Cattle Slaughter Ban: It’s Not Intentions But Consequences That Matter

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Daily Mirror and The Island

By Sathya Karunarathne and Pravena Yogendra

The Cabinet of Ministers approved the Bill to amend laws to ban cattle slaughter in the third week of October. While this is a contentious policy measure, it did not come as a surprise as the Prime Minister proposed the same policy just over a year ago in September of 2020. 

From the outset, it may seem that the policy is well-intended. Alleviating animal suffering is a noble cause that many Sri Lankans would identify with. Unfortunately, even well-intended policies have unintended consequences. In the case of a cattle slaughter ban, the consequences can be dire for the livelihoods of thousands of people. As stated by the Department of Census and Statistics, 117,033 farmers raised cattle and/or buffalo locally and 56,984 farmers raised improved cattle and/or buffalo in 2020.1 Further, as reported by the Livestock Statistical Bulletin there were 296,111 cattle farms and 26,284 Buffalo farms registered in 2020.

The cattle rearing industry does not exist in isolation, nor is it sustained to nurture the beef industry alone. Cattle are an integral part of the dairy industry, leather tanning industry and footwear and leather goods industry. The dairy industry sells unproductive cattle, where 50% of the animal is salvaged as beef (3) and other parts are sold as raw material to other industries such as the leather tanning industry, etc. Therefore, a cattle slaughter ban would have consequences on all these sectors.

The Government’s intention in banning cattle slaughter is to increase dairy production and local agriculture as reported by the media. According to Central Bank data in 2020, the annual milk production from cattle was 414 m litres and 78 m litres were produced by buffalos. In the same year, Sri Lanka imported 102,355,524 Kgs of milk and milk products, and exported 1,057,079 Kgs of the same.

To keep this dairy industry running, milk producers need to get rid of unproductive cattle. Eranga Nihal Perera, the Chief of the Ceylon Cattle Farmers Association, put this into perspective speaking to the Sunday Times a few weeks ago. He stated that a bull or milch cow requires 10% of its body weight in food daily. For example, an adult stud bull weighs about 400 kgs. That is approximately 40 Kgs of feed per bull, every day. Therefore, a bull would require a monthly cost of around Rs. 26,000 to be maintained. It makes limited economic sense to sustain unproductive cattle incurring such costs as it will increase costs of maintenance with no return on investment. 

A total of 162,000 cattle were legally slaughtered in 2020. Key person interviews with leading industry stakeholders revealed that the cattle population which amounted to 1,628,771 in 2020 can grow up to three times within 10 years with the implementation of a slaughter ban with 75% of them counting to be unproductive.(10) The costs of maintenance will therefore evidently be unbearable. These cost increases, if they can be sustained at all, will be passed on to consumers as price increases in milk. A further stress to an industry already reeling with shortages and high prices. 

Beef is sourced from cattle deemed as unproductive by the dairy industry. Male cattle or bull calves are used to identify female animals in heat and to serve stud purposes, aiding the artificial insemination process. They are slaughtered for beef when they reach about three months of age. Milch cows are slaughtered after completing four calving cycles as they are considered aged, unproductive and unprofitable to maintain at this juncture. Unproductive animals must be culled to maintain the overall productivity of the herd as unproductive stud animals could mate with productive cows, producing low yielding calves. 

The latest available data shows that beef production in 2019 amounted to 29.87 metric tons.

Smallholder dairy farmers contribute to this as smallholders dominate the livestock industry. For example, a 2019 study by the University of Peradeniya revealed that among private dairy farms in the country about 95% are small scale producers. While cattle farming in Sri Lanka is running on narrow margins, a significant contribution of the marginal profits comes from the sale of these animals to the beef industry. 

Dairy farmers make an annual lifetime profit of ~30% from the sale of an animal. Therefore, small farmers who raise cattle individually for an additional income will be severely impacted by the ban. They will not be able to afford the additional maintenance costs of unproductive cattle and will have to halt their small scale business operations.

Banning cattle slaughter with the intention of increasing dairy production therefore is contradictory as it proves to be counterproductive. As illustrated above the milk industry can barely sustain itself without the beef industry. 

A slaughterer purchases an animal for ~LKR 300 per Kg live weight. Live weight ranges from 300-500kg. Thereafter, 50% of the animal is salvaged as beef and the remaining is sold to other industries.(14) The leather tanning industry is one such industry that sources raw material from cattle slaughter. A slaughtered cow yields 15-16 sq ft of rawhide. Rawhide is sourced from the slaughterer by the leather tanning industry at Rs. 45 per Kg. Domestically tanned leather is sold to the footwear and leather goods industry as raw material at Rs. 175 per Kg as opposed to imported tanned leather priced at Rs. 250 per kg ($1- 1.20).(15) 

Moreover, discussions with the industry revealed that about 60% of leather needed to produce affordable footwear is produced domestically and banning cattle slaughter will directly impact the accessibility of affordable footwear by the middle and lower-income earners of the country. Further, more than 60% of the footwear and leather goods industry consists of micro and small businesses.(16) Therefore, this policy measure will indeed hamper their access to affordable raw material and their very sustenance.

Implications of cattle slaughter 

As stated by the Buddhasasana, Religious, and Cultural Affairs Ministry Secretary, Prof. Kapila Gunawardana the Government is discussing the possibility of exporting ageing cows that will not be slaughtered in Sri Lanka with the implementation of the ban. However, exporting aged live cattle is challenging as there is a high probability of international markets being reluctant to purchase cattle exposed to infections in the process of transportation. 

With the increase of idling cattle, the Government will have to invest to build new cattle salvage farms, ensuring adequate veterinary facilities and daily feed. The NLDB has only two salvage farms in Kurunegala and Anuradhapura with a combined capacity of 1,000 animals at a time. About 400 cows are legally slaughtered per day.(19) As aged cattle require high maintenance costs with no return on investment, this will be an added strain on Government expenditure given Sri Lanka’s current limited fiscal space and precarious economic conditions. This will also clash with limited agricultural land available in the country leading to a serious threat to crops. 

Moreover, with the local beef industry coming to a complete halt, the domestic production and importation of alternative sources of protein such as chicken and fish will have to increase, meeting domestic demand and ensuring affordability for the average consumer. It is important to note that the prices of these alternatives have experienced a steep increase. According to the Department of Census and Statistics weekly retail prices, one kg of fresh chicken that cost Rs. 558.93 in November of 2020 costs Rs. 727.27 now. Further, one kg of salaya that cost Rs. 252.67 in November of 2020 is now priced at Rs. 291.67.

Moreover, a flat-out ban on cattle slaughter will breed an underground economy of illegal slaughter and trade. This will foster animal cruelty as the industry will not come under the purview of welfare authorities, creating the environment for low-cost slaughtering techniques defeating the very moral grounds of a cattle slaughter ban.

Further, banning cattle slaughter with no ban on beef consumption allowing for beef imports will only shift the burden of slaughter elsewhere. This is hypocritical as cattle will still have to be slaughtered abroad, for the consumption of Sri Lankan people. It is worthy to note that India is the fifth largest carabeef exporter in the world earning 2.8 billion dollars in exports in 2020 despite the country’s religious veneration of cattle. 

It is evident that even though a slaughter ban may sound ideal in theory, it springs a chain of unintended economic consequences hampering the dairy, beef and other related industries, paving the way for further price increases and posing a threat to business operations. 

Therefore, it is clear that when making economic decisions it is paramount to look at policies in terms of incentives they create rather than blindly pursuing a goal. This simply means that immediate and long term consequences matter more than intentions. Economic policies therefore must strive to go beyond intentions crafted by hopes and inspiration. Failure to do this will certainly lead to disastrous outcomes for the whole nation. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Is Wealth Tax the Solution to Sri Lanka’s Low Tax Revenue Collection

Originally appeared on Daily FT, Biz Adaderana , The Morning, Daily Mirror, The Island and Lanka Business Online

By Sathya Karunarathne

Successive governments have run fiscal deficits. Inadequate revenue collection and unrestrained government expenditure have worsened the country’s fiscal position.  

Tax revenue which averaged over 20% of GDP in 1990 has declined to under 10% of GDP in 2020. Ad hoc tax policy changes have significantly eroded the tax base. Weak tax administration has also contributed to the sharp decline in tax collection.

While tax revenue has contracted, government expenditure has ballooned over time. Today, government revenue is not sufficient even to meet its expenditure on salaries and wages and transfers and subsidies to households which include pension payments and social welfare payments such as Samurdhi.  

In this context, there are various proposals put forward to raise government revenue. One proposal is the reintroduction of the wealth tax.  

A wealth tax is expected to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, achieving equality. This tax shifts the tax burden to affluent households, taxing an individual’s net wealth, which is the market value of total owned assets. Proponents of wealth taxation argue that this is a progressive system of taxation and is a more powerful tool in comparison to income, estate or corporate taxes as it addresses the issue of wealth concentration.  

Moreover, a tax should ideally satisfy basic characteristics of taxation: it should not be distortionary; it should be fair, and it should not be difficult to collect. 

The rationale for a wealth tax

One of the earliest proponents of the wealth tax for developing countries was Nicholas Kaldor.  Based on his recommendation, a wealth tax together with an income tax, expenditure tax and a gift tax were introduced in Sri Lanka in 1958. However, these new taxes yielded little revenue due to difficulties in determining the tax base and problems in administration.  Following the recommendation of the Tax Commission in 1990, the government abolished the wealth tax from the year of assessment 1992/1993.

Wealth taxes have mainly been implemented in European countries. In 1990, twelve countries in Europe had a wealth tax. Today, there are only three: Norway, Spain, and Switzerland.  Several non-European countries have also imposed wealth taxes from time to time including such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan 

In recent times there has been renewed interest in wealth taxes. Presidential candidates in the US proposed various forms of a wealth tax. In the UK and France, there were proposals to impose “super taxes” on the rich. The primary justification was to address the increasing inequality in society.  

Issues with a wealth tax

Despite renewed interest in the wealth tax as a progressive tax based on equity, it scores poorly on the criteria of efficiency, and administrative feasibility.  

Many factors have justified the repeal of wealth taxes in OECD countries. The reasons cited are related to efficiency costs, risk of capital flight particularly in light of increased capital mobility and wealthy taxpayers' access to tax havens, failure to meet redistributive goals as a result of narrow tax bases, tax avoidance and evasion, high administrative and compliance costs compared to limited revenues (high cost yield ratio).  

To understand the efficiency costs of wealth taxes one can look at taxing a person’s wealth accumulated through savings. Despite the common consensus that taxing savings is an effective way to redistribute, a person’s saving decisions reveal little about their underlying lifetime resources and wellbeing. It only reveals their preference to consume tomorrow rather than today. Thereby a wealth tax imposes a tax on those who prefer to spend their money later as opposed to taxing the wealthy. Efficiency costs refer to the reduction of the welfare of the taxed individuals by more than $1 to generate $1 of revenue. Therefore, the efficiency cost of a wealth tax in terms of taxing savings is a reduction of  future consumption that can be bought with earnings, reducing incentive to work for those who prefer to consume the proceeds later and reducing incentive for young people to save for their retirement.

Capital flight is the possibility of holding assets outside of one's resident country without declaring them.As wealth taxes are imposed on residents it increases the risk of the wealthy

reallocating their assets to avoid taxation. Therefore a high tax burden encourages taxpayers to change their tax residence to a lower tax jurisdiction or tax havens.

Both income-generating and non-income generating assets are taxed under wealth taxation. They can include land, real estate, bank accounts, investment funds, intellectual or industrial property rights, bonds, shares, and even jewellery, vehicles, art and antiques. However, this tax base for wealth taxes has often been narrowed through exemptions. These exemptions have been justified most commonly on the grounds of social concerns such as the negative social implications of taxing  pension assets. Further liquidity issues (eg - farm assets), supporting entrepreneurship and investment (eg- business assets), avoiding valuation difficulties ( eg- artwork and jewellery) and preserving countries cultural heritage (eg - artwork and antiques) have also been cited as reasons for wealth tax reliefs. While some of these exemptions can be justified, they have led to the reduction of revenue raised from wealth taxes. They have also contributed to wealth taxes being less equitable as the wealthiest such as businesses benefit from these exemptions defeating the very purpose of imposing a wealth tax which is to meet its redistributive goals.

Narrow tax bases in wealth taxation often leads to tax avoidance and evasion opportunities. For example, Spain's 1994 wealth tax exemption for the shares of owner managers resulted in wealthy businesses reorganizing their activities to reap benefits of the exemption resulting in a significant erosion of the wealth tax base. 

Further, several other factors have also discouraged countries to sustain a wealth tax. They are namely, the difficulty in determining the tax base or what assets to be taxed, underreporting and undervaluation of assets, difficulty in measuring wealth taxes, distinguishing between individuals who are asset rich but cash poor, the constant need to value assets and audit returns increasing administrative and enforcement costs

Low revenue collection as well as the other reasons discussed have led to the abolishing of wealth taxes in most countries  (See Table 1 for details) . Tax revenue from individual net wealth taxes in 2016 ranged from only 0.2% of GDP in Spain to 1.0% of GDP in Switzerland. Sri Lanka’s experience with wealth taxation was no different with the tax yielding low revenue as reported by the 1990 Tax Commission.

Table 1: Implementation of Wealth Taxes in Selected Countries

Conclusion 

Taxing the wealth of the rich to generate income and to eliminate economic inequality sounds promising in terms of political debate. However, wealth taxes have failed to generate adequate revenue, failed to meet redistributive goals as a result of narrow tax bases, proven to have high administrative and enforcement costs, resulted in tax evasion and avoidance due to underreporting and undervaluation of assets, increased the risk of capital flight and access to tax havens and may have contributed to the reduction of investment and employment. 

Therefore, imposing a wealth tax may not be the ideal policy response to Sri Lanka’s low tax revenue, especially given the country’s previous experience with the tax yielding low revenue.

Sathya Karunarathne is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at sathya@advocata.org. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

To Leave or to Stay? Years of bad economic policy are killing the aspirations of Sri Lanka’s youth

Originally appeared on The Island, Colombo Telegraph

By Sathya Karunarathne

Overseas migration for work or study, seems a popular option for Sri Lanka’s youth. Central Bank data shows that in 2019 alone the age group 25-29 recorded the highest number of departures abroad for skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled employment. This age group also recorded the second-highest number of departures for professional, middle, and clerical level jobs. UNESCO’s Eurostat data collection on education for 2020 states that the total number of Sri Lankan students overseas is 24,118.

A significant segment of the youth population seem dissatisfied with the available opportunities and choices within Sri Lanka.The above numbers reflect their lack of faith in a better and safer society in the years to come. For decades this lack of opportunity was blamed on the war. However, even twelve years after the conclusion of the war little has changed.It is worthy to explore why.

How did we get here?

The island nation’s predicament was in the making for almost 70 years.Consecutive governments since independence have failed to successfully implement policies to deliver economic growth and better living standards.

Trade is the engine of growth but over the last fifteen years Sri Lanka has shied away from trade led growth. Although Sri Lanka was South Asia’s first to embark on economic liberalisation in 1977 and despite the relatively robust economic performance that resulted even during the war years, Sri Lanka began to move away from international trade and investment.

Starting in 2004 import tariffs were raised in an ad hoc fashion to finance a growing defence budget. By 2009 Sri Lanka had one of the world’s most complex import tax regimes made up of para tariffs, (taxes above custom duties) and customs duties. By 2009 the overall protection more than doubled from 13.4 percent to 27.9 percent. Sri Lanka’s import policies by this time were as protective as they had been 20 years ago. While Sri Lanka continued to miss the boat of economic globalisation our East Asian neighbours such as Vietnam and Thailand have risen to prosperity by successfully integrating with global value chains.

This was compounded by an increase in state spending and increased state involvement in the economy. Much of it is financed by debt. Sri Lanka’s state expenditure has ballooned. Due to excessive borrowing, the central government’s highest recurrent expenditure is on interest payments which were at 36 percent in 2020. The country boasts a bloated public sector. The Ministry of Finance states that 30 percent or the second largest of the central government’s recurrent expenditure is spent on salaries and wages. This amounted to a staggering 794.2 billion in 2020 an increase of 15.7 percent from 2019. The Economy Next reported in June that 86 percent of tax revenue went into salaries and pensions in 2020. Moreover, these salaries are only a part of the problem, much expenditure is wasted sustaining mismanagement, corruption, and negligence within some 527 SOEs whose cumulative losses outweigh profits.

Tax revenues have not kept pace with expenditure and the tax system is weighted towards indirect taxes. In 2020 of the share of Sri Lanka’s tax revenue only 22.1 percent was direct taxes with 77.9 percent being indirect. This is highly regressive as a large component of indirect taxes end up on goods and services consumed by the average Sri Lankan imposing a higher burden on low income earners.

Consecutive government’s reluctance to rectify these economic miscalculations through hard reforms have brought the island to a precarious state of high levels of accumulated debt with exponentially growing interest payments. The country now has a debt to GDP ratio of over 101 percent, while foreign reserves have declined to 2.8 billion- sufficient for less than two months of imports.Fitch ratings have estimated that Sri Lank’s foreign currency debt service obligations until 2026 amount to USD 29 billion. Sri Lanka’s debt is on an unsustainable path.

So what’s at stake for young

people in all this?

Sri Lanka’s youth sit helplessly as bungled policy results in the economy tanking, taking them further away from their aspirations, hopes and dreams. Labour force survey for the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2020 reported a startling youth unemployment (15-25 years) rate of 25.7 percent. In terms of education level, the highest unemployment rate is reported from the GCE A/L and above group. Although the labour force is educated their main source of employment remains in the informal sector. Nevertheless, skills gap and mismatches have been identified as a major obstacle preventing employment. For example, a 2019 survey estimated a shortage of 12,140 ICT graduates.A World Bank study recognised poor English language skills as another impediment.

In addition to this, COVID exacerbated Sri Lanka’s challenge of providing employment. Unemployment as a percentage of the total labour force increased from 4.5 percent to 5.2 percent between 2019 Q4 – 2020 Q4.19 This coupled with the country’s poor economic conditions will lead to more job losses in the coming months.For instance, with banks rationing letters of credit those employed in the import sector are in panic. Additionally, with prices of essential items increasing the demand for other products and services will decline as people are forced to deprive themselves of small luxuries such as ordering a meal from a restaurant to survive.This poses a threat to business operations and employment.

To curb the outflow of dollars the country has resorted to increased import restrictions.These unsustainable policy responses have robbed the Sri Lankan youth of the luxury to dream and to aspire. Purchasing a car and housing are two such aspirations that are slipping through the fingers of the average Sri Lankan. Vehicle Importers Association of Sri Lanka (VIASL) stated that the price of certain vehicles in the local market has increased by around Rs.10 million due to import restrictions.20 A 2017/2018 Wagon R which was sold at Rs.3.5 million is now being sold at Rs.6 million. Those building or repairing houses face difficulty as cement importers have limited the release of cement to the market due to partial suspension of imports and price controls resulting in severe shortages. This coupled with high tariffs on construction material will further contribute to making the construction of a house an illusion to the middle-class Sri Lankan.

Even the escape routes of Sri Lanka are closing. Students aspiring to leave the country for higher education fear banks may not issue dollars to finance their stay. Migrants are unable to take their savings with them meaning they face a much harder start in another country- last month the Central Bank issued a new order under the Foreign Exchange Act declaring limits on migration allowances26. Social media is swamped with infuriated complaints on price hikes and scarcity of essentials such as medicine in midst of a pandemic.

It is safe to conclude that young people have found themselves in a perilous socio economic fabric with looming uncertainty.

To leave or to stay?

If the government is to retain young people they must be provided with indications of stability and hope. Excessive reliance on import restrictions as a policy solution to the foreign exchange crisis at hand exhibits the government’s reluctance to implement painful but necessary reforms. Stability and hope lie in reforms the politicians are resistant to.

Increasing sources of government revenue, re-prioritising government expenditure, limiting intervention, relying on markets and recognizing the vitality of trade in a globalised economy is Sri Lanka’s road to prosperity. It will not be easy or painless, the accumulated policy mistakes of the past two decades require some very hard reforms but it is the only sustainable way out of the current mess.

Sri Lanka faces a serious crisis but it presents an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the past and to rebuild the island’s institutions along with the hopes and dreams of the young.

Sathya Karunarathne is the Research Analyst at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at sathya@advocata.org. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute, or anyone affiliated with the institute.

How can Sri Lanka’s democracy be gender-inclusive?

Covered in the Ceylon Today, Colombo Telegraph, Lanka Business Online and Economy Next

By Sathya Karunarathne

Sri Lanka’s general election dawned at a crucial time of extreme uncertainty and precariousness. The island’s political, social, and economic spheres have been dismantled by an unexpected global pandemic that drove the country into a political limbo with the dissolving of the parliament. The task of untangling the island from its woes has now been handed over to a male-led parliament elected by the general public ostensibly upholding the true values of a  democracy. In contrast, Sri Lanka’s female demographic which constitutes 52% of the population is left underrepresented in parliament, forgotten, and deprived of positions of power and access to the national decision making and policy implementation process, yet again. 

At present, Sri Lanka is ranked 182 out of 193 countries on the inter-parliamentary union of rankings which assesses the percentage share of women in national government. In the previous parliament 13 legislators, or rather a handful of 5.8% of 225 MPs represented the voice and needs of 52% of the population. Moreover, there was only one woman under the age of 40 in parliament that represented the needs of young women.  The newly elected parliament boasts a grand total of one cabinet and two-state female Ministers with five more female members of parliament being elected by popular vote. Moreover, SLPP, SJB, and NPP have collectively appointed four female representatives through their National Lists. 

The World Gender Gap Report published by the World Economic Forum ranked Sri Lanka amongst the top 20 countries in 2006. However, Sri Lanka has drastically slipped in the rankings and has descended to be ranked 102 out of 153 countries in the year 2020 despite performing well on other indicators such as health and education. In 2006 Sri Lanka ranked 84th on the economic participation and opportunity sub-index while in 2020 we ranked 126, slipping 42 places. Moreover, wage equality for similar work has degraded by 27 places since 2006 from being ranked 55 to being ranked 82. Further, Sri Lanka has performed poorly on the political empowerment sub-indicator ranking 7 in 2006 and 73 in the year 2020. Even though Sri Lanka has ranked 9 on “years with a female head of state” indicator it should be noted that the index takes into consideration countries with the most years of a female head of state in the past fifty years. As this is a large time frame it does not necessarily reflect consistency in female political empowerment, especially in the Sri Lankan context. 

Why does female representation matter?

The World Economic Forum states that women are underrepresented in the political sphere globally, with women only making up 23% of national parliamentarians. This severe underrepresentation has an empirical correlation with policy choices and adverse consequences in women’s and children’s welfare. A study by the World Economic Forum addressed this issue by analyzing gender representation in local municipalities and the provision of public childcare in Bavaria. To assess the effect female councillors would have on public childcare a study was carried out to compare the expansion of public childcare across municipalities that have similar characteristics but differ in their share of female councillors. Results emphasized that one additional woman in the local council accelerates the expansion of public childcare by 0.4 spots per 1,000 inhabitants or by 40%. Moreover, a comparison of over 7,700  minutes of council meetings displayed that one additional woman translates to child care being spoken of more frequently and that it creates the ambiance for other female councillors to voice their opinion confidently and to play a more active role in the process of policymaking and implementation.

These findings are relevant to Sri Lanka now more so than ever as Sri Lanka has seen a spike in the number of child abuse and violation of child rights reported in the year, highlighting the lack of female perspective in the policymaking process. 

Furthermore, Sri Lanka is no stranger to policies and laws that are excruciatingly gender discriminatory. Marital rape being legal under the penal code which dehumanizes the “role and duty of a wife”, the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) of 1951 that has a multitude of discriminatory provisions with regard to marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance, property rights and access to justice for Muslim women, discriminatory principles in the Kandyan law on divorce and inheritance, limitations on property rights applicable to women in Jaffna under the Tesawalamai law, mammoth taxes on menstrual hygiene products that are considered a luxury despite 4.2 million menstruating women, 14 year justice struggle for victims of rape, lack of incentive provided for women to enter into the labour force resulting in only 34.3% of females being economically active , failure and delay of the government in midst of the COVID 19 pandemic to repatriate migrant workers that mostly comprise of women who are Sri Lanka’s highest foreign exchange earners, lack of a monitory body/mechanism to assist families and children of migrant workers are just a few amongst a host of gender insensitive and discriminatory laws and policies that haunt the quality of life, day-to-day activities, and even threaten the very lives of women across the island. It takes no expert to identify that much-needed reforms have been conveniently pushed under the rug over the years due to lack of female perspective and representation in positions of power and parliament where laws and policies are debated and solidified. 

Laments of local females aspiring to shatter the glass ceiling 

A glance at the number of female contestants from each major party in the recent general election depicts the difficulty female expectants face in being nominated as a candidate. With the motive of addressing these issues and ensuring women representation in local government, Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 1 of 2016 was introduced which presented a 25% mandatory quota for women. The practicality of abruptly coercing women into positions of power was lost in this attempt. Candidates were provided with zero training and preparation to enter into local government, despite years of convincing them that their expertise lies within the boundaries of a kitchen. Moreover, the lack of preparation in this regard resulted in priority being given to relatives and close associates of politicians overlooking qualified and competent candidates.  

Since Mrs. Bandaraniake’s debut, Sri Lanka’s lineage of female leaders has repeatedly painted a dramatic chronicle of the devoted woman, who steps out of their male counterpart’s shadow in the case of his demise to dutifully carry on the legacy of the deceased. This narrative does not only rob these females of an authentic career and individuality but also leaves a permanent imprint of pedigree that doesn’t necessarily reflect the aspirations of the average woman. Moreover, this phenomenon compromises the quality of leadership as overnight shifts to the political sphere has a certain degree of risk attached to it.

Women continue to be severely underrepresented due to the unequal access to finances and resources needed to successfully seek nominations and to participate in electoral campaigns. According to research conducted by UN Women in 2013, over 80% of respondents identified the lack of access to funding as one of the biggest obstacles for women to participate in a political competition (Ballington and Kahane, 2014). Politics and campaigning is a sphere dominated by big money and more often than not the economically disempowered woman is ruled out from this rich man’s club. According to Lihini Fernando, UNP’s municipal councillor from Moratuwa it costs Rs.25 million roughly to campaign throughout the district. Strong female candidates such as Rosi Senanayake too have stated that financial pressure is a huge burden carried by women that are less likely to have sponsors. Moreover, females employed in the corporate sector, activists, legislature experts, etc are disincentivized to enter into politics due to the high costs involved both financially and otherwise. 

Psychological, sexual, and physical violence against women swamps the arena of politics. Sexually provocative comments publicly directed on new media, abuse from traditional media, the pressure to conform to a subordinate, the stereotypical image of an ideal woman, threats, and physical violence scourges the day to day experiences of a woman contesting to enter into government.

Reform Recommendations

Despite Sri Lanka ratifying the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and enshrined its commitment in the Women’s Charter of Sri Lanka (1993) and the National Plan of Action for Women (1996) reflecting constitutional and international commitments to securing the rights of the woman, the country is yet to implement progressive reforms that will increase women’s participation in the democratic process. 

While there are a multitude of reform recommendations that can assist in improving Sri Lanka’s female representation in government, a transparent and fair framework to finance election campaigns through the Election Finance Campaign Act takes precedence and can pave the way to level the playing field in electoral competition between genders. Introducing a cap for spending on election campaigning and amending election laws to include disclosure of information pertaining to the quantum and sources of campaign contributions can combat illicit campaign financing and high costs involved. Moreover, voluntary, non legislated practices such as internal fundraising mechanisms in-kind contributions can help address the gender funding gap within parties. Moreover, countries like Brazil have put in place provisions to ensure a certain airtime for female contestants from each political party.

Initiating training programmes and capacity building for women aspiring to run for office is crucial in increasing and solidifying effective female representation. These programmes can be targeted at grassroot level activists and even extend to local school levels to encourage and motivate young women to pursue a career in politics. Moreover, special attention should be given to proper selection criteria and conducting the said programmes trilingually. Within parties, training programmes and capacity building should be provided to women along with due recognition and equal opportunity. 

Moreover, introducing a mandatory quota for women in the national list for major parties is yet another step that can be taken in addressing gender underrepresentation. This can facilitate female expectants to avoid financial burdens and gender-based violence and aggression associated with campaigning.

Sathya Karunarathne is a Research Executive at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at sathya@advocata.org or @SathyaKarunara1 on twitter. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.