in all programme years (4.91) is 0.42 higher compared to that of the non-programme years (4.49). When the programmes years are separated into years under fully-implemented programmes (proposes under with the entire committed fund was disbursed by the IMF) and partially implemented programmes, the growth impact of the fully implemented programmes is found to notably higher, as one would expect (5.16%). 

Note that doing the period under study (1965-2009), all non-programme years are preceded by programme years: the period stars with the first IMF programme in1965. Therefore, lower growth rates in the non-programme years reported in Table 2 shows that, on average, the positive growth impact of the programs has not percolated beyond the programme years. The average growth rate during the non-programme years is 4.49 compared to 5.16 during the average growth rate during the fully-implemented programmes. 

This simple comparison of growth rates ignores the possibility that the growth impact of reforms could have shaped by exogenous shocks such as the two JVP uprisings (in 1971 and during 1988-89), escalation of the separatist war, and changes in the terms of trade. Also, the economy has the natural tendency to grow over time at a certain rate regardless of reforms. Moreover, the degree of openness of the economy to foreign trade could impact on the nature of the adjustment process in the economy (Arpac and Bird 2009). The real issue is whether the IMF programmes have produced better growth performance after allowing for these other factors.

We undertook an econometric analysis to delineate the impact of IMF programmes after controlling for these influences. The results indicate that average growth rate is 1.26 percentage points higher using the 33 years under all programmes compared to the non-programme years. This estimated growth impact is however statistically significant only at 20% (that is, there is a 20% probability that this estimate is likely due to chance). By contrast, for the 25 years of completely fully-disbursed programmes, the growth rate is 1.45 percentage points higher compared to the non-programme years and incomplete programme years are taken together. This estimate is statistically significant at the one-percent level (that is, there is only one percent probability that this growth impact is likely due to chance).

In sum, the results of the econometric analysis is consistent with what we observed in the simple data tabulation (Table 2). This estimated growth impact is all the more impressive when we take into account what the econometricians call the possible ‘negative selection bias’. A country normally approaches the IMF at a time of macroeconomic distress. It would not, therefore, be surprising if we had found no statistically significant association or even a negative association between programme participation and economic growth (Easterly 2005). 

It is clear from this evidence that the growth outcome during the IMF programme years has been respectable. But, have the programmes been successful in rectifying macroeconomic imbalances of the economy to set the stage for sustainable growth? This is an important issue because the very purpose of IMF stabilisation programmes is to achieve ‘adjustment with growth’. 

Addressing this issue requires an in-depth analysis of individual programmes, paying attention to the programme objectives, problems cropped up in the implementation process, and the impact of the programmes on the overall incentive structure of the economy. However some tentative inferences can be made by comparing the relevant macroeconomic variable across years of the fully-disbursed programmes and non-programme years. The relevant data are summarised in Table 3. 

The data clearly indicate the catalytic effect of the programmes on net capital inflows to the country. During the programme years, net capital inflows relative to GDP was 1.4 percentage points higher compared to the non-programme years (or the level of net capital inflows was about 32% higher than during the non-program years). Increase in capital flows seems to have helped maintaining imports and government expenditure at relatively higher levels. However, there is no evidence of net capital inflows augmenting domestic investment: investment as a percentage of GDP is strikingly similar between programme years and non-programme years.

There is some evidence of improvement in the country’s international competitiveness (measured by the real exchange rate change), but this has not persisted beyond the programme years.

Government revenue was notably higher during the programme years, with an increase in tax revenue making a significant contribution to the increase. However, this was overwhelmed by the Government’s failure to contain Government expenditure. The difference of the magnitudes of excess domestic demand (which is equal to the sign reversed value of net capital inflows), current account deficit and the budget deficit during programme years and non-programme years are striking similar. 

This pattern suggests that domestic excess demand, which is driven by the failure to contain the budget deficit, is the prime driver of the failure of the reform programmes to contain the external imbalance (widening current account deficit). The current account deficit during the programme years is 50% larger compared to that in the non-programme years (4.8% compared to 3.2% of GDP).

The date relating to the domestic imbalance (domestic expenditure over income) of the economy and the overall Government budget balance are depicted in Figure 1. Note that the domestic imbalance is by definition equal to the current account balance (the external imbalance), after allowing for changes in foreign reserves and valuation effect on foreign assets resulting from exchange rate changes. The figure therefore vividly demonstrates that the explanation of the persistent external imbalance of the economy is deeply rooted in the failure of fiscal management. The widening budget deficit that propels domestic excess demand has been an endemic structural feature of the economy, notwithstanding repetitive recourse to IMF adjustment programmes during the period under study.

Concluding remarks: Seeking or rejecting IMF support

There is no evidence to suggest that the IMF has been a determining hand in shaping economic stabilisation reforms in Sri Lanka. In all 16 stabilisation programmes supported by the IMF during 1965-2020, the decision to go to the IMF has been dictated by the country’s own failure to keep the macroeconomic house in order. There is no evidence to suggest that the IMF insisted on implementing a stereotyped policy package in all ‘crisis’ cases. Moreover, governments in both ideological camps have gone to the IMF in times of need.

The Sri Lanka-IMF relationship during the UF movement during 1970-77 indicates that there is room to enter into an IMF programme even for a national government with an incompatible ideological position provided it agrees with the IMF on the importance of achieving macroeconomic stabilisation. During the right-of-the centre UNP regimes of 1977-’94, the IMF supported trade liberalisation, but subject to its standard conditionality relating to macroeconomic stability. In hindsight, one could surmise that the outcome of the liberalisation reforms would have been much more impressive had the Government followed IMF-World Bank advice (and Shenoy’s advocacy) for combining trade and investment liberalisation with macroeconomic stabilisation. 

There is convincing evidence that the growth rate of the economy was significantly higher during the years of fully-implemented IMF stabilisation programmes. However, the long-standing fundamental macroeconomic disequilibria of the country has persisted despite the repetitive reliance on IMF programmes. This simply reflect policy failures of the country to use the breathing space provided by the programmes to undertake the required structural adjustment reforms: the ‘repetitive client status’ of the country does not, therefore, make a case for rejecting IMF support. 

Borrowing from the IMF is much cheaper than raising funds through sovereign bond issues and borrowing from other commercial sources. Unlike other donors, the IMF always lend funds to the Central Bank of the country strictly for meeting external payments. Therefore, IMF programmes do not have a direct impact on the domestic money supply and hence domestic inflation. More importantly, entering into an IMF programme acts as a catalyst to generate additional financial assistance. 

Other international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and individual donor nations find comfort to lend to Sri Lanka as the lending risks are reduced given the financial discipline that an IMF programme instils. Financial credibility achieved by entering into an IMF programme also helps raising funds at competitive interest rates from private capital markets.

Delaying the inevitability of approaching the IMF can be costly in the form of more stringent conditionality. The IMF team visited Sri Lanka in February 2020 to meet with the new administration and discuss its policy agenda has pre-warned about Sri Lanka’s formidable macroeconomic adjustment challenges: ‘Ambitious structural and institutional reforms are needed to anchor policy priorities, buttress competition and foster inclusive growth. Fiscal prudence remain critical to support macro-economic stability and market confidence, amid high level of debt refinancing needed. Given risks to debt sustainability over the medium term, renewed effort to advance fiscal consolidation is essential for macroeconomic stability.’ [https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/07/pr2042-sri-lanka-imf-staff-concludes-visit-to-sri-lanka]

(Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, an Emeritus Professor of Economics at Australian National University and an Advisor for Advocata Institute and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

Prof Athukorala: Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and reality – Part 2

Originally appeared on The Daily FT.

By Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala

Since 1965 Sri Lanka has been a ‘repetitive client’ of the IMF. The country has entered into 16 economic stabilisation programmes during 1965-2000. Macroeconomic management of the country has been under IMF programmes for approximately 33 years of the 55-year period.

1970-’75: Trotskyite Finance Minister seeking IMF support again

The United Front coalition (UF) came into power in 1970 promising to ‘to lay the foundation for an irrevocable transition to the economy to a socialist one’ (Perera 1970a, p. 4-5). The development strategy of the new Government envisaged combining ‘outward looking development with the right mixture of internal policies and approaches to domestic resource mobilisation which prove to be socially acceptable’ (Perera 1970b, p. 176).

By 1970, Sri Lanka’s repayment obligations to the IMF had become an important factor that contributed to high level of capital amortisation because of repetitive recourse to borrowing in the second half of the 1960s (Central Bank Annual Report 1971, p. 194). NM, the Finance Minister, started negotiation for a fifth SBA with IMF within months of the new Government coming into power. In his 1970 Budget Speech he argued that “we cannot brush aside and completely ignore these international institutions; we can repudiate their terms only if we are prepared to face the far-reaching distortions” (Perera 1970).

The initial discussions were held in June 1970 in Colombo with D.S. Savkar, Assistant Director, West Asia Division of the IMF. NM attended and addressed the IMF-World Bank annual conference in Copenhagen in September 1970 and persuaded the IMF Managing Directors Paul Schweitzer to visit Colombo on 20 October 1970. Final discussion were held in Washington DC in December 1970. In the negotiations, NM was assisted by a strong team of technocrats including W. Tennekoon (Central Bank Governor), M. Rajendra (Secretary to the Treasury) and H.A. de S. Gunasekera (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Employment).

The IMF was firmly of the view that the imbalance of payments can only be set right by a further devaluation of the Rupee. The Finance Minister opposed to the idea because of the perceived inflationary impact it would have and managed to convince the IMF team that the Government had the capacity to reduce the budget deficit by taking firm actions to reduce the budget deficit, promoting domestic saving, relaxing credit controls, encouraging exports and pursuing a vigorous programme of import substitution. The IMF approved a SBA of $ 25.6 million on 17 May 1971. To facilitate the implementation of the SBA, the IMF enlisted assistance of the World Bank and some downer countries for an aid programme.

After signing the SBA, NM emphatically defended his decision to go to the IMF in the Parliament: ‘effort to put its own house in order was not the result of IMF advice but was the obvious thing to do in the national interest’ (Hansard, Vol 91, November 10, 1971, cc 2621-2633).

The worsening balance of payment situation in the wake of the oil price increase in 1973 compelled the Government to negotiate another SBA. In preparation for negotiations the Government came up with some ‘sweeteners’ for the IMF: the rupee was re-linked to the pound sterling from the US$ when the pound was floated on 23 June 1972 resulting in an indirect devaluation of the rupee by about 7%.; in November 1972 the FEECs rate was increased from 45% to 65% with an expansion of the import coverage of FEEC scheme to nearly 75%, and the food subsidy bill was cut substantially on its own initiative. The negotiations took two years and a personal visit by the Finance Minister to the IMF before signing the agreement to the tune of $ 29.6 m on 30 April 1974.

Sri Lanka obtained only the first instalment ($ 8.5 m) under this SBA. The IMF withheld the balance because the Government failed to adhere to the ceiling imposed on domestic credit. Perhaps the Government was not under pressure to stick to IMF conditionality in that year because of the availability of ‘easy’ IMF finance under the newly-introduced Oil Facility (SDR 34 million) and the Compensatory Finance Facility (SDR 7.0).

The Government approached the IMF for another SBA in 1975. However, the discussions floundered allegedly on account of the Government’s reluctance to cut further subsidies as required by the IMF (Kappagoda and Paine 1981, p74).

The UF Government made considerable progress towards macroeconomic adjustment with the help of the IMF programmes. Both the annual debt servicing burden and the term structure of external debt significantly improved. However, as Kappagoda and Paine (1981) have convincingly argued, ‘the payment adjustment [cut in domestic absorption] proceeded faster than was warranted’ (p. 100).

The adjustment burden primarily felt on imports with serious adverse effects on the economy’s medium term prospects and consumer wellbeing. The groundswell of unhappiness of the electorate paved the way for the UNP to return to power with a landslide majority in June 1977.

1977-’88: The first wave of liberalisation reforms 

The widely-held view in the Sri Lankan policy circles is that the regime shift opened up the opportunity for the IMF to dictate ‘neo-liberal’ reform in Sri Lanka (Gunasinghe 1986, Lakshman 1985, Davis 2015). Lakshman (1985, p. 22), in particular, claims that ‘the determining hand of the IMF-WB group in shaping and implementing of the ‘open economy’ is abundantly clear’. This claim could not be further from reality.

Major reforms such as trade liberalisation and exchange rate depreciation and the opening up of the economy to foreign direct investment were, in fact, undertaken by the new Government in the ‘honeymoon’ period following the massive election victory, based on the recommendations of the Shenoy report. When the Government adopted pro-market policies for its own reasons, the IMF became an important partner of development policy, but, of course, subject to its standard conditionality.

As already noted, the balance of payments position was in relatively better shape at the time compared to the first half of the decade. There was also promising sign of massive concessionary capital inflows from the major donor nations in support of the economic opening by the new Government. Immediately after the new Government was formed, the Finance Minister, Ronnie de Mel made a one-month visit to a number of Western countries to seek aid and returned with promising pledges. In 1978, aid disbursements alone were sufficient to cover the current account deficit (Central Bank Annual Report 1978). There was no urgent need for approaching the IMF for balance of payments support alone. It seems that the Government choose to go to the IMF to gain credibility to the reform process. 

The Government presented a proposal for a $ 427 m under a SBA. However, in the absence of a well-prepared medium-term stabilisation programme, and because the Government’s disagreement with the IMF to phase out subsidies, the IMF approved a SBA of only $ 122 plus $ 50.3 million as a supplement from the IMF Trust Fund in 1978. Immediately after approving the SBA, the IMF opened a representative office in Colombo to work closely with the Government in monitoring the reforms. In January 1979, the IMF approved $ 317.2 m EFF programme to support structural adjustment reforms during the three-year period of 1979-’81.

The relationship between the Government and the IMF, however, began to come under strain from 1981 because of a significant disagreement relating to the policy priorities of the Government (Rajapatirana 2017). The Government swiftly implemented the Shenoy recommendations for economic opening, but it overlooked Shenoy’s recommendations for macroeconomic stabilisation, which was an integral part of the proposed overall reform package. It decided to accelerate the implementation of the Mahaweli Development Project (collapsing the original implementation period of 30 years to eight years), side by side with the liberalisation reforms. 

The IMF (and the World Bank) became concerned about the inconsistency between the objective of structural adjustment in the economy under liberalisation reforms and the inevitable macroeconomic instability resulting from the massive investment programme (Levy 1998, Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1991). 

Apart from the macroeconomic instability, there were also genuine concerns regarding the viability of the $ 664 m project: A study of the project financed by the World Bank in 1981 recommended a slower rate of implementation than what the Government envisaged to avoid possible cost blow-up. The study also expressed concern that donors had made aid commitments for the project without properly evaluating the project’s costs. 

In September 1983, the IMF approved another SBA of $ 105 m (as opposed to the Government’s request for $ 221 m). However, the IMF terminated the agreement after only half of the agreed amount was disbursed, over concerns about macroeconomic instability caused by the massive Mahaweli investment programme. The World Bank also withheld disbursement of allocations under a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) ($ 70 m) because of the Government’s dispute with the IMF. According to a confidential letter to the Ministry of Finance and Planning (leaked to Lanka Guardian), David Hopper, the Vice President of the South Asia Programme, emphatically stated that ‘the precondition for all Bank structural adjustment activities is an agreement with the IMF’ (Jayalath 1990). 

Ronnie de Mel, the Finance Minister, described the nature of the Sri Lanka-IMF relationship during this period as follows: ‘We have had discussions, intricate discussions, debates, long negotiations and many quarrels. We have had suspensions. We have had estrangements. It has been, in short, love-hate type relationship. It has been something like the relationship between Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton’ (Hansard, Vol. 22, No. 12, March 18, 1983, C 1768).

1988-2005: The second-wave reforms

The economic boom following the 1977 reforms mainly concentrated in the first three years (1978-81) when the economy grew at an average annual rate of 6.6%. In the ensuing years of the decade, liberalisation reforms were overtaken by the commitment to major infrastructure projects. The process of structural adjustment in the economy was hampered by the failure to complete implementation of the reform agenda, in particular labour market reforms and State enterprise reforms, and the adverse impact of the investment boom on tradable goods production in the economy because of the appreciation of the real exchange rate (Moore 1990, Dunham and Kelegama 1997).

Added to this was the economic disruption caused by the escalation of the separatist war from 1983 and JVP uprising in the south during 1987-’89. By the end of the 1980s, the Sri Lankan economy had come close to a foreign exchange crisis, with low foreign exchange reserves, massive security related Government expenses, and a misaligned exchange rate that propelled significant capital flight and under repatriation of export proceeds (IMF 2001). 

In this volatile economic climate, the UNP Government under the new leadership of President Premadasa embarked on the ‘second wave’ liberalisation reforms (Dunham and Kelegama 1995). The IMF supported the reforms under a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) of $ 209 m) and an Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of $ 478.6 m. Reforms included devaluation of the rupee against the US$ by 34% between mid-1989 and the end of 1993, further liberalisation of financial and commodity markets, revamping of the operations of the Board of Investment (BOI) with a one-stop-shop for investment approval process, privatisation of some State-Owned Enterprises (under an innovative politically-friendly label, ‘peopalisation’) and a poverty alleviation programme. 

Dunham and Kelegama (1995, p. 187) have characterised the second-wave reforms as an illustration of how ‘strong leadership proved critical in ... reforms, in a country where the state is not strong, and is neither cohesive nor disciplined, in organisational rearms’. 

The vigour of second-wave reforms was lost because of the tragic death of the President, but there was no back sliding from reform because economic outcomes had been impressive enough to make economic liberalisation by-partition policy (Kumaranatunge 2004). 

The new SLFP-led Coalition Government continued with trade liberalisation and privatisation of State enterprises. During 2001-2002 the Government received financial support for reforms under a SBA of $ 256.8 m. In releasing funds under the SBA the IMF was sympathetic to the difficulties faced by the Government in meeting conditionality because of the exigencies of the accelerating civil war. 

For instance, the IMF showed flexibility to extend the agreement to 19 September 2002 on a lapse-of-time basis to allow the completion of the final review and granted a waiver for the non-compliance of performance criteria and released the agreed amount, because non-compliance was largely due to factors beyond the control of the Sri Lankan authorities (escalating ethnic conflict and oil price hike). 

1995-2009: The period of escalating civil war

During the period from collapse of peace talks between the LTTE and Government in 1995 until 2009, the reform process was hampered by the escalating civil war. In 2003, the IMF approved a three-year PRGF to the amount of $ 392.7 m and an additional EFF in tune of $ 210.8 m over the period 2003-’06. Both programmes lapsed after the withdrawal of the first instalments.

The post-civil war era

Following the ending of the civil war in July 2009, the IMF approved the largest ever programme loan (SBA of $ 2.6 b) for Sri Lanka. The quarterly performance criteria (QPCs) related to the standard macroeconomic stabilisation measures. 

The Government’s poor record of revenue mobilisation, in particular continued decline in the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, and the budgetary burden of supporting loss-making public enterprises, and the backsliding on trade liberalisation came up in the negotiations but did not become part of the conditionality. This was presumably because the IMF wanted to provide the Government with policy autonomy in restoring the economy after the three-decade civil war.

In June 2016 the Government entered into a three-year EFF ($ 1.5 b) with the IMF. The EFF aimed to harness an additional $ 650 m in other multilateral and bilateral loans of about $ 2.2 b (over and above the existing financing arrangements). The stated objective of the programme was to help the new Government restore macroeconomic stability and resilience of the economy to facilitate sustainable and equitable economic growth (IMF 2016). 

The programme focussed on reforms to tax policy and tax administration with a focus on increasing direct tax collection, fiscal policy management, and State enterprise reforms to achieve fiscal consolidation while providing fiscal space for the Government’s key social and development spending programmes. Fiscal consideration reforms were to combine with flexible monetary targeting under a flexible exchange rate regime, reforms in the trade and investment regime, and rebuilding foreign exchange reserves. 

The reforms undertaken by the Government under the programme during 2016-’19 included a major revision to the value added and income tax systems and introducing a new building tax and rationalising the customs duty structure (Coomaraswami 2017). On 13 May 2019 the IMF Executive Board approved an extension of the EFF until June 2020 with rephrasing of remaining disbursements to complete the reform agenda. However, the implementation of the programme abruptly ended with the change of government in early 2020.

To sum up, since 1965 Sri Lanka has been a ‘repetitive client’ of the IMF. The country has entered into 16 economic stabilisation programmes during 1965-2000. Macroeconomic management of the country has been under IMF programmes for approximately 33 years of the 55-year period. The IMF fully disturbed agreed funds under 12 (approximately covering 25 years) of these 17 agreements. The conditionality attached to the agreements has notably varied over time depending on shifts in the development thinking of the IMF and macroeconomic conditions and the underlying political developments of the country.

(Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, an Emeritus Professor of Economics at Australian National University and an Advisor for Advocata Institute and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

Prof Athukorala: Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and Reality – Part 1

Originally appeared on The Daily FT.

By Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala

Read Sri Lanka and the IMF: Myth and Reality – Part 2 and Part 3

Sri Lanka is now in the midst of its worst macroeconomic crisis since independence. Whether to seek financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in managing the crisis is a hotly-debated issue in Sri Lankan policy circles. The debate is largely ideologically-driven: strongly-held, opposing views are expressed without facts.

The purpose of this paper is to demystify the debate by documenting and analysing Sri Lanka’s experience under IMF-supported macroeconomic adjustment programs, the economic circumstances that propelled the country to seek IMF support, and implications of these programmes for economic stabilisation and growth.

The discussion focuses on two key issues emphasised by the current political leadership and the Central Bank to justify their attempt to avert going to the IMF: IMF dictates policy reforms at the expense of national policy autonomy, and the conditions attached to IMF programs are harmful to national development. The paper primarily adopts an economist’s perspective, but where relevant economics is combined with politics in order to understand the vicissitudes of Sri Lanka-IMF relations.

The paper begins with a short introduction to the role of the IMF in economic stabilisation reforms in developing countries to provide the context for the ensuing analysis. The next section provides as analytical narrative of the history of Sri Lanka-IMF relations. The following section examines the impact of IMF programs on the Sri Lankan economy. The final section provides concluding remarks with a focus on the current debate on entering into an IMF programme.

The IMF and economic stabilisation

The IMF was set up in 1945 to provide member countries with bridging loans to help them get over balance of payments difficulties. A member’s access to the IMF’s financing is expressed in terms of tranches, equal to 25% of its quota of the IMF. The first four trenches (‘reserve’ tranches, in total up to 100% of its quota) can be accessed free of charge at the member’s own discretion.

The IMF also has other concessional credit facilities introduced to help member countries in the event of unforeseeable economic shocks: Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF), the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF), the Trust Fund and Subsidy Account (TFSA) financing, Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), Contingent Credit Lines (CCLs) and Emergency Assistance (EA).

When a country borrows beyond the reserve trenches or eligible concessional credit facilities, it has to agree on a reform package to overcome its problems that led to seek financial support. These lending programs are called structural adjustment (or stabilisation) programmes. The policy measures prescribed by the IMF relating to these lending programmes are known as ‘IMF conditionality’.

The main structural adjustment loan programme is the Stand-By Agreement (SBA) facility, introduced in 1952. The key objectives of SBAs are to rebuild the external reserves, strengthen the fiscal position, maintain monetary stability, and fortify the domestic financial system. The length of the typical SBA programme is 12 to 18 months and loans are to be repaid within a maximum of five years.

The other IMF stabilisation facilities are the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) (established in 1974); Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) (1982) and later remained Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and Poverty Reduction and Growth facility (PRGF) introduced in 1999 in place of the ESAF specifically to help low-income countries. These programmes have been established to provide support to comprehensive structural adjustment programmes that include policies of the scope and character required to correct structural imbalances over an extended period. Normally the duration of these programmes varies from three to five years, and repayment is over four to 10 years from the date of drawing. 

Under the structural adjustment programmes, the IMF releases funds by quarterly credit tranches. The country has to observe the quarterly programme criteria at each test data. The interest rate comprises two components: the service charge and a ‘fixed margin’ (an annual interest rate). The service charge is calculated weekly, based on a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) rate (applicable to all borrowings from the IMF) and the fixed margin is applicable to loans up to 300% of the member’s IMF quota and a surcharge is applicable to loans beyond that limit. The interest rate is normally about one third of the average rate applicable to sovereign bonds issued by the typical developing country.

Unlike the other multilateral and bilateral lenders who lend to the government of the borrowing country, the IMF always lends funds to the central banks of the country. The IMF loans to the central bank are strictly for the purpose of building international reserves to meet external payments. Therefore, borrowing under IMF programmes does not have any direct impact on domestic money supply and hence on domestic inflation. 

Entering into an IMF supported programme also acts as a catalyst to generate additional international financial assistance in three ways (Bird and Rowlands 2007). First, having a macroeconomic adjustment programme with the IMF is often a prerequisite for obtaining World Bank adjustment loans. Second, as part of entering into a stabilisation programme, the IMF arranges aid consortia of donor countries to assist the given country, Most of the donor funds harnessed under these consortia are outright grants or long-term loans that carry low interest rates. Third, credibility of the reform program gained by entering into an IMF programme helps raising funds at competitive interest rates from private capital markets.

The core of an IMF stabilisation programme is a ‘letter of intent’ that contains ‘performance criteria’ (conditionality) agreed with the IMF. The performance criteria vary from case to case, but typically centre on four key variables: budget deficit, the rate at which domestic credit is created, interest rates for both depositors and borrowers, and the exchange rate. In recent decades, the IMF has begun to focus on domestic pricing policy for petroleum products, when the domestic prices are badly out of line with world prices. 

In the typical developing economy where the local capital market is weak and access to foreign credit is limited, domestic credit expansion is largely driven by the budget deficit. In IMF reform programs the major emphasis is, therefore, placed on fiscal reforms, cutting the budget deficit through both government revenue reform and rationalising government expenditure. (There is a saying that the acronym ‘IMF’ stands for ‘It’s Mostly Fiscal’!) 

A straightforward reduction of absorption (expenditure) is likely to entail a decline in total output and employment unless wages are exceptionally flexible and labour and capital is highly mobile among economic sectors. Therefore, exchange rate depreciation is recommended to make tradable goods (exports and imports competing goods) relatively more profitable compared to ‘non-tradables’ (mostly services and construction). The expansion of domestic tradable goods production relatively to non-tradable production is expected to help maintaining growth dynamism of the economy in face of policy-induced contraction in aggregate domestic absorption (Cooper 1992).

The decision to go to the IMF for assistance rests entirely with the IMF members. However, the relationship between the IMF and its developing-country members under stabilisation programmes has not always been smooth. Much of the disagreements hinge on judgements relating to conditionality attached to the lending programmes. While the principle of conditionality is not generally contested, often there are strong reservations on the part of members about the design and application of conditionality. The national officials are typically more optimistic than the IMF staff and the favourable developments they anticipate could imply less difficult action. 

On the other hand, in some cases, the national government’s discontent could also arise because, in setting conditions, the IMF staff has the tendency go beyond the basic framework. For instance, they could get into details of exactly what expenditures should be cut or what taxes should be raised to reduce the budget deficit, instead of leaving the responsibility for meeting the targets with the officials of the country concerned by taking into account country-specific political as well as economic considerations. 

Negotiating a stabilisation programme in a crisis context has the tendency to give the unwarranted impression that a country is rushing into action with a weak negotiating position vis-a-vis the IMF. The governments may resent IMF conditionality because of the loss of sovereignty implied and also because of a belief that the IMF’s objectives do not necessarily coincide with those of the national government. 

In such a context, naturally there is a tendency on the prat of the governments to make the IMF a scapegoat for (to hold the IMF responsibility for) politically unpopular decisions taken by them or for their own poor economic management. Indeed, such scapegoating often lead many to believe that the IMF forces countries to take politically disagreeable, and sometimes economically costly, action (Cooper 1992, Bird 2007).  

Sri Lanka and the IMF 

Sri Lanka (then ‘Ceylon’) became a member of the IMF (and the World Bank) on 29 August 1950. It accepted the obligation for liberalisation of the current account transaction under the IMF Article VIII in March 1994. 

Sri Lanka did not recourse to IMF financing throughout the 1950s, given the healthy external reserve position built up during the Second Word War, which was subsequently buttressed by the Korean War commodity boom (1950-51) and the tea boom (1954-55). The country obtained IMF finance for the first time in 1961, and then in 1962, within the reserve trenches. 

1964: Trotskyite Finance Minister seeking IMF support

Sri Lanka’s first attempt to borrow from the IMF under an SBA was by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) Coalition Government in 1964. By that time import restriction and capital controls had been carried out to the maximum and it was becoming increasingly difficult to introduce further restrictions without damaging the economy (Corea 1971). Because of the nationalisation of the foreign-owned gas and petroleum outlets in 1961, Sri Lanka became the first country against which the US Government invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the suspension of US aid to countries expropriating US property without compensation (Olson 1977). Following this, the international aid community virtually isolated Sri Lanka.

The pragmatic Trotskyite Finance Minister, Dr. N.M. Perera (NM) decided to approach the IMF. In September 1964, at the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank held in Tokyo, the Sri Lankan team led by NM consulted the IMF on the possibility of obtaining financial support under an SBA. The Government was defeated in the Parliament before the negotiations ended. However, according to a statement made by Dudley Senanayake (the Opposition Leader) at a parliamentary debate, the negotiation with the IMF failed well before because NM was not prepared to touch the politically-sensitive subsidy on rice (Hansard Vol 73, No. 13, 1767 c. 2898).

1965-70: Four back-to-back SBAs

During 1965-1970, the right-of-the-centre United National Party (UNP) Government obtained IMF financial support under four SBAs. The IMF conditionality of the Letters of Intent of these SBAs reflected the very nature of the mainstream development thinking at the time, which favoured import-substitution industrialisation with the Government directly playing a major role. 

Redressing the fiscal imbalance by rationalising expenditure, in particular reducing subsidies was the key focus. Reforming State-Owned Enterprises was not part of conditionality even though converting their losses had already become a big drain on the Government budget. Under the third SBA signed in May 1968, a Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate Scheme (FFECS), a dual exchange rate systems, designed to provide incentives to sleeted ‘non-traditional’ exports and to lift quantitative restrictions on selected imports at a premium above the official exchange rate (initially set at 44%). Other than this, there was no emphasis by the IMF on unshackling the economy from import restrictions and other direct Government intervention in the economy.

An important development in the policy scene during this period, which has not received only scant attention in the post-independence development history of Sri Lanka, is a failed attempt by J.R. Jayewardene (JR), the then Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister, to seek IMF support for a major liberalisation reform. At the time the economy was in the doldrums because of the closed-economy polices pursued by the country from the late 1950s. JR ‘regarded the crisis as an opportunity to embark on a radical change in economic policies that would amount to a departure from the dirigiste policies’ (de Silva and Wriggins 1998, p168). 

He approached B. R. Shenoy, the Indian liberal economist (who had taught at the Ceylon University College in the late 1940s) for advice. Shenoy responded with a comprehensive policy blueprint for unshackling the economy (Shenoy 1966). JR presented the Shenoy report to the Cabinet but there was little chance of being adopted the radical reform package given the political adjustments and realignments within the multi-party Cabinet. He had to wait until the UNP’s election victory under his leadership in 1977 to implement the proposed reforms. 

(Prof. Prema-Chandra Athukorala is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences of Australia, an Emeritus Professor of Economics at Australian National University and an Advisor for Advocata Institute and can be reached via Prema-chandra.athukorala@anu.edu.au)

Budget 2021 : A good or bad kettle?

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Then school principal of my alma mater, late Rev. Fr. Bonnie Fernandopulle used to mentor students through the use of anecdotes and examples. One of his favourite questions for students he was mentoring was: “Do you know the difference between a ‘good kettle’ and a ‘bad kettle’? They both look the same. They both sound the same. They both serve the same purpose of boiling water. But only time will tell which one is which.” He used to say: “It is not the ‘term-end exams’ nor the ‘semester-end test’ that are the difficult tests of life. The ‘test of time’ is a test that you, as students, should train yourselves to face.” I hold this advice dear and remember it up to date.

One year into a global pandemic calls for a litmus test on the effectiveness of our economic policies and the presented “Budget 2021”. This will help one evaluate where Sri Lanka stands in the “test of time’ metric. 

The Annual Report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) for 2020 provides some statistical insight for evaluation. Our economy has contracted by about 3.6%. Our debt-to-GDP ratio has increased above 101%. Government revenue has shrunk from about half a trillion rupees. Revenue as a percentage of GDP has shrunk to 9.3% from 12.6% in 2019. The present revenue-to-GDP ratio is among the lowest for countries at our level of development. This would induce us to print more money in the near future, while additionally we have printed about Rs. 650 billion. By contrast, in the year 2019, Sri Lanka printed only about Rs. 4 billion. The two lockdowns and the mounting economic woes that the island has been facing for decades have led us to where we stand now. These figures do not come as a surprise. The end of 2020 left all of us with severe concerns and reasonable estimations of the country’s sorrowful performance of the year.

The 2021 Budget presented Sri Lanka with a good opportunity to take necessary measures to curb the approaching economic downturn. Looking back at the Budget, five months later, it is somewhat evident that we could have done better in certain policy areas.

This column previously highlighted two main loopholes in the 2021 Budget. One was the inadequate allocation of resources and the lack of a solid plan for healthcare services to combat Covid-19. The second was a credible action plan on debt servicing challenges for Sri Lanka. It was evident that without combating Covid-19, mitigating the impact on the economy will be difficult. Some sentiments expressed by members in Parliament questioned the need for the resources for vaccines which were produced by some other countries and highlighted the need for making Sri Lankans guinea pigs for vaccines by multinational pharma corporations. It was personally alarming for me to watch business leaders speaking at budget discussion forums with excessive emphasis on their respective businesses with no regard extended to the larger economic adversity at hand.

As a result of these poor policies and mitigating strategies, we are now in the midst of a raging third wave of the virus. This continues to affect the economy, proposed budget promises, and businesses adversely. Simultaneously, the global demand for vaccines has skyrocketed. Therefore, it is evident that Sri Lanka will have to wait for some time to receive the required amount of vaccines.

The 2021 Budget did not successfully address Sri Lanka’s problem of debt servicing. The only thing concealing the severity of this issue is the burden placed on the country’s healthcare sector at the moment. 

Moreover, Sri Lanka faced international pressure in terms of human rights violations coupled with geopolitical tensions which brings its own economic constraints and impact. As stated by the Central Bank Annual Report 2020, the destinations of more than 60% of our exports are the US, India, Japan, Australia, and the European Union (EU). All these nations have expressed concerns over Sri Lanka’s reconciliation efforts. 

Unlike the first-time shocker of the Covid-19 pandemic, after one year, some countries have made progress even with gigantic challenges. So from the perspective of investor sentiment and businesses, over time, the innovators and early adaptors, who are good to do business in the region and globally, are getting noticed. The attention and priority we received in the initial Covid-19 wave from investors, businesses, local donors, international donor agencies, and the rest of the world may not return during this new wave. Especially if our  policy decisions lack foresight and common sense. The current story published on PublicFinance.lk is that only 6% has been spent from the Yuthukama fund which was set up for Covid management and the availability of Rs. 1.7 billion remaining as the balance is just one example. The fund was supported by many Sri Lankans, and now, local and international companies may doubt the seriousness of our efforts.

We are between two hard choices which will have equally bad negative consequences. Minimising the mobility of people impacts our economic activity but increasing the mobility affects the Covid-19 spread which hits back again on the economy and people’s livelihoods. We need vaccines to control the spread of the virus but we should be able to get the vaccines first, while also balancing our foreign exchange. Economic policy formulation and execution is a team sport. It is not only the right policy but also the execution that matters. Even if we have a good execution team, if we are implementing the wrong policy prescription, the results won’t stand the test of the time. Unfortunately, five months after the Budget 2021 none of our policies nor our policy execution was able to stand the test of time. It is not only the Budget for 2021; the previous budgets and our economic policy over the years have failed to make a positive impact. We should pause for a moment and think about which sort of kettle we are. Are we a good one or a bad one? We should ask ourselves: “Have we been able to stand the ‘test of time’ with the economic policy we have been practicing?”

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.