The other side of parate execution suspension

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

In India, there was a particular type of cobra that was causing havoc due to snake bites. People were protesting and social pressure was building. The then British Government had a brilliant idea to counter cobra bite-related deaths and bring down the reptiles’ population – it announced an incentive scheme for every dead cobra.

In essence, people in India were encouraged to kill cobras and hand over the animal’s dead body to established Government offices in India and collect cash in return. In the first few weeks, things worked out very well, but later the Government realised that the number of cobras being handed over was increasing exponentially.

Upon investigation, the Government realised that Indians had become somewhat entrepreneurial. They had started cobra breeding houses at homes and killing cobras as a means of revenue generation for the family. At one point, the Government withdrew the cash incentive system given the misuse of the entire scheme.

Since there was no incentive for people to maintain cobra breeding houses, they released the reptiles into the jungle. The cobra population then multiplied several fold more than what it was initially as a result of the same policy being implemented to reduce the cobra population. This is called the Cobra Effect.

The Government decision to suspend parate execution as a relief for Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs) is no different. It is true that MSMEs are going through a difficult time as a result of higher inflation, high interest rates, and economic contraction. It is necessary to protect the MSMEs as they comprise about 99% of business establishments and about 75% of employment in Sri Lanka.

However, whether the suspension of parate is really for MSMEs is a question; 557 parate executions have been undertaken as of November 2023. The total value of the parate executions was just Rs. 38 billion, which stands at just 0.4% of total loans and a mere 2.7% of total impaired loans. From the numbers, it is clear that most MSMEs have not been impacted by parate executions.

Effect on MSMEs

Parate is an execution power on the part of banks under the Recovery of Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) Act, No.4 of 1990, where lending banks can recover non-repaid debt by borrowers by selling assets without going through the judicial processes. In 1961, this power was only granted to People’s Bank and the Bank of Ceylon, and in 1985, the power was extended to regional rural development banks as well.

If MSMEs are not affected, what could be expected to happen when parate executions are suspended until December by the Government? This is likely to backfire on MSMEs given the nature of the banking industry, akin to the Cobra Effect.

Banks lend depositors money. Parate was a safeguard for depositors’ money in case someone was not repaying loans they had taken, giving banks a final resort to recover that money so they could honour the depositors.

Now with parate suspension, banks have a higher risk of not being able to recover the money from the loans extended, so they have to charge a higher risk premium when borrowing for anybody, including MSMEs. Therefore, if MSMEs want to borrow money now, they have to pay higher interest rates, which means further contraction of the economy at a time when it needs to grow.

Triple whammy

On the flip side, this will encourage borrowers to default as they now know the banks cannot execute parate even if they were to willfully default. Additionally, borrowers who are honouring their loan repayments with the greatest difficulty during this economic crisis will be discouraged, because their hard work in honouring the dues will not be rewarded. This does not mean that even the Rs. 38 billion through parate execution has to be understated, but it has to be addressed separately without changing a law which affects the entire banking sector.

The Government declared a Rs. 450 billion bank recapitalisation in Budget 2024 given the instability of the banking sector as losses and loans of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have to be absorbed. On the other hand, licensed commercial banks including State banks are being exposed to sovereign debt restructuring, which is at its final stage. Accordingly, this is detrimental to the stability of the banking sector.

On the depositors’ end, they may be reluctant to deposit money as their risk is now higher on recovery.

Parate execution generally takes place at the last stage of recovery and must go through a court process. Suspension of parate without even consulting banks may provide wrong signals for the ongoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) review, since the IMF initially advised to conduct an assessment on the stability of the banks, although the context has now changed after a few months.

The Non-Performing Loan (NPL) ratios of banks are also on the rise, so banks basically face a triple whammy with this parate suspension – having to charge risk premiums, high NPL, exposure to sovereign default, and now difficulties in recovering money and incentives for not servicing existing loans.

However, the need to protect MSMEs is paramount, which requires a separate sequence of actions. Setting up a bank specifically to absorb bad loans, setting up bankruptcy laws, or moratoria on some of the bad loans under parate executions are options. Changing the entire parate system will indeed bring consequences similar to the Cobra Effect in India.

Sri Lanka state fails in the core business: administration of justice

Originally appeared on the Economy Next

By Prof. Rohan Samarajiva

In a previous column I stated that “no political or economic theorist would argue that the state should not be engaged in the provision of law and order. . . even extreme libertarians would see a role for the state in law and order.”

Sri Lanka presents a façade of a functioning legal system. Justices and judges get appointed; ceremonial sittings are held. Funds from World Bank loans are expended; buildings are constructed. Lawyers walk around briskly in court premises; many of them live well.

But it is rare to see a modern state fail so badly in this core function.

Evidence of failure

The President’s Counsel currently serving as Minister of Justice presented the evidence in a speech to the 47th Annual Convocation of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka:

– the average time to enforce a contract in Sri Lanka is 1,318 days

– We have been ranked 161 out of 189 countries for the enforcement of contracts

– Our legal system is ranked 5th out of 8 in South Asia.

– Land, Partition and Testamentary cases on average take a generation to be settled.

– A criminal trial takes on average 9½ years to conclude in the High Court.

– A criminal matter on average will take a year to be fixed for appeal and 3-4 years for the said appeal to be completed.

But this is not all. From 1978, we have had justiciable fundamental rights. Fundamental is defined as “forming a necessary base or core; of central importance.” Therefore, one would expect fundamental rights cases to be given higher priority than the cases listed above.

But that is not the case. It took the Supreme Court until 2021 February to issue a decision on a fundamental rights case, Kurukulasuriya v Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SC FR Application No. 556/2008 & SC FR Application No. 557/2008), notwithstanding the unequivocal language of Article 126(5) of the Constitution: “The Supreme Court shall hear and finally dispose of any petition or reference under this Article within two months of the filing of such petition . . ..” Instead of two months, it took 145 months.

It is said that justice delayed is justice denied. Can it be said that justiciable fundamental rights exist in Sri Lanka?

Then let us look beyond law’s delays, at egregious injustice. At qualitatively bad decisions. We had a Chief Justice who publicly admitted that he absolved the current Prime Minister in the Helping Hambantota case on political grounds.

But this man’s unjust decisions were many, as I documented in an article published in the Financial Times of 27th November 2008. A bench headed by this Chief Justice decided on the 21st of July 2008 (CS/FR 209/2007) a matter that only came up for argument on the 27th of November 2008 before a different bench. That’s right. The case was to come up in November, but the decision was given four months earlier.

The bench headed by the Chief Justice ruled on the tax exemption in July: “The tax relief granted to JKH was not permissible under the existing Regulations and JKH got an amendment tailor made for its purpose and secured the tax exemption” (CS/FR 209/2007, pp. 60-61). Yet, the respondents in the case that came up for argument in November, including the then BOI Chairman Dhammika Perera, the BOI Chairman when the tax exemption was granted Arjuna Mahendran, and former Commissioner General of Inland Revenue A.A. Wijepala, all needed to determine the legality of the exemption, were not among those noticed in CS/FR 209/2007.

By initiating a separate case that was taken up for argument on 27th November and serving notice on the above individuals, the plaintiffs of CS/FR 209/2007 conceded that the tax matter was not part of that case. Yet, the Chief Justice issued a ruling, violating natural justice.

Was the former Chief Justice the only malefactor? What about the other justices on that bench? What about the counsel? I purposely published my indictment on 27th November 2008, the day the tax-exemption case was to be taken up.

It would have been difficult to miss because the editors had put a black border around it and stated that they were not responsible for the content.

Did anyone in the judiciary or the legal profession do anything about it? Was an inquiry initiated? No. Is it unreasonable to conclude that the rot in the legal system was not limited to one out-of-control Chief Justice?

Has the Attorney General’s Department, which wields enormous power, been insulated from the rot? Does it exercise prosecutorial discretion in a fair and reasonable manner? The large number of prosecutions dropped when governments change raise legitimate doubt.

Does the Legal Draftsman’s Department do its job in a professional manner? How could a Constitutional Amendment that sets a quorum of three for an Elections Commission with a membership of three have been cleared by that Department?

How could it have neglected to include the Consolidated Fund as a continuing source of revenue for the Fund of the Disaster Management Council in the Disaster Management Act, No. 13 of 2005?

What is being done?

The current Minister of Justice is striking the right notes:

“It is vital that we look at a complete structural change from end to end and roll it out in a targeted and efficient way. We have to stop looking at the legal profession as one which exists solely for the sustenance of its members, but as one which plays a much more important role as a public centric body which is driving the justice system forward – one which is ready to innovate, to evolve and to take the right decisions at the right time to create a paradigm shift in the administration of justice.”

Even if done in a way that was not quite proper, the Minister has increased the number of judges in the superior courts. Funds have been allocated for court automation. It is hoped that the foundation laid by the comprehensive study completed in 2017 and the extensive consultations the ICT Agency conducted with the judges of the superior courts in 2019 will be built upon.

The above actions will, if adapted from a working system in another country, carefully piloted and scaled up, and supported with the necessary technical personnel, fix the dysfunctions in the “registry” part of the court system, which involves, or should involve, low discretion. If the system is transparent to lawyers, litigants and the public and is hardened to resist malicious attacks and manipulation, a key piece of the solution will be in place. But this will not, by itself, yield the desired outcomes.

The procedures and rules must be redesigned placing the needs of the litigants at the center, and not those of the lawyers and the judges. Even if it is a monopoly buttressed by archaic and arbitrary contempt-of-court rules, what the courts do is supply a service.

The litigants want a service, and they pay for it, either directly or through their taxes. They should be treated with respect and provided the services they seek at high levels of quality.

Decisions, even against those charged for criminal offenses should be of high quality in that they have been reached based on the relevant procedure, and are based on the best possible evidence. High quality also means not having to live in limbo for years, while lawyers and judges take their own cool time.

Unless procedures are reformed to put the litigants at the center, law’s delays will continue. Judges must work reasonable hours and they must impose discipline on lawyers by refusing frivolous requests for postponements. Section 63(2) of the Colombo Port City Economic Commission bill illustrates the dysfunctions of the current system:

“In order to foster international investor confidence in the ease of doing business and in the enforcement of contracts, in the national interest and in the interest of the advancement of the national economy, the inability of a particular attorney-at-law to appear before the Court on a particular date for personal reasons (including engagement to appear on that date in any other court or tribunal) shall not be a ground for postponement of commencement or continuation of the trial or be regarded as an exceptional ground warranting such postponements.”

For cases involving companies registered with the Port City Commission, the conventional rules that privilege the convenience of the lawyers are not to apply. But the rest of us will not only have to continue to put our lives on hold for the convenience of the lawyers and judges; we will also have to suffer the indignity of the fast-track litigants from the Port City cutting in front of us in the queue.

Simply reforming the rules will not suffice. The overall quality of legal education must be improved with a greater openness to innovation. The lowering of the protectionist barriers erected to safeguard the earning potential of members of the legal profession is a necessary condition. In recent debates around bilateral agreements dealing with trade in services, activist engineers told me that they need the kinds of protections the lawyers had erected for themselves against foreign competition.

Innovation requires the transfer of tacit knowledge possible only by day-to-day interactions. It is energized by competition. It is only when the legal profession becomes open to innovation that the judges who are drawn from it can become innovative and responsive.

All professions are protective of the pecuniary interests of their members. They fight back when those interests are threatened in any way. Lawyers are fearsome adversaries. Even the most astute and committed politicians approach legal reform with trepidation. They understand that the reform will take the form of trench warfare unlikely to yield results within the political cycle. They devise workarounds.

Politicians can at least try. System-level workarounds are unavailable to ordinary citizens and businesses. Their workarounds are petty and, in some cases, illegal. They limit transactions to trusted parties, knowing unenforceable contracts are meaningless. They seek the services of thugs to enforce contracts. They keep buildings that can be rented for revenue empty.
Workarounds

The proposed Colombo Port City Commission is a workaround.

Legal-system-related factors are a main reason Sri Lanka is ranked 99th out of 190 countries in the Ease of Doing Business Indicator. Even Nepal is ahead of us; Pakistan is about to catch up. Poor performance in resolving insolvency and enforcing contracts are major contributors to Sri Lanka’s low rank. On enforcing contracts, the country is ranked 164th.

It is unlikely that high-profile financial and service businesses will want to locate offices in Sri Lanka in these circumstances. Despairing that the legal system can be improved, the drafters of the Port City Commission Bill propose to make arbitration by the International Commercial Dispute Resolution Center that is to be established within the Port City mandatory for disputes arising within its area of authority. They also propose a fast-track, exemplified by section 63(2) quoted above, for engagement with the Sri Lankan courts if required.

Despite all the talk of how bad bypassing the Sri Lankan legal system is, this has been going on for a long time.

The disputes between several international banks and the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation over hedging contracts entered in 2008 in the first Mahinda Rajapaksa government were not resolved by the Sri Lankan courts. Arbitrations on the contracts with Standard Chartered and Citibank commenced, respectively, before the English High Court and the London Court of International Arbitration.

Deutsche Bank’s arbitral proceedings against Sri Lanka for the actions of the CPC, Central Bank and the Supreme Court in relation to the failure to perform the hedging agreement were at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an organization established by the 1965 Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID Convention).

The CPC lost the cases. They also bore the considerable costs of participation in expensive cities.

The legal agreements governing the Sri Lanka Telecom privatization by the first Kumaratunga government in 1998 did not give rise to a need for dispute resolution. But had such arisen, the arbitration would have been in Singapore under that country’s laws.

In this context, it is unlikely that commercial disputes where referral to the Dispute Settlement Center within the Port City is not mandatory will come to the Sri Lankan courts. They will go to Singapore, London, Geneva, or Washington DC. They will bypass the Sri Lankan legal system, understandably. At least the International Commercial Dispute Resolution Center will be on Sri Lankan soil and the lawyers need not be paid per diems.

Effects of workarounds

The petty workarounds of the citizen and the businessperson yield no good results. They simply overburden other parts of the system and let resources lie fallow.

We like to teach the Coase Theorem which describes the economic efficiency of an economic allocation or outcome in the presence of externalities. The theorem postulates that if trade in an externality is possible and there are sufficiently low transaction costs, bargaining will lead to a Pareto efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property.

But with a dysfunctional legal system, the condition of properly defined property rights does not exist. Coasean bargaining is limited to the classroom. We are compelled to fall back on the command-and-control capabilities of the state, overburdening it further.

The system-level workaround of the Port City Commission Law could be a holding action until we improve our legal system and associated processes of relevance to investors and service industries that are to be attracted to the Port City.

In the same way that the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC) was to be a holding action until we improved the provision of planning, utility and related services throughout the country, there could be a plan to gradually bring the enclave within the general legal system which has been improved in the meanwhile. The doing business indicator measures good governance in the country as a whole (though for some components they focus on the capital), not in special enclaves.

It would be good if that were the case. But looking at the situation in the zones managed by the Board of Investment as the successor to the GCEC, we can see that the transition has not been completed even some 40 years later.

Even today, the services offered by the BOI in the zones are superior to those outside. We in Sri Lanka appear to be content with running superior systems and single windows for foreigners (and Sri Lankan who achieve such status) while letting the rest of the country suffer under second-rate systems and multiple windows.

The hope, always, is that the island of good governance will catalyze and drive reforms in the surrounding ocean of bad governance; that the land will take over the sea. We keep hoping.

Rohan Samarajiva is founding Chair of LIRNEasia, an ICT policy and regulation think tank active across emerging Asia and the Pacific. He was CEO from 2004 to 2012. He is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

Missing the boat again

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

The many wasted opportunities to capitalise on Port City

This is just a funny story I have heard before; not a true one. Once upon a time, a man was caught amidst a flood, and his life was in danger. This man was extremely religious and believed that his God would rescue him from any threat to his life. A boat came to rescue the man, but he refused, saying that his God was going to help him. Then an emergency rescue team arrived, and he rejected them as well, saying: “I don’t need you. My God is coming to rescue me soon.” Flood became very serious and a helicopter arrived, but the man said he didn’t want anyone’s assistance and the same answer was provided.

Unfortunately, the man died in the flood and he met his god after death. At the very first meeting with his God, the man said: “I am very disappointed with you my God. You didn’t rescue me from floods”. God said: “I first sent a boat to rescue you, and then another emergency rescue team, and finally I sent a helicopter as the floods became severe, but you didn’t consider any of my attempts!”

When it comes to our economy, isn’t that the same case for Sri Lankans? Sri Lankans leave the country, claiming we do not have economic opportunities. Some Sri Lankans even risk their lives by attempting to go to Australia and Italy by boat. When Sri Lanka attempts to implement policies where we could navigate towards the same development as some of the countries they aspire to run away to illegally, the same Sri Lankans oppose and protest.

Think about the recent discussions on the Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the Millenium Challenge Compact (MCC) agreement, East Container Terminal discussion, and now, the Port City public debate.

Instead, many believe working with a foreign nation is a part of a whole conspiracy. We are overwhelmed with the belief that we can become self-sufficient in everything under the sun. We have forgotten that the global context has changed. Global supply chains have changed over the last few decades. We as Sri Lankans have forgotten the power of mankind when we share ideas with each other. Connecting with each other and sharing ideas is sharing and creating wealth.

It is true that working with other countries is not a one-way street; it has to have mutual benefits. The way forward is not to isolate ourselves and attempt to do things on our own, but to connect with the world. That is how small countries like Sri Lanka can succeed.

As of now, Sri Lanka is at the critical juncture of getting the fundamentals right with the Port City Bill, which is now being challenged at the Supreme Court. Of course, constitutionality and the legal aspects have to be considered and cleared before we move forward. What is missing in the discussion is the concept of the “Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and the ability to understand that Port City has to be a special economic zone instead of a real estate project, where we just sell land to investors without creating a business- and market-friendly environment.

“Special Economic Zones” are a concept where a separate and an easy regulatory mechanism is set up in a region to create a business-conducive environment. Businesses can be done easily and people can live conveniently only when markets operate right. We have to establish special economic zones because the rules and regulations in the mainland or other parts are so laid back that doing business or convenient living is difficult.

Take current Sri Lankan regulation as an example: 80% of our land is owned by the Government, where the citizens haven’t been provided property rights. Which investor would invest in a business when the ownership of the property is not secured? According to Minister of Justice Ali Sabry, contract enforcement takes 1,318 days on average, where it is just 164 days in Singapore. The average time to resolve a criminal case is about 10 years, while our business registration takes months. Small and Micro enterprises have tiers of regulatory barriers. Granting a permit for construction takes more than three months or so for accessing electricity. Those are the fundamental reasons why people leave Sri Lanka – because the rules we have set for ourselves are not supporting our aspirations.

What we need to do ideally is to make the rules of the entire country easy for business, and for people to live. Since we haven’t had the political will nor the knowledge to do it, we have to go with second-best solutions. One of the second-best solutions is “Special Economic Zones” such as Port City.

What ultimately decides whether a country and its people are going to prosper or not are the rules that it sets, because our opportunities for investments, doing business, employment, real wages, and quality of life will depend on what we set as rules to govern ourselves. Those rules cannot be excessive, but have to support markets.

While the concept of a “Special Economic Zone” is in the right direction, we should not think that Port City is going to solve all our problems. We can attract investments only if we set an example by allowing market forces to operate. Our immediate term debt repayment challenges, and our regulatory barriers in the mainland, remain as they are, and we have to take a holistic approach on serious economic reforms connecting with the world.

The tax concessions suggested have to be reconsidered, as these would not only further distort our markets by giving just a few politically connected businesses tax benefits, but also a serious burden on our balance sheet when the Government expects to develop infrastructure near Port City, such as the connecting roads to the airport highway and the tunnel connecting Port City and Marine Drive.

We have to be sensitive about the geopolitics coming into play with Port City, and we should not lose our friends internationally. It’s a long-term project, and things change very fast in this era of time.

Like the man who said no to his god’s rescue attempts, we too have missed so many opportunities that could have complemented the Port City project further. If we had implemented the projects with the MCC (after clearing all constitutional matters), it could have been a better attraction to investors. On the MCC project that was developed by local experts, the project on facilitating the proving of land rights could have attracted more investors to Sri Lanka to set up manufacturing plants, and the Port City could have served as the financial service center.

The traffic plan and the infrastructure projects could have added significant value to the entire project. At the same time we could have managed our geopolitics better.

The same goes for the Singapore FTA. We could have provided a strong signal that we are a nation open for business by creating rules that support industry and strengthening trade relations with countries like Singapore. Investors expected to come to the Port City could have tapped into global talent, taking Sri Lanka one step closer towards becoming a global hub for business.

Again with the East Container Terminal, where more Indian investors could have attracted and created a Port City, a truly multicultural, multinational special economic zone. What history teaches us is that we have been provided with so many opportunities, like the man who was provided the chance to save his life from the flood. How we managed and what we did with it is something we have to rethink.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Port City more crucial by the day so don’t delay

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

Debt repayments, human rights issues, credit rating downgrades and pandemic make Port City our big hope.

The company Google maintains the idea of “10X thinking”. What 10X thinking means is that if one is serious about innovation, one would ideally improve things by 10 times, rather than by 10%. While Google believes we have to move at 10 times the speed for real transformation, the Japanese believe in a business philosophy that goes by the name “Kaizen”. The Kaizen theory emphasises that small-scale productivity improvements, if done consistently, with the engagement of employees, will lead to effective transformational change over time.

In hindsight, looking at Sri Lanka’s development pipeline, our own 10X ideas or Kaizens are not something we can be too proud of. We’ve hardly had any 10X ideas, and have had little consistency in our policy. In fact, one could say that the only consistent aspect of our policy is that it is inconsistent.

One of the main 10X ideas for Sri Lanka that this column has extensively discussed is land reform, chiefly through building a digital land registry that could infuse capital into the economy and improve agricultural productivity. The other 10X idea we have on our table is the Colombo Port City, a project by China Harbour Company. 

The reclamation of 269 hectares of land was completed in January 2019. The construction of the water breaker was completed in June the same year. In this backdrop, it has been reported in the media that last week the Cabinet approved the Colombo Port City Economic Bill, which allows the establishment of a special economic zone within Port City.

What is so special about Port City? I am sure most Sri Lankans would say they know nothing much, other than the fact that it is a Chinese investment, and an ambitious project to build a city on the sea. Many view it as an infrastructure project to build a financial city with tall buildings, including hospitals, residential areas, hotels and schools, and many other ancillary services, to make Sri Lanka a financial hub. 

Then the main question we have to ask ourselves is: Why would investors want to come to Port City? The simple reason is that the Port City would act like a special economic zone with special laws and regulations. Therefore, it would be a more convenient place to operate. Secondly, reduced regulations would make it easy to connect with other centres, creating a conducive environment to make profits.

However, people are largely unaware that the new law in force in the Port City actually makes it a project with 10X additions, and gives it an opportunity to become a financial hub in the region. The significance is not in the skyscrapers or other physical infrastructure, but instead lies in its potential to create an easier operating environment with lower regulations.

The next question you may ask is: Why do we need a new law for the Port City? Why can’t it fall under existing Sri Lankan business law? The answer to that is simple: If businesses in Port City come under Sri Lankan law, and under the current jurisdiction and regulatory framework – starting from business registration to resolving a business conflict, or any transaction for that matter – then these businesses would experience the same inconvenient and cumbersome process of doing business that all investors in Sri Lanka presently have to endure.

To attract an investor to Port City, the laws and regulations it comes under should facilitate the creation of speedy business services, and have significant synergies in productivity, thereby significantly lowering business transaction costs. In addition, the laws incorporated will have to be competitive and on par with other competing financial hubs, such as Singapore.

The draft law will be a critical factor that determines the future of this multi-billion dollar project. It has to be competitive with other financial centres in the region if it is to succeed. If it fails to meet these standards, investors have no reason to bring their money, or to move their financial institutes and headquarters to Sri Lanka.

We cannot comment on this law until it is placed before Parliament, but we know for sure that this should have happened far earlier. The Port City project was launched in September 2014, but even after seven years, investors are yet to see this law. This is essential to their investment decisions.

Under the previous Government, it was reported that some attempts were made in drafting the law, but it was not presented to Parliament, and the project was on hold for renegotiation. While the Cabinet clearance of the Colombo Port City Economic Bill could renew hope for the project, we should not delay the process further. At the same time, we have to be absolutely confident that the law has been drafted with the right specifications to meet investor expectations. Because of the current delay in producing the legal draft to Parliament and getting it approved, a quick sale on land in Port City has been affected. Just by the sale of land, or 99-year lease agreements, the Government expects a minimum of $ 1.8 billion in revenue, and $ 3.4 billion for the China Harbour Company. However, in making an investment calculation, we look at not only the amount of money we invest, but also the time spent.

According to State Minister of Money, Capital Markets and State Enterprise Reforms Ajith Nivaard Cabraal, out of $ 32 billion expected in foriegn currency inflows to the country, $ 15 billion in exports and about $ 7-8 billion in remittances has been forecasted. More than $ 3 billion is expected in total only for this year in the form of Foreign Direct Investment, and the main investments are expected through the Port City project. Therefore, the development of the Port City is a significant source of income for the country.

With mounting debt repayments for the next three to four years, and now with the UN Human Rights Council’s human rights-related issues, we should understand the importance of the collective effort of maintaining Sri Lanka’s image as a credible global partner. In this backdrop, placing all our investment expectations into the sole basket of the Port City is going to prove risky.

Let’s think through this in the shoes of an investor. Imagine you have about $ 1 billion and you’re considering investing in the Port City project. But to date, you do not know the law that will be enforced, while concerns have been raised by the UNHRC. In addition, the country’s credit rating has been downgraded by rating agencies, particularly in the face of the pandemic. Would you, as an investor, confidently bring your $ 1 billion to Sri Lanka – or would you delay the investment and consider markets such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam?

On the other hand, the Government has to be very careful of the potential opposition from anti-competition lobby groups who will be affected by the Port City. A successful Port City project means the presence of international law firms, IT professionals, health care workers, and education experts; opening up competition with the best of talent and skill at the global level. Sri Lanka’s experience in the recent past has not been very positive when it comes to opening up to competition. Our strategy has always been to look inwards, rather than outwards.

Therefore, the Government has the twin challenge of first getting the legal draft right and getting it out fast; and providing investors with confidence and addressing investor expectations with a collective effort of easing businesses in Sri Lanka. Secondly, the Government will have to manage the resistance that is likely to pop up from lobby groups for changes in the legal draft, blocking international competition in certain sectors. 

If we are serious about a transformed Sri Lanka, we need a combination of Kaizens and 10X ideas; meaning we have to consistently implement 10X ideas for a significant period of time. But only time will tell what we will do.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.