Two ways the private sector has failed Sri Lanka

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dhananath Fernando

There are two main models of growth and development, which have been discussed and used interchangeably. The state sector-led development model where the government maintains a fair share of businesses by expanding the state footprint is widely popular in Sri Lanka. The second model is a private sector-led model where private enterprises and individuals are provided the opportunity to lead growth and development. Interestingly, the state sector-led model doesn’t rule out the engagement of the private sector. Having a conducive environment for businesses, a high-doing business index, and maintaining a business-friendly environment have always been part and parcel of the promises made by political leaders including ideologues who favour a state sector-led model.

The state sector

In any business model, the main factor is “ownership” or the incentive to have ownership. Ownership comes in different forms, but in business, it is associated with risk. The higher the risk, the higher the gain. The person who risks their money, reputation, time and any form of capital has a natural incentive to recover it or make a benefit out of it. In private business, the individual or the shareholders have risked their private money (property) in the business, so they are psychologically driven to perform well, supervise their teams, recruit cutting-edge talent, and delegate responsibilities with the objective of growing together.

In the state sector, it’s different. The people who manage the specific organisation haven’t really invested any risk. They are just managers and responsible officers. So even if the business/organisation performs well or not, it hardly has any impact on them personally. They will not lose any private property or anything personal in the state sector business model. Instead, in a private sector investment, the investor and the person who takes the risk have so much to lose. In the state sector-driven model, the main source of money is taxpayer money, which was collected at different stages of the economy through imports, income, profit, etc.

As per the Sinhala folktale and anecdote, The Porridge Pot of Seven Villagers (aadi 7 denaage kanda haliya), no one is responsible for anything and everyone assumes the other person will perform. Ultimately, no one performs. When no one takes the responsibility, gaps are created for corruption. The question then arises: Without ownership or stake in your private property, why should someone take the risk of blocking corruption?

It is generally discussed that bribes are a necessity to be paid at all levels of a project/investment or else the project will be blocked at each stage from approval to functioning. This is a good example of the window for corruption that is caused by a lack of ownership. This is the inherent problem in the state sector model and the reason for its inability to improve productivity and efficiency.

Many Sri Lankans are of the view that the private sector running a business is equal to common people losing access to their common public property. A slightly different sentiment which is very deeply rooted in society is that when the state runs the business, it is more people-friendly and that prices tend to be more reasonable.

Also, government jobs are very popular during election times across all voters. Someone with basic mathematics can understand as to how unsustainable our state sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are. According to the recent report by the Labour Department (1) (May 2020), about 1.2 million people work in the state sector. In addition, our SOEs are making eye-watering losses. According to the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE), the total loss suffered by SriLankan Airlines from 2009 to 2019 sums up to about Rs. 240 billion (2), exceeding our expenditure on Samurdhi, our main social security programme for the poor, which is about Rs. 94.7 billion (3).

The private sector

While our state sector has really brought us to our knees, our private sector performance has been equally bad. There are about 3.4 million private-sector workers in Sri Lanka and another 2.7 million are own-account (self-employed) workers. More than 200,000 are employers. The private sector failed Sri Lanka miserably by adding burden on two fronts. One by burdening the common Sri Lankan by blocking the opportunity to consume good quality, reasonably priced, and competitive goods and services by hiding behind high import duties and adding most of the product categories into the negative list. When you impose a higher import duty for a consumable good, it increases the price of that respective product, making it impossible to compete in the local market.

As a result, consumers only have the choice to buy locally manufactured goods and services. Buying locally manufactured goods and services benefit these respective companies and local entrepreneurs. This can be argued as a good thing, but earning a profit by avoiding competition from the global stage and adding an additional cost to the Sri Lankan consumer to pay for the extra inefficiencies is unjustifiable. Instead, most in the private sector should be able to compete with global products by increasing their efficiency and productivity, rather than hiding behind government protection.

Below are some import protections and the numbers are extremely high. How can we justify an extra protection tax of 26.6% on a pair of school shoes, a protectionist tax of 19.6% on construction steel, and 53.62% on floor tiles and wall tiles in a country where the mean household income per month is Rs. 62,237 (4)?

Secondly, some businessmen are dependent on government contracts and licenses, creating an environment of symbiosis for corruption between politicians and the business community. Today, this has become a practice from national level to the local government level, and this is the private sector’s main contribution to taking mother Sri Lanka backwards. To keep this level of protection by higher import duties, most of the senior businessmen have to align with political powers. Even if Sri Lanka is to continue down the path of import substitution, our local products have to be competitive for this policy to succeed.

At the national level, high-level agreements, contracts, tax holidays, moratoriums, and loan reliefs have been provided by each government to their connected business circles. Instead of competing with technology and skills (except for a few players in apparels, rubber, tea, IT, and services), most business leaders have compromised their ethics, modesty, accountability, and genuineness over quick and short-sighted profit margins by avoiding competition at the global level. As a result, Sri Lankans have to pay the price for our domestic inefficiency, while the economy has become uncompetitive and irrelevant to global markets.

Some businessmen went a further mile to establish monopolies while hiding behind high import tariffs. Most of these private-sector monopolies rely on unethical business practices, giving rise to multiple situations of conflict of interest. They have pressured small players and have bought them over by unethical tricks or sometimes the use of power, rather than setting an example for Sri Lanka by empowering our youth to compete for ideas at the global level. Sri Lankan businesses have decided to remain isolated, being planted while isolating our consumers from access to world-class products that would improve their living standards significantly. Some Sri Lankan micro, small, and medium-scale businesses have been hindered from accessing world-class raw material and ingredients.

Another set of businessmen have been arguing on the need for global competition to all industries, except to the industry they are operating based on baseless excuses. One common argument is that the industry is at an infant stage, so they expect import tariffs or types of protectionism. But most of these industries are far from the infant stage. They have been in operation for more than a few decades.

The companies that were open for competition and competitiveness excelled and they extended their business to other parts of the world like India, Bangladesh, and Africa. This fear of competition in the vast majority of Sri Lankan businesses is one reason why Sri Lanka could not become a breeding ground for world-class businesses and have failed to operate beyond this tiny island. So now we have an extremely tail-heavy inefficient public sector and an equally protectionist political party-aligned business sector making all Sri Lankan’s suffer.

The solution for this is not moving back to the state-led business model, but to have an open mind to be open for competition. Till we reach that state of mind, Sri Lanka will suffer economically and continue to be irrelevant in global markets, while more graduates and youth will gather on our roads requesting more government jobs.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Why we can’t afford another lockdown?

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dhananath Fernando

With the sudden spike in Covid-19 infections over the last few days, we have seen a re-emergence of discussion on a possible second wave. Globally, the Covid-19 numbers are increasing on the one hand, while countries have decided to resume activities on the other. However, when there is movement and interaction of people, there is a higher probability of the virus spreading.

Sri Lanka’s economy is at a stage where we can’t afford to face any economic shocks, given the bad economic fundamentals we have been practising over the years. The pandemic has re-exposed these weaknesses and for this, we might have to pay a considerable price as compensation for our past sins of economic mismanagement.

A second wave of the pandemic would bring in a significant array of economic challenges for both the developed and the developing worlds. However, Sri Lanka’s challenges are structurally unique as our economic problems have reached a boiling point.

Our economic problems at a boiling point

Relief schemes provided by the Government during the first lockdown and the economic revival measures scraped the bottom of our barrel, and the ability to absorb a second lockdown is a serious question.

We require foreign currency to pay our external debt at an average of $ 4 billion for the coming three years. Our exports have been declining over the years and Covid-19 has impacted the remaining markets; with a second wave, it will continue to bring new challenges. Our tax revenue is declining and rating agencies have downgraded our credit rating. As a result, investor confidence is low, making it difficult to raise money from markets even to roll over our debt and interest repayments.

Most of our workforce is in the Government and our government expenditure is burdened by salaries, pensions, and welfare structures. These welfare structures (Samurdhi relief, support for low-income differently-abled persons, financial support for the elderly, financial support for kidney patients, flood and drought relief, allowance for preschool teachers, etc.) are inefficient and ineffective. Our remittances, which is one of the main sources of foreign currency, are expected to decline further with Covid-19.

To manage the existing limited foreign revenue and foreign reserves, the Government has imposed import controls. The need to manage our foreign currency income is understandable. However, we cannot rule out the consequences of a further decline in government revenue and the impact this will have on our export industries. Furthermore, prices of consumable goods in the mid and long run are very likely to go up, making things further difficult.

How import controls hit govt. revenue and exports

According to 2018 statistics by the Ministry of Finance, 49% of government revenue was generated from import-based taxes. As per the Mid-Year Fiscal Position Report 2020, from January to April, over 55% of government revenue had been from import-based tax (savings from the lower fuel prices in the world market are one reason for higher import revenue). The Government extending import controls will result in a further decline in government revenue in the next quarter. While income is declining, our main expenditure items such as salaries and pensions are on the rise. Our recurrent expenditure – salaries (Rs. 253.8 billion), pensions (Rs. 79.8 billion), interest payments (Rs. 336 billion), and other payments (Rs. 150.7 billion) – are at Rs. 820 billion from January to April 2020, but our total revenue including a profit transfer from the Central Bank is at Rs. 476 billion. Calculations illustrate that after paying interest payments, we are running short of revenue to pay even our salaries and pensions, let alone other payments.

While import controls impact our national revenue significantly, it will have a higher impact on local businesses – just take computers, for example. If there is a restriction on computer imports and spare parts over time, we will face a challenge in replacing and upgrading the computers we use at present. Needless to say, this would affect the work of government offices and decrease our work efficiency as a significant proportion of the work is done through computers. This is just one example. We haven’t really felt the impact of import controls as we are still using existing stocks. Most imports we use for the moment are, to an extent, durable product categories, but in the mid and long term, people would feel the drop in efficiency and witness price increases.

The very same import controls impact our export businesses as most of the imports are used by local businesses to produce consumable goods and exports. (Think on the same lines of restrictions on importing computers.) The efficiency drop will impact the prices of exports to increase, making it difficult to compete in global markets. Industries like plantations will have further pressure to increase salaries with the high cost of living. Already many industries have indicated the difficulty to sustain their operations due to import controls. From the Government’s point of view, the need to manage the availability of foreign reserves is justifiable, but there will be significantly bigger costs and consequences to the local economy and the consumer.

Can we afford another lockdown?

Looking at the problems at hand and as all problems are reaching a boiling point, it is difficult to have another standstill in our economy. The only possible solution is to keep the movement of people between selected borders between districts or divisional secretariats while adhering to health guidelines, thus keeping the economy afloat running. Of course, the commute of the workforce between borders will have complications, but since most of us have hit rock bottom in our economic conditions, we are left with a very few alternatives.

The ideal solution for the foreign currency shortage is to secure a programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as recommended by us. Such an IMF programme will require significant structural reforms. Another significant determinant by the IMF would be the need for a democratically elected government, meaning that a possible postponement of the election would be detrimental to seek such financial injections.

Probable solutions

The problems at hand have no quick fixes, and quick fixes will only worsen the current situation. First of all, we as a community should take precautions, adhere to all health and safety guidelines, and thereby stop contributing to the spread of Covid-19; we really can’t afford a second lockdown. Secondly, the problem with our economy is neither the high imports nor the consumption of imported goods – our problem is that our economy is not competitive or efficient. Our problem is poverty and the poor man or woman’s only tradable good is labour. There are limited or no opportunities to trade this tradable good called labour to earn a decent living as our economy is not competitive enough. Until we resolve this issue by setting our economic fundamentals right, our current crisis will exacerbate, also meaning that we cannot afford a second lockdown.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Sri Lankans’ common enemy is poverty, not each other

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dhananath Fernando

We may worship different gods but as Sri Lankans, we all have one enemy – poverty. According to data on Sri Lanka’s poverty line, 4.1% of our population is “poor”, but nearly 50% of our population is eligible for the Samurdhi Programme. Another 1.4 million is employed in the government sector. Therefore, the majority of Sri Lankans are just above the poverty line.

This was confirmed recently by the World Bank (WB), when it downgraded us to a lower middle-income country from an upper-middle-income country, as our Gross National Income dropped in USD (dollar) terms. In other words, we have become poorer.

Our economy has grown by 2.3% in LKR (Sri Lankan rupee) terms but in reality, we have become poorer as our GDP growth in USD terms has dropped to the standard of living that existed in Sri Lanka in 2005. Even though we were an upper-middle-income country for a short period, Sri Lanka’s province-wise income told a different story. Apart from the Western Province, the other provinces were way below the upper-middle-income range. It is clear that our average income was skewed by Western Province data.

At a time when we have all become poorer, the last thing we need is to fight amongst ourselves based on cast, creed, religion, or ethnicity.

If you look at Sri Lanka’s history, our highest growth rates and higher levels of production were achieved when the country was in peace. Although there were many interpretations of it, after 2009, which saw the end of the civil war, the country experienced tremendous growth rates above 7% with the Northern and Eastern Provinces joining the national economy. 

However, unfortunately, we failed to establish the fundamentals of our economy post-war, and we have been paying constantly for our early mistakes. We only reaped the advantage of ending the war but we failed to utilise the opportunity to put in place basic fundamentals such as incentive structures, competitiveness, and price-based mechanisms in our economy. Till we establish that basic building block, we will have to go back and forth, and will not be able to experience sustainable growth to defeat our common enemy – poverty – and reach high-income status. 

An encouraging work environment as a country 

A country with a motivated workforce is one determinant the next Government needs to establish if we are serious about a prosperous Sri Lanka. Political parties may be victorious after the election but making Sri Lanka a victorious nation goes far beyond just securing a winning majority at an election. Winning elections is the same as an opportunity to play a cricket match representing the national team. In order to make Sri Lanka prosperous, it needs to put in a game-changing performance that ends in victory. A motivated workforce can only be built on unity between all Sri Lankans so that we can all work as one team, resulting in increased productivity. According to Frederick Herzberg’s Two Factor Theory (of Motivation), there is a hygiene factor instead of a motivator and in the absence of hygiene factors, people get demotivated easily. The biggest loser from tensions between the people and racial disharmony will be our economy, a fact that has been proven throughout history.

Most aspirational Sri Lankans are now tired of experiencing lost economic opportunities and revisiting these never-changing issues. Aspirational Sri Lankans expect to work harder, have better living standards, and to not be entangled in micro issues.  

The recent downgrade to lower-middle-income status has a greater impact, after the Easter Sunday attacks and tensions we witnessed thereafter. Even before the Easter attacks, the riots in Digana and internet blockages were indicators that alerted us about tension between ethnicities – a move in the wrong direction. International investors need stable and peaceful destinations to invest their money. Internal ethnic tensions and communal disharmony tend to scare away potential investments that could drive domestic economic growth.  

This phenomenon is key, among many other reasons, for our lethargic performance on the economic front over the last few years. Recent incidents connected to licensed banking institutes, which were shared widely over social media, highlight that tensions still prevail. If allowed to grow and fester, the price we all have to pay for these untreated wounds will be enormous. All Sri Lankans as well as the Government should understand that a peaceful, secure environment with a motivated and skilled workforce is a basic requirement for a small island nation of the calibre of Sri Lanka.

What should be our strategy and solution?

As outlined in this column, and as many other intellectuals have highlighted repeatedly, Sri Lanka’s strength is in its location and connectivity. Our weakness is that we are a small market and our resources are limited, while the available resources are not optimised. So we are left with no other strategy but to produce for a bigger market than our 22 million people and be competitive on all we produce by global standards. However, we cannot be competitive without having our house in order. 

Our success as a country depends on our ability to understand other people’s needs and the ability to provide goods and services for their needs and address gaps in the market. If we produce only for ourselves and for our own consumption, isn’t it a very short-sighted and selfish approach, which will limit us from reaching our full potential? 

If we blindly follow some trends in the US and other parts of the world which have far bigger domestic markets and very different economic indicators, we will be wasting our advantage of connectivity and location while also expanding our weakness as an isolated and divided society. 

As Frédéric Bastiat said, “when goods and services don’t cross borders, soldiers will”. We should ensure all Sri Lankans engage and trade with all Sri Lankans, beyond manmade intangible borders such as caste, creed, ethnicity, and religion. At the same time, we should trade beyond our shores and country borders if we are serious about making Mother Lanka prosperous again and defeating our common enemy – poverty. 

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Our public universities need more scrutiny, not blind endorsements

Originally appeared on The Daily FT

By Dr. Sujata Gamage

Dr. W. A. Wijewardena recently published an article on the technology campus of the Sri Jayewardenepura University. I looked forward to new information on the State technology education, but I was sorely disappointed. His column was essentially a pitch for the Acting Vice-Chancellor of Sri Jayewardenepura. Interestingly, there have been several such pitches recently for the university itself. On a positive note, it is good that a university tries to justify the public expenditure incurred on it, but in the absence of a counter assessment, these advertorials could be window dressing for a rotten system. 

There are serious issues in education confronting the country today. Our priority from a development perspective should be the preparedness of 360,000 or so youth who turn 18 every year. They should be prepared for living and working in the 21st century. The rest is details, I would say, because it is well established that the economic or social impact of education almost exclusively rests on school education, according to an extensive review of the literature by Alison Wolf in her 2003 book ‘Does Education Matter?: Myths About Education and Economic Growth’. While a highly educated few may contribute to innovation in the economy or society, mass higher education has no impact. A World Bank (WB) study of the same subject has shown that private benefits to higher education are many times greater than public benefits (WB, 2015). 

Yet, our education system is designed to define education as success at receiving three passes for a paper and pen test at the end of 13 years of education. Then we select 10% or less of a cohort of such students for a free-of-charge education at public universities, leaving other 90% off the radar of policymakers or the public. The Tertiary and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector admitted 35,599 students (CBSL, 2018). Yet, I would include those attending the TVET institutions within 90% who are ‘off the radar’ because the TVET sector which is a distant poor cousin to the university sector is barely visible. 

University education captures a lion’s share of education funding and media attention. Apparently, a discussion on amending universities have resurfaced as it does periodically. Such a discussion is like trying to change the deck chairs while the tertiary education ship is sinking. 

The University Grants Commission regulates 15 public universities and associated institutes. The Technical and Vocation Education oversees 500+ state institutes (not counting 700+ private institutes) enrolling 35,000+ students for short or long courses, graduated about 26,024 National vocational Qualification (NVQ) certificate holders. These institutions receive Government funding no matter their performance. 

What we need is a new commission which is a caretaker for all school leavers seeking a tertiary education and or training, not gatekeepers or apologists for underperforming institutions. These reforms will not happen unless the government overrides the interests of the higher education lobby. 

Overly influential higher education lobby

Education funding in this country is driven by three powerful lobbies, The GMOA, the University Community, and Inter-University Federation of University Students, a political arm of the JVP and/or the Peratugami Party. They serve to keep spreading the myth that free-of-charge education to a select few youth is free education, and policymakers and the media swallow the myth wholesale.

Their solution for the other 90% of youth is more and more public spending for education. Yes, it’s true that our education funding is way below international standards. As UNESCO noted: The Education 2030 Framework for Action proposed two benchmarks as ‘crucial reference points’: allocate at least 4% to 6% of GDP to education, and/or allocate at least 15% to 20% of public expenditure to education. Globally, countries spend 4.7% of GDP on education and allocate 14.2% of public expenditure to education; 35 countries spend less than 4% of GDP and allocate less than 15% of public expenditure to education (GEM Report, UNESCO)

Higher education interest groups lobbied for increased in education funding. However, the benefits did not go school education or the TVET sector because education funding formula is unduly tilted towards higher education at the expense of school education or TVET. The result is that university teachers are well remunerated now, and schoolteachers remain some of the poorest paid public servants.

Over-funding of universities

Our universities indeed receive a lion’s share of education funding in relation to international practices in education funding. As far back as 2002, the World Bank (WB) noted that our funding is unduly tilted toward universities. 

By international standards, average recurrent education expenditures per student in Sri Lanka are modest at primary and secondary education levels, but high at the tertiary education level. Average recurrent education expenditure per student as a share of national income per capita on primary and secondary education, at about 9% and 11% respectively, are among the lowest in South Asia and East Asia. In contrast, average tertiary education expenditure per student as a share of national income per capita, [set] at 100%, is slightly higher than India, and substantially above the level in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. The main reason for the high share of public recurrent spending on tertiary education is the large unit cost of government universities. Overall, the pattern of average recurrent expenditure across education levels suggests that, in contrast to high performing East Asian countries, the balance of public resources in Sri Lanka may be tilted unduly in favour of tertiary education, at the expense of primary and secondary schooling (WB, 2005, Sec 16).

The internal efficiency of primary schooling (grades 1-5) and junior secondary schooling (grades 6-9), measured in terms of flow rates, are high (WB, 2005, Section 18). 

Public university education in Sri Lanka is expensive, with high unit operating costs in comparison to other developing countries. In addition, there are wide differences in unit costs among public universities, ranging from about 40,000-120,000 rupees per student per year (WB, 2005, Section 20). 

If education funding was titled in favour of university education in 2002, it is no better in 2019, according to our estimates.

The distribution of gross funding for education across the three sectors has widened since 2002. In 2002 Higher education received 14% of education funding. In 2019, this share increased to 38%. Funding for TVET sector too increased while the share for school education reduced to 50%.

It is true that new admissions to higher education have increased from 12,144 in 2002 to 31,451 in 2018, and new admissions to school education have slightly decreased from 328,632 in 2002 to 325,667 in 2018. We are still in the process of calculating the recurrent education expenditure per student as a share of national income per capita for 2018, in order to reassess funding situation vis-à-vis WB assessment published in 2005. However, a quick calculation of per-student funding for universities v. schooling shows that per capita spending remains as tilted as reported by WB in 2005. 

The problem lies in misplaced priorities. First, education achievement after 13 years of schooling is defined by the ability of a student to obtain passes for any three subjects in a national examination. As tuition teachers have revealed, a student can study for six months to obtain the necessary passes. Further, the government indirectly admitted that education is driven by private tuition by bending over backwards to change health regulation to suit private tuition needs. 

Next, we increase funding for higher education to accommodate these students deemed suitable for higher education by a faulty indicator. In fact, we are trying to find solutions to a poor output at the end of the pipeline without investing adequately in the pipeline.

The evidence is strong that mass higher education does NOT contribute to development. Only research-driven higher universities have an impact. Hence, the priorities for government spending is clear. Quality school education, some further education or training for all youth, and research-based or inquiry-based higher education for a select few. 

Unaccountable

University teachers who justify the expansion of public higher education point out that all higher education in developed countries are provided by the state. This is true indeed. In Canada or the UK, almost all universities are publicly owned. In the US, private institutions co-exist but the federal government supports the education of all students, though loan schemes. 

The comparison ends there because in Sri Lanka students are brought to the doorsteps of the universities. They come with public funds assured for their education, but there are no performance requirements for universities. Universities decide what courses to offer, how they teach, and they refuse to be held accountable for unemployability of graduates or the attitudes of these graduates. In US, USA, or Canada, public institutions receive funding based on enrolment and additional performance criteria. Retention and graduation rates of students are some such criteria. In Sri Lanka, a shockingly high percent of students dropout and the government does not to track that. 

Further, in public higher education in other countries, the students pay a share of the cost of education. For example, at Ohio State University where I worked as a strategic planning specialist, the budget consists of roughly about one-third of cost recovered through student tuition fees, another one third though state subsidy, and the other one third through income generated through research funding, alumni giving etc. In the UK and Canada too, students pay a share of the cost of higher education, giving universities another good reason to be accountable. 

UGC – a commission past its time? 

The University Grants Commission was established in 1978 in the tradition of granting agencies in UK and India. The University Grants Commission of India continues to function but similar commissions in UK and eve USA have changed their roles.

In the nineties, the role of the Ohio Board of regent (OBR) was essentially the same as the UGC. Later, the OBR increasingly took on more responsibility for colleges and community colleges in the state, and today it is reborn as The Ohio Department of Higher Education with the mandate to “make college more affordable for Ohioans and drive the state’s economic advancement through the public universities and colleges of Ohio, the state’s network of public universities, regional campuses, community colleges, and adult workforce and adult education centres”. 

The UK has gone a step further:

The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) distributed public money for teaching and research to universities and colleges. It closed on 1 April 2018. [It was] replaced by UK Research and Innovation [Agency] and the Office for Students.

This move in the UK is very significant. It is an acknowledgement that research and innovation and mass higher education do not belong together and that higher education agencies should serve the potential and current students, not the provider institutions. 

Need a commission for students, not gatekeepers for institutions

The UGC of has 15 institutions and 19 other associated institutes. These institutions awarded 26,024 basic degrees in 2018. The Tertiary and Vocational Education Commission (TVEC) is responsible for the registration and accreditation of TVET institutions. TVEC reported 582 public institutions and 50,215 National Vocational Certificate awardees for 2019 from public institutions. We have 350,000 +school lavers who have left school at various points. Taken together these institutions cater to needs of about 20% of a youth cohort. What about education and training for others? The government may offer merit-based opportunities for some, but there should some accountability for others. What we have is a government that allows the higher education lobby to disrupt the education for the other 80%. 

The present government is on the right track, more or less

As I pointed out, our universities receive an undue share of public funding thanks to a powerful higher education lobby. This situation must be corrected. Any additional funding for education should be directed to school education and 1-2-year colleges offering diplomas or advanced diplomas while holding funding for universities at present levels. On the other hand, funding for research and innovation should be increased with centres of excellence within or outside of universities getting additional funding from the research and innovation budget. 

In the present government, the higher education, technology and innovation portfolios are brought together. Bundling technology and innovation with higher education is unwise because higher education priorities are driven by a self-inflicted responsibility to find slots for students obtaining three passes from an outdated assessment system. New programs like the technology campus at Sri Jayewardenepura will not be able to perform miracles to produce innovators. They will more likely than not produce more job seekers. 

However, it is encouraging that the President has inquired about the feasibility of bringing all education functions under one ministry. This is good news. What we need is a ministry of education that oversees the education for all from early childhood to tertiary education, and a separate ministry of science, technology and innovation that funds centres of excellence in universities and elsewhere and nurture and award scholarships to select set of promising youth for a research-based or inquiry-based university education.

Dr Sujata Gamage is a Senior Research Fellow at LIRNEasia, a regional think tank based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. She specializes in planning, evaluation and capacity building in education, ICT in education, research and research networks, and public sector performance using data analytics, institutional research, scoping studies, systematic reviews, statistical methods and simulations. She is also an advisor to the Advocata Institute.

The myth: Self-sufficiency guarantees food security

Covered in the Daily Mirror, Ada derana and Colombo Telegraph

By Sathya Karunarathne

The novel coronavirus which drove cities and countries into lockdown has now sparked anxiety over a possible food crisis given the increase in export and import bans and disruption of global food supply chains. 

This uncertainty has left the Sri Lankan government to question whether these disruptions would affect food security in the near future and if ensuring self-sufficiency is the absolute and undisputed solution to this conundrum. In this attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in food the government has resorted to import substitution to strengthen domestic production.

Keeping in line with these protectionist policies the government has indefinitely extended import controls that were initially introduced on the 22nd of May for three months “to be in effect till further notice”. Import controls in this degree and nature have not been seen since the 1970s and this has led policymakers and public debate to be heavily inclined towards the possibility of revisiting and reconsidering the socialist policies adopted by the Bandaranaike government.

How credible is the popular narrative?

The renewed vigor attached to closed economic policies and food protectionism through public discourse is perhaps understandable. Amidst a foreign exchange crisis in April, the government imposed import restrictions on 156 categories of products including essential food items such as rice, flour, and sugar. 

Although import restrictions on most of the essential food items have been removed, temporary restrictions have been extended indefinitely on grains, stainless steel tankers and bowsers needed for the distribution of milk and blast freezers needed for preserving poultry meat. While these restrictions have been put in place with the motive of protecting the depreciating rupee it carries a massive potential to further harm the domestic distribution and storage of food which is already in a fragile state.  

Moreover, the latest Climate and Food Security Monitoring bulletin of WFP (United Nations World Food Programme) raises concerns of food security among vulnerable parts in Sri Lanka as a result of the impact and control response of the COVID-19 outbreak. The report further elaborated that weather-related shocks combined with poor hygienic and sanitation conditions could result in an increase of acute malnutrition in the island.  

In response to these growing anxieties in the wake of the COVID 19 pandemic, the government put in place programs and policies to ensure self-sufficiency in food within the island. On the 28th of May, the government approved the importation of 2,500 dairy cows from Australia. The motive behind this decision as stated by the cabinet spokesman is to ensure Sri Lanka’s self-sufficiency in milk by 2025, even though this measure failed just over a year ago with the death of 500 imported heifers that were ill-suited to Sri Lanka’s climate.

Furthermore, restrictions on maize imports that were imposed with the intention of strengthening domestic production has resulted in a lack of maize as feed for chicken. Available alternative feed is not as nutritious for poultry and has affected the quality and production of eggs. Egg production has fallen from 200-300 eggs per year from chicken to 200-240 eggs per year.  With the fall of production, prices have picked up.

On the 3rd of July, Senaka Samarasinghe, Managing Director of Harischandra Mills PLC stated to Ada Derana that import restrictions imposed on agricultural products such as ulundu, black-eyed pea, big onion, red onion, green gram, peanut, corn, and dried chili have affected manufacturers adversely resulting in a massive drop of production. 

These import restrictions have severely affected manufacturers who rely on ulundu as a raw material to produce products such as papadam, flour, thosai, wadai and dhal. Given the lack of raw materials, Harischandra Mills PLC has had to reduce their production by a staggering 90 per cent. Sri Lanka’s domestic ulundu requirement per year is about 12,000 metric tonnes (mt). The production of ulundu domestically has reduced to 5000 mt due to the drought. External factors that affect the domestic supply of food such as these calls for imports to fill the output gap. 

These import restrictions have adversely affected Sri Lanka’s already fragile export sector as well, as manufacturers have failed to meet the demand of international markets for products such as thosai mix. Harischandra PLC exports 15 per cent of its thosai mix to markets in Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia. These protectionist policies that aim to protect the domestic producer and to strengthen their production, have resulted in achieving the very opposite of its intentions as small scale producers of ulundu have opted to close down resulting in reduced shop sales. Moreover, the ban has affected the production of kurakkan flour with producers resorting to completely stopping or reducing production. This fibre-rich alternative to wheat flour is widely consumed by diabetic patients and is an important part of their medically recommended diet. 

It is no doubt that the pandemic has brought to light the extreme vulnerability of Sri Lanka’s domestic food supply to external shocks. These policies have a demonstrated history of achieving quite the opposite of their intentions. The ’70s “produce or perish” economy is an excruciating reminder of this fact as bug-infested flour, hardly edible bread, and stone infiltrated rice was every Sri Lankan’s staple. Therefore the popular narrative that promotes restrictive policies has zero credibility as it will only tighten the already constrained food supply by repeating the mistakes of the past. Long term policy solutions to the crisis, therefore,  should focus on the sustainability and practicality of isolating the island from global trade and food supply chains and producing the bulk of our dietary needs domestically.

Sustainable approach to attaining food security: Lessons from Singapore

The Global Food Security Index (GFSI)  ranks countries’ food security based on food affordability, availability,  quality as well as an adjustment for natural resources and resilience.  Singapore was able to secure the title as the most food-secure nation for two consecutive years, with a high rank in all three core pillars. 

Singapore’s success is attributed to the government’s continued commitment to stay connected to global food supply chains and to strengthen local production. Singapore diversified its food import sources from 140 countries in 2004 to more than 170 countries and regions in 2019  making the country’s food supply chain more resilient and has set a “30 by 30” goal to produce 30 per cent of the country’s nutritional needs by 2030. Diversifying food imports and making the country’s food supply chain more resilient are two sustainable policy solutions through which Sri Lanka can ensure long term food security. 

The Food and Agriculture Association of the United Nations (FAO) states that the crisis we are facing is a global problem that requires a global response.  This calls for governments to collaborate to avoid further disruptions to food supply chains. Import diversification in the context of food security refers to increasing the number of countries from which we import food. 
This ensures an undisrupted inflow of food supply into the country ensuring both physical availability and choice of food in crisis situations. Import diversification is effective even in ordinary situations as loss in the harvest of one exporting country will not threaten the availability or supply of that particular product/produce for the importing country. Singapore imports over 90 per cent of their consumption needs with only 13 per cent of vegetables and 9 per cent of fish being produced locally.  

Moreover, in order to avoid disruptions to the supply chain that may occur by depending on a single major import supplier Singapore has resorted to promoting frozen and powdered product alternatives. Sri Lanka cannot resort to these options by restricting the importation of freezers, tankers, and bowsers that are necessary for such alternatives.

The world is highly globalized and so are food supply chains. Isolating from this interconnected food supply chain will only exacerbate Sri Lanka’s food insecurity. This was evident in the 2007-2008 global food price crisis when export restrictions put in place by exporting countries to increase food security domestically led to serious disturbance in the world food market resulting in price spikes and increased price volatility. In a more local context, this was evident when the government banned the importation of turmeric along with other non-essential goods which led to a scarcity and the available being sold for an exorbitant price ranging from Rs 300-350/- per 100 g despite a maximum retail price of Rs.75 per 100 g. 

Eradicating weaknesses and inefficiencies in the domestic food supply chain is essential to ensuring food security within a country. This is referred to as building a resilient food system domestically. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) defines food security as follows: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences ”.  The abrupt lockdown and curfew COVID-19 brought revealed that our domestic food supply chain does not offer economic or physical access to nutritious food. This was painfully apparent when people desperate to eat set off a stampede during a cash handout held in celebration of Eid, leaving eight injured and three killed. 

This is an obvious cautionary alarm to the government to fix the inefficiencies of the domestic food system and to enhance emergency food assistance to the vulnerable communities, who most often end up bearing the brunt of such inefficiencies. Every crisis presents an opportunity to focus on rebuilding through a novel lens. This presents an opportunity for Sri Lanka to rethink its approach to food security and to branch out our policy solutions to more sustainable and timely options.

Solution 

This crisis has proved that import restrictions and heavy gravitation towards self-sufficiency cannot solve the myriad of issues plaguing the country’s food supply system. Closed economic policies to achieve self-sufficiency, do not guarantee all citizen’s economic and physical access to nutritious food nor do they guarantee a resilient domestic food supply chain. 

Investing in cold storages and strengthened logistics networks, shifting towards climate-smart agriculture, ensuring the supply of raw materials and agricultural equipment by making the eligibility verification process for tax exemptions less complicated and improving ease of doing business, removing import restrictions on veterinary medicine, chemical fertilizer, and other inputs,  relaxing restrictions on the cultivation of crops, strengthening emergency food assistance to vulnerable communities with linkages to local and provincial governments can be stated as policy priorities that can address the inefficiencies of the domestic food supply chain.

The way forward to ensuring the island’s food security is in improving internal inefficiencies while recognizing the extreme and timely importance of staying connected to global food supply chains through relaxing import restrictions and multiplying our food and raw material import sources. 

Sathya Karunarathne is a Research Executive at the Advocata Institute and can be contacted at sathya@advocata.org or @SathyaKarunara1 on twitter. Learn more about Advocata’s work at www.advocata.org. The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

The pre-election opportunity ECT presents the President

In this weekly column on The Sunday Morning Business titled “The Coordination Problem”, the scholars and fellows associated with Advocata attempt to explore issues around economics, public policy, the institutions that govern them and their impact on our lives and society.

Originally appeared on The Morning

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By Dhananath Fernando and Shanaka Paththinigama

The East Container Terminal (ECT) has come into the limelight again.

Last week, a strike was ongoing by trade unions demanding to install gantry cranes, which were ordered a few years ago and which are now in the Colombo Port, at the ECT.

This was followed up with the Cabinet Spokesperson stating that it was “allowing the respective line Minister to conduct discussions at a diplomatic level on changing (the) Colombo Port Terminal deal with India and Japan”, according to Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide.

Subsequently, the Gantry Cranes were permitted to be unloaded and installed on the instructions of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and the port workers decided to call off their strike on Thursday (2).

The fact of the matter is that the ECT is one absolute failure in terms of “getting things done”. Sri Lanka has been running it continuously and like many other economic issues, we have failed at getting our act together. This is despite being located at the heart of a strategic maritime route. Rather than taking advantage and converting the ECT to an operational level, we have lost a reasonable amount of credibility in the business world by opening the ECT for bidding and cancelling the bidding process on multiple occasions, thereby creating years of operational delays based on political favours. We hope, at least this time, Sri Lanka will be able to convert shop talk into actionable outcomes.

Understanding the shipping business

The shipping business is a technical subject and is very complicated. Ports are strategic geographical locations which are situated at the edge of oceans, seas, rivers, or lakes. These locations are then developed to provide facilities for the loading and unloading of cargo ships. The facilities provided for a port depends on the purpose for which the port is being used. A terminal refers to the set of facilities at a port where the loading and unloading of the cargo/container takes place. Terminals are named on the basis of the type of cargo that can be handled by it. Some of the most common types of terminals are container terminals, bulk cargo terminals, and LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminals.

Simply put, in one port, there are multiple terminals and the Port of Colombo has a few container terminals (CICT – Colombo International Container Terminal, JCT – Jaya Container Terminal, SAGT – South Asia Gateway Terminal, and UCT – Unity Container Terminal).

Global trade and most merchandise exports and imports account for a greater share of container terminals. The main factor that drives this business is efficiency and the networking ability to bring as many vessels as possible to the respective terminal. Simply put, when a ship enters the port/terminal how fast we can handle the containers and cargo (efficiency) and how networked we are to bring more vessels into the terminal are the two main determinants of making the business profitable.

Like most businesses, the price or the cost is a key determinant. To be profitable and bring the price down, over the years, shipping vessels have advanced to a point where there is capacity of more than 10,000 TEUs (20-foot equivalent units) in one vessel and those models (New Panamax – 12,500 TEUs | Triple E – 18,000 TEUs) have become popular with the development of global trade. These gigantic vessels can only be managed by deepwater ports which have a depth of more than 18 metres.

What’s all the fuss about the ECT?

There are two deepwater ports in the Colombo Port. One is CICT (85% owned by the China Merchant Port Holdings [for a period of 35 years, starting in 2013] and 15% by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority [SLPA] [owned by the Government]), which contributes to a higher share of the capacity and efficiency of the Colombo Port. The other deepwater terminal is the ECT. This is why the level of interest in this port is very high.

Geopolitical rivalries China, Japan, and India continue to seek operational ownership of the ECT through companies of their respective countries. The JCT (owned by the SLPA), SAGT (owned by John Keells Holdings – 42% , Mearsk – 26%, SLPA – 15%, A.P. Moller – 7%, Evergreen – 5%, and other investors – 5%), and UCT (owned by SLPA) are all shallow-water port terminals which can only handle smaller vessels (not economical compared to larger vessels) with about 10,000 TEUs capacity.

The ECT’s value is very high as it’s the only other deepwater terminal in the Port of Colombo except for CICT. As an additional benefit, it is located in the middle of the old port and the modern port, providing an added advantage for the movement of inter-terminal cargo, given its proximity to other terminals.

Despite the ECT having significant strategic value, consecutive governments have been just sitting on this, calling for bids and cancelling them, while competition is increasing every day – notably, the new Sagarala port development initiative by India, the construction of the Enayam Port in nearby Tamil Nadu, and also the Kerala Port, which is soon to be the world’s deepest multipurpose port.

With the agreement with SAGT due to expire in 2030 and with India developing their ports, the ECT has become a vital business asset as never before. Another deepwater port terminal operator adjacent to CICT will create more competition. However, the networking and other variables will matter to whoever gets the bid for the ECT.

At the same time, with the growth of global trade (not considering the effects of Covid-19), the Colombo Port is nearing full capacity of handling containers. The Port of Colombo moved to the top position of the Fastest Growing Port Index in the first half of 2018 by industry analyst Alphaliner and is one of the most connected ports in the entire world, handling about seven million TEUs in total. It is vital that the ECT is developed to maintain this growth.

Despite being situated in the centre of the Indian Ocean, and even though we are one of the most connected ports in the world, we are far from becoming a maritime hub. The root cause lies in our inability to be competitive and inadequacy to provide ancillary services such as logistics, bunkering, marine lubricants, fresh water supply, offshore supplies and ship chandelling, warehousing, and many more.

Our rules, regulations, and legal structures on the ownership of some shipping-related services and excessive government intervention, with the government acting as a player in the market and a regulator at the same time, has closed the space for private investment which could propel the Colombo Port to becoming a key global player.

Most experts have become weary of speaking about the same issues, while the opportunity of becoming a maritime hub in the Indian Ocean is slipping out of our hands.

Since the shipping business is based on efficiency and networking, the ECT has to be operated by a private operator and the Government should play a regulatory role and facilitate businesses by being the landlord of the port. This must be done while keeping the ownership of the port rather than trying to engage in the business and be a container terminal operator. Container terminal operation requires sizable capital investments. Private investments, which take the risk for the capital they invest, is the only possible way to create the right incentive structure and create the drive for efficiency and a very competitive business model.

Selecting a good terminal operator

After going back and forth, the previous Government signed a Memorandum of Co-operation (MoC) between Sri Lanka, India, and Japan. According to media reports, the current Government expects to discuss changes to the initial agreement, claiming that the previous deal was unfavourable for the country, and move to a new agreement.

At the same time, the SLPA unions claim that gantry cranes worth $ 25.7 million have been purchased for the development of the ECT, but concerns have been raised over the specifications of the cranes.

We really don’t know the truth

However, His Excellency the President, who received 6.9 million votes for a system change, should explore a method to select a proper operator. Undoubtedly, rather than handpicking operators based on introductions given by individuals, it has to be on a competitive bidding process, based on cost and pricing to ensure the competitiveness of the port with proper specifications. That’s the best system we can employ to find the most suited operator in a price-competitive industry.

Generally, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreements are provided with long tax holidays and the taxpayer has to be protected and prioritised as it is the people who gave the mandate for a system change.

At the same time, when the existing terminal operators bid for the project, their existing capacities and advantages need to be reflected in their pricing, investment, and proposal structure. The system change expected by the taxpayer, in this case, is to set up a system to ensure accountability and that things get done while getting the maximum benefit to the port and by establishing a level playing field for businesses and investors.

In countries like Sri Lanka where discussions revolve around high-value government transactions, there is a higher risk of such projects being influenced by many powerful businessmen and bureaucrats, leading to irregularities and corruption.

The President and the Government now have an opportunity to prove such assumptions wrong and set a prime example of how such a high-level transaction can be transparently managed. A single transaction with a conflict of interest can make a regime unpopular faster than anyone can expect. The Central Bank Bond irregularity is the most recent example.

On the verge of a crucial election and with the prospect of forming a fresh government, we hope Sri Lanka would move forward instead of dragging its feet on the ECT by ensuring and implementing a competitive bidding process (which will help avoid most of the geopolitical pressures) without getting sandwiched in between two global economic powers vying for regional dominance.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Import controls - out of control?

Covered in the Colombo Telegraph

By Erandi de Silva

As the COVID-19 virus forced much of the world into lockdown, the scale of interdependence and reliance on trade across nations was apparent by the global urgency to re-open economies as soon as possible. The shortage of goods and loss of income experienced due to the disruption of supply chains helped some nations realize that a country typically stands to lose more than it may gain by being shut out from the global market. Sri Lanka continually increasing import controls and locking itself out of trading networks then begs the question, why are we punishing ourselves? 

A common justification in people’s minds may be that difficult times call for difficult measures; curbing imports may seem inevitable amidst the current health crisis caused by a contagious virus and the financial threat of a depreciating currency. However, as elections are approaching, it appears these decisions are primarily driven by political and not economic motives. Given that Sri Lanka’s exchange rate became a key campaign topic in the last election, the current rise in import controls seems to be an attempt at artificially maintaining a “strong” currency prior to elections after the excessive money-printing in March this year. 

Furthermore, such decisions should also be recognised as far more than precautionary policies due to the pandemic, and rather, a projection of the national tendency to revert to protectionism. The ban placed on maize imports in mid-January (prior to when the first case of coronavirus was reported in Sri Lanka) indicates this predisposition. Sri Lanka exhibits a recurrent desire - often fueled by nationalistic rhetoric - to boost domestic production or even become self-sufficient across various sectors and industries, sometimes in complete ignorance of comparative advantage and practicalities. This is evidenced in the aftermath of importing 5,000 milk cows in order to boost local dairy production in 2017 which led to many farmers accruing debt whilst over 400 cows died due to poor living conditions. Not only did it result in Sri Lanka still importing; this method was more expensive because now money had to be spent to feed and care for the cows in the absence of their natural habitat. Despite this result, the new Government again approved a proposal to import 2,500 cattle from Australia on the 1st of June this year in the hope of curbing milk product imports to Sri Lanka.

In the case of import controls and such protectionist actions, problems tend to manifest regardless of the intentions behind the implementation of such policies. For example, the maize embargo which was imposed with the intent of accelerating domestic production and protecting local farmers has led to several adversities - now including a shortage of supply. It is important to note that the brunt of the outcome was faced by a vulnerable stakeholder that the Government aims to protect: small-scale poultry farmers. As the main consumers of maize (because it is needed for chicken feed), poultry farmers were initially forced to pay higher prices to obtain maize and were at the mercy of Sri Lanka’s oligopoly of grain collectors. The problem was exacerbated as domestic stocks of maize withered away and suppliers could not import to fill the deficit. According to the Export Development Board, Sri Lanka imported 102,461.175 metric tonnes of maize in 2019 despite domestic production for the year being at 245,647 metric tonnes. This clearly reflects that the local demand for maize is far greater than the domestic capacity for maize production. Another example of unintended consequences can be extracted from the confectionery industry which recently expressed concern regarding the inability to access imported raw materials that are necessary for cost-effective local production. The 340% special commodity levy on block fat and margarine imports which was introduced this month has led to significant strain and job-insecurity within the industry. 

The new administration recently reiterated their pledge made under the ‘Saubhagya Dekma’ policy statement of turning Sri Lanka into a “people-centric production economy”. Despite his claim that limiting imports has “paved the way” for a production economy, it is necessary to understand that even most local businesses require imported materials in order to produce. The latest statistics from the World Bank indicate that 38.19% of our total merchandise imports are intermediate goods that are used locally as inputs for production. Regardless of our ambitions, Sri Lanka’s economy requires imports for growth. Many of our consumables are imported and local businesses, including key exporters such as the textile industry, use imported raw materials. Curbing imports will impede the ability of local businesses to cost-effectively grow.

If the Government fails to readjust its policy on import controls and continues down the path of increasing protectionism post-COVID-19, Sri Lanka may continue to face economic instability and revenue loss within the sectors that are affected by these constraints. Ultimately, despite the rhetoric and propaganda of “saving local businesses” and creating a brand of “made in Sri Lanka” that enamours the public during political campaigns, it is often the most vulnerable within local businesses that stand to lose the most from the enactment of protectionist policies. As poultry farmers struggle to maintain their income and employees within the confectionery industry remain anxious about the status of their jobs, the question remains: why are we punishing ourselves?

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.

Reform for our micro and small businesses

Covered in the Daily FT and Daily Mirror

By Aneetha Warusavitarana

Last Saturday was the UN World Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Day, and in light of that, focus should be given to Sri Lanka’s small businesses and the challenges they face. 

Sri Lankan micro and small enterprises form a substantial part of our economy. Sole proprietorships account for 63.1% of all businesses in the country, and account for 27.1% of national employment (Department of Census and Statistics). However, they face a myriad of challenges and this focus on improving their business environment is welcome. As highlighted in a study conducted by the Advocata Institute on the regulatory barriers faced by micro and small enterprises, the three main challenges faced are access to finance, labour, and rent.

In addition, 45% of micro-enterprises and 10% of small enterprises remain unregistered, exacerbating these problems. Unregistered businesses are excluded from formal sources of finance, business networks, and do not qualify for Government assistance. 

In early March this year, the Cabinet approved the establishment of ‘one-stop shops’ for micro and small businesses in Sri Lanka. This project is now moving forward, with the Government working with the EU to set up these ‘one-stop shops’ in each district; with the aim of streamlining the registration process and providing assistance on issues of access to technology, quality control and access to markets. However, what else is there to be done? 

The problem of registration

Registering a business in Sri Lanka has always been a long, tedious process; one that discouraged businesses and negatively impacted our ease of doing business ranking. However, in 2018, Sri Lanka was witness to some welcome reform with the launch of ‘E-RoC portal’, which streamlined registration, and brought the process completely online. This success in reform was reflected in the country’s ranking on the ease of doing business ranking and was hailed as a reform success. 

However, the E-RoC portal is only applicable to the registration of private companies. 

In Sri Lanka, the registration of private companies is governed by the Companies Act No 07 of 2007, while the registration of sole proprietorships and partnerships are governed by Business Names Ordinance No 06 of 1918. As a result, the E-RoC could not be broadened to include the sole proprietors and partnerships. 

97% of micro-businesses in Sri Lanka and 85% of small businesses have registered their business as sole proprietorships, with only 3% of the businesses surveyed having registered themselves as a partnership, and 2% registering themselves as a Private Limited Company.4 In other words, for the vast majority of micro and small businesses in Sri Lanka, their registration process is long, tedious and unnecessarily convoluted.

How does business registration work for sole proprietors and partnerships?

The process of registration is implemented by the Divisional Secretariats. At best, the country currently has nine different regulatory processes for the registration of sole proprietors and partnerships. The process of registering a sole proprietorship or a partnership in Sri Lanka is a time consuming, complicated task, with the main steps detailed below: 

1. Visit the Divisional Secretariat and collect form and instructions

2. Fill out the application

3. Provide documentation

   • Proof of ownership of business premises

   • Original Deed and notarised copy or

   • Original Rent agreement and notarised copy, or

   • No Objection letter from the owner of the premises

   • NIC copy

   • Tax assessment notification for the premises

   • Copy of the partnership business agreement

   4. Visit the Grama Niladhari and get the application and attached documents approved

   5. Receive additional approvals depending on the business type e.g.: PHI approval

   6. Hand over completed application to the Divisional Secretariat.

A majority of provinces do not have the application for business registration or the instructions sheet available for download from the Divisional Secretariat or Provincial Council website, and the instruction form is not always available in all three languages. 

This is in comparison to much simpler processes that have become standard internationally, and have also been replicated in Sri Lanka, as was seen with the E-RoC reform for private companies. 

Address the problem at hand

According to the island-wide survey conducted by the Advocata Institute, over 80% of respondents found the Grama Niladhari and the Divisional Secretariat to be an effective touch point. This would indicate that improving service at this point may not be an immediate requirement. Instead, focus should be placed on reforming the registration process for micro and small enterprises. 

Sri Lanka’s micro and small enterprises will have faced significant economic fallout during the curfew period. The Government has recognised this and responded with policy action like the debt moratorium to help ease some financial pressure. However, this is unlikely to be sufficient. These policies would only apply to entities that have registered their business and would leave the segment of unregistered businesses without support. It is vital that the registration process is streamlined, making it easier for these businesses to enter the formal sector and reap the benefits for formal sources of finance, and better access to markets that come with formalisation. There is a window for reform that exists, and we hope that the Government takes advantage of this to bring about some much-needed change.