Sri Lanka’s next leader faces a web of crises

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

In two weeks, a newly-elected president and government will take charge of steering the country.

At the beginning of the forex crisis, we warned that an economic crisis often comes as a package of five interconnected crises.

Balance of payments crisis

A balance of payments crisis occurs when excessive borrowing from the central bank (money printing) leads to inflation. In countries like Sri Lanka, where the local currency is not a reserve currency and the economy relies heavily on imports, printing too much money increases the demand for goods and services – many of which are imported.

If exports, remittances, and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) fail to keep up with this increased demand for imports, we run out of foreign exchange reserves, causing the currency to depreciate.

Debt crisis

When foreign currency reserves are depleted, the country struggles to meet its obligations to creditors. While borrowing from international markets might offer temporary relief, credit rating downgrades make this option limited, triggering a debt crisis. On 12 April 2022, Sri Lanka officially declared it could no longer service its debts, despite having the intention to do so.

Banking crisis

If local banks have provided significant loans to the government and the government defaults, a banking crisis can unfold. Sri Lanka narrowly avoided this scenario.

Humanitarian crisis

With debt defaults and depleted foreign reserves, imports become limited. Inflation makes basic necessities unaffordable for the poorest segments of society. In Sri Lanka, poverty numbers surged from three million to seven million, pushing more than 30% of the population below the poverty line.

Political crisis

When a government faces multiple crises such as these, political instability inevitably follows, as we have seen in Sri Lanka. The President was ousted, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister resigned, and an interim Government was formed.

Although the political crisis continues, it is only one phase in an ongoing cycle of instability, with the Presidential Election being a milestone in this process.

Current political landscape

The incumbent President has introduced significant relief measures, including raising public sector salaries, forgiving agricultural loans, and making other promises. However, if re-elected, he will struggle to deliver on these promises within the limited fiscal space, potentially leading to a deviation from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme.

Alternatively, he might be forced to raise taxes or borrow more, which would increase interest rates and add to the economic strain.

If another candidate is elected, they will face the same fiscal limitations and may have to reverse salary increases to maintain fiscal discipline.

In the case of a Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) government, the challenges are compounded. The Economic Council within the SJB sends mixed signals about achieving revenue targets to support proposed expenditures. Additionally, the broad alliance of political factions under the SJB presents internal challenges, especially concerning sensitive reforms like State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) restructuring and maintaining Central Bank independence.

Not all factions have aligned views based on previous voting records and public statements. Managing these internal differences will be critical for an SJB government, especially in the context of carrying forward the relief measures introduced by the current President.

Similarly, in a National People’s Power (NPP) government, the same challenges apply. The NPP, primarily led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), advocates for a more State-led development approach, but many professionals in the party’s outer circle lean toward market-driven policies. This could lead to internal conflict, making reforms difficult to implement without alienating part of the party.

This situation resembles the ‘Yahapalana’ Government, where the President and Prime Minister held differing ideologies. As a result, governance became more about managing stakeholders than effective government operation.

If you recall, the Prime Minister made economic decisions through the Cabinet Committee on Economic Management (CCEM), which was later replaced by the National Economic Council appointed by then President Maithripala Sirisena. Stakeholder management within an NPP government could prove just as challenging.

On top of these internal struggles, Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections are expected to follow, adding even more political promises that will further constrain the fiscal space. Reforms tend to slow down during election periods, making debt restructuring more difficult and putting the IMF programme and long-term debt sustainability at risk.

While we may see temporary relief from one or more of these crises, the interconnected nature of these issues means that one crisis could easily trigger the others. The risk factors remain extremely high, underscoring how difficult and sensitive sovereign debt restructuring and recovery can be. There is always a risk of setbacks before we see real progress.

The path forward

Whoever takes office, the best-case scenario involves continuing with reforms aimed at growing the economy, with all political parties supporting these efforts with transparency and accountability.

Stakeholder management will be crucial, but there is no other way to avoid the complete package of five crises. Economic growth, fiscal discipline, and political unity are essential if Sri Lanka is to emerge from this difficult period.

The thin line between gaining power and triggering crises

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

The game has begun. The familiar auctioning of non-existent resources during election season is in full swing. Candidates are making various promises without considering the repercussions they will face whether they win or lose.

Candidates are likely contemplating two things: first, promise now, gain power, then deal with the aftermath of those promises. Secondly, if they know they’re not going to win, they might promise the impossible, thinking they won’t have to deal with the consequences. Neither of these approaches is without significant risks and either can lead to disastrous consequences.

Elections and governing a country go beyond mere promises and their execution; it’s about managing people’s expectations with available resources.

After the economic crisis, all indicators suggest we are slowly recovering, thanks to stringent measures. Interest rates have soared to record highs to curb inflation. Urban poverty has tripled, rural poverty has doubled, and the already impoverished estate sector has seen a 1.5-fold increase in poverty.

Apart from our parliamentarians, all citizens have compromised their wealth and earnings. The public has reluctantly understood that tough sacrifices are necessary.

Impossible promises

The promises being made now are simply impossible to deliver. One such promise is a 25-50% salary increase for Government employees. Even the last Budget’s cost of living allowance increment is yet to be fully implemented. According to the 2023 Budget, Government salaries and wages total approximately Rs. 939 billion. Therefore, a 25-50% increase would require an additional Rs. 230-460 billion next year.

Our annual revenue from Advance Personal Income Tax (APIT) is at most Rs. 160 billion. This means that the proposed salary hike would require almost 1.5 to three times APIT. Is the private sector ready to shoulder an additional 150-300% in tax or revenue hikes for these Government salary increases?

Just in July, the Government rejected a proposed Rs. 20,000 salary hike for State workers, stating that it would need an additional Rs. 275 billion, which would require increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT) by 4% to proceed.

Making matters worse, there are suggestions to amend VAT and many other tax rates by different candidates to align with their earlier pitches.

The danger of these promises is that whoever becomes the candidate who comes into power will need to fulfil all these promises, even those made by their competitors, which are unattainable.

The losing candidate, who will then be in the opposition, will always pressure the government to fulfil these unsustainable promises, raising public expectations for things that cannot be delivered. When expectations are unmet, it typically results in a political crisis, or if they try to fulfil what was promised and it is not economically viable, we will end up in an economic crisis.

That is why elections are not just about gaining power but also about managing people’s expectations.

Making promises responsibly

A salary hike for senior Government officials is necessary, but it is only feasible through a complete restructuring of the Government cadre and our military.

Currently, about 48% of our salary expenditure is for the defence sector, with about 32% going to the military. Restructuring the military is complicated and sensitive. A salary hike without restructuring will disincentivise staff who are expecting to leave, adding a massive burden on Government pensions and leading to a pension crisis.

With the new Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) Act, the Treasury cannot borrow money from the CBSL or print money. Therefore, if the Government borrows more from the market, interest rates will rise and the overall cost of capital will skyrocket.

The proposals to revise VAT are no different. VAT is a reasonable tax system because it only charges for the value added, unlike other indirect taxes like the Social Security Contribution Levy (SSCL), which has a cascading effect. VAT is easier to collect and it creates minimal distortions. Additionally, high-income earners contribute a higher amount of VAT as their consumption is greater.

The discussion about renegotiating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement needs to be approached with caution. In every IMF review, it is clear that adjustments or shifts in timelines are made based on our performance.

However, trying to renegotiate the entire IMF agreement and its structural benchmarks could invite unnecessary complications. Not only Sri Lanka, but our bilateral partners including China, Japan, and India; multilaterals such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); and our bondholders have all based their calculations on the existing IMF agreement.

It took over a year to negotiate our current terms. Another renegotiation would be time-consuming, and by the time we reach a settlement, the accumulated interest would be unbearable and market confidence would likely falter.

The damage our candidates are collectively doing is by making promises that cannot be delivered during this crucial time, and people’s expectations are a combination of all these. Whoever wins may have to deliver most of these pledges, which is not feasible. If the winner cannot deliver, a political crisis is certain, or if the winner tries to implement what was promised, another economic and social crisis is assured.

While people must vote carefully, candidates must make their promises responsibly; otherwise, they will start losing power from the very first day they receive it.

The State’s business is no business at all

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

We can’t judge a book by its cover, but in the Sri Lankan Presidential Election, we can certainly gauge many people’s futures based on what is said about State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reforms.

The simple truth is that we can only progress with SOE reforms. These reforms are rare and even mentioning them on a political stage requires courage. However, the fact remains that there is no future without SOE reforms.

Given the resistance by political leaders, this column is another attempt to reiterate why the State should not engage in business and how State involvement in business impacts all citizens.

Why should the State not do business?

The role of the State is not to do business but to ensure the rule of law. As the saying goes, “When you do something, you are not doing something else.” When the State engages in business, it neglects its primary duty – upholding the rule of law, which is its core mandate.

Another reason the State should not do business is that it has a unique way of participating in every business as a mandatory shareholder through the tax system. Every corporation is required to pay 30% of its profit to the State, which is essentially the Government’s share.

Additionally, businesses must pay an 18% tax based on their income. This means that the Government collects more than 50% of the profit value without doing anything. Since the Government is already collecting money from all businesses, there is no need for it to engage in business directly.

Why sell profit-making SOEs?

A common argument against privatisation is, ‘why sell profit-making SOEs?” The answer is that the State has no role in business, and even if these enterprises are making a profit, those profits must be evaluated against the value of the assets.

For instance, the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation has an asset base of about Rs. 500 million, but its annual profit is only around Rs. 14 million. This translates to roughly Rs. 1 million per month. Does it make sense to run a business that generates just Rs. 1 million in profit after tying up resources worth Rs. 500 million?

If we had Rs. 500 million, even the safest investment, such as a fixed deposit at a 6% interest rate, would yield about Rs. 30 million per year, which is more than double the profit of the Cashew Corporation. Just because an enterprise is making a profit doesn’t justify the State continuing to run it if we can’t maximise the return on those assets.

What about the SOEs of Vietnam and South Korea?

Like Sri Lanka, both South Korea and Vietnam had significant SOEs in the 1960s due to limited private capital. As private capital slowly developed, both countries began reforming their SOEs. These reforms included privatisations and gradual government withdrawal through corporatisation.

In Vietnam, there were about 5,600 SOEs in 2001, which was reduced to 3,200 by 2010 through various reform packages under the Doi Moi reforms. By 2016, the number of SOEs had further decreased to 2,600, thanks to reforms including Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and corporatisation.

Vietcombank, which was a 100% State-owned bank, was listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange as part of a pilot project in 1990. The State’s ownership was reduced by 75%, with 15% of the shares sold to Japan’s Mizuho Bank. Similarly, Petrolimex, a petroleum company in Vietnam, sold 9% of its shares to JX Nippon Oil & Energy on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange.

In South Korea, Korea Telecom (KT) was fully privatised by listing it on the Korean Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, and London Stock Exchange. The Korea Electric Power Corporation was also opened to private investors by listing on the Korean Stock Exchange in 1989 and the New York Stock Exchange in 1999. Other companies, like Pohang Iron and Steel Company, Korea Exchange Bank, and Korea Tobacco & Ginseng Corporation, also underwent reforms to allow private sector participation.

Vietnam attracted Nokia as a key investor for economic growth, while South Korea grew with Samsung and other electronics companies. If Sri Lanka wants to progress, we need to bring in world-class operators that can run these enterprises efficiently, rather than have the Government manage them.

Benefits of SOE reforms

SOE reforms offer a package of four solutions to our problems.

First, they boost Government revenue, as efficiently-run companies will generate higher profits, allowing the Government to increase its revenue.

Second, SOEs have significantly contributed to our sovereign debt, and reforming them can help reduce the national debt.

Third, Sri Lanka requires Foreign Direct Investment, and SOE reforms can serve as a channel to attract such investments.

Fourth, SOE reforms can help cut down Government expenditure, as these enterprises currently contribute to massive Government losses.

SOE reforms require political will because incorporating them into a manifesto is unlikely to attract votes; in fact, it may deter traditional voters. However, the moment of truth will come, and ultimately, we all have to face it – it’s just a matter of time.

Why public transport should be the real campaign promise

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

All political parties want to make promises during the election to attract their voter base.

Some politicians in the Opposition provide material benefits such as roofing sheets, sarees, and mobile phones. Additionally, the ruling party often announces salary hikes for Government servants, special interest rates for retirees, fuel cost reductions, and fertiliser subsidies, expecting to provide relief for voters and secure their votes in return.

The biggest benefit voters can receive from politicians and their manifestos is the improvement of the public transport system. A solid mechanism to improve public transport is more beneficial compared to all other promises combined.

However, the way most politicians are opting to provide relief for the problem of commuting is by removing the vehicle import ban. Removing the ban is necessary because our vehicle stock has not been renewed for the last 4-5 years. However, vehicle imports will not solve the problem of public transportation. Not many politicians or parties understand that our economy and many of the other struggles related to the cost of living are connected to the problem of commuting.

Given the poor status of our public transport system, every middle-class family living in suburban areas within a 20-30 km radius of Colombo wants to travel in their own vehicle. To own a personal vehicle, a middle-income family pays about 150-200% in tariffs on imported vehicles. Simply put, this means that middle-class people pay twice the value of a car, often with a vehicle loan taken at about 12-14% interest.

The solution many middle-class families choose to solve their commuting problem comes at a significant cost to their living expenses and lifestyle. As a result, they end up spending two to three times the value of a vehicle at high-interest rates, cutting down on other potential expenditure, such as higher education or investing in a business.

When the middle class cuts down on spending, many other industries that could have benefited from middle-class expenditure are negatively impacted.

Moreover, as middle-class citizens purchase personal vehicles to solve their commuting problems, the roads become overcrowded. Our average speed during peak hours is dropping below 20 km/h. By spending a fortune on a car at a very high-interest rate, we spend valuable time on the road.

During peak hours, residents from the stretch of Moratuwa, Wattala, Pelawatta, Battaramulla, Maharagama, Kottawa, and Homagama take at least one hour to enter Colombo and another hour to return home. Spending two hours a day commuting means that if a person works for 22 days per month for 12 months, they spend about 22 full days (24-hour days) on the road. This translates to spending at least one month out of 12 on daily commuting. We are spending a month in the most expensive and uncomfortable way possible.

Politicians need to understand the need for a solid public transport system, which will not only provide relief for people but also improve our productivity manifold and boost economic growth and investments.

How can we fix it?

Many political parties make only broad statements, but none specify how to solve the problem. An often-tried solution is buying extra buses from India for the Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB) or purchasing new train engines or compartments from India. Despite trying this approach for over two decades, the situation remains the same.

Recent data reveals that after Covid-19, the number of bus routes has declined. One notable bus route that disappeared in Colombo was route number 155, which operated from Mount Lavinia to Mattakkuliya.

While the problem is complicated, the first step to solving it is to encourage people to commute to the city using public transport rather than personal vehicles. Therefore, we need to prioritise high-passenger capacity vehicles in traffic lanes. The priority lane system for buses was a step in the right direction, but the condition of the buses remains very poor. Bus owners are already complaining that high costs and a lack of labour are causing them to leave the industry.

The framework for the solution is to provide a public transport option that is less expensive than travelling by personal vehicle and allows for faster commuting with the same level of comfort as a personal vehicle. In terms of buses, the option is to allow more air-conditioned buses and permit them to charge a higher price.

However, the route permit system must be abolished or replaced with a new mechanism where supply and demand can be matched. With the current route permit system, even if there are many passengers on a particular route, no new buses can be introduced. With controlled pricing, service providers have no incentive to improve their services. Therefore, allowing players to enter with different price points is the first requirement.

Secondly, we can consider high-level options such as a Light Rail Transit (LRT) system, where we can tap into bilateral and multilateral funds.

In terms of trains, private investment must also be allowed. For instance, railway stations across the island are generally located at points where real estate values are the highest. With amendments to the Railways Authority Act, private investments can be tapped to generate alternative revenue models for these stations. Additionally, railway tracks, compartments, and operations can be unbundled, allowing different players to enter each segment rather than running it as a State-run, loss-making monopoly.

Solutions for public transport do not lie solely in Government investments. They lie in making regulatory changes that can unleash the potential of capital, allowing players to enter the market according to demand, and making regulatory changes that offer the public more choices.

Let’s hope that the manifestos of political parties will address the above issues in the upcoming Presidential and General Elections.

Economics 101: A lesson for presidential candidates

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

The story of how Singapore wanted to emulate Sri Lanka and how Sri Lanka later aspired to be like Singapore is widely known. This narrative has been discussed at many forums and political rallies.

Less known, however, is that Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the architect of Singapore’s financial system, advised the Sri Lankan Government and the then President in the 1980s. He clearly outlined what needed to be done and what should be monitored in our economy. Unfortunately, we did not heed Dr. Goh’s advice. He was then the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore.

What Dr. Goh recommended remains relevant for whoever is elected as the new president on 22 September. His focus was mainly on the financial architecture of the country because he knew that without stability in the financial system, other achievements would be impossible. As it is famously said, ‘Stability is not everything, but without stability, everything is nothing.’

Dr. Goh’s first advice to the President was to monitor the Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s (CBSL) Government securities holdings, which essentially means the money printed by the CBSL. He noted that should the Government continue to print more money beyond the rate of economic growth, it would be a sign of significant trouble and unsustainability.

Evaluating Sri Lanka’s data since 2020, this issue is evident. The Government’s total securities holdings, which were about Rs. 400 billion in June 2020, rose to about Rs. 1,500 billion in September 2021 and exploded to almost Rs. 3,000 billion by June 2022.

Dr. Goh explained that excessive money printing indicated three things: first, the government is spending more than it can afford. Second, it cannot afford to borrow and spend because borrowing from the market will raise interest rates. Thus, excessive printing means spending beyond our borrowing capacity at market interest rates. Third, it points to leakages in revenue.

Essentially, a government that prints too much money fails in all three areas. Therefore, the new president must avoid money printing at all costs. Although the new CBSL Act imposes limitations, the bank can still add excessive money when buying US Dollar reserves while collecting reserves for upcoming debt repayments.

The second metric Dr. Goh advised monitoring was the CBSL’s reserve levels; how the bank accumulates or depletes reserves signals financial stability.

The third indicator to monitor was the exchange rate, which should be observed alongside reserves and money printing. If reserves are depleting while the exchange rate remains stable, it means the currency is being defended at the expense of reserves. Conversely, if the exchange rate depreciates without reserve depletion, it might indicate influencing forex demand by printing more money.

Dr. Goh’s last two parameters were the consumer price index and the cost of construction materials. Printing too much money leads to inflation, raising consumer prices. If the cost of construction materials is high, it indicates slow development. Economic growth involves building and investing, mainly in the construction sector.

It is unfortunate that the Cabinet recently approved an increase in the cess on cement clinker, which will raise cement prices and open room for corruption. Higher cement prices slow down the economy. When construction costs rise, people cut back on other expenditures, shrinking the overall economic cycle and slowing the economy when growth is most needed.

Dr. Goh’s advice to then President J.R. Jayewardene remains valid for the new president, whoever that may be. The real victory lies not just in electing a president through a massive political campaign, but campaigning for an economic programme that can rescue us from the ongoing crisis.

Tilt toward China is at stake in Sri Lanka's presidential election

Originally appeared in Nikkei Asian Review

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

Candidates' foreign policy platforms have sharply different economic consequences

Sri Lanka votes Saturday to elect a new president, yet the family names of the leading candidates are familiar. The top contenders are Gotabaya Rajapaksa, whose brother held the presidency from 2005 to 2015, and Sajith Premadasa, whose father led the country from 1989 to 1993.

In terms of foreign policy, the two candidates crudely represent a choice between the continuity of current policies under Maithripala Sirisena, who repaired strained relations with India and the West, and a return to a more China-centric policy.

Rajapaksa heralds the return to China. A former soldier who served as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence during his brother's regime, he oversaw the military strategy that resulted in the annihilation of the leadership of the Tamil Tigers and the ending of the long-running civil war in 2009.

His brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had got into office on the back of hostility to the West, which had underwritten a putative peace process in 2002. As a part of the peace settlement, in 2003 the U.S., EU, Japan and Norway pledged $4.5 billion in reconstruction aid, but emphasized that assistance was linked to progress in the peace process, which involved concessions to the Tamil Tigers.

In the election of 2005 Rajapaksa capitalized on public disquiet over violations of the current cease-fire and heavy foreign involvement to portray the peace deal as a sellout to the Tamil Tigers and the West. When the fighting resumed the next year, it was particularly brutal, earning the condemnation of Western nations.

Rajapaksa's foreign policy, which already viewed the West negatively, gravitated further toward countries which were less critical. Leaders such as Russia's Vladimir Putin who stood up to the West were seen as models, and China, carrying a large checkbook, was viewed as particularly useful.

Following the end of the conflict in 2009, Chinese companies became involved in infrastructure development, building ports, airports, power plants and much else. Relations with India soured over extensive Chinese involvement in what it regards as its own backyard. This is the legacy Gotabaya Rajapaksa bears.

The shock defeat of the Rajapaksa regime in 2015 by Sirisena saw a change in foreign policy. The victory was hailed as triumph of democracy and welcomed by the West and India. Relations with the West and India improved and China was effectively sidelined.

Large China-backed projects were put on hold and the government threatened to renege on Chinese contracts. Economic pressures have meant that some of these projects have now resumed but the attitude to China remains lukewarm. China itself is generally thought to view the current regime as unfriendly and welcomed an abortive constitutional coup in October 2018 that temporarily installed Mahinda Rajapaksa as prime minister.

Thanks to term and age limits placed by the new government, neither Mahinda Rajapaksa nor his son is qualified to run for president, so Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had to give up his U.S. citizenship in order to run for office, is seen as proxy.

Mahinda Rajapaksa is likely to contest the parliamentary election due next year with a view to obtaining the now powerful office of prime minister, thus he would be influential in shaping policy in his brother's government.

In any case, both are believed to share a similar worldview. A change in regime now would lead to a foreign policy realignment more favorable to China, although for economic rather than political reasons.

Battered by war, Sri Lanka faces periodic balance of payments crises and in 2016 received a $1.5 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund -- the fourth bailout since 2001. Election giveaways mean the current IMF program is unlikely to be completed.

A pivot to China does not necessarily mean upsetting the West. The Rajapaksas are shrewd politicians and, while critical of the West, have shied away from open confrontation, not least because several key members of the regime are either foreign citizens or have permanent residency there.

The international landscape today is also very different from the previous Rajapaksa era.

Trump's foreign policy is distrustful of U.S. allies, scornful of international institutions and indifferent, if not downright hostile, to the liberal international order. In the immediate aftermath of the war in 2009 questions over atrocities, accountability and reconciliation were dominant. Ten years on, in a new global landscape, this is no longer the case.

The Rajapaksas are likely to seek accommodation with Trump, pointing to the Isis-inspired attacks on churches in Sri Lanka to present a case for alliance against a common threat from Islamic terror. India's Narenda Modi is likely to be courted in similar terms.

A Europe distracted by Brexit may be less willing to pursue difficult questions on Sri Lanka unless some serious new problems arise.

The new foreign policy is therefore likely to be more nuanced than the previous Rajapaksa era, but China will remain the first friend. For a floundering, debt-ridden economy, China's deep pockets present a far more attractive partner than the strictures of an IMF bailout.

Where is the money behind our politicians from?

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Thiloka Yapa and Aneetha Warusavitarana

Election campaigns tend to be one of the driving forces behind corrupt practices even after candidates are elected.

Therefore, with a monumentally significant presidential election just over a month away, conversations around the issue of campaign finance and corruption in public office should be gathering steam.

Running a campaign in Sri Lanka is a costly affair; an aspiring candidate needs to connect with people on a grassroots level as well as a policy level. This exercise requires a great deal of manpower, posters, social media engagement, travel, and lots of “buth packets” – none of which come cheap. As a result, adequate campaign finance is a prerequisite for a successful election bid.

The problem lies in the issue of who is providing this finance and whether there are strings attached. If money is being funnelled into an election campaign on the understanding that once the candidate is in power, the financier will be afforded special privileges and benefits, this is when citizens need to be concerned.

Of course, campaign finance is not the root of all evil in the world of corruption. Regulating campaign financing would not address blatant theft within the government, nepotism, irregular procurement procedures, and the handing out of government jobs to political supporters. However, it is a step in the right direction and, interestingly, is something that Sri Lankan law has addressed in the past.

Regulating campaign finance

The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order in Council of 1946 specifies that a candidate would have to appoint an agent known as the “election agent”. This agent is responsible for the accounting and reporting of all expenses spent on elections, along with a declaration by the candidate. These financial reports have to be submitted within 31 days of the result of the election being published in the gazette. If it is not conveyed within the stipulated time period, the candidate would not be given the chance to sit or vote as a member in the House of Representatives, until such a conveyance is made.

However, this was repealed by the Parliamentary Elections Act No. 1 of 1981. Under this law, the sources of campaign financing would have to be tracked and reported. The fact that non-compliance would prohibit an individual from taking their seat in Parliament provides a strong and effective incentive for candidates to ensure that reporting is completed in the stipulated time period. While this law did not provide caps on spending during campaigns, making these declarations open to the public would provide another avenue through which elected officials could be held accountable.

However, this accountability mechanism is no longer in place. Under the Parliamentary Elections Act No. 1 of 1981, the entire section on reporting campaign finance was repealed, thus removing this avenue of accountability.

Bringing regulations back

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) has detailed the National Action Plan 2019-2023, aimed at tackling corruption in its various forms. The section on policy suggestions for proposed legislative amendments is all the more relevant in the context of elections. While the amendments proposed to the Bribery and Corruption Act aim to strengthen the powers of CIABOC and increase their ability to tackle corruption across the board, the proposals on campaign finance and asset declarations aim to curb opportunities for corruption in public office.

The proposed legislative framework for campaign finance puts in restrictions and accountability mechanisms on the finances of candidates. This ensures that when an individual comes into office, they do not bring with them the strings and influence of external parties, and are free to prioritise the needs and requirements of their electorate.

While the suggestions do include a cap on campaign financing, the amendments which prevent conflicts of interest and introduce accountability mechanisms may be more practical to enforce.

Restrictions on donations extend to donations made by government departments, companies registered under the Companies Act in which the government owns shares, donations from foreign governments, and organisations registered outside Sri Lanka. The proposed reform also includes a section on accounting and auditing of campaign finances, making this a prerequisite for an individual to come into power and acting as an accountability mechanism.

Beyond campaign financing

Through the proposed amendments to the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law, the checks on financing of elected officials continue once they enter office, expanding the scope of the law to encompass the President, private staff of elected officials, provincial council members, and members of local government authorities, to mention a few. The amendments specify that officials would have to submit asset declarations at the point of their initial appointment on a yearly basis while they hold office, at the point of retirement, and for two years post-retirement.

Additionally, asset declarations of the elected official’s spouse, dependent children, and other persons who live with the elected official or have similar ties are also required.

Tackling corruption is a mammoth task, but these reforms could form the backbone of a culture where citizens hold their representatives responsible and demand increased transparency and accountability.

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