Sri Lanka’s next leader faces a web of crises

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

In two weeks, a newly-elected president and government will take charge of steering the country.

At the beginning of the forex crisis, we warned that an economic crisis often comes as a package of five interconnected crises.

Balance of payments crisis

A balance of payments crisis occurs when excessive borrowing from the central bank (money printing) leads to inflation. In countries like Sri Lanka, where the local currency is not a reserve currency and the economy relies heavily on imports, printing too much money increases the demand for goods and services – many of which are imported.

If exports, remittances, and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) fail to keep up with this increased demand for imports, we run out of foreign exchange reserves, causing the currency to depreciate.

Debt crisis

When foreign currency reserves are depleted, the country struggles to meet its obligations to creditors. While borrowing from international markets might offer temporary relief, credit rating downgrades make this option limited, triggering a debt crisis. On 12 April 2022, Sri Lanka officially declared it could no longer service its debts, despite having the intention to do so.

Banking crisis

If local banks have provided significant loans to the government and the government defaults, a banking crisis can unfold. Sri Lanka narrowly avoided this scenario.

Humanitarian crisis

With debt defaults and depleted foreign reserves, imports become limited. Inflation makes basic necessities unaffordable for the poorest segments of society. In Sri Lanka, poverty numbers surged from three million to seven million, pushing more than 30% of the population below the poverty line.

Political crisis

When a government faces multiple crises such as these, political instability inevitably follows, as we have seen in Sri Lanka. The President was ousted, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister resigned, and an interim Government was formed.

Although the political crisis continues, it is only one phase in an ongoing cycle of instability, with the Presidential Election being a milestone in this process.

Current political landscape

The incumbent President has introduced significant relief measures, including raising public sector salaries, forgiving agricultural loans, and making other promises. However, if re-elected, he will struggle to deliver on these promises within the limited fiscal space, potentially leading to a deviation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme.

Alternatively, he might be forced to raise taxes or borrow more, which would increase interest rates and add to the economic strain.

If another candidate is elected, they will face the same fiscal limitations and may have to reverse salary increases to maintain fiscal discipline.

In the case of a Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) government, the challenges are compounded. The Economic Council within the SJB sends mixed signals about achieving revenue targets to support proposed expenditures. Additionally, the broad alliance of political factions under the SJB presents internal challenges, especially concerning sensitive reforms like State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) restructuring and maintaining Central Bank independence.

Not all factions have aligned views based on previous voting records and public statements. Managing these internal differences will be critical for an SJB government, especially in the context of carrying forward the relief measures introduced by the current President.

Similarly, in a National People’s Power (NPP) government, the same challenges apply. The NPP, primarily led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), advocates for a more State-led development approach, but many professionals in the party’s outer circle lean toward market-driven policies. This could lead to internal conflict, making reforms difficult to implement without alienating part of the party.

This situation resembles the ‘Yahapalana’ Government, where the President and Prime Minister held differing ideologies. As a result, governance became more about managing stakeholders than effective government operation.

If you recall, the Prime Minister made economic decisions through the Cabinet Committee on Economic Management (CCEM), which was later replaced by the National Economic Council appointed by then President Maithripala Sirisena. Stakeholder management within an NPP government could prove just as challenging.

On top of these internal struggles, Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections are expected to follow, adding even more political promises that will further constrain the fiscal space. Reforms tend to slow down during election periods, making debt restructuring more difficult and putting the IMF programme and long-term debt sustainability at risk.

While we may see temporary relief from one or more of these crises, the interconnected nature of these issues means that one crisis could easily trigger the others. The risk factors remain extremely high, underscoring how difficult and sensitive sovereign debt restructuring and recovery can be. There is always a risk of setbacks before we see real progress.

The path forward

Whoever takes office, the best-case scenario involves continuing with reforms aimed at growing the economy, with all political parties supporting these efforts with transparency and accountability.

Stakeholder management will be crucial, but there is no other way to avoid the complete package of five crises. Economic growth, fiscal discipline, and political unity are essential if Sri Lanka is to emerge from this difficult period.

Underneath the underwear patriotism

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

• Can Sri Lanka become self-sufficient in undergarments?

My father had a very hard time with me when he accompanied me for haircuts when I was a kid. I’d ask him “Who cuts the hair of the barber?”. He’d say “It has to be another barber!”. Then I’d argue back saying “If the barber can give haircuts to everybody, why can’t he cut his own hair?”. Then my argument continued. Do the doctors go to doctors when they are sick or do they check themselves by their own stethoscope and decide their own medication? The same goes for surgeons. When a surgeon has to go through surgery can they do it on their own or do they have to go for another surgeon? When I look back, though I am not very proud of my arguments as a kid, the recent comments on the economics of undergarments on “Why Sri Lanka cannot produce all undergarments we require locally?” took me back to my childhood. 

A big social media discussion driven by political rhetoric, with little to no understanding of basic economics, was popular last week. Some argued that Sri Lankans will not have enough undergarments with the new direction by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) for licensed commercial banks (LCBs). The direction was to deposit 100% of the invoice value to open a letter of credit and halting credit facilities for LC’s for 623 HS codes including men and women undergarments. 

The opposite argument was there are enough local undergarment brands in Sri Lanka and anyone can buy it from Pamunuwa. There were some arguments going to the extent that “Sathosa” can provide undergarments in case of any shortages. Many argued that if Sri Lanka can export and stitch for world-class brands such as Victoria’s Secret, VS PINK, GAP Body, and Calvin Klein, how come we can’t produce to meet local demand? 

The argument went to the extent of some proponents mentioning that we have to ban everything we can produce in Sri Lanka to solve our foreign exchange crisis. 

First, let’s understand the reason behind the circular direction by the CBSL. A cluster of 623 HS codes are now required to deposit 100% of the value upfront. Additionally LCBs are not permitted to provide credit facilities, to open LC’s for the purposes of importing the mentioned 623 HS code line items. So simply it is not a tariff barrier, but the real objective is to discourage imports, in order to minimise the demand for foreign exchange used for imports, given the forex shortage we have presently. When the supply is suppressed, in this case on undergarments which is an essential product category the prices will automatically go up. That higher prices may impact consumer behaviour. 

Secondly, the question is why can’t we produce undergarments for Sri Lankans if we produce for Victoria’s Secret? Obviously, we can produce but economically or business-wise it doesn’t make any sense for the producer to produce a low-value, low-priced product for a 22 million market. Especially when the existing competency is at producing a world-class high-value, high-priced product for a market of a few billion people. In terms of margin as well as volume, the obvious pick is to produce for a bigger market. If we ask our manufacturers to produce for the local market as well, most likely they will have to shut down most of their factories, and obviously, Sri Lanka’s export numbers will drop drastically. When the capacity is there to produce high-value goods with significant value additions, why should a business consider producing a low-value product for a smaller volume. So pondering whether we can produce undergarments to our own markets by restricting imports, is the same as my childhood argument of asking the surgeon to get his own surgery done. So producing undergarments for the local market just because we produce for Victoria’s Secrets doesn’t have any rationale. On the other hand, if the current garment manufacturing plants are pushed to produce for the local market, the resources such as labour, land and capital have to be taken from the same resource pool. This can make exports expensive and make Sri Lankan exports uncompetitive. 

At the same time, export garments are stitched under branding regulations and contractual standards with strict customer audits where even a rejected garment is not allowed to be released to the local market. The companies have signed intellectual property agreements on individual designs and premium quality raw material is imported from Hong Kong, China and different parts of the world to make the product of superior quality. 

The same argument is there for tea. Often people complain that though Sri Lanka produces Ceylon tea, the tea available at the retail market is not as good as export quality. Obviously, just like the high value branded undergarments, there are high quality teas in Sri Lanka which many can’t afford given our purchasing power. As a result we have to settle for something affordable and the market is offering a product which is affordable for an average Sri Lankan consumer. Obviously a country of nearly a per capita $ 4000 income cannot afford to drink expensive silver tea three times a day. It is same for undergarments that markets offer a range of products where anyone can pick based on their affordability and personal preference. Those who could afford Victoria’s Secret and Tommy Hilfiger can go for it and those who can’t have the freedom to select from a range of undergarment brands and even unbranded categories based on their affordability. What is important is to make sure the choice is available so people can pick what fits them the best. 

Especially in a category like undergarments, it is the last thing that people will check – whether it is imported or locally manufactured. Perfect fit for the body, hygiene factors, sanitation factors, comfortability, affordability and even emotional attachment for the brand are very prominent in the product category at point of purchase. So it is essential that Sri Lankans have the freedom of choice to select what undergarments they feel comfortable with. Some people obviously may have a preference for local brands based on their criterion of selection. 

At the same time it doesn’t mean that local players shouldn’t produce garments for the local market. In a level playing field some businesses can produce for the local market and importing also needs to be allowed for their production as well. 

With the deepening of the US dollar shortage there are economic misperceptions built around imports. Banning imports is deemed to be the only way to develop local industries. Obviously we all know by hating something; we cannot achieve anything and the only way to achieve it is by competing. It is understandable that we face a foreign exchange shortage but obviously trying to produce undergarments for the local market by cutting imports will worsen the situation rather than solving it. 

Thinking that we should produce all undergarments we require locally as we produce for Victoria’s Secret is the same as my childhood thought that the barber should get his own haircut done and the surgeon should do his own surgery.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Closing the gate once the horse has bolted

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Can price controls rein in uncontrolled depreciation?

People are infuriated over the recent drastic price hikes on essential food items, and analysts and policymakers are attempting to make sense of what triggered this.

Some argue that the increasing global commodity prices are indeed the root cause of these local price hikes. In my opinion, however, global price hikes cannot be the sole reason. This conclusion is misleading as the domestic prices of these food items are higher than the percentage increase of global commodity prices adjusted for the depreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee (SLR).

Steep depreciation of the currency

It is no secret that the Government sought refuge in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) in recent times. This has had a considerable impact on commodity prices due to the depreciation of the rupee. A depreciating rupee coupled with increasing commodity prices is certainly an ill-fated combination. Even though many economists alerted the Government of the risks MMT could pose, they fell on deaf ears.

When global market prices rise, it is inevitable that domestic markets adjust accordingly due to price signals. This means that people shift their consumption behaviours and patterns with price volatility. However, Sri Lanka’s essential commodity price hikes came suddenly and have given people no time to adjust their purchasing patterns.

As per Central Bank data, Sri Lanka’s food inflation is increasing. Advocata Institute’s Bath Curry Indicator, which tracks the weekly expenditure of a four-member household on rice and curry, found that prices increased by 45% on a YoY (Year-on-Year) basis in July and by 30% in August.

I’d like to conclude my argument by quoting Nobel Laureate Prof. Milton Friedman: “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”

Acute foreign exchange crisis exacerbated by MMT

The acute foreign exchange crisis we are in, too, is a major contributor to recent price hikes. Oversupply of money has drained our reserves and added additional pressure on the currency. For example, when the government provides Rs. 20,000 (which is beyond the government’s capacity) for low-income families, money will flow out of the system due to the purchase of imported goods. People will be inclined towards buying imported LP gas, lentils, sprats, and tin fish.

Further, maintaining a negative real interest rate, which is to keep interest rates artificially low by increasing money supply below the inflation rate, will motivate people to spend more money than to save. More spending equals more expenditure on imports, which will then exacerbate the country’s Balance of Payment (BOP) crisis.

Currently, banks have different exchange rates for different customers. The kerb market’s exchange rate for the US dollar is between Rs. 250 and Rs. 260.

If this trend continues, the country’s fuel prices, LP gas, milk powder, and many other commodity prices will continue to rise.

Price controls

The Government has announced strict price controls and has appointed a designated officer to curb hoarding by traders with the objective of decreasing essential commodity prices. Recent news reports claim that hoarded essential food items such as sugar have been confiscated from stores by the authorities.

However, price controls are proven to be ineffective and will lead to goods disappearing from markets, as a result creating black markets. Further, it is likely that price controls will result in importers stopping the importation of goods. The first lockdown saw an initial price control of Rs. 65 on lentils and a controlled price of Rs. 100 on tin fish. Later, the Government had to withdraw the price controls as it resulted in severe shortages, with traders halting imports and the sellers hesitating to trade at a loss. Price controls simply don’t work because the price structure is unique for each trader.

Competition is the only factor that drives prices down. For example, the cost structure of a trader who sells lentils in an air-conditioned shop and a trader who sells at the Sunday market is different. The price they mark is based on the cost, and consumers buy it based on the value they get. Price controls hamper the signalling mechanism, resulting in severe repercussions.

Why do traders hoard?

Even with increased raids by the Consumer Affairs Authority (CAA), traders continue to hoard. This behaviour is intricately linked with the foreign exchange crisis the country is in. The Central Bank introduced regulations stating that traders cannot buy US dollars for a future day (forward market) at the current exchange rate. Further, importers were requested to open Letters of Credit (LCs) for a 180-day credit period. As a result, importers brought essential commodities in agreement to pay the exchange rate to be in effect after 180 days. They brought the goods they already sold at a calculated exchange rate.

However, now the exchange rates are depreciating further. For example, when traders imported the consignments, our exchange rate was about Rs. 190. But with the currency depreciation, now they have to pay the current exchange rate as there is no forward market or interbank market in operation. This is pushing importers to hoard to secure stocks for the future. Importers will also be inclined to increase prices to cover their losses incurred due to exchange rate volatility.

All of these trickle down to the average consumer as higher prices on essential commodities. Higher prices, long queues for essential goods, and empty shelves are symptoms of wrong macroeconomic policies.

This column and many economists alerted the Government that it would come to this, and I am disappointed that the Government did not heed our advice.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.