Electricity reform: The battle between control and competitiveness

By Dhananath Fernando

Originally appeared on the Morning

The amendments to the Sri Lanka Electricity Act of 2024 have once again stirred public discourse, as key international development partners – namely the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB), and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) – have raised serious concerns about their implications.

Sri Lanka’s power sector reform journey, particularly the unbundling of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), has been a prolonged and often politically fraught conversation. The recent economic crisis made one thing clear: inefficiencies and structural rigidities in the energy sector are no longer sustainable. 

In response, a new bill was passed, aiming to restructure the sector by unbundling the CEB into generation, transmission, and distribution entities. This was intended to facilitate grid upgrades, improve renewable energy absorption, and lower costs while improving service delivery.

Yet, the devil – as always – is in the details. The accompanying table contains a summary of the four key concerns raised by development partners, along with the corresponding responses from the Director General of the Power Sector Reforms Secretariat.

On the surface, the responses summarised in the table seem to address concerns. But policy isn’t judged by intentions; it is judged by results. And to get results, legislation must be clear, enforceable, and resistant to misuse by future governments. Unfortunately, the Electricity Act still leaves many grey areas, which could cause more problems than it solves.

Take permanent Government ownership, for instance. The Government says it will only hold on to generation and distribution companies for now, but there is no clear legal path or timeline for opening up future entities to investment. Without clear guarantees, this could become a case of kicking the can down the road, keeping control within State hands while blocking much-needed capital and innovation. 

Then there is the issue concerning a National Transmission Network Service Provider (NTNSP). Even if the NTNSP won’t directly handle power generation, it will still own companies that do. This undermines the principle of unbundling, which is all about separating who generates power from who transmits it, so that the playing field is fair for everyone. You cannot say you are de-merging the system while letting one player wear two hats.

On the question relating to the Lanka Electricity Company (LECO), the response says only the CEB’s 55% stake is involved and that LECO will remain independent. But the act gives enough flexibility for future decisions that could quietly erode LECO’s autonomy. Without explicit protections written into law, these assurances are only as strong as the next government’s intentions.

Finally, on tariffs: while the regulator is supposed to have the final say, the phrase “in consultation with the Ministry of Finance” in legal terms can mean joint decision-making. That could politicise price-setting, delay reforms, and discourage private investment. What investors want is clarity; ambiguity is their biggest fear.

In public policy, it is not the intent but the outcome that matters.

At the heart of all four concerns lies a common thread – control over market dynamics and decision-making. Two underlying fears appear to drive the insistence on Government ownership: the fear of losing control over a strategic sector and the pressure from trade unions worried about losing the privileges that come from monopoly protection. These are not unfounded concerns, but they are not sufficient justifications to resist reform.

Strategic interest is best preserved not through outright ownership but through strong regulation. Maintaining Government ownership over generation and distribution does not guarantee better outcomes for consumers. Instead, a robust, independent regulator and a competitive market architecture are more likely to deliver efficiency, lower costs, and innovation.

Moreover, modernising our grid is critical not just for absorbing renewable energy but also for positioning Sri Lanka to eventually export electricity, especially through grid connectivity with India – a long-term but strategic goal.

Another key principle is that legislation should be designed not just for today’s leaders but to guard against potential misuse by future actors with less noble intentions. A vague clause, even with the best current leadership, can become a tool for rent-seeking or manipulation down the line. 

The ambiguity around the Ministry of Finance’s involvement in tariff setting, for instance, opens the door for potential political interference, even if unintentional.

The political economy of reform is such that ambiguity breeds resistance, from investors and insiders alike. Leaving grey areas in legislation invites both capital flight and capture by vested interests.

Ultimately, the Electricity Act must be evaluated on its ability to foster competition that is regulated, not ownership that is politicised. The objective should be clear: maximise consumer benefit in terms of price, reliability, and national security. In chasing control, we risk losing all three. 

Concerns and responses 

Summary of concerns by WB, ADB, and JICA

Response by Director General of the Power Sector Reforms Secretariat

1. Permanent Government ownership

Legislating 100% permanent State ownership for key electricity entities limits flexibility, deters private investment, and increases the long-term burden on the Government.

The Government of Sri Lanka will retain 100% permanent ownership only in the generation and distribution companies created through the preliminary transfer. Further unbundled entities, except for hydropower, will not be subjected to this restriction.

2. Concerns with National Transmission Network Service Provider (NTNSP) structure

Including LTL Holdings and Sri Lanka Energies under the NTNSP undermines unbundling, risks conflicts of interest, and reduces transparency.

The CEB’s stakes in these entities are classified as assets to be transferred to the NTNSP. The NTNSP will be limited to transmission functions. No re-bundling will occur, and power purchase agreements will be managed competitively by the National System Operator (NSO).

3. Distribution company risks

Merging LECO into the new distribution company disregards operational and governance structures, risking reversal of previous efficiency gains.

Only the CEB’s 55% stake in LECO will be affected. LECO will remain a separate legal entity, with the freedom to pursue private investment. There will be no full absorption.

4. Tariff-setting ambiguity

Changing “after consultation” to “in consultation” with the Ministry of Finance in tariff-setting risks undermining regulatory independence.

Although tariffs are now to be set “in consultation with the Ministry of Finance,” the regulator retains final authority, in accordance with national tariff policy.