What we could have done with the losses of state-owned enterprises

By Dhananath Fernando

The article originally appeared on the Daily Mirror on May 15, 2016

Would you believe the Sri Lankan government could have declared a Rs. 5000 bonus for each and every citizen in 2016 April New Year if Sri Lankan Airlines even if they had broken even for last 10 years.

The subject is State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and strangely most of them do not have proper financial data (Data is publicly available for 55 out of 255 SOE’s). I am adding my two cents worth to write about the mega losers of public money and some ‘why’ factors for the reader’s consumption.

The total losses of the 55 SOE’s from 2006-2015 amounts to a gigantic Rs. 636 billion. Interestingly 5 key institutes are responsible for 95 percent of the losses which adds up to Rs. 605 billion losses. Namely Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, Sri Lankan Air Lines, Mihin Lanka and Sri Lanka Transportation Board are the money eating machines of poor taxpayers. 

Surprisingly significant discrepancies were identified even in the figures disclosed to public through the COPE report, the Treasury Annual Report and Fiscal Management Report for the same institute.

Obviously all 3 the figures cannot be true and we can come to a reasonable conclusion that either two figures or all 3 figures are false. The simple reason we cannot ignore the discrepancy is because it exceeds Rs. 5 billion of tax payer’s money. If I take examples of other institutes this column will run out of space

Naturally, with such drastic discrepancies the following appalling questions cross our minds: nAre accepted accounting standards followed when profit calculations are made?  nIs the data fabricated to misguide the 20 million population?

Has COPE done their job well and does the money spent on the COPE committee justify taxpayer’s money.

If these government workers cannot manage these institutes and cannot even calculate profit and loss accurately, are they worth the money they are paid from tax payers’money.  The ‘Profits and losses’ analysis shows that in 2011 and 2012 there is a sharp increase in losses and the reasons for the increase in losses should be investigated to avoid reoccurrence of such situations in the future. 

Although it is a fact that the global economic conditions took a beating in 2012, but Sri Lanka had just emerged from a war situation in 2009, and this was a huge advantage to the Sri Lankan economy. SLTB and Mihin Air has failed to make any profit for last 10 long years and if a company cannot be turned around in 10 years, the ability of the management should be questioned. How many years must one wait to see a progress being made? 

Sometimes we the ordinary citizens of Sri Lanka cannot comprehend the value of Rs. 605 billion. Most of us, including the ministers and parliamentarians confuse millions and billions. In order to illustrate the potential of Rs. 605 billion, a list of things which could be done, if the 5 key institutes were well managed and were able to break even is given below:

1. Ten more highways

The cost of southern high way was 60 Billion rupees and we could have easily built 10 southern highways connecting all corners of the island with this money because the cost of the southern highway was way above the average cost. The Ministry of Highways attributes the high cost to the high prices paid for land acquisitions and land diversity. Even if this is true, 10 highways with similar capacity could have been constructed for the same price.  

2. Eleven harbours

The Hambantota port cost US$ 361 million and we could have built 11 ports and even saved another 600 million for the grand opening ceremony  

3. Cover 81% of the current budget deficit

The current budget deficit is estimated to be LKR 740 billion rupees and if the 5 institutes mentioned herein could have performed at breakeven level, we could easily cover 81% of the current budget deficit  

4. Twenty more airports

The current government is planning to make Sri Lanka an aviation hub and if they think they need airports like Mattala, even if it is only to store paddy during the harvest season, 20 similar airports could be built. The San Francisco Air Port in the USA, which incidentally is one of the top airports in the world, with the size of the runway being 3600 meters long and 45 meters wide is smaller than the Mattala airport runway which has a 3500 long and 60 meters wide runway. So I am talking about an investment of 20 airports having a capacity equal to the San Francisco Airport, not small domestic airports carrying light aircrafts  

5. Nine power plants as Norochchole

Making a Sri Lanka a hub of energy is another popular topic in town. The first phase of Norchchole cost US$ 455 million and losses made by the 5 key SOE’s in 10 years is 9 times  this cost.  

6. 10% of the Megapolis project 2030

The initial mega project in 2016 targeting to make Sri Lanka a middle income country by 2030, requires an investment of US$ 44 billion. The Government could easily cover 10 percent of the total investment with the losses made by these key 5 institutes.  

7. Relief of 22% of total tax revenue in 2016 on tax payers

The total estimated tax revenue of the government for 2016 is Rs. 1,584 billion. Even if Sri Lankan Airlines and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation could operate at breakeven level it could still cover 22 percent of the total estimated tax revenue from 2016 budget. I reiterate the values are just face values and the net present value (NPV) will show a worse situation  

8. Rs. 30,000 bonus by the first citizen with his annual greeting SMS

Leaving alone all of the above, the President instead of sending a SMS message to all Sri Lankan citizens who own a phone, wishing them a happy Sinhala and Tamil New Year, could give a cash gift of Rs.30,000 to every citizen of this country, including newly born infants, if these 5 key loss making institutes performed better by breaking even. (Rs. 120,000 for a 4 member house family) With the losses incurred by Sri Lankan Airlines alone, the President could gift Rs. 5000 to each citizen. 

What would be the solution?

It is a globally accepted theory that when you run a business, focussing on your strengths is a must and establishing monitoring and evaluation procedures is essential. If you do not possess the required skills or expertise within your organizations, you have to either hire the right people or outsource the job.I t is sad that the words like “Privatization” are injected as terrorist words into the blood of the nation but the reality is just leaving these 5 institutes in the hands of honest politicians had lost the country 605 billion which no one can justify. Those who promote concepts like state ownerships and big government has absolutely no idea on financial management.

If they had any sense on fiscal management a decade is a too long period even for a below average management.  The fear of privatization is same as fear of failure and the success is always lies beyond our comfortable zone. It is Albert Einstein, the brain of the 21stcentury, who said “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results”. 

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Dhananath Fernando is the Chief Operating Officer of AdvocataInstitute; an independent Sri Lankan think tank works for economic freedom. He could be reached via dhananath@advovata.org

Reforming State Owned Enterprises - Q&A with Razeen Sally

Razeen Sally is Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the Notional University of Singapore. He is Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, the main economic-policy think tank in his native Sri Lanka. Previously he taught at the London School of Economics, where he received his PhD. He has been Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy, a global-economy think tank in Brussels. He has held visiting research and teaching positions at Institut D’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris,

Australian National University, University of Hong Kong, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and Dartmouth College in the USA. He was also Chair of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Competitiveness. He is an Adjunct Scholar at the Coto Institute and is on the advisory boards of the Institute of Economic Affairs (UK) and Centre for Independent Studies (Australia).

He is a member of the Mont Pelerin Society. Sally’s research and teaching focuses on global trade policy and Asia in the world economy. He has written on the WTD, FTAs and on different aspects of trade policy in Asia. He has also written on the history of economic ideas, especially the theory of commercial policy. His new book on Sri Lanka will be published in 2017

Razeen Sally, a Professor at the National University of Singapore, shared his experience about the experience of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in South Asia and East Asia with Advocata, a Colombobased think tank promoting free market. While privatization is the best option to reduce the burden of state enterprises on society and improve t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e , s u b j e c t i n g them t o competition, shielding them from politicization can also give benefits, he says in this interview.

There seems to have been an epidemic of state enterprises after World War II, especially in newly independent countries like Sri Lanka. When did state enterprises start to emerge in the world and in Sri Lanka? What is the historical background to SOEs?

In Sri Lanka as in India, many state enterprises date back to mid-1950s when the government policies took a turn towards to more intervention, more protection and using the state to promote investments in heavy industry and other areas. In this respect, the S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike government was following what the Nehru government was doing in India. So, the SOEs were intended to be the spearhead of economic development. And of course in Sri Lanka, this was really ratcheted up under Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government in 1970, when the state intended to take control of the commanding heights of the economy.

What were the intentions of the architects of SOEs? Have these objectives been met?

The answer is clearly no. The idea was to use the SOEs as part of an alternative model of economic development.

The model people had in mind was Soviet Union and its five-year plan. And here there is a contrast with what was done in the East Asian countries and what was done in South Asia. South Asia went for heavy state-led investment, nationalisation, for various government internal controls and external protection - import substitution. And this model clearly failed, which led to later market reforms, from 1977 in Sri Lanka and from 1991 in India.

The East Asian countries - some of them actually had SOEs - like Taiwan. But on the whole they didn’t nationalise rampantly and they relied much more on the private sector to be the engine of economic development. It was part of a different model which was more open to international trade, which had fewer domestic controls, which had macroeconomic stability and so on.

I would argue that the old model, which had nationalisation and SOEs controlling significant parts of the economy, definitely failed. And you see the costs of failure of SOEs in Sri Lanka. There are 250 or more SOEs, some that are hugely loss-making, that are a drain on an already depleted exchequer, that are heavily politicised, that crowd out private investment and that constrain consumer choice. So, it is a bad deal all around.

Why do so many state enterprises get into trouble and end up becoming burdens on the tax payer? Is there an inherent problem in the incentives or structure behind the SOEs that leads them on this path?

the world, state enterprises fail because there are disincentives to competition.

They are shielded from competition. They have a close link to the state. They are highly politicized. Appointments are not made on merit. The market is rigged in their favour, on prices and on production. Often they are protective from international competition as well as domestic competition. For all those reasons they fail.

And they are a drag on the economy, on the exchequer and on consumers - they limit competition. There are of course, exceptions.

One can point to a minority of SOEs in a few countries in the world that have not prevented fast and successful economic development. One thinks in particular of the government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore. Singapore, which is a fantastic and successful economy, still has large companies that are majority state-owned, that are grouped under Temasek - the state holding company - and are commercially viable. Some of them have done very well competing internationally. Singapore Airlines is perhaps the best example.

That they have been subjected to competition is the basic answer - and in a small economy like Singapore, which is highly open to the world. It is the most open economy of any size in the world with trade at close to 400 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

The GLCs that play in the international market place are subject to fierce international competition in the market place. That’s true of Singapore Airlines, that’s true of the port services authority and that’s true of state-owned banks and so on. Over the decades the government has put in place the mechanisms to separate ownership - that is to say by the state - from the management, of commercial enterprises. In other words, they’ve been depoliticised to a large extent. It would be wrong to say that all SOEs in all countries have failed.

That’s not true. For the most part it is true. But a handful of exceptions are there. Singapore is the one that really stands out for exceptional pieces. But it’s very difficult to try and replicate in a country like Sri Lanka, what Singapore has done - in a country where politics is much more extrusive, where it is much more difficult to depoliticise the running of SOEs and also much more difficult to subject them to competition from domestic players and also from international players. Malaysia has a holding company called Khazanah, which is similar in some ways to Temasek in Singapore.

This holding company houses a number of leading SOEs in Malaysia, which accounts for about one third of Malaysian output. At least one of them is a big player in Sri Lanka. The Malaysian GLCs don’t perform nearly as well as Singapore GLCs - for two reasons. Firstly, they are less subject to competition and secondly, they are much more politicized. However, some of them are actually not too bad or are reasonably good because they have been shielded more than the others from politics.

What can be done?

The first best solution to the running of SOEs in Sri Lanka is to have a timetable to privatise. So yes, would use the ‘P’ word without feeling embarrassed about it. The obvious economically efficient solution is to privatize as many of the SOEs as possible over a realistic period of time. We know that politically this is not on the cards at the moment.

So the ‘P’ word is not used. As a matter of expediency that’s understandable. But I think as a medium to long-term objective, privatisation should be the way to go. However, now we have to get the second-best scenarios and second-best solutions. If large-scale privatisation is not feasible, what can be done in the short term, over the next one or two parliamentary terms, to improve the current dismal situation of the SOEs that won’t be as good as and as efficient as full privatisation, but might deliver a better result than what we have at the moment?’ In other words, improve the running of the enterprises; make them more commercially viable, more productive. In this scenario, we have to look at the other countries that have better practices. So Singapore comes to mind and so does Malaysia.

So we should look at the Temasek and Khazanah models of having a state holding company for SOEs. The lesson I would draw from the best example, which is Temasek, is that first you subject them to all-round competition, including international competition. And second, you put in place mechanism to depoliticise them as much as possible. In other words, separate ownership from management.

That’s the starting point. Then we can ask ourselves, ‘What should be the criteria for making these principles real?’ I was at a conference in Goa to discuss Indian reforms and I was part of a group that looked at this Temasek - Khazanah type of a model. And the local participants were interested in what lessons could there be for India, which is also not in the game of big privatisations.

As a first step, there is no point setting up a state-owned holding company and calling it something that’s done on the Temasek or Khazanah model if you’re not going to change the current operating procedures. So, the point is to have serious reforms, even if you can’t do privatisation. So what can you do? Firstly, identify the enterprises that essentially operate in a commercial sphere, where there is some competition already or where there could be more competition. If you have a state-run monopoly or oligopoly, then don’t put it in such a holding company.

Keep it separate. Because that’s probably going to be more politicized anyway there may be other public policy objectives that will get involved in the running of that enterprise. So keep that to one side. Rather, put in this basket enterprises that are commercial. So, that would include SriLankan Airlines, Mihin Air and the Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB) but not the Ceylon Electricity Board. So, in other words, don’t put all SOEs in this holding company, only put some of them that operate in a commercial sphere.

These should be corporatised with initially majority state’s ownership. Then you should start introducing the minority equity participation. And Temasek is interesting because, in the key enterprises, the government still retains the majority equity, therefore control. But they have actually gradually beefed up the minority equity in most of the Temasek enterprises.

That’s also a boost for the stock exchange or financial markets. And in some cases with nonpriority enterprises, they have actually taken the private sector stakes to a majority of equity and the government has retained only a minority of equity - and in some cases actually exited altogether. But in the meantime, the government could be with the minority equity - up to 19 percent. Maybe when the time is right politically, move into the majority private ownership. But the holding company should include airlines, buses, telcos and whatever is commercially viable and subject to competition.

We talk of loss-making state enterprises hurting the people. Are there other fallouts of badly managed SOEs? What’s a reasonable way of counting the total costs of SOEs on the economy?

Losses are the tip of the iceberg. And of course there are other SOEs in other countries that are hugely profitable. But that’s not an indication of overall economic efficiency. They are profitable because they have monopoly rents. They are not subject to normal competition.

So, I think the cost of SOEs that operate in rigged markets is the costs that fall on the consumer because of lack of competition. These might be difficult to quantify. We are talking of usually higher than normal prices, restricted product variety, often restricted supply of the product or service in question. I think probably the biggest losses to the economy are the losses that come from lack of competition.

When the Public Utilities Commission was set up here by Prof. Rohan Samarajiva, the law provided that you cannot replace the entire board in one go. Two or few members can be appointed for one year. What is your opinion on a procedure of that nature?

You could try to introduce independent directors. Having independent anybody in Sri Lanka is very difficult at the moment. Some of the Temasek companies have had foreign CEOs. Mind you SriLankan had a foreign CEO when it tied up with Emirates. What happened to him? You could try to maybe have a regulation that there should be a minimum number of independently appointed directors to the boards of these companies and to the boards of the holding company as well. So, the government appointees would be restricted to a certain number and there would be some mechanism to appoint some of the rest.

But of course they would have to be qualified. There is no point appointing a lawyer who leads someone’s political campaign without prior commercial experience to be an independent director of a commercial enterprise. That’s one thing to play around with that.

We have seen companies like Temasek advertise globally. So do you suggest that some people could also be hired globally?

Yes. Target the diaspora as well. See whether you could attract some of the qualified people from the diaspora to be directors of these companies, CEOs or the senior management.

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A version of this article originally appeared in “The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka” Report as well as Daily Mirror

The re-nationalisation of SriLankan Airlines and the follies of State enterprise

A couple of weeks ago, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe announced that the debts of SriLankan Airlines, amounting to a mammoth US$ 3.2 billion, will have to borne by the taxpayer. He said the government is taking this action to defuse an economic ‘landmine’ and that his government is actively looking for an international partner to manage the airline.

When a three billion dollar bill is passed on to ordinary Sri Lankans, many of whom have never flown the airline, it’s worth examining what let do this disastrous situation. In examining the data, it’s clear that Srilankan Airlines provides an excellent example of the problems that arise from state-owned enterprises.

Air Lanka, the state-owned airline was privatised in April 1998. The government of Sri Lanka sold a 40% shareholding to Emirates Airlines, which was also contracted to manage the company for a period of 10 years. The government of Sri Lanka continued to retain the majority shareholding but management was relinquished to Emirates.

Emirates re-branded the airline as ‘SriLankan’, overhauled the airline’s infrastructure and adopted a new approach to its operations. Cost-effective strategies were introduced; new pro-active management teams were put in place; Information technology became the basis of everyday activities. The airline’s network was constantly reappraised and product enhancement became a part of the airline’s philosophy. The airline was completely re-fleeted with an all-Airbus fleet of A340, A330 and A320 aircraft replacing the ageing Lockheed Tristars.

Although the privatisation and restructuring attracted a lot of criticism at the time, the exercise was eventually deemed a success; indeed in many quarters it was hailed as model for other airlines.

At an international seminar on airline restructuring and privatisation, held a couple of years after the divestment; the President of the employees union of Srilankan spoke on how union rights were protected and the improvement of working conditions.

At the time of the privatisation all employees were gifted shares by the government based on the number of years of service. Although a voluntary retirement scheme was also implemented the President of the union stated that employees were given an excellent deal if they wanted to leave and no-one was made redundant. Collective Agreements signed by the airline with employee unions guaranteed increments to employees. New human resource development programmes were instituted after privatisation to upgrade employees’ skills and a new grade and pay structure put in place.

Union representatives from other state-owned airlines were also impressed by the manner in which the airline disclosed information to employees; “they had never seen such transparency from an airline’s management,” said K J L Perera president of the employees union. SriLankan published its quarterly financial results in its staff newsletter.

Following a spat in December 2007 the Chief Executive Peter Hill, had his work permit revoked.The dispute began when Hill refused to bump 35 passengers from a full London-Colombo flight to make way for Sri Lanka’s president and his entourage. The Government cancelled the work permit of the CEO of the airline and in March 2008, Emirates did not renew the management contract. The airline, which had been consistently profitable under the management of Emirates last reported a profit in 2008; a bumper Rs.4.4bn. Since then the airline has racked up enormous losses; according to the latest published accounts for the year ended March 2015 losses stood 123.26bn rupees.

The airline reported an operating loss of Rs.16bn in the year 2015, an improvement from the loss of Rs.31.3bn in 2014. To put these figures into context, the Government bought out Emirates for only US$53m (or Rs.7bn at today’s exchange rate). Last year alone the airline lostfour times its original purchase price, a truly remarkable feat.  The airline’s accumulated losses amount to almost a billion dollars; the entire Southern highway was built for around 700 million dollars, cost overruns included.

The management of the airline has claimed that the recession in Europe and high oil prices caused the losses. The public was urged to look beyond the “mere profitability aspect” and understand the “catalyst role played” by the airline in tourism; in the words of the former CEO.

Airlines are global businesses and the same factors affect all airlines. Singapore Airlines cited by many who try to justify state ownership of airlines reported a marginal operating loss in only a single year during the last ten years; a loss of US$38m in 2009/10.

Singapore airlines is no less affected by the recession and oil prices, but it did not report losses. Singapore Airlines is a well-run state airline that is something of an exception. Many cite it’s example but few have been able to emulate its success, so we should not try to justify our Government’s ownership by looking to Singapore. Srilankan Airlines own track record is what we need to examine.

What changed when the Government took it over? They inherited a profitable business with the same staff, systems and infrastructure; the principal difference was in the management. The truth is that the airline suffered from gross mismanagement and corruption, some of which has recently been uncovered.

These problems seem to plague state owned enterprises (SOE’s), but why do they occur?

There are two elements to explanation: the principal-agent problem and the free-rider problem, both based on the assumption of self-seeking individuals.

An SOE is run by managers who do not own the firm. In a firm under state control managers know that their salaries will be paid regardless of how the business performs, therefore there is no incentive to maximise efficiency.

Frequently in Sri Lanka the Government will be under pressure to appoint various loyalists to key positions. In some, (although not all) instances, those who seek political patronage to be ‘fixed up in a job’ are people who lack the skills or abilities to find a job on their own merits. Thus the enterprise may become stuffed with incompetents; good staff will find it very difficult to work with these people so they either leave or give up trying to do any work and concentrate on keeping in the good books of the bosses.

The maxim of “more work, more trouble, less work, less trouble and no work, no trouble” is applied. In any case pay and benefits are not dependent on performance, so why bother to stick ones neck out? Soon, this attitude poisons the enterprise and staff work on surviving in their jobs rather than trying to manage the business.

This problem would not exist if the citizens, who are the owners (principals) of SOEs, can perfectly monitor the SOE managers (their agents) but individual citizens do not have the incentive, and means, to monitor the SOE managers.

This leads to the second element of the problem, even if they did try to hold the SOE to account, the costs that an individual citizen incurs in monitoring SOE managers (obtaining and analysing financial information, seeking explanations through public channels etc.) are solely his or hers, while the benefits of improved management accrue to all owners. Time and effort will be expended in the exercise by the citizen who receives no immediate benefit. Thus, individually, the citizens have little incentive to monitor the SOE managers, which means that in the end, no one monitors them. This is the so-called free-rider problem.

This is the fundamental structural flaw with SOE’s which explains why many operating in truly competitive markets are doomed to failure. There are apparently profitable SOE’s but In some instances they operate as a monopoly, like the Sri Lanka Port Aunthority.  In other instances such as LakSathosa, Governments  may  create an  uneven-playing  field  in  markets  where  an  SOE  competes  with private  firms,  as  they  have  a  vested  interest  in  ensuring  that  state-owned  firms  succeed. LakSathosa is exempt from the VAT and NBT charged on other supermarkets giving them a significant competitive advantage.

Accordingly, despite its role as regulator the government may, in fact, restrict competition through granting SOEs various benefits not offered to private firms. In such instances SOE’s may appear to be profitable but this is due to hidden subsidies and distortions which are ultimately borne by taxpayers.  

Airlines used to be regarded as a key part of transport infrastructure, like roads or bridges, which should be owned by the Government. Until the mid-1980s, most governments did own airlines and protected flag-carriers by restricting new entrants. This thinking has changed.

Privatisation made air travel more competitive and liberalisation brought competition from low-cost carriers. Most airlines in state control have failed to adapt and are losing money. There is little strategic interest in owning an airline; Switzerland and Belgium have done without a flag carrier for years.

The airline is currently a huge drain on the treasury and the previous experience with Emirates demonstrates the clear benefit of privatisation.

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A version of this article originally appeared in “The State of State Enterprises in Sri Lanka” Report as well as Ground Views

Limitations in Prof. Hausmann’s policy recommendations

By Premachandra Athukorala

The article originally appeared on the Sunday times 24 January 2016.

The policy recommendations made by Professor Ricardo Hausmann in his presentation at the recent Colombo Economic Summit are based on the ‘product space’ analysis developed and popularised by him and his co-researchers at the Centre for International Development at Harvard University. This approach has a fundamental limitation as policy guidance in this era of economic globalisation, even though their ‘ pictures’ (product space diagrams) look very impressive and have a great appeal to policy makers who take them at face value.

Product space analysis is based on the conventional approach to analysing trade patterns, which treats international trade as an exchange of goods produced entirely from beginning to end within national boundaries. This approach is based on the assumption that factors of production are locked in within national boundaries (that is, it assumes away foreign direct investment, and cross border movement of labour and all inputs used in manufacturing). It completely overlooks the ongoing process of global production sharing (GPS), the breakup of the production processes into separate stages, with each country specialising in a particular stage of the production sequence, which opens up opportunities for countries to specialise in different tasks within vertically integrated global industries.

Parts and components, and final assembly traded within global production networks (‘network trade’) have been growing at a much faster rate compared to trade in goods wholly produced within countries (‘horizontal trade’, the focus of product space analysis). Global production has been the prime driver of export-oriented growth East Asian countries. According to my calculation network trade accounts for over 60 per cent of total manufacturing exports from China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. A number of countries in the region (Vietnam and Cambodia are the latest example) have successfully moved from primary product specialisation to exporting manufactured goods (parts and components and final assembly) by joining production networks. This certainly is not ‘Monkeys jumping from low trees to taller trees’ as depicted in product space diagrams.

Policy inferences based on the product space analysis is not consistent with the objective of reaping gains from joining global production networks. As Professor Gerald Helleiner has aptly stated in a best-known article, “The introduction of the possibility of component manufacture and middle-stage processing within international industries knocks the bottom out of any stage theory of the development through industrialisation and trade which focuses upon final products” (Helleiner, Gerald K. (1973), ‘Manufactured Exports from Less-Developed Countries and Multinational Firms’, Economic Journal, 83 (329), p 43) It seems that Prof. Hausmann’s policy advocacy of export promotion has basically been shaped by the Latin American experience.

Latin American countries’ lack-luster record of manufacturing export expansion can be explained to a greater extent by these countries’ failure to reap gains from the ongoing process of global production sharing. I was surprised to note that in the website posting on the Sri Lankan visit, Prof. Hausmann has used Venezuela as a comparator for justifying his policy advocacy for Sri Lanka! Sri Lanka needs to learn lessons from its own past and from the successful countries in our Asian neighbourhood, not from a failed state in Latin America. In the aftermaths of the 1977 liberalisation reforms, a number of electronics multinationals came to Sri Lanka to set up assembly plants. We sadly missed the opportunity to become an export hub based on global production sharing because these MNCs soon left the country in the early 1980s as political instability set in.

Among these lost investment projects was a large assembly plant (with a planned employment of 3000 workers), which made headlines in a Harvard Business Review article. Chet Singh, the founding chairman of the Penang Development Corporation, recently told me that Motorola’s decision to come to Sri Lanka was a big concern to him and the Penang state government at the time because Sri Lanka was a much better location for electronics assembly compared to Penang. Luckily for him (and for Penang) Motorola eventually gave up the Sri Lanka option and set up a plant in Penang. The Motorola plant in Penang currently employ 8500 workers and also acts as the regional R&D centre of that giant multinational enterprise. We need to strive to regain such lost opportunities.

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Premachandra Athukorala is an advisor to the Advocata Institute.  He is a Professor of Economics, at the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australia National University.

The 2016 Budget in Sri Lanka -- The Good. The Bad. And the Ugly.

Sri Lanka's budget for 2016 included several liberal  measures but also many seemingly senseless interventions that may boomerang.

The budget contained the various give-aways to many constituencies: farmers, fishermen, housewives, and relatively higher salary earners who are in the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) tax bracket.

The budget deficit is large and revenue proposals ambitious.

The budget takes some steps in the right direction, but overall, we consider it a mixed bag. There were no shocks as in the interim budget earlier in the year, but the extent and timeframe over which reforms will be implemented is crucial.

We have highlighted some of the key proposals below, classifying them as either Good: liberal measures that will help people, Bad: poorly-conceived proposals that may be administratively difficult and Ugly: those that will impair the quality of life and society of Sri Lankans.

There were some proposals, such as the one to strengthen law and order by building police stations, that appeared to be more in line with a police state.

We have emphasized changes in policy rather changes in tax rates.

The Good: Liberalisation Measures

The government deserves credit for restarting Sri Lanka’s halted reform program in the areas of finance and trade. The budget contains many solid proposals in this area, including the liberalization of certain trades that were previously closed, including removal of certain products from the ‘negative list’ where prior permission is needed for imports.  The proposed repeal of the Exchange Control Act is also a major step in the right direction. This signals an end of an archaic law, to be replaced by a more market-friendly exchange management process.

Land lease and ownership regulations for foreigners are also to be to be eased. The tax imposed on land leases and the prohibition on freehold ownership were viewed as obstacles to investment. These measures should positively impact investor sentiment and encourage investment. This proposal also has the potential to inject fresh capital into Sri Lanka’s now fledgling real estate sector that has taken a brow beating following the curtailing of foreign state backed development projects.

Proposals to liberalise the labour market by allowing more part-time work, relaxation of rules on contract employees (although not spelled out in detail) is welcome. Sri Lanka’s labour laws are seen to be very rigid and a barrier to investment and overall business efficiency.

Also encouraging is the outward looking rhetoric of the government, including the proposed Financial Centre, modeled along the lines of Dubai’s International Finance Centre (DIFC). The DIFC operates as a tax-free zone which essentially imports laws and judges more familiar to international investors, and a similar model could help enhance Sri Lanka’s attractiveness in this regard.

The announced open sky policy is also a welcome move that could open up Sri Lanka as an aviation hub and help tourism.

We are also encouraged by the right rhetoric in terms of promoting Start-ups and small and medium enterprises including motivations to expand access to capital.

The decision to reduce import tariffs on consumer items such as electronics, shoes and clothing is also a welcome move so that people are able to enjoy more from their earnings than sending it to the government as well as playing a role in tourist spending.

Reforming Agriculture

Agriculture sector has suffered from years of populist pandering, price controls and a host of other misguided policies that has benefited neither the farmer nor the consumer. The moves to reform this sector is encouraging.  Cash grant to small farmers in place of the fertiliser subsidy is a step in the right direction.  While we view subsidies with caution,  it is better to give the farmer an outright grant with the discretion to apply it where they deem necessary rather than blanket subsidy which may promote overuse or waste.

The over usage of fertilizer which was encouraged by the subsidies has resulted in unanticipated negative externalities such as the recent contamination of lakes, rivers and groundwater supplies. This is suspected to be the cause of kidney ailments of residents in in the Rajarata region.
 

Underutilised state land is to be leased to fruit and vegetable farmers. There are large tracts of marginal land under the State Plantations Corporation and the Janatha Estates Development Board. Allowing farmers access to this for other crops is far better than to allow the land to to lie fallow.

The budget also proposes that RPCs (Plantation companies) to be allowed more flexibility in land use. This will allow them to make better use of land uneconomical for tea or rubber greatly enhancing their economic freedom.

PPPs and State Reform

Reform of State-owned Enterprises is proposed. We welcome the fact that the problem is recognised and some attempt is being made to address it. Exiting from non-strategic holdings via the stock exchange is better than what the government policy has been for the last decade.  While we advocate re-looking at privatisation of state industries that burden the government finances and in turn the taxpayer, we welcome the moves to address this problem.

Other noteworthy proposals such as restructuring the BOI, EDB and the Tourism Board to streamline operations and grant investment approvals within 50 days is welcome.

We are encouraged by the government’s apparent willingness to let the private sector into areas traditionally monopolised by an inefficient government sector.  

Creating Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) for state owned projects (the highways, coal plant, etc.) to attract private investment to repay debt requires further study but may be a step in the right direction.  Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) on Domestic airports,  monorail, investment zones, transport sector and developments in the proposed megapolis are all positive if carried out transparently.

The Bad

The budget text does have the customary give-aways and hand-outs as well as several measures that interfere unnecessarily in the market.

Price controls and subsidies on food items.

The Government has proposed price controls on six essential items including Mysoor Shal (Rs. 190/kg) , potatoes (Rs. 145/kg) , onions (Rs. 155/kg) , chicken (Rs. 480/kg) , packeted wheat flour (Rs. 95/kg) and dried chillies (Rs. 355/kg).

Price controls are administratively clumsy to implement and result in either goods disappearing from the shelves, lower quality goods, or the creation of black markets. This was a regular occurrence during the 1970s socialist era.   

A License-Quota regime.

Licenses are notorious for creating avenues for graft. Fifty licenses for duty free import of gold unnecessarily regulates the market place. The government should focus on dismantling current licensing regimes instead of putting up new ones.

Unintended consequences

Proposals to tax cash withdrawals will have an adverse impact on informal sectors of the economy. The  high rate (2% for withdrawals of Rs1-10m and 3% on withdrawals above Rs.10m) is designed to bring the informal sector into the normal banking system. While the objective is laudable it may hinder trade, especially among SMEs.   

The proposal to spend Rs.21bn or Rs.1.5mn for each cluster village is not clearly spelled out. This could be a license for wasting tax-payer money.

Fixing non-existent problems

The government proposes introducing regulations into certain previously unregulated markets. This includes Three-wheelers, School Vans and Taxis. One of the redeeming aspects of Sri Lankan public transport is that the free-market in private transport provision including Taxis and three-wheelers that provides a better service than most countries in the region. While the type of regulation is not spelt out in the budget speech, the government intervention could very well worsen matters.

Similar micro interventions in a mandate to register all hotels, and government subsidies for accountancy students seem like solutions in search of problems. A mandate to to have four people in a vehicle entering Colombo is also bound to be unpopular and difficult to administer.

Left unsaid

Whilst the finance minister spoke for a taxing four hours on the budget proposals, there was still much unsaid.  The budget was not explicit on what the government would do to tackle the over-staffed public sector. Nor were there proposals to put gasoline on a market-based pricing formula as was promised during the elections.

The Ugly

National Digital Identity Card.  

Whilst there is a tendency in Sri Lanka to cheer on anything to do with technology, we advocate caution on this proposal.  Little is known about the program except that it was initiated by the previous government.   For a country that’s emerging from an all powerful state,  a national security mindset, with the full extent of surveillance on citizens still unknown, people should demand more transparency and information before blanket implementation of this program. The country requires a robust debate on privacy and surveillance.

Micro interventions in the Banking & Financial Sector

Banks are asked to cease leasing operations from June 2016.

The rationale for this micro level interference in the banking sector is weak. It will be hugely disruptive to the operation of most banks with little benefit to anyone other than the non-bank financial sector.  

Similarly the directive to lend to agriculture, SME's and Women & Youth (whatever that may be) is poorly thought out. Fixing the fees on bank drafts at Rs.150 is another intervention proposed.  

We see no reason why government should be involved in these matters that should be left to the market place

 Confusing “Canned Fish” Proposal

A buy back scheme for locally produced canned fish to be sold at a subsidised price may open the door to massive losses at Lak Sathosa. If prices are high enough supply of canned fish to Sathosa will increase significantly and the losses may exceed the amounts budgeted.

At the same time taxes on imported canned fish will be increased, which will only increase the pressure to consume the subsidised products driving up the final bill to the taxpayer.

In another part of the budget speech the Minister blames a policy at Lak Sathosa where rice was imported at Rs.75 per kg and sold at Rs.50 per kg for the Rs.8bn accumulated losses in that institution. The Minister is proposing the same policy, but for canned fish instead of rice. 

The government seems to be concerned about reducing prices for the consumer as well as protecting local industry, these two objectives seems at odds with each other.

New Government entities and unfunded programs

On education, while the government has made election promises to expand state funding of education, the establishing of yet another state university (The Mahapola University, to teach ICT, business and English) is the wrong way to go about it.  Instead of spending Rs. 3bn  on buildings for a new state university the money would better spent on improving facilities at existing ones, expanding scholarships or setting up a market-led voucher schemes for funding of higher education.

The University of Moratuwa has a well deserved reputation for excellence in ICT, the Postgraduate Institute of Management has a similar reputation for business studies and faculties of English at both Colombo and Peradeniya produce high quality graduates. Should this money be better spent on strengthening facilities or faculties at these institutions? Much like the administrations before this, the government confuses funding for education with the provision of education.

A new proposal to spend Rs 1 billion on increasing the number of police stations from 428 to 600 is not explained properly. It is unclear if law and order will improve simply by building police stations. There is no mention of the manpower that is needed and whether that adds to the burden of an already mega public sector.

In Conclusion

The many steps taken by the government to transform Sri Lanka into a more outward looking, open market are welcome. The Finance minister certainly hit the right notes on Friday, about the government’s commitment to a market-friendly policy regime, a technology-focus and the emphasis on the private sector as the key driver of economic growth.

However glaring inconsistencies takes the shine off the Finance Minister’s claims.  Continued use of price controls and a readiness to make micro-level interventions in markets is not how a thriving market economy operates.  

As a society, Sri Lankan has also been unable to move away from expecting short-term goodies from the budget statement. Whether it’s price controlled big onions or powdered milk someone has to pick up the tab, and it’s often the same people as tax payers or their children in the next generation as government racks up debt.

There are reasonable questions asked whether the budget actually could meet the  deficit target the set by the Finance minister. The elephant in the room as always is Sri Lanka’s mega government apparatus. Slow dismantling the leviathan should be the answer to the long-term untying of the Gordian fiscal mess.

Advocata Institute is a public policy think tank based out of Colombo, Sri Lanka. 

Post-Election Agenda: A Sri Lankan Economy That is More Open to the World

By Anushka Wijesinha

This article originally appeared in the Daily Mirror on 06 August 2015.

Over the past decade or more the Sri Lankan economy has become less and less open to the world than it has ever been. Exports to GDP has nearly halved; the share of trade in overall growth has fallen, our overall tariff protection rates are higher now than in the past; our export diversification and product complexity now is far behind countries that were at the same level as we were several decades ago; and our foreign policy has not focused enough on economic relations and trade agreements. Looking at Sri Lanka’s export product categories, not much has changed between 1990 and 2013, whereas in countries like Thailand there are dramatic shifts from basic exports to highly sophisticated exports.

Reforms to Open Up

We must change the orientation of the Sri Lankan economy, if the country is to succeed at achieving sustained high growth and boost prosperity for our people. When you measure along trade openness (exports + imports as % of GDP) and along public vs. private sector participation – the Sri Lankan economy in 2013/2014 looks more like 1970, according to analysis in a forthcoming World Bank publication.

But the positive news is that when Sri Lanka did undertake liberalization policies in the past, the economy saw positive results. In the years following waves of reforms – both in the early 1980s (after 1977) but most clearly in the late 1990s and early 2000s (after the 2nd wave of reforms in 1990) the economy was more export oriented and more private sector driven. In the last couple of decades, in the absence of critical next generation reforms, we have slid back.

The Sri Lankan economy has a lot going for it – an unviable strategic location, rich biodiversity, a strong human resource base due to past investments, in the midst of the Asian century, and in close proximity to major markets like India. But the reality is that we are not the only ‘hot stuff’ on the market. We are in a dynamic region, but around us we have a lot of dynamic countries doing a lot of progressive things that make them attractive locations for international business. Sometimes I wonder – have we tricked ourselves into thinking that Sri Lanka is such a magical country where investors ought to come to, where foreign companies ought to do business with us?

Sri Lanka must reposition itself on the global stage and provide the right climate for companies to thrive on that stage. Two aspects are important for Sri Lankan companies to gain from this – a level playing field here at home and opening up of the playing field overseas.

A Better Playing Field at Home

Creating a level playing field at home means removing unnecessary and harmful distortions that have crept in over the past decade and incentives that really haven’t worked. Protectionism for selected industries and producst – often benefitting one or two recognisable firms with political patronage – have created disincentives for competition and dynamism. There has been a noticeable bias towards domestic economic activities and domestic non-tradables than export orientation in the past decade. While this would be fine for a large economy with a large domestic market, for Sri Lanka such a strategy is not sustainable.

Meanwhile, we must look strategically at leveraging on the massive new infrastructure outlays of the past decade – some of which have been doubted for their usefulness but can boost growth if managed cleverly. For instance how can we make Hambantota work and not abandon it due to political compulsions? Already it is emerging as a key vehicle transshipment port in the region. But beyond this, a private-public partnershuip approach is necessary to operationalise the port-airport-industrial zone nexus and make it an export hub like what Malaysia did in Penang.

Opening Up The Playing Field Abroad

Opening up the playing field abroad is a must to help Sri Lankan firms gain a greater foothold in the international market. This is a key area the state can help. It is where our foreign policy and international economic policy comes in. In recent years, much of our foreign policy has been preoccupied with managing international relations related to the end of the war, human rights, and governance issues. We must reorient this. Future foreign visits must necessarily have a strong trade and investment component with a strategically planned international business agenda. Diplomatic delegations must take with them foreign investors who have set up here and are thriving – let them tell the Sri Lanka story. That’s what the Penang Development Corporation in Malaysia did when they wanted to attract international business into the Penang Export Hub. When 3M first invested there, top executives from 3M were taken along with Malaysian political delegations to convince other foreign investors about the benefits of locating in Penang. Having global multinational executives selling your country for you is a powerful signal to potential new international investors.

Supporting Firms To Go Global

Much of Sri Lanka’s – and indeed many Asian countries – industrial policy approaches of the past have been focussed on trying to identify export sectors and providing a host of incentives and support to growth them. It worked in many East Asian coutnries only because of strong state capacity. Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan institutional set up to support exports and industry has not kept up with evolving needs. While traditional sectors like garments, tea, rubber, gems, etc., would continue as in the past, I would advocate that state institutions focus less and less on promoting full sectors. The future focus should be – “how can we help more Sri Lanka firms go global?”, rather than be obsessed with identifying and promoting sectors. This goes back to the argument on the states’ role in providing a level playing field at home and expanding the playing field overseas. There are a lot of very competent and competitive Sri Lankan firms who have proven that Sri Lanka can win in lucrative niches that may not be part of full sectors. Sri Lanka can boast of a manufacturing company that produces the impact sensors for airbags and seatbelts for much of the Japan’s automobiles; a technology company that produces combat simulation software for the US military; and a medium-sized fly fish producer that supplies the leading US brand of sport fishing equipment. These are all individuals companies winning in the export game. We need to help more of them emerge and win new markets. We may have to end our preoccupation with trying to promote whole sectors, and state institutions like the EDB and Ministry of Industries would have to reorient to support this new agenda.

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Anushka Wijesinha is visiting Scholar at Advocata and currently the chief economist for the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce.  He has previously worked at Institute for Policy Studies, The World Bank and the presidential commision on taxation.  His writings on economics are found on his blog -- The curionomist.  You can follow him on Twitter @anushwij

Assessing Colombo’s urban redevelopment projects

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

There has been some controversy about the urban redevelopment that took place at break-neck speed in Colombo under previous regime. Visitors and casual observers were struck by the changes to the city; Colombo was looking a lot cleaner and smarter.

The criticism has focused on the human aspects: the plight of evicted residents, the loss of a certain way of life or the change in the character of the city. Little attempt seems to have been made to assess the financial costs and benefits, chiefly because the full costs remain unknown.

The World Bank funded a part of the project and has borne the brunt of the criticism, but many of the projects were carried out independently by the UDA, the military and other state agencies.

The World Bank provided a loan of US$213m of which US$148m was allocated to finance flood and drainage management, US$ 51m for infrastructure rehabilitation (mainly streets and drainage) and US$10m for implementation support.

According to the project brief, the World Bank funding is in two components; the first addresses the problem of urban flooding, which regularly affects economic activities of Colombo. The second aims to support local authorities to rehabilitate and manage their drainage infrastructure and improve the systematic collection of solid waste. 

What the World Bank has been funding is basic infrastructure, something that was sorely lacking. Some observers have conflated this with the high profile redevelopments such as The Dutch Hospital, Colombo Racecourse, Floating Market, and Independence Arcade which seem to have been done independently by various state agencies. The confusion is understandable, given the lack of information.

The most controversial projects involving the rehousing of the urban poor seem to have been carried out mainly by state agencies, with the World Bank involvement being limited to one project at St Sebastian's Canal.

For a proper assessment citizens should know all the facts but the costs of the projects were deliberately shrouded in secrecy. In the interests of transparency the Government should collate and publish the total cost of the regeneration projects and the means by which they were financed. Since some of the projects are largely commercial in nature it is also necessary to know the income earned and the costs of operation.

Pending the availability of hard financial data, we can look at some of the broad philosophical arguments for urban regeneration.

There are many positive things that can come from urban renewal, depending on what drives the programme. The earliest projects were carried out in Victorian London to provide social housing to the poor, replacing the terrible slums that they lived in. A similar justification was used in the case of some of Colombo's new projects but one must note two critical points: the terrible conditions in London at the time, and the underlying purpose of the exercise : to improve the lives of the poor by providing cheap housing for the poor.

In Colombo the impetus seems to be more modern, one of stimulating economic growth through urban regeneration. This is something that has also worked (with varying degrees of success) in many different places but success is dependent on the right policy and governance framework.

If the economy booms, consistently over a few years people will have money to spend and there will be demand for land: for shops, for business premises, for entertainment.

When the demand materialises it makes sense to redevelop older or decaying parts of the city, to improve land usage or ease congestion. If the economy were booming then the Town and Urban Councils would be flush with cash (from trade based taxes) and there would be less need to borrow money to redevelop. It would also be possible to get the private sector involved in the redevelopment process, minimising the need for debt funding.

Urban regeneration needs to go hand in hand with the right policy and good governance because this is what ultimately drives growth. Ideally these should precede the regeneration effort and will help overall growth and the building of confidence. Getting this right policy costs little money but requires enlightened leadership. Once in place, growth will take place overall and attention may be turned towards the more neglected or decaying parts of the city.

Unfortunately what appears to have happened is debt funded beautification for which there is scant demand. According to news reports the floating market in Pettah is deserted. The Racecourse and Independence Arcade fare somewhat better, but store owners have complained that traffic is limited. It is a nice place to wander around in but few people actually seem to buy anything, as indicated by a recent news report that the Ceylon Tea Board shop at the Racecourse is running at a monthly loss of Rs.1m.

The problem seems partly to be in the mix of the shops in the malls. The shops were not allocated on general commercial principles or through a transparent process. Most crucially the malls seem to lack a proper ‘anchor’ tenant. Typical shopping malls incorporate one or more anchor stores and a variety of smaller stores, an anchor tenant being the largest retail outlet in the mall, chosen on the basis of its potential to attract customers to the shopping centre in general.

Naturally, these are commercial decisions and are best taken by businesses, not the Government.

What the Government should have done with these prime locations is to have tendered for proposals for redevelopment and handed over the entire project to a commercial developer. The property would have been developed, the treasury would have earned some revenue, the Government would be less burdened with debt and citizens need not be concerned with the commercial risks and rewards of the restaurant and retail trade.

What was the final cost to the taxpayer and could the money could have been better spent elsewhere? These are fundamentals question which must be answered and it is imperative that all the relevant information be made public as soon as possible.

The townsmen and visitors may be delighted by the external appearance of the city, but let us just hope that we are not walking on streets paved with gold, as in the folk tale of Dick Whittington.

Economic Recovery in the North: Moving From Aid to Entrepreneurship

By Anushka Wijesinha

This article originally appeared in the Daily Mirror on 27 May 2015.

Last week, Sri Lanka marked the six-year anniversary since the end of the armed conflict in May 2009. In the aftermath of the war, there was an impressive reconstruction and public infrastructure effort, with around 10% of all budget expenditures during 2009-2013 being spent directly on reconstruction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Two large ‘Marshall Plan’-type programmes – Uthuru Vasanthaya in the North and Neganahira Navodaya in the East – aimed to kick-start growth through an infrastructure and public works drive. The major connective infrastructure in these provinces – roads, bridges, fishery harbours, etc. – are now of a standard rivaling many other parts of the country. However, the shift from reconstruction, to true economic recovery through industrialization, job creation, and entrepreneurship, has been much slower – particularly in the North. While this article does not take a comprehensive look at all the reasons for this, it points to some key issues that need attention by donors, public officials and the private sector.

Post-war Economic Dynamics

It is clear that the post-war growth spurt is having a tangible effect on the Northern economy, particularly in key cities like Jaffna and Vavuniya. Consumption has picked up sharply, and a lot of the big brands from the South – in consumer electronics and agricultural equipment – are now operating here. There is even a branch of the Colombo-based men’s hair salon, La Passion!. Meanwhile, years of donor interventions have also distorted economic incentives. A local civil society leader I met with on a recent visit remarked that, “A hand-out mentality has been rooted in, and there is a need to promote entrepreneurial effort”. The steady inflow of foreign remittances is also having an economic effect in Jaffna, skewing the incentives to work. Young people who would otherwise be joining the labour force seeking employment are opting to stay out and live off remittance income instead. Locals complain of sharp rises in alcoholism and drug abuse among youth. But the picture is not the same across the peninsula. In Point Pedro, for instance, young people are keen to look for jobs and eager to see new industrial activities start up.

Supporting Industrialization

Atchuvely Industrial Zone is one such activity. This estate, which had been derelict and shut down during war, has now been revamped by UNOPS with funding from the Indian government. Twenty-five acres are now ready for occupation, but the inflow of investment has been rather slow. When I visited here earlier this year, I met with the owners of the few factories that have commenced operations, including a manufacturer of hardware items and a recycled paper producer. Several factories have received American donor support for their equipment and machinery, but are having difficulty finding the local skilled labour required to install and operate these machines. I also noticed that while several other projects had been given approval, the slots allocated to them were empty. Many local entrepreneurs are having difficulties with obtaining project finance to set up. This must be tackled, and local bank branches must play a better role in financing enterprise growth here. There is plenty of opportunity for, and interest among, indigenous entrepreneurs to expand into Atchuvely, professionalize their operations, expand and employ more people.

Beyond Donor Aid to Accessing Better Markets

In the immediate post-war period, there has been a high dependence on day labour for income – manual labour on farms and civil works projects. But the availability of work is often uncertain, leaving people vulnerable to fluctuations in income. Donor projects have identified this and attempted to support income diversification. These projects have funded training centers for job training and livelihood development and gifted people and households machinery and equipment. But during recent visits to the North, I witnessed in several instances where these facilities lay abandoned. I observed how successive rounds of donor projects have “gifted” assets to people, but paid little attention to help them make productive use of these assets. While these have been built and gifted with all the right intentions, there has been less focus on ensuring that these can sustainably support entrepreneurship. Little attention has been paid to helping them access markets. One local government official in the North remarked to me, “Many NGOs are providing training for people to produce various things in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu, but the peoples marketing knowledge is weak and so they cannot sell what they make.”

From ‘Cow-Dropping’ to ‘Dairy Entrepreneurship’

Diary projects have similar problems. A colleague I was travelling with jokingly called this the “cow-dropping syndrome”. So many donors have “dropped” free cows on families and hoped that this would improve livelihoods and incomes. Yet, little attention had been paid to help them become ‘dairy entrepreneurs’ instead; helping them maintain healthy animals, improve milk quality, and link up to stable markets and lucrative value chains. In some cases, women of female-headed households who received free cows had simply sold them off, either because they did not have a way of plugging in to a profitable milk supply chain, or even because it became too expensive to maintain owning them (feed, veterinary costs, etc), in the absence of sustainable revenue generation. Amidst this, however, a project by Cargills and Tetra Laval, was different. Supported by GIZ, they built up a group of dairy entrepreneurs who now regularly supplying large volumes of milk at better prices, to the national supply chain. With advice from Tetra Laval’s global ‘Food for Development’ programme, Cargills has been able to learn best practices in dairy farming and milk production. This in turn has boosted Northern dairy farmer’s knowledge in maintaining better milk production. Similar efforts by ILO’s LEED project have also adopted an integrated approach, where local producer groups are closely linked to national value chains.

Next Phase

More of these approaches are needed to boost entrepreneurship to support the growth of indigenous enterprises here, not just support an influx of brands from Colombo. Helping micro-producers link up with supply chains can certainly boost incomes in the North. It is already six years on, and once the dust settles on donor support it is entrepreneurship of the people that will boost the Northern economy more sustainably. The next phase of economic recovery must shift from ‘aid’ to ‘entrepreneurship’.

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Anushka Wijesinha is a development economist and a consultant to a host of governmental and non-governmental organizations in Sri Lanka.  He has previously worked at Institute for Policy Studies, The World Bank and the presidential commision on taxation.  His writings on economics are found on his blog -- The curionomist.  You can follow him on Twitter @anushwij

Abuse of Sri Lanka's migrant workers: Is a ban on migrant labour the best solution?

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

Reports of abuse of migrant workers have prompted calls to ban the outflow of labour, is this a solution?  There are some real concerns that need to be addressed but the economic consequence of a complete ban would be dire as foreign employment, is, by far, the dominant sub-economy of Sri Lanka. Remittances reached US$ 7,018 m in 2014, accounting for 39% of all foreign exchange earnings. The estimated 1.9 million foreign workers form 25% of our labour force.

To put things in context it is worth examining the history of migrant labour.

The oil boom in the 1970’s resulted in labour shortages in the Middle East. Fortuitously, the Non-Aligned Conference held in Colombo in 1976 opened up employment opportunities for Sri Lankans in the Gulf. By 1976 unemployment had reached almost 25 percent of the labour force, leaving 1.5 million unemployed in a population of 15 million. Migration was a solution to a problem of severe unemployment.   

It is ironic that even today, migrant labour absorbs 25% of the labour force. Hypothetically if there was no overseas employment Sri Lanka should have an unemployment rate of around 29%, far worse than that of 1976.

Overseas employment is therefore a solution to economic problems faced at home. A report by the UN states that out-migration in Sri Lanka is driven by low per capita income, unemployment and/or underemployment, high inflation, indebtedness and lack of access to resources. A long term solution needs to address these fundamental problems, most crucially the creation of employment. If there are sufficient well-paying jobs at home there is no need to seek work overseas. The steady increase in total departures testifies that Sri Lankan workers are making a choice, that it is better to risk abuse abroad than suffer poverty at home.

The abuse stems from weaknesses in the legal system in host countries. Fear of being overwhelmed by migrant workers may be one reason why host-country legal systems offer scant protection to temporary workers.

According to the Middle East Institute, a think tank, foreigners make up an estimated 37-43% of the population of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and constitute 70% of the workforce, with workforce numbers rising significantly higher in the UAE (90%), Kuwait (82%), and Qatar (90%).

The high percentage of guest workers worries government officials in host countries. Accordingly, governments have legislated to minimise the perceived threat. Restrictions on length of stay, strict regulations about changing jobs, hurdles imposed by the sponsorship system, difficult-to-meet criteria for bringing in family members, the inability to own land and businesses, the near-impossibility of obtaining citizenship, and the absence of legal rights all work to keep guest workers’ stays short, temporary, or informal.

Unfortunately, this is what enables the abuse. According to Human Rights Watch, workers typically have their passports confiscated and are forced to work under the highly exploitative kafala system of sponsorship-based employment, which prevents them from leaving employers. Migrants often have limited information about their rights and channels to seek help, and face discrimination and obstacles to redress. Domestic workers are worst off because labour laws in the Gulf exclude domestic workers from even the basic protections guaranteed other workers such as a weekly rest day, limits to hours of work, and compensation in case of work-related injury. Restrictive immigration rules make it difficult for domestic workers to escape from abusive employers.

Worker remittances have become a mainstay both for the national economy and for the households which receive them. Domestic workers, the category most vulnerable to abuse, are generally unskilled and drawn from the poorest sections of society. Many are below the poverty line or just above it, working overseas represents an opportunity to escape from poverty.

Therefore what the Government needs to do is to work with GCC countries to improving the system so that abuses are minimised.

Some work is being done, eleven Asian countries set up the Colombo Process in 2003, a regional consultative process to address the needs of contractual migrant workers employed overseas. In 2012, participating governments, including South Asian countries and all six GCC countries, adopted a Framework of Regional Collaboration committing to prevent abuse and foster greater benefits from migration. These include reducing recruitment costs, developing standard employment contracts, and making recruiting agencies responsible for the activities of local-level labour brokers. It also recommends pre-departure and post-arrival information seminars for migrant workers and government action to enforce labour laws.

Charities such as Helvitas are implementing projects to educate workers, provide guidance, support and access to legal advice. The Helvitas Labour Migration project works along 4 main threads:

• Access to Information: Migrants and their families are empowered to take an informed decision, based on safe migration knowledge. This includes the ability to follow the legal process or to detect fraudulent practices of sub-agents.

  At the same time, local government officials are supported to increasingly provide safe migration messages to the community and guide a decision-making process.

• Access to psycho-social support: By raising awareness on migrants'psycho-social issues with counsellors, midwives, and other relevant officers, the migrants are increasingly able to access services to mitigate their psycho-social hardships. Individual counselling and psycho-education sessions are provided for caregivers, migrants'children and returnees.

• Access to justice: Together with The Centre for Human Rights and Development (CHRD) Sri Lanka, migrants are provided free legal assistance and access to legal redress mechanisms provided by the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment.

• Remittances management: Migration can only be successful when remittances are managed sustainably. Financial literacy and knowledge about productive investments is key for migrants and their families. Therefore, they are sensitised on access to loans, budgeting, savings, formal banking and remittances transfer systems in order to maximise the financial benefits of migration.

The Government should partner with such organisations to ensure wide dissemination of these programmes.

Not all abuse takes place overseas, some local recruitment agencies have been known to be guilty of poor practices including failure to observe blacklists of employers/overseas recruitment firms compiled by the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), excessive fees, double-charging migrants for fees already paid by the employer and misrepresentation of pay or working conditions. More seriously some employment agencies have been accused of theft of wages and refusal to assist in mediation and repatriation. The SLBFE monitoring and enforcement functions also need to be strengthened to limit any local malpractices.  

Banning overseas employment is not a solution, although Nepal did experiment with one, temporarily banning women under the age of 30 from working in Gulf countries. The danger with a ban is that it may push workers into irregular migration channels with heightened risk of exploitation and trafficking. Instead, the Government needs to work in partnership with international agencies and other countries to strengthen the system so abuse is minimised.

Attracting FDI: Sorting out contradictions in policy

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

The article originally appeared on the Daily News on 15 May 2015

The BOI is reportedly developing a new investment policy for Sri Lanka with the help of a panel of experts.

This is a welcome move, but the investment policy needs take a broad view in order to remove some of the impediments to investment that stem from different sources. Two in particular, the policy on land ownership by foreigners and the visas for foreigners have become a source of confusion and a barrier to investment.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is widely used by developing countries as a tool to solve their economic problems. FDI can create employment and result in the transfer of technology which contributes to long term growth.

In countries where unemployment or underemployment is a prevalent the creation of new jobs is a priority and a good enough reason to attract FDI.

Even more important is technology transfer, a broad term that encompasses not only equipment but technical know-how, organisational, managerial, marketing practices and other skills that the employees of a firm learn while working with a foreign partner. When employees move to other firms they take these skills with them, which results in the skills being diffused into the local labour market, improving its productivity.

The transfer of knowledge is not limited to direct employees; foreign affiliates can also diffuse technology and skills to domestic suppliers, customers and entities with which they have direct and indirect dealings.

To ensure that local inputs meet their stringent technical requirements, foreign affiliates often provide the local suppliers not just with specifications but sometimes also with assistance in raising their technological capabilities.

Naturally, as countries have become more aware of the benefits of FDI an intense 'global race' for foreign investment has developed and Sri Lanka should ensure that it is not left behind.

In order for a country to be more attractive to investors (both local and foreign), there is a need to put in place measures to ensure an enabling environment by reducing so-called hassle costs, which is why the BOI was set up as a central point for all paperwork.

Access to land is necessary for investment but recent shifts in policy on land have caused concern.

The purchase of land by foreigners was prohibited in 1963, under the Finance Act. In 1992, the Exchange Control Act repealed the Finance Act allowing the purchase of land by non-residents on payment of a 100% tax.

The growth of tourism in Galle and the southern coast since the mid 1990's, particularly the development of a new concept of 'boutique hotels' may be traced to this event. Prior to this Sri Lanka focused mainly on mass tourism, the change in land ownership policy attracted a different type of investor, who brought with them a new concept of selling to niche markets. The 100% transfer tax on land was repealed in 2002. This, together with the tax amnesty of 2003 created a boom in property.

Up to that point the policy on land followed a clear trajectory towards greater liberalisation. Then followed a series of policy flip flops. First the 100% land tax was re-imposed in 2004. The tax was initially applied only to foreign nationals but was later extended to local companies owned by foreigners.

Then an announcement was made in November 2012, during the budget speech, that the sale of land would be banned. No legislation was enacted but the land registry simply refused to register any transfers due to the uncertainty causing much annoyance and confusion amongst investors.

Parliament finally enacted the Land (Restrictions on Alienation) Act No. 38 of 2014 in October 2014. This banned the sale of land to foreigners and companies where 50% or more of the shares were held by foreigners. Foreigners were allowed to lease land but a 15% tax was to be imposed on the lease rental for the entire term of the lease.

If a firm entered into a 99 year lease, it would be required to pay 15% of the total lease rental payable over the 99 years immediately as tax. In effect the firm would be asked to pay 15 years rent, up front as tax. Moreover, the tax was applied retrospectively, from January 2013.

On a short term lease of a year or two, a 15% tax may be tolerable but for any investor who is here for the long term, the type of investor that the country needs, the tax is prohibitive. Should investment slow there may be knock-on effects on areas such as tourism. Boutique hotels, being small, sell through word of mouth, to friends and associates of the owners. If foreigners are made to feel unwelcome they, along with their friends and family, are likely to start looking elsewhere for their annual holidays and winter escapes.

The spirit of the new Act appears aimed at restricting the access to land for foreigners, first by outright prohibition on sale and second by imposing an extortionate tax on leases, creating an effective barrier to investment.

Inconsistent with such a restrictive law is provision for the Minister with the approval of cabinet to grant exemptions to the Act. Therefore in practice foreigners can buy whatever they want, provided they have the blessings of the appropriate politicians and government officials. Analysts say that such wide discretion is designed to encourage what economists call 'rent-seeking' behaviour or in common parlance, corruption. Similarly confusing are the visa rules. On one hand the country wants to attract talent from overseas, initiatives such as Work In Sri Lanka have been launched to encourage skilled people from overseas to relocate but the country still denies work visas to foreign spouses of citizens. These are foreigners already resident in the country, many have skills that can be utilised productively, yet they are denied the right to work.

Although the sale of land is restricted, the Government still seems interested in promoting the sale of flats in high rises to foreigners-flats situated on or above the fourth floor of a building are specifically exempt from the restriction on the sale of land to foreigners. It does not seem to have struck anyone in authority that foreigners may not be interested in buying flats if residency visas and dual citizenship are hard to get. If the foreign spouse of a Sri Lankan has to give up a career in order to relocate the attractiveness of the country will diminish.

Some countries do restrict ownership of land and work permits are required almost everywhere but the rules need to be sensible investment is not to be deterred. Coherence, consistency and simplicity in policy will promote investment. 

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Ravi Ratnasabapathy trained as a management accountant and has broad industry experience in finance. He is interested in economic policy and governance issues. 

Plans to impose a Rs 10,000 Minimum wage: Will it improve welfare?

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy 

The article originally appeared on Dailynews on 7 May 2015

It is reported that the Government intends to legislate a minimum monthly wage of Rs.10,000 with an increment of 25% to be imposed over the next year. An increment of Rs.1,500 is to be effective from May 1 2015, while the rest will be effected from May 1 2016.

The legislation is probably founded in good intent: improvement of the welfare of citizens. Improving the welfare of people should be one of the fundamental objectives of a Government and one that few, if any, would question.

In simple terms we may measure welfare as the standard of living or in economics, the amount of goods and services that a person can enjoy. To the average person it may appear obvious that there is a minimum that one needs to earn to pay for basic foodstuffs, rent, electricity and utility bills and other expenses to live as a human being.

The standard of living is dependent on two factors: the income of people and the cost of goods and services. If the cost of goods and services is low then people do not need a high income.

A price list from Ceylon Cold Stores dating from the 1950's or 1960's lists the price of an imported Australian chicken at Rs.3.10 per pound, haddock fillet from Scotland at Rs.3.00 per pound and ice cream at Rs.10.00 per gallon. The author recalls paying a rupee for bread and 15 cents for the bus fare to school. If costs had remained at those levels people could have lived comfortably on a few hundred rupees a month.

Therefore in striving to improve the welfare of people there are two approaches that may be taken: the increase of wages or the reduction in the cost of living. Moreover if the cost of living increases faster than wages, people will be worse off, even if wages keep rising.

Sri Lanka has a highly distorted tax structure with essential commodities and foodstuffs being taxed at high rates. The previous regime excelled at the art of taxation by stealth with “special commodity levies” being imposed on milk powder, dhal, canned fish, potatoes, onions, chillies and a host of other foodstuffs. Milk powder is taxed at Rs.135 per kg, dried fish at Rs. 102 per kg, butter at Rs.880 per kg, cooking oil at Rs.110 per litre.

This is quite apart from VAT and other levies that add a further 15%-16% to costs. The taxes form a significant part of the final price of the goods. The current regime has cut some of the taxes but there is much more that could be done.

The problem that the Government faces in cutting taxes is that they have no means of paying for the bloated public service. The Government spends 54% of the tax revenue just paying the salaries and pensions of public servants.

Due to high levels of debt, interest cost takes up a further 38% of tax revenue.There are also huge inefficiencies and waste in the public sector. Sri Lankan Airlines lost Rs.30 bn in 2013, the cost of which is passed on to people as higher taxes.

The cost of living can be reduced significantly, with consequent improvement in welfare of the people, if taxes were cut but in order to do so waste and inefficiency in the public sector must be reduced.

Returning to the minimum wage, in order to impose a minimum wage, there needs to be employment.

The Government can impose minimum wages but this will have little effect in improving welfare if people are unemployed. There is no point in absorbing the unemployed into public service, as the previous regime did on grand scale because paying for this means taxing-and impoverishing the population at large.

Therefore the first step in poverty reduction is to ensure that jobs are created in the private sector, the second step being to control the cost of living.

The problem is that if the minimum wage is set too high and economic activity that takes place at low wage levels may become unviable.

Low wage jobs generally employ unskilled labour; if jobs are lost it is the poor who will suffer. It is better to have a low-paying job and some income rather than no job and no income.

As liberal economist Paul A. Samuelson wrote in 1973, “What good does it do a black youth to know that an employer must pay him $2.00 per hour if the fact that he must be paid that amount is what keeps him from getting a job?

In 2003, South Africa imposed minimum wages in agriculture to provide protection for workers to a sector with lowest average wages in the country.

A study on the impact of this by Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix concluded that while farmworker wages rose by approximately 17% as a result of the minimum wage, employment fell significantly, by over 20% within the first year.

A study of the impact of minimum wages in Indonesia by Asep Suryahadi, Wenefrida Widyanti, Daniel Perwira and Sudarno Sumarto reached similar conclusions. Since the late 1980's minimum wages had become an important plank of Indonesian government policy. While minimum wages succeeded in increasing average wages employment declined.

According to the study, a 10% increase in minimum wages resulted in a more than one per cent reduction in employment for all categories of workers except white collar workers.

Given the evidence available, the Government's decision to impose a minimum wage must be viewed with caution. If the minimum wage is significantly above market rates it will cause a decline in employment. The current wage level of Rs.10,000 is fairly low and anecdotal evidence suggests that its impact on employment will be small but once such legislation is in place the question of increments comes up.

A politician looking for quick votes in an election year may promise a high increase to the minimum wage which may reduce employment in the long term, to the detriment of the poor.

This policy, taken together with the ill-conceived taxes imposed in the budget sends a negative signal to investors. Investment in new business is needed to create employment, so sending the right signals is important. Not only could this policy destroy existing employment it could also be a dis-incentive to the creation of employment in the future.

It is advisable that the Government reconsider this policy. 

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Ravi Ratnasabapathy trained as a management accountant and has broad industry experience in finance. He is interested in economic policy and governance issues.

Expanding Trade with India : Winning with Competition or Cowering under Protection?

By Anushka Wijesinha

The article originally appeared on the Daily Mirror on April 29, 2015

In preferential trade agreements, we often see the potential losers being the most vociferous and more organized, while the gainers are quieter and more fragmented. This has been a typical characteristic of the debates on the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) and the proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) as well. But Sri Lanka must be careful of letting one side be heard more – by the public as well as by policymakers – than the other. More eclectic and informed debate representing all sides is essential, which is why I look forward to moderating this afternoon’s National Chamber forum on ‘CEPA and Its Implications for the Sri Lankan Economy’ – the first by the private sector following Indian PM Modi’s visit and announcements by both him and the new Sri Lankan government that they would forge ahead with the deal.

Deeper Engagement

The proposed CEPA would expand the current ISFTA to cover services, investment, and economic cooperation. The agreement was to take in to account the massive asymmetry between the two countries (economic size, population, etc.), afford Sri Lanka a more than disproportionate advantage, and allow for partially or fully restricting sectors it didn’t wish to open up right away. Following aggressive lobbying by narrow nationalist business leaders with close political affiliations, there was an eruption of uninformed and exaggerated sentiments against promoting greater commerce with India over the past few years. These groups successfully scuttled efforts at completing the CEPA deal several times in the past. “CEPA” became such a taboo word that the India-Sri Lanka Joint Statement in January 2013 avoided using that terminology, and referred to a “special economic partnership framework” instead!

Problem with Protectionism

It is not surprising that protectionist trade lobbies have emerged so influential. Sri Lanka has been sliding backwards in its openness to the world. For around 10-15 years now, protectionism has been on the rise and there has been a creeping up of applied tariffs and para-tariffs. A tangle of para-tariffs has now effectively doubled nominal protection rates to over 20%. Simultaneously, successive Budgets have introduced a range of ad hoc, special protection and promotion schemes for various domestic industries and indigenous enterprise. While this is not an unprecedented industrial policy approach, it does serve to weaken competitiveness of Sri Lankan firms. I recall a conversation with a business school friend of mine who started a high value added spice export operation out of Sri Lanka some years back. He lamented about the severe protectionist behaviour from local spice industrialists even though the project had been given the green light by the necessary authorities. Economic theory and evidence amply proves that in the presence of protection and in the absence of competition, firms become more complacent, less innovative and dynamic, and less able to face international markets. Is this what has happened to Sri Lankan firms vehemently against expanding trade ties with India? Ill-prepared for competition, cushioned by industrial policy that afforded special comforts?

 Government Must Play Smarter Role

It is incumbent on the government to ensure that stakeholder concerns are heard and addressed; that as much transparency as possible is maintained (without of course compromising the country’s negotiation position), and information is shared more comprehensively and consistently so as to prevent groups with narrow vested interests being able to misinform an mislead. Most importantly, the government cannot let the agenda be highjacked and held hostage by narrow interests groups, like in the past. A bilateral trade or economic partnership agreement that Sri Lanka enters in to affects not just a handful of firms and their employees but hundreds of other firms, hundreds of thousands of employees, and millions of consumers in Sri Lanka. The government must provide a clear policy direction on its economic engagement with India, making a strong departure from the ambiguous statements of the past – i.e., calling for a ‘special economic partnership agreement’. Meanwhile, although I did acknowledge at the start that the gainers from freer trade are often fragmented, less organized and less vociferous, it’s time that changed. Consumer and producer groups that gain from freer trade must speak up.

Opportunity to Win Big or Cower Down

Whether its called a CEPA or any other variation of it, the fact remains clear – it is in Sri Lanka’s interests to deepen economic ties with India. An agreement must be forged that cleverly expands Sri Lanka’s economic interests – those of our firms and our consumers; not a narrow few of them, but the wider many. To those who claim that it threatens our national interest, we must remind them that expanding our trade interests for the benefit of the many is also a part of our national interest. Just the opportunity to tap in to India’s growing middle class alone, set to be over 250 million this year – 20 times our entire domestic market – can be transformative. There are Sri Lankan firms with quality products that can and must break in to India. There are service providers, including dynamic Sri Lankan start-ups like Trekurious – a provider of unique lifestyle experiences – that have already entered India and demonstrated early success. A bilateral agreement will ensure that the systems are set out, for companies like these to operate in a rules-based environment. And if it is that we feel Sri Lankan firms cannot face competition, and it is for that reason alone we should not go for deeper economic engagement, then I’m afraid we have bigger things to worry about than a four-letter word starting with C.

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Anushka Wijesinha is a development economist and a consultant to a host of governmental and non-governmental organizations in Sri Lanka.  He has previously worked at Institute for Policy Studies, The World Bank and the presidential commision on taxation.  His writings on economics are found on his blog -- The curionomist.  You can follow him on Twitter @anushwij

Reforming Sri Lanka’s power sector

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

 The article originally appeared in the Daily News.

Electricity was introduced to Ceylon by a private company in 1895, but since 1927, with the formation of the Department of Government Electrical Undertakings the industry has been a vertically integrated state monopoly.

The electricity infrastructure comprises generation, transmission and distribution. Transmission refers to the bulk transfer of electricity from power plants to substations located near demand centres. Distribution is the delivery of power to consumers from substations.

Some reform of the industry took place during the 1980's and 1990's. LECO, a state owned private company established in 1983 to undertake the distribution of power in Kotte. Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and small hydro developers entered the industry in the mid1990s when generation was opened to private investors following a severe power crisis in 1996.

Since 2004 policy reverted to state-lead investment with the exception of small renewable power projects. The CEB reports regular losses, is heavily indebted and has invested billions but does Sri Lanka have an efficient and economic system of electricity supply, the stated mission of the CEB?

The disaster that is the coal power plant is well known and provides good reason to reassess the long term plans for the provision of power.

Before examining long term solutions there are immediate problems that need to be addressed so some short-term measures are necessary. A peculiarity of Sri Lanka's electricity demand is the high evening peak load. A steep increase in demand occurs between 6pm-7pm which then peaks from 7pm-8pm. Thereafter demand gradually eases over the following three hours.

Peak demand is about 50% higher than average demand and coping with this presents the most urgent problem for the CEB. A study by the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) in 2012 recommended that “aggressive action is still required to curb further growth in peak demand, since an adverse trend is observed during recent past”.

The simplest solution to this is to move to daylight saving time, which means setting the clock forward by an hour. This proved to be an effective curb on demand when it was implemented after the power crisis of 1996. It was previously used in Ceylon during WWII to conserve power and also by Pakistan after a power crisis in 2008. It is a simple cost free solution that demands immediate implementation.

The management of the demand for power by bulk consumers is also needed. An overlooked aspect of this is the waste of power in the telecommunications industry. Transmission towers consume a lot of power but operators in Sri Lanka do not have a comprehensive infrastructure sharing regime. Operators regard their networks as a source of competitive advantage and share only limited sites. This has resulted in widespread duplication of infrastructure, unnecessary strain on the grid and unsightly visual pollution. The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRC) needs to impose a proper infrastructure sharing regime. Sharing must cover all infrastructure including SLT’s fibre backbone and the TRC should incentivise the decommissioning of redundant sites. Moving on to longer term solutions should private power have a role to play?

In Sri Lanka IPPs have been controversial but the solution is not be to ignore the private sector but instead to move to electricity auctions to procure power. Auctions increase the competition and transparency of electricity procurement and are now quite widely used. Examples include the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Singapore. Open, transparent competition promotes efficiency and reduces costs to consumers. Singapore moved from state monopoly in 1995 to competitive market in stages over a period of years, yielding tangible benefits to consumers. Although the price of oil, the major cost in electricity generation, increased by 152% between 2001 and 2008, Singapore’s electricity tariff rose only 14% during that period. This was possible largely due to efficiency gains in generation, such as utilising more cost-efficient technology.

Competitive pricing encouraged firms to invest, for example in more efficient gas fired combined cycle turbines and retro-fitting existing plants. The share of electricity generated in Singapore by natural gas increased from 19% in 2000 to 79% in 2010 and overall power generation efficiency increased from 38% to 44%. Consequently, carbon dioxide emissions per unit of electricity generated declined by 30% between 2000 and 2007.

The tangible benefits from liberalising the electricity market make a compelling case to move in that direction although the process is by no means a simple or easy. Even in Singapore the major reforms were introduced gradually over a period of a decade, but this should be the vision for Sri Lanka’s power sector.

The Pathfinder Foundation published a paper in 2007 examining in some detail how Sri Lanka could move to a competitive electricity market. The conceptual model for an electricity market, in very simple terms is to have the generation, transmission and distribution split into independent units with competition between them.

It is essential to have several entities carrying out generation (IPPs and entities carved out from existing CEB generation assets). These will compete in a daily computerised auction to sell power to the transmission entity, which should have no links to the generating entities. The auction is usually held a few says before the actual despatch of power is needed. The generating units compete to supply power for fixed time slots in the day, usually for each hour or half hour and the system automatically awards the time slots to each generating unit based on the lowest cost. The transmission entity in turn sells the power to distribution units, which will be monopolies in their respective areas of operation. When distribution utilities operate in similar operational areas, the regulator can easily set up realistic performance targets by comparing their performances. Similarly since the transmission will be carried out by a separate entity the losses in transmission are easily monitored and the incentive is created to minimise leakage.

If practical advice were needed the Government of Singapore has always been willing to share its expertise.

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Ravi Ratnasabapathy trained as a management accountant and has broad industry experience in finance. He is interested in economic policy and governance issues.

Tea & Hoppers - Fixed Prices, perverse incentives [Podcast]

By Anushka Wijesinha

In my latest podcast, I talk about tea and hoppers; two of my favourite food items, and indeed of most Sri Lankans. But the government now dictates how much shops can charge me for these – and its a pretty fantastic, lower price than ever before – milk tea at Rs 25, plain tea at Rs. 10, and plain hoppers at Rs. 10. As a consumer, I should be pretty happy right? “Not if it’s causing unintended consequences!”, the economist inside me is saying.

In this article titled ‘The Problems of Price Controls‘, The Cato Institute – a prominent libertarian think tank in the US, asserts that,

“price controls reduce quality, create black markets, and stimulate costly rationing”.

We are seeing this play out right here in Sri Lanka. Last month, we saw one of the most intrusive and bizarre examples of administered prices (or price controls) being introduced by a government in recent times. This was on tea, and hoppers, served anywhere in the country, to be enforced by the Consumer Affairs Authority. What this has done is cause perverse incentives among those making and selling these items. Using poorer quality ingredients, shaving off quantity, skimping on the add-ons. Government-imposed fixed prices not only completely violates basic economic freedoms enjoyed by firms – like the freedom (and ability) to use price to signal quality or differentiation – but it is also notoriously difficult for a government to enforce fully and fairly. We must do more to make policymakers and bureaucrats understand that badly thought out public policies cause perverse incentives by economic agents, and this helps nobody. Listen to the podcast by clicking play below, or visit it on Soundcloud 

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Anushka Wijesinha is a development economist and a consultant to a host of governmental and non-governmental organizations in Sri Lanka.  He has previously worked at Institute for Policy Studies, The World Bank and the presidential commision on taxation.  His writings on economics are found on his blog -- The curionomist.  You can follow him on Twitter @anushwij 

The Colombo Port City: dealing with unsolicited proposals

By Ravi Ratnasabapathy

The Colombo Port City has generated a storm of criticism, the latest from the Friday Forum, which has called for systematic reviews of large state infrastructure projects. The Chinese Government is now reportedly weighing in on the side of the developer, The China Harbour Engineering Corporation.

Unsolicited proposals such as the Port City are controversial. How should a government deal with them? What should be done with the Port City project itself?

Public procurement, especially for infrastructure is a complex process. The general procedure is that a project, once identified and screened by the relevant line Ministry (in regard to the economic and financial viability), should be submitted to the Ministry of Finance for preliminary clearance. If Finance Ministry Clearance is obtained it must be submitted to the Cabinet for approval in principle. If this is obtained, the Finance Ministry will appoint a Project Committee to develop a detailed Request for Proposal (RFP).

The RFP is very important, since it is the foundation of the project. It spells out the project needs clearly and sets the framework within which competing bids can be evaluated. The RFP would include the following:

1. Criteria of assessment of technical and financial viability of the project.

2.  Details of specifications

3. Models of relevant Agreements as decided on a case by case basis.

4. Environmental data and information.

5. Any other relevant information.

An unsolicited proposal bypasses this process of vetting, which means a bad project can get through. Therefore, traditionally unsolicited proposals were viewed with disfavour. The United Kingdom for example does not permit unsolicited projects.

Many of the world’s most controversial private infrastructure projects originated as unsolicited proposals, such as the Dabhol Power Plant in India and many independent power generation plants in Indonesia. In some countries private companies submitting unsolicited proposals often did so in an attempt to avoid a competitive process to determine the project developer. If successful, they were then able to finalise project details with the government through exclusive negotiations behind closed doors, which is also the case in Sri Lanka.

Should Sri Lanka bar unsolicited proposals?

There are positive aspects of unsolicited proposals. Sometimes such proposals are based on innovative ideas and it is useful to obtain external input in conceptualising, designing, and developing projects.

The difficulty is in getting the right balance between obtaining innovative project ideas without losing the transparency and efficiency of a competitive tender process.

Therefore a proper written policy is essential. At a minimum, the principle should be that all unsolicited proposals are channeled into a transparent, competitive process where challengers have a fair chance of winning the tender.  

There are two main approaches that have been developed to deal with unsolicited proposals. These are:

1. In a formal bidding process, a predetermined bonus point is awarded to the original proponent of the project. Chile and the Republic of Korea have such a system. Problems may arise with definition of appropriate bonuses which is subjective and potentially open to manipulation.

2. The Swiss challenge system in which other parties are invited to make better offers than the original proponent within a specified time period. If a better offer is received, the original proponent has the right to counter match any such better offer. This system is practiced in the Philippines, South Africa and Gujarat in India. This is the preferred option since it does not require further analysis or subjective decision making.

Either of the above approaches can work with proposals that are still on the drawing board. How do we deal with a project where work has already commenced such as the Colombo Port City where the developer has already spent a substantial amount of funds? It cannot simply be cancelled, despite various contradictory claims emanating from the sections of the Government, nor can be easily be opened to tender.

A Developers fee approach – where the project is opened to tender but development costs to date are reimbursed, either by the government or the winning bidder, could be a solution. There will be difficulties in assessing the costs and it is not certain whether either the Government or another developer would be willing to take it on, but at least opening up for tender will give us an idea of the alternatives available.

The project will initially need to be subjected to an independent technical review to ensure that concerns in areas such as water supply, sewage disposal and power have been addressed. The city of Colombo is already overloaded in all these respects, adding the strain of the port city to the crumbling infrastructure of the capital could take it to bursting point.

The environmental issues are another can of worms, from the supply to sand, to the damage to corals, impact on marine life to altering of tidal patterns that may cause coastal erosion elsewhere. A full independent review is needed.

If both areas of concern can be addressed then it may proceed, after being opened to tender as discussed above.  If the project cannot proceed there is another headache as to what to do with the partially built site-a separate study on the best alternate use is needed.

What is tragic is that all these problems could have been avoided. There were processes and institutions in place to ensure proper procurement, but they were abolished in 2007.

The National Procurement Agency (NPA) of Sri Lanka provided the general framework for handling unsolicited proposals. Written guidelines on unsolicited proposals were in place. All unsolicited proposals were to be dealt with through the Swiss Challenge system.

 Set up in 2004 by then president Chandrika Kumaratunga the NPA was shut down in December 2007. All the more reason that the proposals in hand should be channeled into a transparent, competitive process.