One-size-fits-all reform strategy will not work

Originally appeared on The Morning.

By Dhananath Fernando

It is said that there are three kinds of people: those who watch things happen, those who make things happen, and those who wonder what happened. Sri Lanka’s economic crisis and its story of reforms is undeniably a case of the latter.

Unfortunately, our key institutions and the Government authorities who are currently in the driving seat fall into a new category called ‘those who wonder what happened, but frankly just don’t care’.

A good example is the recent discussion on the validity of the debt servicing suspension announcement. Since Parliament has the power to approve all public finance decisions, questions have been raised as to how such an important decision, which was made for the first time in the history of Sri Lanka, was not tabled before Parliament for approval.

Of course, if we had enough money and if our State coffers held a reasonable amount of foreign reserves, we wouldn’t have needed to skip debt servicing or suspend debt repayments, and this would not have been an issue. However, it is no secret that the country did not even have enough funds to clear a shipment of LP Gas worth $ 20-30 million. The phrase ‘scraping the bottom of the barrel’ is not appropriate in this instance, because there is simply nothing at the bottom.

Warnings fell on deaf ears

There were multiple alerts on Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability issued by local intellectuals as well as by common men and women. Global banks such as Citibank even issued a report titled ‘Denial is not a strategy’. But their warnings fell on deaf ears as our Parliament and Central Bank did next to nothing to remedy the situation.

Months after suspending debt payments, Parliament is now questioning whether the debt suspension decision had been approved by them. Instead, they should be asking themselves what they were doing for so long when it was obvious that we did not have money to pay our debt.

When the country was heading straight towards bankruptcy, many policymakers did not bother to question what was happening. This does not justify the failure to follow parliamentary protocol, of course, but two wrongs will not make a right.

In desperate need of reforms

The current system is a clear indication that our institutions are in desperate need of a complete reform programme, one that includes political reforms. However, expecting reforms to be implemented by a set of policymakers who, up until very recently, did not even bother to question what was happening may be too high an expectation.

The execution of a solid reform programme requires building upon an understanding of what these reforms should be as well as understanding the importance of laying the foundations for strong, independent institutions. Along with specialist skills, a commitment to seeing these reforms through is required. Political reforms should support economic reforms and vice versa.

SOEs as a starting point

A good starting point is reforming State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). It is quite surprising to me that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) press release on the Staff-Level Agreement (SLA) gives little significance to SOE reforms.

One of the seven main points highlighted by the IMF and the Government is the need for cost reflective pricing for energy and petroleum products. This is a welcome move, but it will lead to the same problems we have been facing so far.

Given the state of our institutions, our politicians will adopt the cost reflective pricing strategy for as long as is needed and then simply revert back to their old habits – changing the pricing formula, bringing prices down, and ignoring the cost factor. For this reason, our reforms have to be of a much more permanent nature this time around and that is why we need a strong combination of specialist skills and a commitment to implementing these reforms.

The role of the Government

The Government’s role is not to conduct business, and a private sector business leader recently said as much: “The Government’s only business is to not to do business.” Simply looking at which enterprises make profits or incur losses is definitely the wrong way to look at it.

Government businesses that make profits at present can incur losses in future. The Government has the ability to destroy any notion of a level playing field and can support Government businesses through loans, subsidies, and special permits. The vast majority of profit-making SOEs are not profitable solely due to their own efforts, and in reality, they aren’t competitive businesses.

For instance, it is widely known that the Development Lotteries Board is a profit-making Government institution. What may be a lesser known fact is that there is only one other competitor – the National Lotteries Board, and the directors of both these companies are appointed by the Minister of Finance. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be a surprise that the Development Lotteries Board is profitable.

Therefore, looking solely at profitability won’t address prevailing issues. We have to first look at what the role of the Government should be.

It is true that all SOE reforms cannot adopt a one-size-fits-all strategy. Different SOEs have to be treated differently. This treatment has to be based on the principle of the government having no role in business.

In cricket and football, it is a commonly held view that the umpire or referee has no role in playing the game. It is the umpire’s responsibility to overlook the game and ensure that it is being played fairly. The umpire’s decision is final and if the umpire acts more favourably towards one side, there is another set of regulation mechanisms to manage this. The umpire facilitates the competitive nature of the game. The same holds true for the role of the government.

Many options have been discussed for reforming SOEs, including privatisation and SOE consolidation that follows models like the Temasek in Singapore and Khazanah in Malaysia. Regardless of which option is chosen and which model is followed, we expect the Government to implement SOE reforms on a case-by-case basis, with special attention being paid to the role of the State.

If we fail to understand the role of the State and implement solutions for SOEs based on this, Sri Lanka’s reform programme will probably fall into the category of things that make people ‘wonder what happened’. People will certainly question the reform programme and its credibility, while our next generation will wonder how they inherited such a poorly-managed nation that was once so full of potential.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.