When ‘national assets’ become ‘national liabilities’

Originally appeared on The Morning

By Dhananath Fernando

• Understanding the Trinco Oil Tank Farm controversy

Robert Kysokai, the author of the book “Rich Dad Poor Dad”, defines the difference between an asset and a liability quite simply. According to Mr. Kysokai, who is a management guru, anything which creates a cash flow is an asset and anything that dries the cash flow is a liability. If someone buys a car to be rented out to a taxi service, then it is an asset, because it can create cash flow and generate income. It can cover the expenses of the car from the income it creates by being used as a taxi. But if someone buys the same car to commute to work, it’s a liability, because it dries the existing cash flow from a different cash inflow, as the buyer has to incur regular cost for fuel, insurance, running costs, etc.

The lack of understanding of this simple concept has cost Sri Lanka a few generations of delayed development, with the recent fiasco surrounding the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm story being a prime example of this.

The discussion surrounding the Trinco Oil Tank Farm is a good case study to explore the question as to whether the resources we have as a country are actually “national assets” or “national liabilities”. In most cases, holding onto national resources has gone on to create “breeding grounds for corruption and crime”, thereby becoming national liabilities.

The Trincomalee Oil Tanks were developed by the British, using labour from British territories in Africa between 1924 and 1930 – almost a century ago. The project plan was to develop 102 oil tanks. Tank number 100 was not developed and tank number 91 was destroyed due to an aeroplane accident. The tanks were constructed with inch-thick steel and protected with foot-thick concrete rings. The objective of setting up the tanks in Trincomalee was to make the  Trincomalee Port a naval hub in the region. This could be utilised for trade and military usage. The Trincomalee Port was one of the main natural deep-water ports where big vessels can be docked easily. So the vision behind setting up an oil tank farm in Trincomalee was mainly to set up an ecosystem for naval operations and bunkering operations.

In the meantime, in the 1970s, Sri Lanka introduced a policy of nationalisation and self-sufficiency. As a result, the properties of foreign energy companies that were in operation were asked to leave our shores, with the government monopolising the energy market.

Singapore took this as an opportunity and embraced all oil companies that left our shores. They were, in fact, welcomed with open arms. Provisions were made for them to invest and provide the freedom to take their profits off if they wanted. But instead of taking the profits off, investors invested them back into Singapore and made Singapore a dominant trading hub in the region, while also making it a maritime centre. Sri Lanka lost a great opportunity. This loss is signified  by the difference in the GDP per capita of the two countries. In approximate figures, Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP is $ 4,000 while Singapore’s per capita GDP is $ 60,000.

Rather than utilising the resources of oil tanks as an asset by working with foreign investors, the government taking over the energy market converted the asset into a liability. As a result, taxpayers have to keep supporting the colossal loss-making Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), which was a creation of this monopolising energy markets.

Since the nationalisation and self-sufficiency attempts in the 1970s, only about 15 oil tanks were used by CPC and their subsidiary, Ceylon Petroleum Storage Terminals (CPST) Ltd., till 2002, when Indian Oil Company bought one third of CPST’s shares. Then, the 15 tanks were leased out on a 35-year lease agreement to India for development. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) war too obstructed the optimum usage of the tanks. Each tank in the  Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm has a storage capacity of about 12,000 MT per tank, which accounts for about 1.2 million MT of storage in the entire facility. The recently built Muthurajawela Oil Tank Facility, built with a $ 72 million loan from China’s Exim Bank (total investment was $ 157 million), can only store upto about 250,000 MT. So the capacity of the Trincomalee Oil Tanks is far more substantial.

However, according to the shipping  industry expert Mr.Rohan Masakorala, the  LTTE problem would never  have taken off if the foriegn oil companies were allowed to operate in Trincomalee. According to him their entire eastern coastal belt would have been developed as much as Colombo, if we had allowed the foreign capital and technology to flow in,  especially in the Energy Market.

In 2018, the then Minister of Petroleum had discussions on a joint development project with India for 15 oil tanks out of the remaining 85 tanks. Again, another political monsoon started and nothing took off. So for nearly a century, we really didn’t use the Trincomalee Oil Tanks, although we still claim it as a “national asset”. Refurbishment of Phase I of the Trincomalee Oil Tanks requires a few billion dollars of capital. It also requires technology beyond our shores, and having an international partner is the only way to operationalise it.

Again in February, the current Minister of Petroleum announced that Sri Lanka is going to take over all oil tanks. Now there is a national interest on these oil tanks as a result of the Indian Foreign Secretary’s visit. The simple reality is that the 100 oil tanks which we failed to do anything with for 100 years, which occupies valuable land stretching 850 acres, are not really assets at present, from an economic perspective. They are simply liabilities, and in our case, they are even more than liabilities.

The only solution we have is to open our resources for foreign investments, if Sri Lanka is really serious about coming out from this economic downturn. Trincomalee has the potential to become a revenue-earning asset. The emerging Bay of Bengal economy is just opposite the Trincomalee Port. Chennai, Bangladesh, Visakhapatnam, and Thailand are countries and cities with large populations, with bigger markets where Trincomalee has the capacity to trade with and become a naval point for much larger economies. Currently, the trade volume we do at the Trincomalee Port is very limited, and the Prima factory and the cement plant are the only players presently using these facilities.

We have to think about Trincomalee as a whole and see the bigger picture than just seeing a fraction of it. The development of Trincomalee can be further extended with tourism up to our southern beach belt.

National assets are the ones that generate cash flows, regardless of ownership, and national liabilities dry up our cash flow. From an economic perspective, what we really celebrate as “national assets” and what we really try to hold for ourselves are “national liabilities”.

The opinions expressed are the author’s own views. They may not necessarily reflect the views of the Advocata Institute or anyone affiliated with the institute.